2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
56 #include <net/netlabel.h>
57 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
58 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
59 #include <linux/atomic.h>
60 #include <linux/bitops.h>
61 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
62 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
63 #include <linux/netlink.h>
64 #include <linux/tcp.h>
65 #include <linux/udp.h>
66 #include <linux/dccp.h>
67 #include <linux/quota.h>
68 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
69 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <linux/parser.h>
71 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
73 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
74 #include <linux/personality.h>
75 #include <linux/audit.h>
76 #include <linux/string.h>
77 #include <linux/selinux.h>
78 #include <linux/mutex.h>
79 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
80 #include <linux/syslog.h>
81 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
82 #include <linux/export.h>
83 #include <linux/msg.h>
84 #include <linux/shm.h>
96 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
98 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
100 /* SECMARK reference count */
101 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
103 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
104 int selinux_enforcing;
106 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
108 unsigned long enforcing;
109 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
110 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
113 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
116 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
117 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
119 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
121 unsigned long enabled;
122 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
123 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
126 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
128 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
134 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
137 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
138 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
139 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
140 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
143 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
145 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
149 * initialise the security for the init task
151 static void cred_init_security(void)
153 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
154 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
156 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
158 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
160 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
161 cred->security = tsec;
165 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
167 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
169 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
171 tsec = cred->security;
176 * get the objective security ID of a task
178 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
183 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
189 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
191 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
198 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
200 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
202 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
203 u32 sid = current_sid();
205 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
209 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
210 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
212 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
213 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
214 isec->task_sid = sid;
215 inode->i_security = isec;
220 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
223 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
225 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
226 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
227 list_del_init(&isec->list);
228 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
230 inode->i_security = NULL;
231 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
234 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
236 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
237 u32 sid = current_sid();
239 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
244 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
245 file->f_security = fsec;
250 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
252 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
253 file->f_security = NULL;
257 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
259 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
261 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
265 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
266 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
267 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
269 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
270 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
271 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
272 sb->s_security = sbsec;
277 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
279 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
280 sb->s_security = NULL;
284 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
286 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
288 "uses transition SIDs",
290 "uses genfs_contexts",
291 "not configured for labeling",
292 "uses mountpoint labeling",
295 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
297 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
299 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
308 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
311 static const match_table_t tokens = {
312 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
313 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
316 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
320 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
322 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
323 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
324 const struct cred *cred)
326 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
329 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
330 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
334 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
335 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
339 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
340 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
341 const struct cred *cred)
343 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
345 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
346 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
350 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
351 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
355 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
358 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
359 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
362 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
363 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
364 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
365 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
366 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
367 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
368 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
369 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
370 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
374 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
375 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
376 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
377 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
378 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
379 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
382 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
383 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
388 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
390 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
391 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
394 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
395 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
396 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
398 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
399 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
400 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
401 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
402 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
404 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
405 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
406 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
408 /* Initialize the root inode. */
409 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
411 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
412 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
413 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
415 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
417 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
418 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
419 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
420 struct inode_security_struct, list);
421 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
422 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
423 inode = igrab(inode);
425 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
429 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
430 list_del_init(&isec->list);
433 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
439 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
440 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
441 * mount options, or whatever.
443 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
444 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
447 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
448 char *context = NULL;
452 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
454 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
460 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
461 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
462 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
464 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
467 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
468 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
469 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
471 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
472 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
477 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
478 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
484 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
485 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
488 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
489 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
491 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
492 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
495 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
496 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
498 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
499 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
502 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
503 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
505 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
506 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
507 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
509 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
512 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
513 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
515 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
532 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
534 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
535 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
536 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
537 (old_sid != new_sid))
540 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
541 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
543 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
544 if (mnt_flags & flag)
550 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
551 * labeling information.
553 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
554 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
556 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
558 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
559 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
560 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
561 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
562 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
563 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
564 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
565 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
566 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
568 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
570 if (!ss_initialized) {
572 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
573 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
574 server is ready to handle calls. */
578 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
579 "before the security server is initialized\n");
584 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
585 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
586 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
587 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
589 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
590 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
591 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
592 * will be used for both mounts)
594 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
599 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
600 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
601 * than once with different security options.
603 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
606 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
608 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
609 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
611 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
612 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
613 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
620 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
622 goto out_double_mount;
624 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
629 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
631 goto out_double_mount;
633 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
635 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
636 rootcontext_sid = sid;
638 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
640 goto out_double_mount;
642 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
646 defcontext_sid = sid;
648 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
650 goto out_double_mount;
652 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
661 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
662 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
663 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
664 goto out_double_mount;
669 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
670 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
672 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
673 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
675 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
676 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
680 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
700 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
702 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
707 if (!rootcontext_sid)
708 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
711 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
714 if (rootcontext_sid) {
715 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
720 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
721 root_isec->initialized = 1;
724 if (defcontext_sid) {
725 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
727 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
728 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
732 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
733 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
739 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
742 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
744 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
748 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
749 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
753 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
754 struct super_block *newsb)
756 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
757 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
759 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
761 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
764 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
765 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
770 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
771 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
773 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
774 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
777 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
779 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
781 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
782 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
783 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
786 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
790 if (!set_rootcontext) {
791 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
792 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
795 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
797 if (set_rootcontext) {
798 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
799 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
800 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
801 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
803 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
806 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
807 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
810 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
811 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
814 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
815 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
816 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
818 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
820 /* Standard string-based options. */
821 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
823 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
828 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
832 if (context || defcontext) {
834 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
837 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
847 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
850 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
857 case Opt_rootcontext:
860 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
863 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
871 if (context || defcontext) {
873 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
876 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
882 case Opt_labelsupport:
886 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
893 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
897 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
898 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
899 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
904 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
905 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
908 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
909 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
912 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
913 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
916 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
917 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
920 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
931 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
933 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
936 char *options = data;
937 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
939 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
944 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
946 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
951 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
954 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
958 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
959 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
964 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
968 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
972 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
974 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
977 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
979 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
980 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
983 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
987 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
993 /* we need a comma before each option */
998 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1004 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1006 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1009 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1011 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1017 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1019 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1024 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1026 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1028 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1030 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1034 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1036 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1038 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1040 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1044 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1047 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1049 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1052 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1054 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1057 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1063 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1064 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1066 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1073 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1074 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1076 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1078 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1079 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1081 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1085 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1094 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1108 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1111 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1114 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1116 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1118 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1121 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1124 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1125 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1130 char *buffer, *path;
1132 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1136 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1140 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1141 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1142 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1143 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1147 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1149 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1153 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1161 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1162 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1164 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1165 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1167 struct dentry *dentry;
1168 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1169 char *context = NULL;
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1176 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1177 if (isec->initialized)
1180 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1181 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1182 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1183 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1184 server is ready to handle calls. */
1185 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1186 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1187 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1188 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1192 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1193 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1194 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1195 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1199 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1200 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1202 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1203 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1205 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1206 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1210 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1211 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1212 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1213 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1214 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1215 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1216 * be used again by userspace.
1221 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1222 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1228 context[len] = '\0';
1229 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1231 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1234 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1235 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1242 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1248 context[len] = '\0';
1249 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1255 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1256 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1257 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1258 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1263 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1266 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1270 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1271 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1273 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1274 if (printk_ratelimit())
1275 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1276 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1277 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1279 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1280 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1281 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1284 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1292 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1293 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1296 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1297 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1299 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1300 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1301 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1302 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1307 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1308 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1311 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1314 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1316 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1317 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
1328 isec->initialized = 1;
1331 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1333 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1334 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1338 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1339 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1345 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1346 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1349 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1350 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1353 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1354 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1357 /* All other signals. */
1358 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1366 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1367 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1369 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1370 const struct cred *target,
1373 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1375 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1379 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1380 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1381 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1382 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1384 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1385 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1388 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1392 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1393 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1395 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1399 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1400 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1401 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1402 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1404 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1409 sid = current_sid();
1410 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1411 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1414 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1415 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1418 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1419 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1422 struct common_audit_data ad;
1423 struct av_decision avd;
1425 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1426 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1429 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1432 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1434 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1437 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1441 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1446 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1447 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1448 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
1455 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1456 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1459 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1461 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1462 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1465 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1466 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1467 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1468 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1469 struct inode *inode,
1471 struct common_audit_data *adp,
1474 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1477 validate_creds(cred);
1479 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1482 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1483 isec = inode->i_security;
1485 return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp, flags);
1488 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1489 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1490 pathname if needed. */
1491 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1492 struct dentry *dentry,
1495 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1496 struct common_audit_data ad;
1498 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1499 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1500 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1503 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1504 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1505 pathname if needed. */
1506 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1510 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1511 struct common_audit_data ad;
1513 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1515 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1518 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1519 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1520 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1521 check a particular permission to the file.
1522 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1523 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1524 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1525 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1526 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1530 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1531 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1532 struct common_audit_data ad;
1533 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1536 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1537 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1539 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1540 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1548 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1551 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad, 0);
1557 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1558 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1559 struct dentry *dentry,
1562 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1563 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1564 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1566 struct common_audit_data ad;
1569 dsec = dir->i_security;
1570 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1573 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1575 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1576 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1578 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1579 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1584 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1585 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1586 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1591 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1595 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1596 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1597 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1600 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1601 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1602 struct task_struct *ctx)
1604 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1606 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1610 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1613 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1614 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1615 struct dentry *dentry,
1619 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1620 struct common_audit_data ad;
1621 u32 sid = current_sid();
1625 dsec = dir->i_security;
1626 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1628 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1629 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1632 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1633 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1648 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1653 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1657 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1658 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1659 struct inode *new_dir,
1660 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1662 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1663 struct common_audit_data ad;
1664 u32 sid = current_sid();
1666 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1669 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1670 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1671 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1672 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1674 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1676 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1677 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1678 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1681 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1682 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1685 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1686 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1687 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1692 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1693 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1694 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1695 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1696 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1699 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1700 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1701 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1702 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1704 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1712 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1713 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1714 struct super_block *sb,
1716 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1718 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1719 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1721 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1722 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1725 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1726 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1730 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1731 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1732 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1733 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1736 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1738 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1742 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1744 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1746 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1753 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1754 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1758 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1760 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1761 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1768 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1777 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1780 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1782 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1784 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1790 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1792 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1797 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1801 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1802 u32 sid = current_sid();
1803 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1804 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1807 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1810 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1814 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1818 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1821 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1822 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1826 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1830 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1833 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1834 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1835 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1836 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1840 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1841 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1845 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1849 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1850 * which was removed).
1852 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1853 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1854 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1855 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1858 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
1863 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
1867 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
1870 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1872 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1884 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1889 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1892 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1898 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1900 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1902 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1905 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1910 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1911 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1912 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1914 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1915 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1916 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1917 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1918 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1920 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1921 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1922 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1923 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1924 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
1926 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1933 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1934 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1935 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1937 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1938 * processes that allocate mappings.
1940 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1942 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1944 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
1945 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
1949 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1952 /* binprm security operations */
1954 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1956 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
1957 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
1958 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1959 struct common_audit_data ad;
1960 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
1963 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
1967 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
1968 * the script interpreter */
1969 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
1972 old_tsec = current_security();
1973 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
1974 isec = inode->i_security;
1976 /* Default to the current task SID. */
1977 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
1978 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
1980 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
1981 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
1982 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
1983 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
1985 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
1986 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
1987 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
1988 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
1991 * Minimize confusion: if no_new_privs and a transition is
1992 * explicitly requested, then fail the exec.
1994 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)
1997 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
1998 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
1999 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2005 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2006 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2008 if ((bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) ||
2009 (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS))
2010 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2012 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2013 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2014 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2018 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2019 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2020 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2024 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2025 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2029 /* Check for shared state */
2030 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2031 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2032 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2038 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2039 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2041 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2042 struct task_struct *tracer;
2043 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2047 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2048 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2049 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2055 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2057 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2063 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2064 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2070 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2072 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2080 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2081 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2082 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2083 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2085 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2088 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2091 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2093 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2096 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2097 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2098 struct files_struct *files)
2100 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2101 struct tty_struct *tty;
2105 tty = get_current_tty();
2107 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2108 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2109 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2111 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2112 Use path_has_perm on the tty path directly rather
2113 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2114 file may belong to another process and we are only
2115 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2116 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2117 struct tty_file_private, list);
2118 file = file_priv->file;
2119 if (path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2122 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2125 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2129 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2130 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2131 if (!n) /* none found? */
2134 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2135 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2137 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2139 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2140 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2146 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2148 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2150 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2151 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2154 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2155 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2158 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2159 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2161 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2162 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2164 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2165 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2166 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2168 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2169 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2170 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2171 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2172 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2174 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2175 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2177 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2179 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2180 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2181 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2182 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2184 task_unlock(current);
2185 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2190 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2193 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2195 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2196 struct itimerval itimer;
2206 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2207 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2208 * flush and unblock signals.
2210 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2211 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2213 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2215 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2216 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2217 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2218 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2219 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2220 __flush_signals(current);
2221 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2222 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2224 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2227 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2228 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2229 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2230 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2231 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2234 /* superblock security operations */
2236 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2238 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2241 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2243 superblock_free_security(sb);
2246 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2251 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2254 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2256 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2257 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2258 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2259 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2260 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2263 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2270 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2274 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2277 int current_size = 0;
2285 while (current_size < len) {
2295 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2297 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2298 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2299 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2305 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2313 in_save = in_end = orig;
2317 open_quote = !open_quote;
2318 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2320 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2322 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2323 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2325 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2327 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2329 } while (*in_end++);
2331 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2332 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2337 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2340 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2341 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2342 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2344 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2350 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2353 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2354 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2357 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2359 goto out_free_secdata;
2361 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2363 goto out_free_secdata;
2365 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2366 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2368 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2372 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
2374 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2375 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid);
2377 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2378 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2379 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2385 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2386 goto out_bad_option;
2389 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2390 goto out_bad_option;
2392 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2393 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2394 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2396 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2397 goto out_bad_option;
2400 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2401 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2402 goto out_bad_option;
2411 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2413 free_secdata(secdata);
2416 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2417 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2422 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2424 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2425 struct common_audit_data ad;
2428 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2432 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2433 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2436 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2437 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2438 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2441 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2443 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2444 struct common_audit_data ad;
2446 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2447 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2448 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2451 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2454 unsigned long flags,
2457 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2459 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2460 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2461 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2463 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2466 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2468 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2470 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2471 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2474 /* inode security operations */
2476 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2478 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2481 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2483 inode_free_security(inode);
2486 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2487 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
2488 void **value, size_t *len)
2490 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2491 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2492 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2493 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2495 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2497 dsec = dir->i_security;
2498 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2501 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2503 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2504 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2505 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2506 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2507 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2508 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2511 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2512 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2515 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2520 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2521 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2522 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2523 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2525 isec->initialized = 1;
2528 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2532 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2539 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2551 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2553 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2556 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2558 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2561 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2563 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2566 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2568 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2571 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2573 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2576 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2578 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2581 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2583 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2586 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2587 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2589 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2592 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2594 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2596 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2599 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2601 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2603 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2606 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2607 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2610 struct common_audit_data ad;
2611 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2614 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2617 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2618 audited, denied, &ad, flags);
2624 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2626 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2629 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2630 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2632 struct av_decision avd;
2634 u32 audited, denied;
2636 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2637 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2639 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2643 validate_creds(cred);
2645 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2648 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2650 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2651 isec = inode->i_security;
2653 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2654 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2655 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2657 if (likely(!audited))
2660 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, flags);
2666 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2668 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2669 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2670 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2672 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2673 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2674 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2680 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2681 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2682 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2684 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2687 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2690 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2692 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2695 path.dentry = dentry;
2698 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2701 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2703 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2705 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2706 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2707 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2708 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2710 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2711 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2712 Restrict to administrator. */
2717 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2718 ordinary setattr permission. */
2719 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2722 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2723 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2725 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2726 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2727 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2728 struct common_audit_data ad;
2729 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2732 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2733 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2735 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2736 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2739 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2742 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2743 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2745 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2746 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2750 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2751 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2752 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2753 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2757 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2758 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2761 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
2762 audit_size = size - 1;
2769 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
2770 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2771 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
2776 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2781 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2782 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2786 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2791 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2793 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2794 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2798 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2799 const void *value, size_t size,
2802 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2803 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2807 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2808 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2812 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2814 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2815 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2816 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2824 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2826 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2828 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2831 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2833 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2835 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2838 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2840 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2841 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2843 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2844 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2849 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2851 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2853 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2857 char *context = NULL;
2858 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2860 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2864 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2865 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2866 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2867 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2868 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2869 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2870 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2872 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2873 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2875 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2878 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2891 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2892 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2894 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2898 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2901 if (!value || !size)
2904 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2909 isec->initialized = 1;
2913 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2915 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2916 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2917 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2921 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2923 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2927 /* file security operations */
2929 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2931 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2932 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2934 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2935 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2938 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2939 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2942 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2944 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2945 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2946 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2947 u32 sid = current_sid();
2950 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2953 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2954 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2955 /* No change since file_open check. */
2958 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2961 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2963 return file_alloc_security(file);
2966 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2968 file_free_security(file);
2971 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2974 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2984 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
2986 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
2987 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
2990 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
2992 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
2993 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
2996 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3000 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3005 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3006 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3009 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3010 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3013 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3018 static int default_noexec;
3020 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3022 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3025 if (default_noexec &&
3026 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3028 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3029 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3030 * This has an additional check.
3032 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3038 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3039 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3041 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3042 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3045 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3046 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3048 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3055 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3058 u32 sid = current_sid();
3061 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
3062 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
3063 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
3064 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
3066 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3067 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3068 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3073 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3074 return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3077 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3078 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3080 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3083 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3084 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3087 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3088 unsigned long reqprot,
3091 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3093 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3096 if (default_noexec &&
3097 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3099 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3100 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3101 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3102 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3103 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3104 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3105 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3106 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3108 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3109 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3110 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3111 * modified content. This typically should only
3112 * occur for text relocations.
3114 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3120 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3123 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3125 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3127 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3130 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3133 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3138 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3143 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3144 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3153 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3154 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3155 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3160 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3165 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3169 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3176 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3178 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3180 fsec = file->f_security;
3181 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3186 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3187 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3190 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3192 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3194 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3195 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3197 fsec = file->f_security;
3200 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3202 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3204 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3205 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3208 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3210 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3212 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3215 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3217 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3218 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3220 fsec = file->f_security;
3221 isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3223 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3224 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3225 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3226 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3227 * struct as its SID.
3229 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3230 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3232 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3233 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3234 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3235 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3236 * new inode label or new policy.
3237 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3239 return path_has_perm(cred, &file->f_path, open_file_to_av(file));
3242 /* task security operations */
3244 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3246 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3250 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3252 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3254 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3256 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3260 cred->security = tsec;
3265 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3267 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3269 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3272 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3273 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3275 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3276 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3281 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3283 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3286 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3287 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3289 old_tsec = old->security;
3291 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3295 new->security = tsec;
3300 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3302 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3304 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3305 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3311 * set the security data for a kernel service
3312 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3314 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3316 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3317 u32 sid = current_sid();
3320 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3321 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3322 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3326 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3327 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3328 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3334 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3335 * objective context of the specified inode
3337 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3339 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3340 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3341 u32 sid = current_sid();
3344 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3345 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3346 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3350 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3354 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3357 struct common_audit_data ad;
3359 sid = task_sid(current);
3361 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3362 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3364 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3365 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3368 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3370 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3373 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3375 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3378 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3380 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3383 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3385 *secid = task_sid(p);
3388 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3392 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3396 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3399 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3403 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3407 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3410 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3412 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3415 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3416 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3418 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3420 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3421 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3422 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3423 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3424 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3425 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3430 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3434 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3438 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3441 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3443 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3446 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3448 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3451 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3458 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3460 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3462 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3463 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3465 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3469 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3471 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3474 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3475 struct inode *inode)
3477 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3478 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3481 isec->initialized = 1;
3484 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3485 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3486 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3488 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3489 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3491 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3492 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3496 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3497 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3500 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3501 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3505 *proto = ih->protocol;
3507 switch (ih->protocol) {
3509 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3511 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3515 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3519 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3520 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3525 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3527 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3531 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3535 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3536 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3540 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3541 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3543 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3547 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3551 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3552 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3563 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3565 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3566 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3567 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3570 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3571 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3574 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3575 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3579 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3580 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3583 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3584 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3585 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3594 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3596 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3600 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3601 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3606 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3608 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3612 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3613 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3617 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3618 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3620 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3624 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3625 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3629 /* includes fragments */
3639 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3640 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3645 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3647 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3650 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3651 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3654 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3656 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3659 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3660 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3670 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3671 " unable to parse packet\n");
3681 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3683 * @family: protocol family
3684 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3687 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3688 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3689 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3690 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3691 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3695 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3702 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3703 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3705 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3706 if (unlikely(err)) {
3708 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3709 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3716 /* socket security operations */
3718 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3719 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3721 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3722 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3726 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3730 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3732 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3733 struct common_audit_data ad;
3734 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3735 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3737 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3740 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3744 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3747 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3748 int protocol, int kern)
3750 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3758 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3759 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3763 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3766 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3767 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3769 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3770 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3771 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3774 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3777 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3779 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
3784 isec->initialized = 1;
3787 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3788 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3789 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3790 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3796 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3797 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3798 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3800 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3802 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3806 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3811 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3812 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3813 * check the first address now.
3815 family = sk->sk_family;
3816 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3818 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3819 struct common_audit_data ad;
3820 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3821 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3822 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3823 unsigned short snum;
3826 if (family == PF_INET) {
3827 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3828 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3829 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3831 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3832 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3833 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3839 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3841 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3842 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3846 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3848 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3849 ad.u.net->family = family;
3850 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3852 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3858 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3859 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3860 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3863 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3864 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3867 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3868 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3872 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3876 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3880 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3882 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
3883 ad.u.net->family = family;
3885 if (family == PF_INET)
3886 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3888 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
3890 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3891 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3899 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3901 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3902 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3905 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3910 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3912 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3913 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3914 struct common_audit_data ad;
3915 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3916 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3917 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3918 unsigned short snum;
3921 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3922 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3923 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3925 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3927 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3928 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3930 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3933 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3937 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3938 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3940 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3942 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
3943 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
3944 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3949 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3955 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3957 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3960 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3963 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3964 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3966 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3970 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3972 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3973 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3974 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3975 newisec->initialized = 1;
3980 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3983 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3986 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3987 int size, int flags)
3989 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3992 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3994 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3997 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3999 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4002 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4006 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4010 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4013 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4016 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4019 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4021 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4024 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4028 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4029 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4030 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4031 struct common_audit_data ad;
4032 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4035 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4037 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4039 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4040 sksec_other->sclass,
4041 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4045 /* server child socket */
4046 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4047 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4052 /* connecting socket */
4053 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4058 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4059 struct socket *other)
4061 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4062 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4063 struct common_audit_data ad;
4064 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4066 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4068 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4070 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4074 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4076 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4082 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4085 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4086 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4090 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4093 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4094 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4097 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4101 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4102 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4103 struct common_audit_data ad;
4104 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4107 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4109 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4110 ad.u.net->family = family;
4111 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4115 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4116 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4122 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4125 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4130 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4133 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4134 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4135 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4136 struct common_audit_data ad;
4137 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4142 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4145 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4146 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4149 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4150 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4151 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4152 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4153 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4154 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4156 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4157 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4158 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4161 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4163 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4164 ad.u.net->family = family;
4165 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4169 if (peerlbl_active) {
4172 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4175 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4178 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4181 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4184 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4187 if (secmark_active) {
4188 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4197 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4198 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4203 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4204 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4206 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4207 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4208 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4209 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4210 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4212 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4216 if (scontext_len > len) {
4221 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4225 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4231 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4233 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4236 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4238 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4241 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4245 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4246 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4248 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4251 *secid = peer_secid;
4252 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4257 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4259 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4261 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4265 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4266 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4267 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4268 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4273 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4275 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4277 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4278 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4282 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4284 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4285 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4287 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4288 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4289 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4291 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4294 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4297 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4299 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4301 *secid = sksec->sid;
4305 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4307 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4308 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4310 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4311 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4312 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4313 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4316 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4317 struct request_sock *req)
4319 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4321 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4325 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4326 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4329 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4332 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4333 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4334 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4336 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4339 req->secid = newsid;
4340 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4343 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4346 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4347 const struct request_sock *req)
4349 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4351 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4352 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4353 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4354 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4355 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4356 time it will have been created and available. */
4358 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4359 * thread with access to newsksec */
4360 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4363 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4365 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4366 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4368 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4369 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4372 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4375 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4377 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4380 __tsec = current_security();
4383 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4386 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4388 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4391 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4393 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4396 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4399 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4402 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4404 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4406 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4409 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4415 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4420 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4422 u32 sid = current_sid();
4424 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4425 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4426 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4427 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4428 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4429 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4431 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4435 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4437 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4439 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4440 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4443 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4445 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4446 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4448 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4449 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4450 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4451 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4452 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4453 * protocols were being used */
4455 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4456 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4461 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4463 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4464 u32 sid = current_sid();
4467 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4468 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4471 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4472 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4480 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4484 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4485 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4487 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4491 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4493 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4495 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4496 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4497 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4498 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4499 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4500 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4510 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4515 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4517 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4523 struct common_audit_data ad;
4524 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4529 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4532 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4533 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4534 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4535 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4538 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4541 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4543 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4544 ad.u.net->family = family;
4545 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4548 if (peerlbl_active) {
4549 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4552 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4558 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4559 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4563 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4564 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4565 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4567 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4573 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4574 struct sk_buff *skb,
4575 const struct net_device *in,
4576 const struct net_device *out,
4577 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4579 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4582 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4583 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4584 struct sk_buff *skb,
4585 const struct net_device *in,
4586 const struct net_device *out,
4587 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4589 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4593 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4598 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4601 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4602 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4603 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4605 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4608 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4609 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4615 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4616 struct sk_buff *skb,
4617 const struct net_device *in,
4618 const struct net_device *out,
4619 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4621 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4624 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4628 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4629 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4630 struct common_audit_data ad;
4631 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4637 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4639 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4641 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4642 ad.u.net->family = family;
4643 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4646 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4647 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4648 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4649 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4651 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4652 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4657 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4663 struct common_audit_data ad;
4664 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4669 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4670 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4671 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4672 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4673 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4674 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4676 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4677 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4678 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4679 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4680 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4681 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4682 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4685 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4686 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4687 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4690 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4691 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4692 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4693 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4697 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4698 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4701 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4702 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4705 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4706 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4707 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4710 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4712 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4713 ad.u.net->family = family;
4714 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4718 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4719 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4720 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4722 if (peerlbl_active) {
4726 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4728 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4729 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4730 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4732 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4734 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4735 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4736 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4742 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4743 struct sk_buff *skb,
4744 const struct net_device *in,
4745 const struct net_device *out,
4746 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4748 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4751 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4752 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4753 struct sk_buff *skb,
4754 const struct net_device *in,
4755 const struct net_device *out,
4756 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4758 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4762 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4764 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4768 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4772 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4775 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4776 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4779 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4782 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4786 sid = task_sid(task);
4787 isec->sclass = sclass;
4789 perm->security = isec;
4794 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4796 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4797 perm->security = NULL;
4801 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4803 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4805 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4809 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4810 msg->security = msec;
4815 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4817 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4819 msg->security = NULL;
4823 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4826 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4827 struct common_audit_data ad;
4828 u32 sid = current_sid();
4830 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4832 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4833 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4835 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4838 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4840 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4843 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4845 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4848 /* message queue security operations */
4849 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4851 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4852 struct common_audit_data ad;
4853 u32 sid = current_sid();
4856 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4860 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4862 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4863 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4865 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4868 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4874 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4876 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4879 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4881 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4882 struct common_audit_data ad;
4883 u32 sid = current_sid();
4885 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4887 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4888 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4890 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4891 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4894 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4902 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4903 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4906 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4909 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4912 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4918 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4922 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4924 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4925 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4926 struct common_audit_data ad;
4927 u32 sid = current_sid();
4930 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4931 msec = msg->security;
4934 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4936 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4938 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4939 * message queue this message will be stored in
4941 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4947 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4948 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4950 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4951 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4954 /* Can this process send the message */
4955 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4958 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4959 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4960 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4965 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4966 struct task_struct *target,
4967 long type, int mode)
4969 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4970 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4971 struct common_audit_data ad;
4972 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4975 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4976 msec = msg->security;
4978 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
4979 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4981 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4982 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4984 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4985 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4989 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4990 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4992 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4993 struct common_audit_data ad;
4994 u32 sid = current_sid();
4997 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5001 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5003 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5004 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5006 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5009 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5015 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5017 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5020 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5022 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5023 struct common_audit_data ad;
5024 u32 sid = current_sid();
5026 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5028 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5029 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5031 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5032 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5035 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5036 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5044 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5045 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5048 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5051 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5058 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5064 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5068 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5069 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5073 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5076 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5078 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5081 /* Semaphore security operations */
5082 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5084 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5085 struct common_audit_data ad;
5086 u32 sid = current_sid();
5089 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5093 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5095 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5096 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5098 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5101 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5107 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5109 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5112 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5114 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5115 struct common_audit_data ad;
5116 u32 sid = current_sid();
5118 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5120 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5121 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5123 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5124 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5127 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5128 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5136 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5137 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5141 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5152 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5155 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5159 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5165 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5169 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5170 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5175 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5179 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5182 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5188 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5190 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5195 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5198 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5200 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5204 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5207 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5210 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5211 char *name, char **value)
5213 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5219 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5225 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5227 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5229 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5231 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5232 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5233 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5234 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5235 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5236 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5237 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5238 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5246 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5256 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5257 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5259 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5260 struct task_struct *tracer;
5267 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5268 security attributes. */
5273 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5274 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5275 * above restriction is ever removed.
5277 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5278 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5279 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5280 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5281 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5282 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5283 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5284 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5285 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5286 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5292 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5293 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5294 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5298 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5299 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5300 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5301 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5304 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5305 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5306 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5307 audit_size = size - 1;
5310 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5311 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5312 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5317 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5324 new = prepare_creds();
5328 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5329 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5330 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5331 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5332 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5333 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5334 tsec = new->security;
5335 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5336 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5337 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5338 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5339 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5340 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5343 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5344 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5345 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5346 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5351 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5353 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5354 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5359 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5360 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5361 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5365 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5366 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5369 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5371 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5375 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5376 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5395 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5397 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5400 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5402 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5405 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5411 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5413 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5415 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5419 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5421 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5423 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5426 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5429 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5438 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5439 unsigned long flags)
5441 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5442 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5444 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5448 tsec = cred->security;
5449 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5450 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5452 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5458 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5460 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5466 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5467 const struct cred *cred,
5471 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5474 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5475 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5476 appear to be created. */
5480 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5482 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5483 ksec = key->security;
5485 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5488 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5490 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5491 char *context = NULL;
5495 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5504 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5507 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5508 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5509 .capget = selinux_capget,
5510 .capset = selinux_capset,
5511 .capable = selinux_capable,
5512 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5513 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5514 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5515 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5517 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5519 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5520 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5521 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5522 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5524 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5525 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5526 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5527 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5528 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5529 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5530 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5531 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5532 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5533 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5534 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5535 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5538 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5539 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5540 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5541 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5542 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5543 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5544 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5545 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5546 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5547 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5548 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5549 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5550 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5551 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5552 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5553 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5554 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5555 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5556 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5557 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5558 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5559 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5560 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5561 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5562 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5564 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5565 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5566 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5567 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5568 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5569 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5570 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5571 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5572 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5573 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5574 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5575 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5577 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5579 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5580 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5581 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5582 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5583 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5584 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5585 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5586 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5587 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5588 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5589 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5590 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5591 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5592 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5593 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5594 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5595 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5596 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5597 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5598 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5599 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5600 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5602 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5603 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5605 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5606 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5608 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5609 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5610 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5611 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5612 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5613 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5615 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5616 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5617 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5618 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5619 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5621 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5622 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5623 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5624 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5625 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5627 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5629 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5630 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5632 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5633 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5634 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5635 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5636 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5637 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5639 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5640 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5642 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5643 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5644 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5645 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5646 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5647 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5648 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5649 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5650 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5651 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5652 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5653 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5654 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5655 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5656 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5657 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5658 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5659 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5660 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5661 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5662 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5663 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5664 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5665 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5666 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5667 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5668 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5669 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5670 .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
5671 .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
5672 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5673 .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
5674 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5675 .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
5677 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5678 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5679 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5680 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5681 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5682 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5683 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5684 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5685 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5686 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5687 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5691 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5692 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5693 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5694 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5698 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5699 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5700 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5701 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5705 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5707 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5708 selinux_enabled = 0;
5712 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5713 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5717 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5719 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5720 cred_init_security();
5722 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5724 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5725 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5726 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5729 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5730 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5732 if (selinux_enforcing)
5733 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5735 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5740 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5742 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5745 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5747 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5749 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5750 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5751 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5754 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5755 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5756 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5758 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5760 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5762 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5763 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5765 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5766 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5769 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5770 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5772 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5773 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5776 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5777 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5779 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5780 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5784 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5786 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5788 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5789 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5791 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5792 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5795 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5796 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5798 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5799 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5805 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5809 if (!selinux_enabled)
5812 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5814 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5816 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5818 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5819 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5821 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5828 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5830 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5831 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5833 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5835 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5836 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5837 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5842 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5844 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5845 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5848 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5850 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5851 static int selinux_disabled;
5853 int selinux_disable(void)
5855 if (ss_initialized) {
5856 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5860 if (selinux_disabled) {
5861 /* Only do this once. */
5865 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5867 selinux_disabled = 1;
5868 selinux_enabled = 0;
5870 reset_security_ops();
5872 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5875 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5876 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5878 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */