2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
14 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
17 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
18 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
21 #include <linux/config.h>
22 #include <linux/module.h>
23 #include <linux/init.h>
24 #include <linux/kernel.h>
25 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
26 #include <linux/errno.h>
27 #include <linux/sched.h>
28 #include <linux/security.h>
29 #include <linux/xattr.h>
30 #include <linux/capability.h>
31 #include <linux/unistd.h>
33 #include <linux/mman.h>
34 #include <linux/slab.h>
35 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
36 #include <linux/swap.h>
37 #include <linux/smp_lock.h>
38 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
39 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
40 #include <linux/file.h>
41 #include <linux/namei.h>
42 #include <linux/mount.h>
43 #include <linux/ext2_fs.h>
44 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
46 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
48 #include <linux/tty.h>
50 #include <net/ip.h> /* for sysctl_local_port_range[] */
51 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
52 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
53 #include <asm/semaphore.h>
54 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
55 #include <linux/bitops.h>
56 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
57 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
58 #include <linux/netlink.h>
59 #include <linux/tcp.h>
60 #include <linux/udp.h>
61 #include <linux/quota.h>
62 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
63 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
64 #include <linux/parser.h>
65 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
67 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
68 #include <linux/personality.h>
69 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
70 #include <linux/audit.h>
71 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
78 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
80 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
81 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
83 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
84 int selinux_enforcing = 0;
86 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
88 selinux_enforcing = simple_strtol(str,NULL,0);
91 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
94 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
95 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
97 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
99 selinux_enabled = simple_strtol(str, NULL, 0);
102 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
105 /* Original (dummy) security module. */
106 static struct security_operations *original_ops = NULL;
108 /* Minimal support for a secondary security module,
109 just to allow the use of the dummy or capability modules.
110 The owlsm module can alternatively be used as a secondary
111 module as long as CONFIG_OWLSM_FD is not enabled. */
112 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops = NULL;
114 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
115 before the policy was loaded. */
116 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
117 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
119 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
121 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
123 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
125 tsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
129 memset(tsec, 0, sizeof(struct task_security_struct));
130 tsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
132 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = tsec->ptrace_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
133 task->security = tsec;
138 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
140 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
142 if (!tsec || tsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
145 task->security = NULL;
149 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
151 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
152 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
154 isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
158 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct inode_security_struct));
159 init_MUTEX(&isec->sem);
160 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
161 isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
163 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
164 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
165 if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC)
166 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
168 isec->task_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
169 inode->i_security = isec;
174 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
176 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
177 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
179 if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
182 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
183 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
184 list_del_init(&isec->list);
185 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
187 inode->i_security = NULL;
191 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
193 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
194 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
196 fsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_ATOMIC);
200 memset(fsec, 0, sizeof(struct file_security_struct));
201 fsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
203 if (tsec && tsec->magic == SELINUX_MAGIC) {
204 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
205 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
207 fsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
208 fsec->fown_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
210 file->f_security = fsec;
215 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
217 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
219 if (!fsec || fsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
222 file->f_security = NULL;
226 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
228 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
230 sbsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
234 memset(sbsec, 0, sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct));
235 init_MUTEX(&sbsec->sem);
236 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
237 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
238 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
239 sbsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
241 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
242 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
243 sb->s_security = sbsec;
248 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
250 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
252 if (!sbsec || sbsec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
255 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
256 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
257 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
258 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
260 sb->s_security = NULL;
264 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
265 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
267 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
269 if (family != PF_UNIX)
272 ssec = kmalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
276 memset(ssec, 0, sizeof(*ssec));
277 ssec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
279 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
280 sk->sk_security = ssec;
285 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
287 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
289 if (sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX || ssec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
292 sk->sk_security = NULL;
295 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
297 /* The security server must be initialized before
298 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
299 extern int ss_initialized;
301 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
303 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
305 "uses transition SIDs",
307 "uses genfs_contexts",
308 "not configured for labeling",
309 "uses mountpoint labeling",
312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
316 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
325 static match_table_t tokens = {
326 {Opt_context, "context=%s"},
327 {Opt_fscontext, "fscontext=%s"},
328 {Opt_defcontext, "defcontext=%s"},
331 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
333 static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
335 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
338 int alloc = 0, rc = 0, seen = 0;
339 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
340 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
345 name = sb->s_type->name;
347 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
349 /* NFS we understand. */
350 if (!strcmp(name, "nfs")) {
351 struct nfs_mount_data *d = data;
353 if (d->version < NFS_MOUNT_VERSION)
357 context = d->context;
364 /* Standard string-based options. */
365 char *p, *options = data;
367 while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
369 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
374 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
380 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
383 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
394 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_fscontext)) {
396 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
399 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
406 seen |= Opt_fscontext;
410 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
412 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: "
413 "defcontext option is invalid "
414 "for this filesystem type\n");
417 if (seen & (Opt_context|Opt_defcontext)) {
419 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
422 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
429 seen |= Opt_defcontext;
434 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount "
446 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, strlen(context), &sid);
448 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
449 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
450 context, sb->s_id, name, rc);
454 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
455 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
459 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
460 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
466 if (seen & Opt_context)
467 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
471 rc = security_context_to_sid(defcontext, strlen(defcontext), &sid);
473 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
474 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
475 defcontext, sb->s_id, name, rc);
479 if (sid == sbsec->def_sid)
482 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
483 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
487 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
488 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
492 sbsec->def_sid = sid;
504 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
506 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
507 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
508 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
512 if (sbsec->initialized)
515 if (!ss_initialized) {
516 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
517 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
518 server is ready to handle calls. */
519 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
520 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
521 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
522 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
526 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
527 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
529 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
530 __FUNCTION__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
534 rc = try_context_mount(sb, data);
538 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
539 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
540 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
541 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
542 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
543 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
544 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
545 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
546 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
550 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
551 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
552 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
553 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
554 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
555 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
557 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
558 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
559 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
564 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
567 sbsec->initialized = 1;
569 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) {
570 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
571 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
574 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
575 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
576 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
579 /* Initialize the root inode. */
580 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(sb->s_root->d_inode, sb->s_root);
582 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
583 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
584 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
586 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
588 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
589 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
590 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
591 struct inode_security_struct, list);
592 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
593 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
594 inode = igrab(inode);
596 if (!IS_PRIVATE (inode))
600 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
601 list_del_init(&isec->list);
604 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
610 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
612 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
614 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
616 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
618 return SECCLASS_FILE;
620 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
624 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
626 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
630 return SECCLASS_FILE;
633 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
640 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
642 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
649 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
651 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
653 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
659 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
660 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
661 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
662 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
663 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
665 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
667 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
668 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
669 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
671 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
673 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
674 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
675 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
676 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
677 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
679 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
682 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
684 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
687 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
690 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
691 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
696 char *buffer, *path, *end;
698 buffer = (char*)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
708 while (de && de != de->parent) {
709 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
713 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
718 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
719 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
723 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
731 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
732 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
734 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
735 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
737 struct dentry *dentry;
738 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
739 char *context = NULL;
744 if (isec->initialized)
749 if (isec->initialized)
752 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
753 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
754 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
755 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
756 server is ready to handle calls. */
757 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
758 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
759 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
760 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
764 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
765 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
766 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
767 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
771 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
772 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
774 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
775 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
777 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
778 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
781 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: no dentry for dev=%s "
782 "ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
787 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
788 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
794 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
797 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
798 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
806 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
812 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
818 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
819 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: getxattr returned "
820 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
821 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
825 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
826 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
829 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
832 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: context_to_sid(%s) "
833 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
834 __FUNCTION__, context, -rc,
835 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
837 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
845 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
846 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
848 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
849 /* Default to the fs SID. */
850 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
852 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
853 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
854 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
863 /* Default to the fs SID. */
864 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
867 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
869 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
870 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
881 isec->initialized = 1;
884 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
885 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
892 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
893 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
899 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
900 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
903 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
904 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
907 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
908 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
911 /* All other signals. */
912 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
919 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
920 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
921 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
922 struct task_struct *tsk2,
925 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
927 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
928 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
929 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
930 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
933 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
934 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
937 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
938 struct avc_audit_data ad;
940 tsec = tsk->security;
942 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,CAP);
946 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
947 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(cap), &ad);
950 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
951 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
954 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
956 tsec = tsk->security;
958 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
959 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
962 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
963 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
964 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
965 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
968 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
970 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
971 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
972 struct avc_audit_data ad;
974 tsec = tsk->security;
975 isec = inode->i_security;
979 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
980 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
983 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
986 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
987 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
988 pathname if needed. */
989 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
990 struct vfsmount *mnt,
991 struct dentry *dentry,
994 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
995 struct avc_audit_data ad;
996 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
998 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
999 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1002 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1003 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1004 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1005 check a particular permission to the file.
1006 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1007 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1008 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1009 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1010 static inline int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1014 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1015 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1016 struct vfsmount *mnt = file->f_vfsmnt;
1017 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_dentry;
1018 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1019 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1022 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1024 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1026 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1027 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1035 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1037 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1042 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1043 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1044 struct dentry *dentry,
1047 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1048 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1049 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1051 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1054 tsec = current->security;
1055 dsec = dir->i_security;
1056 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1058 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1059 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1061 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1062 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1067 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1068 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1070 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1076 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1080 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1081 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1082 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1086 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1089 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1090 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1091 struct dentry *dentry,
1095 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1096 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1097 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1101 tsec = current->security;
1102 dsec = dir->i_security;
1103 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1105 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1106 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
1109 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1110 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1125 printk(KERN_WARNING "may_link: unrecognized kind %d\n", kind);
1129 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1133 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1134 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1135 struct inode *new_dir,
1136 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1138 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1139 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1140 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1142 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1145 tsec = current->security;
1146 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1147 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1148 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1149 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1151 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1153 ad.u.fs.dentry = old_dentry;
1154 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1155 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1158 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1159 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1162 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1163 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1164 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1169 ad.u.fs.dentry = new_dentry;
1170 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1171 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1172 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1173 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1176 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1177 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1178 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1179 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1181 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1189 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1190 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1191 struct super_block *sb,
1193 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1195 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1196 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1198 tsec = tsk->security;
1199 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1200 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1204 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1205 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1209 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1210 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1211 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1212 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1215 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1217 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1221 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1223 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1225 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1232 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1233 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1237 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1239 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1240 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1249 /* Set an inode's SID to a specified value. */
1250 static int inode_security_set_sid(struct inode *inode, u32 sid)
1252 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1253 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1255 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1256 /* Defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
1261 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1263 isec->initialized = 1;
1268 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1270 static int selinux_ptrace(struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
1272 struct task_security_struct *psec = parent->security;
1273 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1276 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace(parent,child);
1280 rc = task_has_perm(parent, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1281 /* Save the SID of the tracing process for later use in apply_creds. */
1283 csec->ptrace_sid = psec->sid;
1287 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1288 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1292 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1296 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1299 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1300 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1304 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1308 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1311 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1312 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1314 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1317 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1321 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1325 return task_has_capability(tsk,cap);
1328 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1332 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1336 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1340 tsec = current->security;
1342 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(table->de, (op == 001) ?
1343 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1345 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1346 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1349 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1350 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1352 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1353 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1361 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1362 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1368 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1381 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1383 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1388 rc = superblock_has_perm(current,
1390 FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1393 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1399 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1401 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1404 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1408 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1413 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1414 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1415 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1417 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1418 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1419 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1420 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1422 case 0: /* Close log */
1423 case 1: /* Open log */
1424 case 2: /* Read from log */
1425 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1426 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1428 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1435 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1436 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1437 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1439 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1440 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1441 * the capability is granted.
1443 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1444 * processes that allocate mappings.
1446 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
1448 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1449 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1451 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1453 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1454 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1455 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1461 return __vm_enough_memory(pages, cap_sys_admin);
1464 /* binprm security operations */
1466 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1468 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1470 bsec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1474 memset(bsec, 0, sizeof *bsec);
1475 bsec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
1477 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1480 bprm->security = bsec;
1484 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1486 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1487 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1488 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1489 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1491 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1494 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
1498 bsec = bprm->security;
1503 tsec = current->security;
1504 isec = inode->i_security;
1506 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1507 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
1509 /* Reset create SID on execve. */
1510 tsec->create_sid = 0;
1512 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
1513 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
1514 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1517 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1518 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1519 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
1524 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1525 ad.u.fs.mnt = bprm->file->f_vfsmnt;
1526 ad.u.fs.dentry = bprm->file->f_dentry;
1528 if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
1531 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
1532 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1533 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
1537 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
1538 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
1539 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
1543 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
1544 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
1548 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
1549 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
1551 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
1559 static int selinux_bprm_check_security (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1561 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
1565 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec (struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1567 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1570 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
1571 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
1572 the noatsecure permission is granted between
1573 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
1574 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
1576 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
1579 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
1582 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1584 kfree(bprm->security);
1585 bprm->security = NULL;
1588 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
1589 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
1591 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
1592 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct * files)
1594 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1595 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
1596 struct tty_struct *tty = current->signal->tty;
1601 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_list);
1603 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
1604 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
1605 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
1606 file may belong to another process and we are only
1607 interested in the inode-based check here. */
1608 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
1609 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
1610 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
1611 /* Reset controlling tty. */
1612 current->signal->tty = NULL;
1613 current->signal->tty_old_pgrp = 0;
1619 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
1621 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1623 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1625 unsigned long set, i;
1630 if (i >= files->max_fds || i >= files->max_fdset)
1632 set = files->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
1635 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1636 for ( ; set ; i++,set >>= 1) {
1641 if (file_has_perm(current,
1643 file_to_av(file))) {
1645 fd = get_unused_fd();
1653 atomic_inc(&devnull->f_count);
1655 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
1662 fd_install(fd, devnull);
1667 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
1670 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
1673 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
1675 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1676 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1680 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
1682 tsec = current->security;
1684 bsec = bprm->security;
1687 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
1689 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
1690 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
1691 unchanged and kill. */
1692 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
1693 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1694 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
1701 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
1702 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
1703 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
1704 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
1705 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
1717 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
1719 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1721 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1722 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
1723 struct itimerval itimer;
1724 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1727 tsec = current->security;
1728 bsec = bprm->security;
1731 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
1734 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
1737 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
1738 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
1740 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
1741 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
1742 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
1743 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
1744 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
1745 will be checked against the new SID. */
1746 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1747 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
1749 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
1750 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
1751 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
1752 flush_signals(current);
1753 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1754 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
1755 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
1756 recalc_sigpending();
1757 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
1760 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
1761 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
1762 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
1763 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
1764 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
1765 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
1766 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
1767 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
1768 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
1770 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
1771 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
1773 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
1774 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
1775 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
1776 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max,initrlim->rlim_cur);
1778 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
1780 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
1783 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
1787 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
1788 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
1789 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
1792 /* superblock security operations */
1794 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
1796 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
1799 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
1801 superblock_free_security(sb);
1804 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
1809 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
1812 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
1814 return (match_prefix("context=", sizeof("context=")-1, option, len) ||
1815 match_prefix("fscontext=", sizeof("fscontext=")-1, option, len) ||
1816 match_prefix("defcontext=", sizeof("defcontext=")-1, option, len));
1819 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
1827 memcpy(*to, from, len);
1831 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(struct file_system_type *type, void *orig, void *copy)
1833 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
1834 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
1835 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
1840 /* Binary mount data: just copy */
1841 if (type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) {
1842 copy_page(sec_curr, in_curr);
1846 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1854 in_save = in_end = orig;
1857 if (*in_end == ',' || *in_end == '\0') {
1858 int len = in_end - in_curr;
1860 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
1861 take_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
1863 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
1865 in_curr = in_end + 1;
1867 } while (*in_end++);
1869 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
1870 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
1875 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1877 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1880 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
1884 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1885 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1886 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
1889 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct super_block *sb)
1891 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1893 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
1894 ad.u.fs.dentry = sb->s_root;
1895 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
1898 static int selinux_mount(char * dev_name,
1899 struct nameidata *nd,
1901 unsigned long flags,
1906 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, nd, type, flags, data);
1910 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
1911 return superblock_has_perm(current, nd->mnt->mnt_sb,
1912 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
1914 return dentry_has_perm(current, nd->mnt, nd->dentry,
1918 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
1922 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
1926 return superblock_has_perm(current,mnt->mnt_sb,
1927 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT,NULL);
1930 /* inode security operations */
1932 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
1934 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
1937 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
1939 inode_free_security(inode);
1942 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
1943 char **name, void **value,
1946 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1947 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1948 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1949 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1952 char *namep = NULL, *context;
1954 tsec = current->security;
1955 dsec = dir->i_security;
1956 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1957 isec = inode->i_security;
1959 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1960 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1962 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
1963 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
1966 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
1967 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
1970 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1975 inode_security_set_sid(inode, newsid);
1978 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
1985 rc = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &context, &clen);
1997 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
1999 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2002 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2006 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry,dir,new_dentry);
2009 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2012 static void selinux_inode_post_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2017 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2021 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2024 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2027 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2029 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2032 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2034 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2037 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2039 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2042 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2046 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2050 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2053 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2054 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2056 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2059 static void selinux_inode_post_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2060 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2065 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2067 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2070 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2074 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry,nameidata);
2077 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2080 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
2081 struct nameidata *nd)
2085 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask, nd);
2090 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2094 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2095 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2098 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2102 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2106 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2109 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2110 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2111 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2113 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2116 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2118 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2121 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name, void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2123 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2124 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2125 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2126 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2127 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2131 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2132 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2133 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2134 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2135 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2136 Restrict to administrator. */
2140 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2141 ordinary setattr permission. */
2142 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2145 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2146 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2149 if ((current->fsuid != inode->i_uid) && !capable(CAP_FOWNER))
2152 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,FS);
2153 ad.u.fs.dentry = dentry;
2155 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2156 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2160 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2164 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2165 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2169 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2174 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2176 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2177 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2181 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *name,
2182 void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2184 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2185 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2189 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2190 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2194 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2196 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: unable to obtain SID for context "
2197 "%s, rc=%d\n", __FUNCTION__, (char*)value, -rc);
2205 static int selinux_inode_getxattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2207 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2208 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2210 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2213 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2216 static int selinux_inode_listxattr (struct dentry *dentry)
2218 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2221 static int selinux_inode_removexattr (struct dentry *dentry, char *name)
2223 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2224 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2225 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1) &&
2226 !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2227 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2228 Restrict to administrator. */
2232 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2233 ordinary setattr permission. Might want a separate
2234 permission for removexattr. */
2235 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2238 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2239 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2243 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void *buffer, size_t size)
2245 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2250 /* Permission check handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.*/
2252 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2255 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
2259 if (!buffer || !size) {
2267 memcpy(buffer, context, len);
2272 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2273 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2275 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2279 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2282 if (!value || !size)
2285 rc = security_context_to_sid((void*)value, size, &newsid);
2293 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2295 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2296 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2297 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2301 /* file security operations */
2303 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2305 struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
2308 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2312 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2313 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2316 return file_has_perm(current, file,
2317 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2320 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2322 return file_alloc_security(file);
2325 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2327 file_free_security(file);
2330 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2342 case EXT2_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2344 case EXT2_IOC_GETVERSION:
2345 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2348 case EXT2_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2350 case EXT2_IOC_SETVERSION:
2351 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2354 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
2358 error = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2363 error = task_has_capability(current,CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG);
2366 /* default case assumes that the command will go
2367 * to the file's ioctl() function.
2370 error = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__IOCTL);
2376 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2378 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2379 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2381 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2382 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2383 * This has an additional check.
2385 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2392 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2393 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2395 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2396 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2399 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2400 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2402 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2407 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2408 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
2412 rc = secondary_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags);
2416 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2419 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
2420 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
2423 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
2424 unsigned long reqprot,
2429 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
2433 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
2436 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2437 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
2438 (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
2439 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk)) {
2441 * We are making an executable mapping in the brk region.
2442 * This has an additional execheap check.
2444 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
2448 if (vma->vm_file != NULL && vma->anon_vma != NULL && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
2450 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
2451 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been written,
2452 * check ability to execute the possibly modified content.
2453 * This typically should only occur for text relocations.
2455 int rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
2459 if (!vma->vm_file && (prot & PROT_EXEC) &&
2460 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
2461 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
2462 /* Attempt to make the process stack executable.
2463 * This has an additional execstack check.
2465 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
2471 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
2474 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
2476 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2479 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2486 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2491 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
2492 err = file_has_perm(current, file,FILE__WRITE);
2501 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
2502 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
2507 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
2512 if (!file->f_dentry || !file->f_dentry->d_inode) {
2516 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
2523 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
2525 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2526 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2528 tsec = current->security;
2529 fsec = file->f_security;
2530 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
2535 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
2536 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
2540 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2541 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
2543 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
2544 file = (struct file *)((long)fown - offsetof(struct file,f_owner));
2546 tsec = tsk->security;
2547 fsec = file->f_security;
2550 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
2552 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
2554 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
2555 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
2558 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
2560 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
2563 /* task security operations */
2565 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
2569 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
2573 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
2576 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2578 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
2581 tsec1 = current->security;
2583 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
2586 tsec2 = tsk->security;
2588 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
2589 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
2591 /* Retain the exec and create SIDs across fork */
2592 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
2593 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
2595 /* Retain ptracer SID across fork, if any.
2596 This will be reset by the ptrace hook upon any
2597 subsequent ptrace_attach operations. */
2598 tsec2->ptrace_sid = tsec1->ptrace_sid;
2603 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
2605 task_free_security(tsk);
2608 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2610 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
2611 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
2612 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
2613 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
2614 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
2619 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
2621 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0,id1,id2,flags);
2624 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
2626 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2630 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
2632 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
2635 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
2637 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
2640 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
2642 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
2645 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
2647 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
2651 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
2655 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
2659 return task_has_perm(current,p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2662 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
2664 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
2667 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
2671 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
2672 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
2673 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
2674 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
2675 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
2676 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
2681 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
2683 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
2686 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
2688 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
2691 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, int sig)
2696 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig);
2700 if (info && ((unsigned long)info == 1 ||
2701 (unsigned long)info == 2 || SI_FROMKERNEL(info)))
2705 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
2707 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
2709 return task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
2712 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
2718 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
2719 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
2720 the state of the current process. */
2724 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
2728 perm = signal_to_av(p->exit_signal);
2730 return task_has_perm(p, current, perm);
2733 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
2735 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2737 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
2740 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2741 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
2745 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
2746 struct inode *inode)
2748 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
2749 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2751 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
2752 isec->initialized = 1;
2756 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
2758 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2759 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2761 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
2762 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
2764 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2765 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
2769 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
2770 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
2773 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
2774 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
2777 switch (ih->protocol) {
2779 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2781 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2785 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2789 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2790 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2795 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2797 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
2801 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2805 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2806 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2817 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2819 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
2820 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad)
2823 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
2824 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
2826 offset = skb->nh.raw - skb->data;
2827 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
2831 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
2832 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
2835 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
2836 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
2837 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
2843 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
2845 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
2849 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
2850 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
2855 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
2857 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
2861 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
2862 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
2866 /* includes fragments */
2876 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
2877 char **addrp, int *len, int src)
2881 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
2883 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad);
2887 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
2888 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
2891 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
2893 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad);
2897 *addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
2898 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
2908 /* socket security operations */
2909 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
2912 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2913 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2914 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2917 tsec = task->security;
2918 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2920 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
2923 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
2924 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
2925 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
2931 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
2932 int protocol, int kern)
2935 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2940 tsec = current->security;
2941 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2942 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
2943 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
2949 static void selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2950 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2952 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2953 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2955 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2957 tsec = current->security;
2958 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
2959 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : tsec->sid;
2960 isec->initialized = 1;
2965 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
2966 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
2967 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
2968 #define ip_local_port_range_0 sysctl_local_port_range[0]
2969 #define ip_local_port_range_1 sysctl_local_port_range[1]
2971 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
2976 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
2981 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
2983 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
2984 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
2986 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2987 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2988 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2989 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
2990 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
2991 unsigned short snum;
2992 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
2993 u32 sid, node_perm, addrlen;
2995 tsec = current->security;
2996 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
2998 if (family == PF_INET) {
2999 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3000 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3001 addrlen = sizeof(addr4->sin_addr.s_addr);
3002 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3004 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3005 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3006 addrlen = sizeof(addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr);
3007 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3010 if (snum&&(snum < max(PROT_SOCK,ip_local_port_range_0) ||
3011 snum > ip_local_port_range_1)) {
3012 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3013 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3016 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3017 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3018 ad.u.net.family = family;
3019 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3021 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3026 switch(sk->sk_protocol) {
3028 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3032 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3036 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3040 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, addrlen, &sid);
3044 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3045 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3046 ad.u.net.family = family;
3048 if (family == PF_INET)
3049 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3051 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3053 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3054 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3062 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3064 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3067 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3072 * If a TCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3074 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3075 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
3076 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3077 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3078 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3079 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3080 unsigned short snum;
3083 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3084 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3085 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3087 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3089 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3090 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3092 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3095 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3096 sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3100 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3101 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3102 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3103 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass,
3104 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT, &ad);
3113 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3115 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3118 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3121 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3122 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3124 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3128 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3130 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3131 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3132 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3133 newisec->initialized = 1;
3138 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3141 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3144 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3145 int size, int flags)
3147 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3150 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3152 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3155 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3157 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3160 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,int level,int optname)
3162 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3165 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3168 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3171 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3173 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3176 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3177 struct socket *other,
3180 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3181 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3182 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3183 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3186 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3190 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3191 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3193 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3194 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3196 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3198 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3202 /* connecting socket */
3203 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3204 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3206 /* server child socket */
3207 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3208 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3213 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3214 struct socket *other)
3216 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3217 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3218 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3221 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3222 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3224 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad,NET);
3225 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3227 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3228 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3235 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3240 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, recv_perm = 0;
3243 struct socket *sock;
3244 struct net_device *dev;
3245 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3247 family = sk->sk_family;
3248 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
3251 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3252 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == ntohs(ETH_P_IP))
3255 read_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3256 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3258 struct inode *inode;
3259 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3261 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3262 isec = inode->i_security;
3263 sock_sid = isec->sid;
3264 sock_class = isec->sclass;
3267 read_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
3275 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3279 switch (sock_class) {
3280 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3281 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
3282 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
3283 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3286 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3287 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
3288 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
3289 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
3293 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
3294 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
3298 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3299 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3300 ad.u.net.family = family;
3302 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, &len, 1);
3306 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, &ad);
3310 /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3311 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len, &node_sid);
3315 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, &ad);
3322 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3323 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
3324 sk->sk_protocol, ntohs(ad.u.net.sport),
3329 err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
3330 sock_class, recv_perm, &ad);
3336 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
3337 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3342 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3343 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3345 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3346 if (isec->sclass != SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET) {
3351 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3353 err = security_sid_to_context(ssec->peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
3357 if (scontext_len > len) {
3362 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
3366 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
3374 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, int priority)
3376 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
3379 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
3381 sk_free_security(sk);
3384 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3388 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
3389 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
3390 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3392 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
3396 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
3398 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
3400 if (err == -EINVAL) {
3401 audit_log(current->audit_context, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3402 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
3403 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
3404 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
3405 if (!selinux_enforcing)
3415 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
3420 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
3422 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3423 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3424 const struct net_device *in,
3425 const struct net_device *out,
3426 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *),
3430 int len, err = NF_ACCEPT;
3431 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, node_sid, if_sid, send_perm = 0;
3433 struct socket *sock;
3434 struct inode *inode;
3435 struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
3436 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3437 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3438 struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
3444 sock = sk->sk_socket;
3448 inode = SOCK_INODE(sock);
3452 err = sel_netif_sids(dev, &if_sid, NULL);
3456 isec = inode->i_security;
3458 switch (isec->sclass) {
3459 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3460 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
3461 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
3462 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3465 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3466 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
3467 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
3468 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
3472 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
3473 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
3478 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3479 ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
3480 ad.u.net.family = family;
3482 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp,
3483 &len, 0) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3484 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3487 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF,
3488 netif_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3489 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3492 /* Fixme: this lookup is inefficient */
3493 err = security_node_sid(family, addrp, len,
3494 &node_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3495 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3498 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE,
3499 node_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3500 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3506 /* Fixme: make this more efficient */
3507 err = security_port_sid(sk->sk_family,
3510 ntohs(ad.u.net.dport),
3511 &port_sid) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3512 if (err != NF_ACCEPT)
3515 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
3516 send_perm, &ad) ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
3523 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3524 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3525 const struct net_device *in,
3526 const struct net_device *out,
3527 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3529 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET);
3532 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3534 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
3535 struct sk_buff **pskb,
3536 const struct net_device *in,
3537 const struct net_device *out,
3538 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
3540 return selinux_ip_postroute_last(hooknum, pskb, in, out, okfn, PF_INET6);
3545 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
3549 static inline int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3554 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
3556 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
3558 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3559 struct av_decision avd;
3562 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
3566 tsec = current->security;
3569 avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
3570 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
3571 cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
3573 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
3574 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
3579 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
3581 if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
3586 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
3587 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
3590 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
3591 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3593 isec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3597 memset(isec, 0, sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct));
3598 isec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
3599 isec->sclass = sclass;
3600 isec->ipc_perm = perm;
3602 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3604 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3606 perm->security = isec;
3611 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
3613 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
3614 if (!isec || isec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
3617 perm->security = NULL;
3621 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3623 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3625 msec = kmalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
3629 memset(msec, 0, sizeof(struct msg_security_struct));
3630 msec->magic = SELINUX_MAGIC;
3632 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
3633 msg->security = msec;
3638 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3640 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
3641 if (!msec || msec->magic != SELINUX_MAGIC)
3644 msg->security = NULL;
3648 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
3651 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3652 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3653 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3655 tsec = current->security;
3656 isec = ipc_perms->security;
3658 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3659 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
3661 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3664 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3666 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
3669 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
3671 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
3674 /* message queue security operations */
3675 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3677 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3678 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3679 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3682 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
3686 tsec = current->security;
3687 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3689 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3690 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3692 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3695 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3701 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
3703 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
3706 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
3708 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3709 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3710 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3712 tsec = current->security;
3713 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3715 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3716 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3718 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3719 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3722 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
3730 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3731 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3734 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
3737 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
3740 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
3746 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
3750 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
3752 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3753 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3754 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3755 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3758 tsec = current->security;
3759 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3760 msec = msg->security;
3763 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
3765 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
3767 * Compute new sid based on current process and
3768 * message queue this message will be stored in
3770 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3778 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3779 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3781 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
3782 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
3785 /* Can this process send the message */
3786 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3787 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
3789 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
3790 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
3791 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
3796 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
3797 struct task_struct *target,
3798 long type, int mode)
3800 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3801 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3802 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
3803 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3806 tsec = target->security;
3807 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
3808 msec = msg->security;
3810 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3811 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
3813 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
3814 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
3816 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
3817 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
3821 /* Shared Memory security operations */
3822 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3824 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3825 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3826 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3829 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
3833 tsec = current->security;
3834 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3836 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3837 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3839 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3842 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3848 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
3850 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
3853 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
3855 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3856 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3857 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3859 tsec = current->security;
3860 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
3862 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3863 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
3865 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
3866 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3869 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
3870 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
3878 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3879 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3882 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
3885 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
3892 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
3898 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3902 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
3903 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
3908 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
3912 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
3915 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
3917 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
3920 /* Semaphore security operations */
3921 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3923 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3924 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3925 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3928 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
3932 tsec = current->security;
3933 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3935 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3936 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3938 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3941 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3947 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
3949 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
3952 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
3954 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3955 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
3956 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3958 tsec = current->security;
3959 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
3961 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
3962 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
3964 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
3965 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
3968 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
3969 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
3977 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
3978 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
3982 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
3993 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
3996 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
4000 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
4006 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4010 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
4011 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
4016 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
4020 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
4023 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
4029 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
4031 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
4036 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
4039 /* module stacking operations */
4040 static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4042 if (secondary_ops != original_ops) {
4043 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: There is already a secondary security "
4044 "module registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4048 secondary_ops = ops;
4050 printk(KERN_INFO "%s: Registering secondary module %s\n",
4057 static int selinux_unregister_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
4059 if (ops != secondary_ops) {
4060 printk (KERN_INFO "%s: trying to unregister a security module "
4061 "that is not registered.\n", __FUNCTION__);
4065 secondary_ops = original_ops;
4070 static void selinux_d_instantiate (struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
4073 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
4076 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4077 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4079 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4085 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
4095 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4097 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
4099 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4100 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
4101 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4102 sid = tsec->create_sid;
4109 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
4116 memcpy(value, context, len);
4121 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
4122 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
4124 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4130 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
4131 security attributes. */
4136 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
4137 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
4138 * above restriction is ever removed.
4140 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4141 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
4142 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4143 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
4144 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
4145 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
4151 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
4152 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
4153 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
4157 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
4162 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
4163 performed during the actual operation (execve,
4164 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
4165 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
4166 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
4167 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
4169 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
4170 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
4171 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
4172 tsec->create_sid = sid;
4173 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
4174 struct av_decision avd;
4179 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
4180 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
4181 struct task_struct *g, *t;
4182 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
4183 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
4184 do_each_thread(g, t)
4185 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
4186 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4189 while_each_thread(g, t);
4190 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
4193 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
4194 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4195 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
4199 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
4200 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
4202 if (p->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) {
4203 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid,
4205 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd);
4209 avc_audit(tsec->ptrace_sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4210 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
4224 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
4225 .ptrace = selinux_ptrace,
4226 .capget = selinux_capget,
4227 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
4228 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
4229 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
4230 .capable = selinux_capable,
4231 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
4232 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
4233 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
4234 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
4236 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
4237 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
4239 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
4240 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
4241 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
4242 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
4243 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
4244 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
4245 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
4247 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
4248 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
4249 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
4250 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
4251 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
4252 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
4253 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
4255 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
4256 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
4257 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
4258 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
4259 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
4260 .inode_post_link = selinux_inode_post_link,
4261 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
4262 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
4263 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
4264 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
4265 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
4266 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
4267 .inode_post_rename = selinux_inode_post_rename,
4268 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
4269 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
4270 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
4271 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
4272 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
4273 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
4274 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
4275 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
4276 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
4277 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
4278 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
4279 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
4280 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
4282 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
4283 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
4284 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
4285 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
4286 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
4287 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
4288 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
4289 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
4290 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
4291 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
4292 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
4294 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
4295 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
4296 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
4297 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
4298 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
4299 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
4300 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
4301 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
4302 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
4303 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
4304 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
4305 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
4306 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
4307 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
4308 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
4309 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
4310 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
4311 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
4312 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
4314 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
4316 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
4317 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
4319 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
4320 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
4321 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
4322 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
4323 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
4324 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
4326 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
4327 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
4328 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
4329 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
4330 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
4332 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
4333 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
4334 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
4335 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
4336 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
4338 .register_security = selinux_register_security,
4339 .unregister_security = selinux_unregister_security,
4341 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
4343 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
4344 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
4346 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
4347 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
4348 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
4350 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
4351 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
4352 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
4353 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
4354 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
4355 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
4356 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
4357 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
4358 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
4359 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
4360 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
4361 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
4362 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
4363 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
4364 .socket_getpeersec = selinux_socket_getpeersec,
4365 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
4366 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
4370 static __init int selinux_init(void)
4372 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4374 if (!selinux_enabled) {
4375 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
4379 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
4381 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
4382 if (task_alloc_security(current))
4383 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
4384 tsec = current->security;
4385 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4389 original_ops = secondary_ops = security_ops;
4391 panic ("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
4392 if (register_security (&selinux_ops))
4393 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
4395 if (selinux_enforcing) {
4396 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
4398 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
4403 void selinux_complete_init(void)
4405 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
4407 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
4408 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
4409 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4411 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
4412 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
4413 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
4414 struct superblock_security_struct,
4416 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
4417 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
4419 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
4420 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4421 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
4423 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
4425 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
4426 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
4429 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
4432 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
4433 all processes and objects when they are created. */
4434 security_initcall(selinux_init);
4436 #if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
4438 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_op = {
4439 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute_last,
4440 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4442 .hooknum = NF_IP_POST_ROUTING,
4443 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4446 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4448 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_op = {
4449 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute_last,
4450 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
4452 .hooknum = NF_IP6_POST_ROUTING,
4453 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
4458 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
4462 if (!selinux_enabled)
4465 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
4467 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4469 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
4471 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4473 err = nf_register_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4475 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hook for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
4482 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
4484 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4485 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
4487 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
4489 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv4_op);
4490 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4491 nf_unregister_hook(&selinux_ipv6_op);
4496 #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4498 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4499 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
4502 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4504 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
4505 int selinux_disable(void)
4507 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
4508 static int selinux_disabled = 0;
4510 if (ss_initialized) {
4511 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
4515 if (selinux_disabled) {
4516 /* Only do this once. */
4520 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
4522 selinux_disabled = 1;
4524 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
4525 security_ops = secondary_ops;
4527 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
4528 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
4530 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */