2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
56 #include <net/netlabel.h>
57 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
58 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
59 #include <linux/atomic.h>
60 #include <linux/bitops.h>
61 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
62 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
63 #include <linux/netlink.h>
64 #include <linux/tcp.h>
65 #include <linux/udp.h>
66 #include <linux/dccp.h>
67 #include <linux/quota.h>
68 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
69 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <linux/parser.h>
71 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
73 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
74 #include <linux/personality.h>
75 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #include <linux/selinux.h>
78 #include <linux/mutex.h>
79 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
80 #include <linux/syslog.h>
81 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
82 #include <linux/export.h>
83 #include <linux/msg.h>
84 #include <linux/shm.h>
96 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
98 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing;
106 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
108 unsigned long enforcing;
109 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
110 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
119 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
121 unsigned long enabled;
122 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
123 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
128 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
134 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
137 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
138 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
139 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
140 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
143 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
145 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
149 * initialise the security for the init task
151 static void cred_init_security(void)
153 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
154 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
156 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
158 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
160 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
161 cred->security = tsec;
165 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
167 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
169 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
171 tsec = cred->security;
176 * get the objective security ID of a task
178 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
183 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
189 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
191 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
198 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
200 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
203 u32 sid = current_sid();
205 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
209 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
210 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
212 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
213 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
214 isec->task_sid = sid;
215 inode->i_security = isec;
220 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
223 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
225 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
226 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
227 list_del_init(&isec->list);
228 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
230 inode->i_security = NULL;
231 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
234 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
236 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
237 u32 sid = current_sid();
239 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
244 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
245 file->f_security = fsec;
250 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
252 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
253 file->f_security = NULL;
257 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
259 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
261 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
265 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
266 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
267 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
269 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
270 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
271 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
272 sb->s_security = sbsec;
277 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
279 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
280 sb->s_security = NULL;
284 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
286 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
288 "uses transition SIDs",
290 "uses genfs_contexts",
291 "not configured for labeling",
292 "uses mountpoint labeling",
295 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
297 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
299 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
308 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
311 static const match_table_t tokens = {
312 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
313 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
320 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
322 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
323 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
324 const struct cred *cred)
326 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
329 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
330 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
334 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
335 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
339 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
340 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
341 const struct cred *cred)
343 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
345 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
350 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
351 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
355 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
358 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
359 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
362 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
363 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
364 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
365 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
366 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
367 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
368 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
369 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
370 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
374 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
375 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
376 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
377 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
378 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
379 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
382 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
383 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
388 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
390 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
391 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
394 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
395 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
396 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
398 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
399 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
400 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
401 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
402 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
404 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
405 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
406 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
408 /* Initialize the root inode. */
409 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
411 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
412 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
413 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
415 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
417 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
418 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
419 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
420 struct inode_security_struct, list);
421 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
422 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
423 inode = igrab(inode);
425 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
429 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
430 list_del_init(&isec->list);
433 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
439 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
440 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
441 * mount options, or whatever.
443 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
444 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
447 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
448 char *context = NULL;
452 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
454 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
460 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
461 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
462 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
464 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
467 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
468 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
469 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
471 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
472 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
477 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
478 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
484 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
485 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
488 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
489 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
491 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
492 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
495 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
496 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
498 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
499 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
502 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
503 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
505 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
506 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
507 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
509 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
512 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
513 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
515 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
532 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
534 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
535 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
536 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
537 (old_sid != new_sid))
540 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
541 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
543 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
544 if (mnt_flags & flag)
550 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
551 * labeling information.
553 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
554 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
558 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
559 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
560 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
561 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
562 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
563 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
564 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
565 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
566 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
568 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
570 if (!ss_initialized) {
572 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
573 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
574 server is ready to handle calls. */
578 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
579 "before the security server is initialized\n");
584 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
585 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
586 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
587 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
589 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
590 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
591 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
592 * will be used for both mounts)
594 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
599 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
600 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
601 * than once with different security options.
603 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
606 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
670 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
707 if (!rootcontext_sid)
708 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
714 if (rootcontext_sid) {
715 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
720 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
721 root_isec->initialized = 1;
724 if (defcontext_sid) {
725 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
727 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
728 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
732 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
733 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
739 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
742 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
744 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
748 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
749 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
753 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
754 struct super_block *newsb)
756 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
757 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
759 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
761 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
764 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
765 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
770 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
771 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
773 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
774 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
777 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
779 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
781 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
782 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
783 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
786 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
790 if (!set_rootcontext) {
791 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
792 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
795 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
797 if (set_rootcontext) {
798 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
799 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
800 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
803 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
806 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
807 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
810 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
811 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
814 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
815 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
816 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
818 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
820 /* Standard string-based options. */
821 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
823 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
828 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
832 if (context || defcontext) {
834 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
837 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
847 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
850 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
857 case Opt_rootcontext:
860 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
863 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
871 if (context || defcontext) {
873 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
876 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
882 case Opt_labelsupport:
886 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
893 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
897 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
898 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
899 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
904 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
905 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
908 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
909 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
912 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
916 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
917 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
920 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
931 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
933 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
936 char *options = data;
937 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
939 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
944 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
946 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
951 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
954 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
958 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
959 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
964 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
968 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
972 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
974 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
977 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
979 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
980 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
983 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
987 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
993 /* we need a comma before each option */
998 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1004 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1006 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1009 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1011 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1017 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1019 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1024 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1026 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1028 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1030 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1034 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1036 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1038 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1040 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1044 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1047 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1049 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1052 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1054 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1057 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1063 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1064 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1066 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1073 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1074 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1076 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1078 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1079 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1081 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1085 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1108 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1111 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1114 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1116 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1121 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1124 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1125 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1130 char *buffer, *path;
1132 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1136 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1140 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1141 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1142 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1143 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1147 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1149 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1153 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1161 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1162 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1164 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1165 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1167 struct dentry *dentry;
1168 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1169 char *context = NULL;
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1176 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1177 if (isec->initialized)
1180 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1181 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1182 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1183 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1184 server is ready to handle calls. */
1185 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1186 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1187 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1188 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1192 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1193 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1194 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1195 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1199 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1200 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1202 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1203 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1205 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1206 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1210 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1211 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1212 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1213 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1214 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1215 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1216 * be used again by userspace.
1221 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1222 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1228 context[len] = '\0';
1229 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1231 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1234 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1235 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1242 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1248 context[len] = '\0';
1249 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1255 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1256 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1257 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1258 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1263 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1266 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1270 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1271 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1273 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1274 if (printk_ratelimit())
1275 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1276 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1277 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1279 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1280 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1281 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1284 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1292 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1293 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1296 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1297 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1299 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1300 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1301 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1302 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1308 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1311 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1314 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1316 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1317 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1328 isec->initialized = 1;
1331 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1333 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1334 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1338 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1339 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1345 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1346 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1349 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1350 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1353 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1354 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1357 /* All other signals. */
1358 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1366 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1367 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1369 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1370 const struct cred *target,
1373 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1375 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1379 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1380 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1381 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1382 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1384 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1385 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1388 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1392 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1393 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1395 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1399 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1400 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1401 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1402 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1404 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1409 sid = current_sid();
1410 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1411 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1414 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1415 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1418 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1419 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1422 struct common_audit_data ad;
1423 struct av_decision avd;
1425 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1426 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1429 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1432 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1434 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1437 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1441 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1446 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1447 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1448 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1455 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1456 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1459 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1461 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1462 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1465 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1466 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1467 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1468 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1469 struct inode *inode,
1471 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1474 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1477 validate_creds(cred);
1479 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1482 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1483 isec = inode->i_security;
1485 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1488 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1489 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1490 pathname if needed. */
1491 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1492 struct dentry *dentry,
1495 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1496 struct common_audit_data ad;
1498 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1499 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1500 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1503 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1504 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1505 pathname if needed. */
1506 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1510 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1511 struct common_audit_data ad;
1513 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1515 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1518 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1519 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1520 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1521 check a particular permission to the file.
1522 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1523 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1524 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1525 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1526 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1530 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1531 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1532 struct common_audit_data ad;
1533 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1536 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1537 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1539 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1540 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1548 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1551 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1557 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1558 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1559 struct dentry *dentry,
1562 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1563 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1564 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1566 struct common_audit_data ad;
1569 dsec = dir->i_security;
1570 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1573 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1575 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1576 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1578 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1579 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1584 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1585 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1586 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1591 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1595 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1596 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1597 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1600 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1601 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1602 struct task_struct *ctx)
1604 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1606 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1610 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1613 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1614 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1615 struct dentry *dentry,
1619 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1620 struct common_audit_data ad;
1621 u32 sid = current_sid();
1625 dsec = dir->i_security;
1626 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1628 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1629 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1632 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1633 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1648 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1653 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1657 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1658 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1659 struct inode *new_dir,
1660 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1662 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1663 struct common_audit_data ad;
1664 u32 sid = current_sid();
1666 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1669 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1670 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1671 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1672 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1674 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1676 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1677 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1678 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1681 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1682 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1685 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1686 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1687 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1692 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1693 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1694 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1695 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1696 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1699 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1700 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1701 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1702 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1704 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1712 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1713 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1714 struct super_block *sb,
1716 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1718 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1719 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1721 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1722 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1725 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1726 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1730 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1731 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1732 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1733 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1736 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1738 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1742 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1744 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1746 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1753 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1754 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1758 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1760 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1761 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1768 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1777 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1780 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1782 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1784 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1790 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1792 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1797 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1801 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1802 u32 sid = current_sid();
1803 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1804 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1807 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1810 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1814 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1818 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1821 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1822 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1826 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1830 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1833 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1834 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1835 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1836 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1840 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1841 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1845 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1849 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1850 * which was removed).
1852 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1853 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1854 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1855 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1858 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
1863 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
1867 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
1870 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1872 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1884 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1889 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1892 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1898 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1900 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1902 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1905 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1910 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1911 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1912 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1914 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1915 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1916 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1917 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1918 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1920 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1921 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1922 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1923 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1924 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1926 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1933 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1934 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1935 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1937 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1938 * processes that allocate mappings.
1940 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1942 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1944 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1945 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1949 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1952 /* binprm security operations */
1954 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1956 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1957 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1958 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1959 struct common_audit_data ad;
1960 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1963 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1967 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1968 * the script interpreter */
1969 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
1972 old_tsec = current_security();
1973 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
1974 isec = inode->i_security;
1976 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1977 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1978 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
1980 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1981 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
1982 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1983 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1985 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
1986 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
1987 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1988 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1991 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
1992 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
1994 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
1997 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1998 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1999 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2005 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2006 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2008 if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
2009 (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
2010 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2012 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2013 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2014 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2018 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2019 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2020 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2024 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2025 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2029 /* Check for shared state */
2030 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2031 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2032 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2038 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2039 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2041 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2042 struct task_struct *tracer;
2043 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2047 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2048 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2049 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2055 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2057 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2063 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2064 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2070 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2072 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2080 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2081 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2082 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2083 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2085 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2088 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2091 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2092 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2093 struct files_struct *files)
2095 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2096 struct tty_struct *tty;
2097 struct fdtable *fdt;
2101 tty = get_current_tty();
2103 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2104 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2105 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2107 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2108 Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
2109 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2110 file may belong to another process and we are only
2111 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2112 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2113 struct tty_file_private, list);
2114 file = file_priv->file;
2115 if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2118 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2121 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2125 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2126 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2128 unsigned long set, i;
2133 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2134 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2136 set = fdt->open_fds[j];
2139 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2140 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2145 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2147 file_to_av(file))) {
2149 fd = get_unused_fd();
2159 devnull = dentry_open(
2162 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2169 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2174 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2177 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2181 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2183 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2185 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2186 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2189 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2190 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2193 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2194 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2196 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2197 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2199 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2200 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2201 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2203 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2204 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2205 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2206 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2207 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2209 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2210 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2212 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2214 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2215 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2216 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2217 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2219 task_unlock(current);
2220 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2225 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2228 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2230 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2231 struct itimerval itimer;
2241 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2242 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2243 * flush and unblock signals.
2245 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2246 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2248 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2250 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2251 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2252 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2253 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2254 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2255 __flush_signals(current);
2256 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2257 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2259 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2262 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2263 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2264 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2265 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2266 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2269 /* superblock security operations */
2271 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2273 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2276 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2278 superblock_free_security(sb);
2281 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2286 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2289 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2291 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2292 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2293 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2294 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2295 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2298 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2305 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2309 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2312 int current_size = 0;
2320 while (current_size < len) {
2330 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2332 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2333 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2334 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2340 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2348 in_save = in_end = orig;
2352 open_quote = !open_quote;
2353 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2355 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2357 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2358 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2360 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2362 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2364 } while (*in_end++);
2366 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2367 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2372 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2375 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2376 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2377 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2379 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2385 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2388 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2389 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2392 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2394 goto out_free_secdata;
2396 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2398 goto out_free_secdata;
2400 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2401 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2403 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2407 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2409 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2410 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2412 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2413 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2414 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2420 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2421 goto out_bad_option;
2424 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2425 goto out_bad_option;
2427 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2428 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2429 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2431 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2432 goto out_bad_option;
2435 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2436 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2437 goto out_bad_option;
2446 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2448 free_secdata(secdata);
2451 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2452 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2457 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2459 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2460 struct common_audit_data ad;
2463 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2467 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2468 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2471 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2472 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2473 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2476 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2478 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2479 struct common_audit_data ad;
2481 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2482 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2483 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2486 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2489 unsigned long flags,
2492 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2494 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2495 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2496 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2498 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2501 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2503 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2505 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2506 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2509 /* inode security operations */
2511 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2513 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2516 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2518 inode_free_security(inode);
2521 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2522 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2523 void **value, size_t *len)
2525 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2526 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2527 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2528 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2530 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2532 dsec = dir->i_security;
2533 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2536 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2538 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2539 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2540 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2541 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2542 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2543 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2546 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2547 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2550 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2555 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2556 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2557 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2558 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2560 isec->initialized = 1;
2563 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2567 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2574 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2586 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2588 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2591 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2593 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2596 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2598 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2601 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2603 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2606 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2608 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2611 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2613 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2616 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2618 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2621 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2622 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2624 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2627 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2629 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2631 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2634 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2636 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2638 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2641 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2642 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2645 struct common_audit_data ad;
2646 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2649 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2652 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2653 audited, denied, &ad, flags);
2659 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2661 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2664 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2665 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2667 struct av_decision avd;
2669 u32 audited, denied;
2671 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2672 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2674 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2678 validate_creds(cred);
2680 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2683 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2685 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2686 isec = inode->i_security;
2688 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2689 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2690 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2692 if (likely(!audited))
2695 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
2701 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2703 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2704 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2705 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2707 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2708 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2709 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2715 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2716 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2717 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2719 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2722 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2725 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2727 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2730 path.dentry = dentry;
2733 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2736 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2738 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2740 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2741 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2742 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2743 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2745 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2746 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2747 Restrict to administrator. */
2752 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2753 ordinary setattr permission. */
2754 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2757 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2758 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2760 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2761 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2762 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2763 struct common_audit_data ad;
2764 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2767 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2768 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2770 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2771 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2774 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2777 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2778 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2780 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2781 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2785 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2786 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2787 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2788 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2792 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2793 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2795 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
2796 audit_size = size - 1;
2799 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
2800 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2801 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
2806 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2811 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2812 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2816 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2821 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2823 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2824 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2828 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2829 const void *value, size_t size,
2832 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2833 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2837 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2838 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2842 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2844 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2845 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2846 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2854 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2856 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2858 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2861 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2863 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2865 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2868 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2870 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2871 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2873 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2874 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2879 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2881 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2883 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2887 char *context = NULL;
2888 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2890 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2894 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2895 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2896 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2897 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2898 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2899 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2900 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2902 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2903 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2905 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2908 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2921 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2922 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2924 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2928 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2931 if (!value || !size)
2934 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2939 isec->initialized = 1;
2943 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2945 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2946 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2947 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2951 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2953 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2957 /* file security operations */
2959 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2961 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2962 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2964 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2965 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2968 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2969 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2972 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2974 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2975 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2976 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2977 u32 sid = current_sid();
2980 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2983 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2984 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2985 /* No change since file_open check. */
2988 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2991 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2993 return file_alloc_security(file);
2996 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2998 file_free_security(file);
3001 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3004 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3014 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3016 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3017 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3020 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3022 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3023 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3026 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3030 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3035 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3036 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3039 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3040 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3043 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3048 static int default_noexec;
3050 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3052 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3055 if (default_noexec &&
3056 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3058 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3059 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3060 * This has an additional check.
3062 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3068 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3069 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3071 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3072 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3075 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3076 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3078 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3085 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3088 u32 sid = current_sid();
3091 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3092 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3093 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3094 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3096 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3097 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3098 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3103 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3104 return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3107 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3108 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3110 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3113 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3114 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3117 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3118 unsigned long reqprot,
3121 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3123 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3126 if (default_noexec &&
3127 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3129 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3130 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3131 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3132 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3133 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3134 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3135 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3136 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3138 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3139 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3140 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3141 * modified content. This typically should only
3142 * occur for text relocations.
3144 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3150 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3153 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3155 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3157 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3160 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3163 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3168 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3173 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3174 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3183 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3184 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3189 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3194 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3198 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3205 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3207 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3209 fsec = file->f_security;
3210 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3215 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3216 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3219 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3221 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3223 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3224 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3226 fsec = file->f_security;
3229 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3231 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3233 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3234 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3237 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3239 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3241 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3244 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3246 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3247 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3249 fsec = file->f_security;
3250 isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
3252 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3253 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3254 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3255 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3256 * struct as its SID.
3258 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3259 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3261 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3262 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3263 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3264 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3265 * new inode label or new policy.
3266 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3268 return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
3271 /* task security operations */
3273 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3275 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3279 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3281 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3283 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3285 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3289 cred->security = tsec;
3294 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3296 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3298 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3301 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3302 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3304 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3305 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3310 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3312 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3315 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3316 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3318 old_tsec = old->security;
3320 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3324 new->security = tsec;
3329 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3331 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3333 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3334 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3340 * set the security data for a kernel service
3341 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3343 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3345 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3346 u32 sid = current_sid();
3349 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3350 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3351 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3355 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3356 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3357 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3363 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3364 * objective context of the specified inode
3366 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3368 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3369 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3370 u32 sid = current_sid();
3373 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3374 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3375 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3379 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3383 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3386 struct common_audit_data ad;
3388 sid = task_sid(current);
3390 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3391 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3393 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3394 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3397 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3399 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3402 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3404 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3407 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3409 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3412 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3414 *secid = task_sid(p);
3417 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3421 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3425 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3428 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3432 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3436 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3439 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3441 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3444 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3445 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3447 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3449 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3450 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3451 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3452 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3453 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3454 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3459 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3463 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3467 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3470 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3472 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3475 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3477 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3480 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3487 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3489 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3491 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3492 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3494 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3498 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3500 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3503 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3504 struct inode *inode)
3506 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3507 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3510 isec->initialized = 1;
3513 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3514 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3515 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3517 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3518 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3520 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3521 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3525 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3526 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3529 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3530 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3534 *proto = ih->protocol;
3536 switch (ih->protocol) {
3538 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3540 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3544 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3548 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3549 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3554 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3556 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3560 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3564 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3565 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3569 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3570 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3572 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3576 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3580 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3581 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3592 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3594 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3595 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3596 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3599 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3600 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3603 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3604 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3608 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3609 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3612 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3613 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3614 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3623 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3625 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3629 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3630 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3635 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3637 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3641 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3642 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3646 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3647 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3649 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3653 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3654 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3658 /* includes fragments */
3668 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3669 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3674 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3676 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3679 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3680 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3683 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3685 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3688 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3689 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3699 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3700 " unable to parse packet\n");
3710 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3712 * @family: protocol family
3713 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3716 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3717 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3718 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3719 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3720 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3724 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3731 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3732 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3734 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3735 if (unlikely(err)) {
3737 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3738 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3745 /* socket security operations */
3747 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3748 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3750 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3751 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3755 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3759 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3761 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3762 struct common_audit_data ad;
3763 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3764 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3766 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3769 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3773 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3776 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3777 int protocol, int kern)
3779 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3787 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3788 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3792 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3795 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3796 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3798 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3799 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3800 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3803 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3806 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3808 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3813 isec->initialized = 1;
3816 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3817 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3818 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3819 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3825 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3826 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3827 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3829 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3831 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3835 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3840 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3841 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3842 * check the first address now.
3844 family = sk->sk_family;
3845 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3847 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3848 struct common_audit_data ad;
3849 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3850 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3851 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3852 unsigned short snum;
3855 if (family == PF_INET) {
3856 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3857 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3858 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3860 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3861 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3862 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3868 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3870 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3871 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3875 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3877 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3878 ad.u.net->family = family;
3879 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3881 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3887 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3888 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3889 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3892 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3893 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3896 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3897 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3901 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3905 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3909 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3911 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3912 ad.u.net->family = family;
3914 if (family == PF_INET)
3915 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3917 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
3919 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3920 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3928 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3930 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3931 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3934 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3939 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3941 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3942 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3943 struct common_audit_data ad;
3944 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3945 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3946 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3947 unsigned short snum;
3950 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3951 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3952 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3954 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3956 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3957 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3959 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3962 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3966 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3967 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3969 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3971 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
3972 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
3973 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3978 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3984 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3986 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3989 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3992 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3993 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3995 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3999 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4001 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4002 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4003 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4004 newisec->initialized = 1;
4009 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4012 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4015 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4016 int size, int flags)
4018 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4021 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4023 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4026 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4028 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4031 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4035 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4039 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4042 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4045 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4048 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4050 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4053 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4057 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4058 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4059 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4060 struct common_audit_data ad;
4061 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4064 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4066 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4068 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4069 sksec_other->sclass,
4070 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4074 /* server child socket */
4075 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4076 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4081 /* connecting socket */
4082 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4087 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4088 struct socket *other)
4090 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4091 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4092 struct common_audit_data ad;
4093 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4095 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4097 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4099 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4103 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4105 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4111 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4114 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4115 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4119 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4122 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4123 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4126 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4130 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4131 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4132 struct common_audit_data ad;
4133 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4136 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4138 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4139 ad.u.net->family = family;
4140 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4144 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4145 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4151 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4154 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4159 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4162 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4163 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4164 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4165 struct common_audit_data ad;
4166 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4171 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4174 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4175 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4178 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4179 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4180 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4181 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4182 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4183 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4185 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4186 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4187 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4190 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4192 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4193 ad.u.net->family = family;
4194 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4198 if (peerlbl_active) {
4201 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4204 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4207 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4210 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4213 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4216 if (secmark_active) {
4217 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4226 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4227 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4232 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4233 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4235 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4236 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4237 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4238 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4239 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4241 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4245 if (scontext_len > len) {
4250 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4254 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4260 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4262 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4265 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4267 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4270 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4274 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4275 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4277 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4280 *secid = peer_secid;
4281 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4286 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4288 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4290 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4294 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4295 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4296 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4297 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4302 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4304 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4306 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4307 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4311 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4313 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4314 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4316 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4317 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4318 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4320 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4323 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4326 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4328 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4330 *secid = sksec->sid;
4334 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4336 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4337 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4339 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4340 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4341 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4342 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4345 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4346 struct request_sock *req)
4348 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4350 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4354 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4355 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4358 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4361 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4362 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4363 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4365 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4368 req->secid = newsid;
4369 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4372 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4375 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4376 const struct request_sock *req)
4378 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4380 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4381 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4382 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4383 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4384 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4385 time it will have been created and available. */
4387 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4388 * thread with access to newsksec */
4389 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4392 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4394 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4395 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4397 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4398 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4401 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4404 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4406 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4409 __tsec = current_security();
4412 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4415 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4417 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4420 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4422 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4425 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4428 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4431 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4433 u32 sid = current_sid();
4435 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4436 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4437 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4438 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4439 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4440 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4442 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4446 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4448 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4450 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4451 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4452 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4453 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4454 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4455 * protocols were being used */
4457 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4458 * the sockcreate SID here */
4460 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4461 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4464 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4466 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4467 u32 sid = current_sid();
4470 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4471 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4474 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4475 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4484 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4488 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4489 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4491 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4495 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4497 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4499 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4500 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4501 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4502 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4503 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4504 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4514 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4519 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4521 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4527 struct common_audit_data ad;
4528 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4533 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4536 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4537 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4538 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4539 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4542 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4545 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4547 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4548 ad.u.net->family = family;
4549 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4552 if (peerlbl_active) {
4553 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4556 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4562 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4563 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4567 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4568 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4569 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4571 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4577 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4578 struct sk_buff *skb,
4579 const struct net_device *in,
4580 const struct net_device *out,
4581 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4583 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4586 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4587 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4588 struct sk_buff *skb,
4589 const struct net_device *in,
4590 const struct net_device *out,
4591 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4593 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4597 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4602 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4605 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4606 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4607 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4609 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4612 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4613 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4619 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4620 struct sk_buff *skb,
4621 const struct net_device *in,
4622 const struct net_device *out,
4623 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4625 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4628 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4632 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4633 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4634 struct common_audit_data ad;
4635 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4641 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4643 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4645 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4646 ad.u.net->family = family;
4647 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4650 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4651 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4652 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4653 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4655 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4656 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4661 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4667 struct common_audit_data ad;
4668 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4673 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4674 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4675 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4676 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4677 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4678 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4680 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4681 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4682 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4683 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4684 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4685 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4686 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4689 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4690 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4691 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4694 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4695 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4696 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4697 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4701 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4702 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4705 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4706 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4709 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4710 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4711 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4714 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4716 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4717 ad.u.net->family = family;
4718 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4722 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4723 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4724 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4726 if (peerlbl_active) {
4730 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4732 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4733 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4734 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4736 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4738 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4739 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4740 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4746 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4747 struct sk_buff *skb,
4748 const struct net_device *in,
4749 const struct net_device *out,
4750 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4752 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4755 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4756 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4757 struct sk_buff *skb,
4758 const struct net_device *in,
4759 const struct net_device *out,
4760 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4762 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4766 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4768 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4772 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4776 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4779 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4780 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4783 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4786 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4790 sid = task_sid(task);
4791 isec->sclass = sclass;
4793 perm->security = isec;
4798 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4800 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4801 perm->security = NULL;
4805 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4807 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4809 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4813 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4814 msg->security = msec;
4819 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4821 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4823 msg->security = NULL;
4827 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4830 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4831 struct common_audit_data ad;
4832 u32 sid = current_sid();
4834 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4836 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4837 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4839 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4842 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4844 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4847 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4849 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4852 /* message queue security operations */
4853 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4855 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4856 struct common_audit_data ad;
4857 u32 sid = current_sid();
4860 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4864 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4866 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4867 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4869 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4872 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4878 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4880 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4883 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4885 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4886 struct common_audit_data ad;
4887 u32 sid = current_sid();
4889 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4891 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4892 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4894 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4895 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4898 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4906 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4907 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4910 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4913 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4916 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4922 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4926 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4928 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4929 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4930 struct common_audit_data ad;
4931 u32 sid = current_sid();
4934 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4935 msec = msg->security;
4938 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4940 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4942 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4943 * message queue this message will be stored in
4945 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4951 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4952 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4954 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4955 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4958 /* Can this process send the message */
4959 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4962 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4963 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4964 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4969 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4970 struct task_struct *target,
4971 long type, int mode)
4973 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4974 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4975 struct common_audit_data ad;
4976 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4979 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4980 msec = msg->security;
4982 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4983 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4985 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4986 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4988 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4989 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4993 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4994 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4996 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4997 struct common_audit_data ad;
4998 u32 sid = current_sid();
5001 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5005 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5007 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5008 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5010 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5013 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5019 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5021 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5024 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5026 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5027 struct common_audit_data ad;
5028 u32 sid = current_sid();
5030 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5032 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5033 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5035 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5036 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5039 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5040 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5048 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5049 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5052 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5055 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5062 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5068 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5072 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5073 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5077 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5080 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5082 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5085 /* Semaphore security operations */
5086 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5088 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5089 struct common_audit_data ad;
5090 u32 sid = current_sid();
5093 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5097 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5099 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5100 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5102 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5105 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5111 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5113 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5116 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5118 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5119 struct common_audit_data ad;
5120 u32 sid = current_sid();
5122 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5124 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5125 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5127 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5128 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5131 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5132 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5140 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5141 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5145 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5156 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5159 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5163 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5169 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5173 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5174 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5179 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5183 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5186 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5192 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5194 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5199 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5202 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5204 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5208 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5211 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5214 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5215 char *name, char **value)
5217 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5223 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5229 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5231 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5233 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5235 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5236 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5237 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5238 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5239 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5240 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5241 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5242 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5250 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5260 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5261 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5263 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5264 struct task_struct *tracer;
5271 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5272 security attributes. */
5277 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5278 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5279 * above restriction is ever removed.
5281 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5282 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5283 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5284 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5285 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5286 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5287 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5288 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5289 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5290 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5296 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5297 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5298 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5302 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5303 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5304 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5305 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5308 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5309 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5310 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5311 audit_size = size - 1;
5314 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5315 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5316 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5321 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5328 new = prepare_creds();
5332 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5333 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5334 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5335 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5336 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5337 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5338 tsec = new->security;
5339 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5340 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5341 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5342 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5343 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5344 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5347 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5348 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5349 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5350 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5355 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5357 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5358 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5363 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5364 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5365 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5369 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5370 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5373 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5375 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5379 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5380 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5399 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5401 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5404 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5406 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5409 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5415 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5417 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5419 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5423 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5425 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5427 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5430 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5433 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5442 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5443 unsigned long flags)
5445 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5446 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5448 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5452 tsec = cred->security;
5453 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5454 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5456 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5462 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5464 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5470 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5471 const struct cred *cred,
5475 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5478 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5479 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5480 appear to be created. */
5484 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5486 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5487 ksec = key->security;
5489 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5492 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5494 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5495 char *context = NULL;
5499 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5508 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5511 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5512 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5513 .capget = selinux_capget,
5514 .capset = selinux_capset,
5515 .capable = selinux_capable,
5516 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5517 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5518 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5519 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5521 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5523 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5524 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5525 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5526 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5528 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5529 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5530 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5531 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5532 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5533 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5534 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5535 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5536 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5537 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5538 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5539 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5542 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5543 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5544 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5545 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5546 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5547 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5548 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5549 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5550 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5551 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5552 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5553 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5554 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5555 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5556 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5557 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5558 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5559 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5560 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5561 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5562 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5563 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5564 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5565 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5566 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5568 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5569 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5570 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5571 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5572 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5573 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5574 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5575 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5576 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5577 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5578 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5579 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5581 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5583 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5584 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5585 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5586 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5587 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5588 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5589 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5590 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5591 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5592 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5593 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5594 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5595 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5596 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5597 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5598 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5599 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5600 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5601 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5602 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5603 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5604 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5606 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5607 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5609 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5610 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5612 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5613 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5614 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5615 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5616 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5617 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5619 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5620 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5621 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5622 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5623 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5625 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5626 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5627 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5628 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5629 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5631 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5633 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5634 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5636 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5637 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5638 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5639 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5640 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5641 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5643 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5644 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5646 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5647 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5648 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5649 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5650 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5651 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5652 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5653 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5654 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5655 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5656 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5657 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5658 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5659 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5660 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5661 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5662 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5663 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5664 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5665 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5666 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5667 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5668 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5669 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5670 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5671 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5672 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5673 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5674 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5675 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5676 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5678 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5679 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5680 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5681 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5682 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5683 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5684 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5685 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5686 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5687 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5688 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5692 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5693 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5694 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5695 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5699 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5700 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5701 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5702 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5706 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5708 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5709 selinux_enabled = 0;
5713 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5714 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5718 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5720 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5721 cred_init_security();
5723 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5725 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5726 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5727 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5730 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5731 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5733 if (selinux_enforcing)
5734 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5736 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5741 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5743 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5746 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5748 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5750 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5751 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5752 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5755 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5756 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5757 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5759 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5761 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5763 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5764 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5766 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5767 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5770 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5771 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5773 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5774 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5777 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5778 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5780 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5781 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5785 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5787 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5789 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5790 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5792 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5793 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5796 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5797 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5799 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5800 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5806 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5810 if (!selinux_enabled)
5813 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5815 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5817 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5819 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5820 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5822 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5829 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5831 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5832 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5834 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5836 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5837 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5838 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5843 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5845 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5846 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5849 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5851 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5852 static int selinux_disabled;
5854 int selinux_disable(void)
5856 if (ss_initialized) {
5857 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5861 if (selinux_disabled) {
5862 /* Only do this once. */
5866 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5868 selinux_disabled = 1;
5869 selinux_enabled = 0;
5871 reset_security_ops();
5873 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5876 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5877 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5879 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */