security/selinux/hooks.c

   1 /*
   2  *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   3  *
   4  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   5  *
   6  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
   7  *            Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
   8  *            Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
   9  *            James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  10  *
  11  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  13  *                                         Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
  14  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  15  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  16  *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  17  *              Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
  18  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  19  *                     Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
  20  *
  21  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  22  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  23  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  24  */
  25
  26 #include <linux/init.h>
  27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
  29 #include <linux/errno.h>
  30 #include <linux/sched.h>
  31 #include <linux/security.h>
  32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  33 #include <linux/capability.h>
  34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  35 #include <linux/mm.h>
  36 #include <linux/mman.h>
  37 #include <linux/slab.h>
  38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  39 #include <linux/swap.h>
  40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  42 #include <linux/file.h>
  43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
  44 #include <linux/namei.h>
  45 #include <linux/mount.h>
  46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  49 #include <linux/tty.h>
  50 #include <net/icmp.h>
  51 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for local_port_range[] */
  52 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
  54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
  55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
  56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
  58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  60 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  63 #include <linux/udp.h>
  64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
  65 #include <linux/quota.h>
  66 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  67 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  68 #include <linux/parser.h>
  69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  70 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  72 #include <linux/personality.h>
  73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
  74 #include <linux/audit.h>
  75 #include <linux/string.h>
  76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
  77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
  79
  80 #include "avc.h"
  81 #include "objsec.h"
  82 #include "netif.h"
  83 #include "netnode.h"
  84 #include "netport.h"
  85 #include "xfrm.h"
  86 #include "netlabel.h"
  87 #include "audit.h"
  88
  89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
  90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
  91
  92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
  93
  94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
  95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
  96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
  97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
  98
  99 /* SECMARK reference count */
 100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 101
 102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 103 int selinux_enforcing;
 104
 105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 106 {
 107         unsigned long enforcing;
 108         if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
 109                 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 110         return 1;
 111 }
 112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
 113 #endif
 114
 115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 117
 118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 119 {
 120         unsigned long enabled;
 121         if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
 122                 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
 123         return 1;
 124 }
 125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 126 #else
 127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 128 #endif
 129
 130
 131 /*
 132  * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
 133  * just to allow the use of the capability module.
 134  */
 135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
 136
 137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
 138    before the policy was loaded. */
 139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 141
 142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 143
 144 /**
 145  * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
 146  *
 147  * Description:
 148  * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
 149  * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
 150  * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
 151  * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
 152  *
 153  */
 154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 155 {
 156         return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
 157 }
 158
 159 /*
 160  * initialise the security for the init task
 161  */
 162 static void cred_init_security(void)
 163 {
 164         struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
 165         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 166
 167         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 168         if (!tsec)
 169                 panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
 170
 171         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 172         cred->security = tsec;
 173 }
 174
 175 /*
 176  * get the security ID of a set of credentials
 177  */
 178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
 179 {
 180         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 181
 182         tsec = cred->security;
 183         return tsec->sid;
 184 }
 185
 186 /*
 187  * get the objective security ID of a task
 188  */
 189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
 190 {
 191         u32 sid;
 192
 193         rcu_read_lock();
 194         sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
 195         rcu_read_unlock();
 196         return sid;
 197 }
 198
 199 /*
 200  * get the subjective security ID of the current task
 201  */
 202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
 203 {
 204         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
 205
 206         return tsec->sid;
 207 }
 208
 209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 210
 211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 212 {
 213         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 214         u32 sid = current_sid();
 215
 216         isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
 217         if (!isec)
 218                 return -ENOMEM;
 219
 220         mutex_init(&isec->lock);
 221         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
 222         isec->inode = inode;
 223         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 224         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
 225         isec->task_sid = sid;
 226         inode->i_security = isec;
 227
 228         return 0;
 229 }
 230
 231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 232 {
 233         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 234         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 235
 236         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 237         if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
 238                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 239         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 240
 241         inode->i_security = NULL;
 242         kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 243 }
 244
 245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 246 {
 247         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 248         u32 sid = current_sid();
 249
 250         fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 251         if (!fsec)
 252                 return -ENOMEM;
 253
 254         fsec->sid = sid;
 255         fsec->fown_sid = sid;
 256         file->f_security = fsec;
 257
 258         return 0;
 259 }
 260
 261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
 262 {
 263         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 264         file->f_security = NULL;
 265         kfree(fsec);
 266 }
 267
 268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 269 {
 270         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 271
 272         sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 273         if (!sbsec)
 274                 return -ENOMEM;
 275
 276         mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
 277         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
 278         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 279         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 280         sbsec->sb = sb;
 281         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 282         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 283         sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 284         sb->s_security = sbsec;
 285
 286         return 0;
 287 }
 288
 289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 290 {
 291         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 292
 293         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 294         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 295                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
 296         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 297
 298         sb->s_security = NULL;
 299         kfree(sbsec);
 300 }
 301
 302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 303 {
 304         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 305
 306         ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
 307         if (!ssec)
 308                 return -ENOMEM;
 309
 310         ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 311         ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 312         sk->sk_security = ssec;
 313
 314         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
 315
 316         return 0;
 317 }
 318
 319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 320 {
 321         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
 322
 323         sk->sk_security = NULL;
 324         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
 325         kfree(ssec);
 326 }
 327
 328 /* The security server must be initialized before
 329    any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
 330 extern int ss_initialized;
 331
 332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
 333
 334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
 335         "uses xattr",
 336         "uses transition SIDs",
 337         "uses task SIDs",
 338         "uses genfs_contexts",
 339         "not configured for labeling",
 340         "uses mountpoint labeling",
 341 };
 342
 343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 344
 345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
 346 {
 347         return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 348 }
 349
 350 enum {
 351         Opt_error = -1,
 352         Opt_context = 1,
 353         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 354         Opt_defcontext = 3,
 355         Opt_rootcontext = 4,
 356         Opt_labelsupport = 5,
 357 };
 358
 359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
 360         {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 361         {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 362         {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 363         {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 364         {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
 365         {Opt_error, NULL},
 366 };
 367
 368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 369
 370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 371                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 372                         const struct cred *cred)
 373 {
 374         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 375         int rc;
 376
 377         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 378                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 379         if (rc)
 380                 return rc;
 381
 382         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 383                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 384         return rc;
 385 }
 386
 387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 388                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 389                         const struct cred *cred)
 390 {
 391         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 392         int rc;
 393         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 394                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 395         if (rc)
 396                 return rc;
 397
 398         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 399                           FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 400         return rc;
 401 }
 402
 403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 404 {
 405         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 406         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 407         struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
 408         int rc = 0;
 409
 410         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 411                 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 412                    error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 413                    the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 414                    the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 415                    assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 416                 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 417                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
 418                                "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 419                         rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 420                         goto out;
 421                 }
 422                 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 423                 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 424                         if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 425                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 426                                        "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 427                                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 428                         else
 429                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 430                                        "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
 431                                        sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 432                         goto out;
 433                 }
 434         }
 435
 436         sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
 437
 438         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 439                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
 440                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 441         else
 442                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
 443                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 444                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 445
 446         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
 447             sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
 448             sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
 449             sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 450                 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 451
 452         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 453         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 454
 455         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 456            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 457            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 458            populates itself. */
 459         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 460 next_inode:
 461         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 462                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 463                                 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
 464                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 465                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 466                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 467                 inode = igrab(inode);
 468                 if (inode) {
 469                         if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
 470                                 inode_doinit(inode);
 471                         iput(inode);
 472                 }
 473                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 474                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 475                 goto next_inode;
 476         }
 477         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 478 out:
 479         return rc;
 480 }
 481
 482 /*
 483  * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
 484  * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
 485  * mount options, or whatever.
 486  */
 487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 488                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 489 {
 490         int rc = 0, i;
 491         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 492         char *context = NULL;
 493         u32 len;
 494         char tmp;
 495
 496         security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
 497
 498         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 499                 return -EINVAL;
 500
 501         if (!ss_initialized)
 502                 return -EINVAL;
 503
 504         tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 505         /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
 506         for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
 507                 if (tmp & 0x01)
 508                         opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 509                 tmp >>= 1;
 510         }
 511         /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
 512         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
 513                 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 514
 515         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 516         if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
 517                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 518                 goto out_free;
 519         }
 520
 521         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
 522         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 523                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 524                 goto out_free;
 525         }
 526
 527         i = 0;
 528         if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
 529                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
 530                 if (rc)
 531                         goto out_free;
 532                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 533                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 534         }
 535         if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
 536                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
 537                 if (rc)
 538                         goto out_free;
 539                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 540                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 541         }
 542         if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
 543                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
 544                 if (rc)
 545                         goto out_free;
 546                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 547                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 548         }
 549         if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
 550                 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 551                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
 552
 553                 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
 554                 if (rc)
 555                         goto out_free;
 556                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 557                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 558         }
 559         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
 560                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
 561                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 562         }
 563
 564         BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
 565
 566         return 0;
 567
 568 out_free:
 569         security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
 570         return rc;
 571 }
 572
 573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
 574                       u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 575 {
 576         char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 577
 578         /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
 579         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 580                 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
 581                     (old_sid != new_sid))
 582                         return 1;
 583
 584         /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
 585          * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
 586          */
 587         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 588                 if (mnt_flags & flag)
 589                         return 1;
 590         return 0;
 591 }
 592
 593 /*
 594  * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
 595  * labeling information.
 596  */
 597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 598                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 599 {
 600         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 601         int rc = 0, i;
 602         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 603         const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
 604         struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 605         struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
 606         u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
 607         u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
 608         char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
 609         int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
 610         int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
 611
 612         mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 613
 614         if (!ss_initialized) {
 615                 if (!num_opts) {
 616                         /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 617                            after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 618                            server is ready to handle calls. */
 619                         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 620                         if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 621                                 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 622                         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 623                         goto out;
 624                 }
 625                 rc = -EINVAL;
 626                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
 627                         "before the security server is initialized\n");
 628                 goto out;
 629         }
 630
 631         /*
 632          * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
 633          * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
 634          * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
 635          * we need to skip the double mount verification.
 636          *
 637          * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
 638          * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
 639          * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
 640          * will be used for both mounts)
 641          */
 642         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
 643             && (num_opts == 0))
 644                 goto out;
 645
 646         /*
 647          * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
 648          * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
 649          * than once with different security options.
 650          */
 651         for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
 652                 u32 sid;
 653
 654                 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
 655                         continue;
 656                 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
 657                                              strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
 658                 if (rc) {
 659                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 660                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 661                                mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
 662                         goto out;
 663                 }
 664                 switch (flags[i]) {
 665                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
 666                         fscontext_sid = sid;
 667
 668                         if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
 669                                         fscontext_sid))
 670                                 goto out_double_mount;
 671
 672                         sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 673                         break;
 674                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
 675                         context_sid = sid;
 676
 677                         if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
 678                                         context_sid))
 679                                 goto out_double_mount;
 680
 681                         sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
 682                         break;
 683                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
 684                         rootcontext_sid = sid;
 685
 686                         if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
 687                                         rootcontext_sid))
 688                                 goto out_double_mount;
 689
 690                         sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 691
 692                         break;
 693                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
 694                         defcontext_sid = sid;
 695
 696                         if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
 697                                         defcontext_sid))
 698                                 goto out_double_mount;
 699
 700                         sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 701
 702                         break;
 703                 default:
 704                         rc = -EINVAL;
 705                         goto out;
 706                 }
 707         }
 708
 709         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 710                 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
 711                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
 712                         goto out_double_mount;
 713                 rc = 0;
 714                 goto out;
 715         }
 716
 717         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 718                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
 719
 720         /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
 721         rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 722         if (rc) {
 723                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 724                        __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 725                 goto out;
 726         }
 727
 728         /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
 729         if (fscontext_sid) {
 730                 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
 731                 if (rc)
 732                         goto out;
 733
 734                 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
 735         }
 736
 737         /*
 738          * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
 739          * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 740          * the superblock context if not already set.
 741          */
 742         if (context_sid) {
 743                 if (!fscontext_sid) {
 744                         rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 745                                                           cred);
 746                         if (rc)
 747                                 goto out;
 748                         sbsec->sid = context_sid;
 749                 } else {
 750                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 751                                                              cred);
 752                         if (rc)
 753                                 goto out;
 754                 }
 755                 if (!rootcontext_sid)
 756                         rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
 757
 758                 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
 759                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 760         }
 761
 762         if (rootcontext_sid) {
 763                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
 764                                                      cred);
 765                 if (rc)
 766                         goto out;
 767
 768                 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
 769                 root_isec->initialized = 1;
 770         }
 771
 772         if (defcontext_sid) {
 773                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 774                         rc = -EINVAL;
 775                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
 776                                "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
 777                         goto out;
 778                 }
 779
 780                 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
 781                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
 782                                                              sbsec, cred);
 783                         if (rc)
 784                                 goto out;
 785                 }
 786
 787                 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
 788         }
 789
 790         rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
 791 out:
 792         mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
 793         return rc;
 794 out_double_mount:
 795         rc = -EINVAL;
 796         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
 797                "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
 798         goto out;
 799 }
 800
 801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 802                                         struct super_block *newsb)
 803 {
 804         const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
 805         struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
 806
 807         int set_fscontext =     (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
 808         int set_context =       (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
 809         int set_rootcontext =   (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
 810
 811         /*
 812          * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
 813          * mount options.  thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
 814          * with it later
 815          */
 816         if (!ss_initialized) {
 817                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 818                 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
 819                         list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 820                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 821                 return;
 822         }
 823
 824         /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
 825         BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
 826
 827         /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
 828         if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 829                 return;
 830
 831         mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
 832
 833         newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
 834
 835         newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
 836         newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
 837         newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
 838
 839         if (set_context) {
 840                 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
 841
 842                 if (!set_fscontext)
 843                         newsbsec->sid = sid;
 844                 if (!set_rootcontext) {
 845                         struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
 846                         struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
 847                         newisec->sid = sid;
 848                 }
 849                 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
 850         }
 851         if (set_rootcontext) {
 852                 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
 853                 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
 854                 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
 855                 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
 856
 857                 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
 858         }
 859
 860         sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
 861         mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
 862 }
 863
 864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
 865                                   struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 866 {
 867         char *p;
 868         char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
 869         char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
 870         int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
 871
 872         opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
 873
 874         /* Standard string-based options. */
 875         while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
 876                 int token;
 877                 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 878
 879                 if (!*p)
 880                         continue;
 881
 882                 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
 883
 884                 switch (token) {
 885                 case Opt_context:
 886                         if (context || defcontext) {
 887                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 888                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 889                                 goto out_err;
 890                         }
 891                         context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 892                         if (!context) {
 893                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 894                                 goto out_err;
 895                         }
 896                         break;
 897
 898                 case Opt_fscontext:
 899                         if (fscontext) {
 900                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 901                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 902                                 goto out_err;
 903                         }
 904                         fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 905                         if (!fscontext) {
 906                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 907                                 goto out_err;
 908                         }
 909                         break;
 910
 911                 case Opt_rootcontext:
 912                         if (rootcontext) {
 913                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 914                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 915                                 goto out_err;
 916                         }
 917                         rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 918                         if (!rootcontext) {
 919                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 920                                 goto out_err;
 921                         }
 922                         break;
 923
 924                 case Opt_defcontext:
 925                         if (context || defcontext) {
 926                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 927                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 928                                 goto out_err;
 929                         }
 930                         defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 931                         if (!defcontext) {
 932                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 933                                 goto out_err;
 934                         }
 935                         break;
 936                 case Opt_labelsupport:
 937                         break;
 938                 default:
 939                         rc = -EINVAL;
 940                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount option\n");
 941                         goto out_err;
 942
 943                 }
 944         }
 945
 946         rc = -ENOMEM;
 947         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 948         if (!opts->mnt_opts)
 949                 goto out_err;
 950
 951         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
 952         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 953                 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
 954                 goto out_err;
 955         }
 956
 957         if (fscontext) {
 958                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
 959                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 960         }
 961         if (context) {
 962                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
 963                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 964         }
 965         if (rootcontext) {
 966                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
 967                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 968         }
 969         if (defcontext) {
 970                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
 971                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 972         }
 973
 974         opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
 975         return 0;
 976
 977 out_err:
 978         kfree(context);
 979         kfree(defcontext);
 980         kfree(fscontext);
 981         kfree(rootcontext);
 982         return rc;
 983 }
 984 /*
 985  * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
 986  */
 987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 988 {
 989         int rc = 0;
 990         char *options = data;
 991         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
 992
 993         security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
 994
 995         if (!data)
 996                 goto out;
 997
 998         BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
 999
1000         rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1001         if (rc)
1002                 goto out_err;
1003
1004 out:
1005         rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1006
1007 out_err:
1008         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1009         return rc;
1010 }
1011
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013                                struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1014 {
1015         int i;
1016         char *prefix;
1017
1018         for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1019                 char *has_comma;
1020
1021                 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022                         has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1023                 else
1024                         has_comma = NULL;
1025
1026                 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1027                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1028                         prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1029                         break;
1030                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1031                         prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1032                         break;
1033                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034                         prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1035                         break;
1036                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037                         prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1038                         break;
1039                 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1040                         seq_putc(m, ',');
1041                         seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1042                         continue;
1043                 default:
1044                         BUG();
1045                 };
1046                 /* we need a comma before each option */
1047                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1048                 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1049                 if (has_comma)
1050                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1051                 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1052                 if (has_comma)
1053                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1054         }
1055 }
1056
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1058 {
1059         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1060         int rc;
1061
1062         rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1063         if (rc) {
1064                 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1065                 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1066                         rc = 0;
1067                 return rc;
1068         }
1069
1070         selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1071
1072         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1073
1074         return rc;
1075 }
1076
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1078 {
1079         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1080         case S_IFSOCK:
1081                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1082         case S_IFLNK:
1083                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1084         case S_IFREG:
1085                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1086         case S_IFBLK:
1087                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1088         case S_IFDIR:
1089                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1090         case S_IFCHR:
1091                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1092         case S_IFIFO:
1093                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1094
1095         }
1096
1097         return SECCLASS_FILE;
1098 }
1099
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1101 {
1102         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1103 }
1104
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1106 {
1107         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1108 }
1109
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1111 {
1112         switch (family) {
1113         case PF_UNIX:
1114                 switch (type) {
1115                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1116                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1118                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1119                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1120                 }
1121                 break;
1122         case PF_INET:
1123         case PF_INET6:
1124                 switch (type) {
1125                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1126                         if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127                                 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1128                         else
1129                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1130                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1131                         if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132                                 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1133                         else
1134                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1135                 case SOCK_DCCP:
1136                         return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1137                 default:
1138                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1139                 }
1140                 break;
1141         case PF_NETLINK:
1142                 switch (protocol) {
1143                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1144                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145                 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147                 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1149                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1150                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1151                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1152                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1155                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1156                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157                 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1163                 default:
1164                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1165                 }
1166         case PF_PACKET:
1167                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1168         case PF_KEY:
1169                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1170         case PF_APPLETALK:
1171                 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1172         }
1173
1174         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1175 }
1176
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1179                                 u16 tclass,
1180                                 u32 *sid)
1181 {
1182         int buflen, rc;
1183         char *buffer, *path, *end;
1184
1185         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1186         if (!buffer)
1187                 return -ENOMEM;
1188
1189         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1190         end = buffer+buflen;
1191         *--end = '\0';
1192         buflen--;
1193         path = end-1;
1194         *path = '/';
1195         while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196                 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1197                 if (buflen < 0)
1198                         break;
1199                 end -= de->namelen;
1200                 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1201                 *--end = '/';
1202                 path = end;
1203                 de = de->parent;
1204         }
1205         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1207         return rc;
1208 }
1209 #else
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1211                                 u16 tclass,
1212                                 u32 *sid)
1213 {
1214         return -EINVAL;
1215 }
1216 #endif
1217
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1220 {
1221         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1223         u32 sid;
1224         struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226         char *context = NULL;
1227         unsigned len = 0;
1228         int rc = 0;
1229
1230         if (isec->initialized)
1231                 goto out;
1232
1233         mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234         if (isec->initialized)
1235                 goto out_unlock;
1236
1237         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241                    server is ready to handle calls. */
1242                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1246                 goto out_unlock;
1247         }
1248
1249         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252                         isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1253                         break;
1254                 }
1255
1256                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1258                 if (opt_dentry) {
1259                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1261                 } else {
1262                         /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1264                 }
1265                 if (!dentry) {
1266                         /*
1267                          * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1268                          * before the policy is loaded.  When we load policy we
1269                          * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1270                          * sbsec->isec_head list.  No reason to complain as these
1271                          * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1272                          * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1273                          * be used again by userspace.
1274                          */
1275                         goto out_unlock;
1276                 }
1277
1278                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1279                 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1280                 if (!context) {
1281                         rc = -ENOMEM;
1282                         dput(dentry);
1283                         goto out_unlock;
1284                 }
1285                 context[len] = '\0';
1286                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1287                                            context, len);
1288                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1289                         /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
1290                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1291                                                    NULL, 0);
1292                         if (rc < 0) {
1293                                 dput(dentry);
1294                                 goto out_unlock;
1295                         }
1296                         kfree(context);
1297                         len = rc;
1298                         context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1299                         if (!context) {
1300                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1301                                 dput(dentry);
1302                                 goto out_unlock;
1303                         }
1304                         context[len] = '\0';
1305                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1306                                                    XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1307                                                    context, len);
1308                 }
1309                 dput(dentry);
1310                 if (rc < 0) {
1311                         if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1312                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned "
1313                                        "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1314                                        -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1315                                 kfree(context);
1316                                 goto out_unlock;
1317                         }
1318                         /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1319                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1320                         rc = 0;
1321                 } else {
1322                         rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1323                                                              sbsec->def_sid,
1324                                                              GFP_NOFS);
1325                         if (rc) {
1326                                 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1327                                 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1328
1329                                 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1330                                         if (printk_ratelimit())
1331                                                 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1332                                                         "context=%s.  This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1333                                                         "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1334                                 } else {
1335                                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
1336                                                "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1337                                                __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1338                                 }
1339                                 kfree(context);
1340                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1341                                 rc = 0;
1342                                 break;
1343                         }
1344                 }
1345                 kfree(context);
1346                 isec->sid = sid;
1347                 break;
1348         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1349                 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1350                 break;
1351         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1352                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1353                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1354
1355                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1356                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1357                 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1358                                              sbsec->sid,
1359                                              isec->sclass,
1360                                              &sid);
1361                 if (rc)
1362                         goto out_unlock;
1363                 isec->sid = sid;
1364                 break;
1365         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1366                 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1367                 break;
1368         default:
1369                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1370                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1371
1372                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1373                         struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1374                         if (proci->pde) {
1375                                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1376                                 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1377                                                           isec->sclass,
1378                                                           &sid);
1379                                 if (rc)
1380                                         goto out_unlock;
1381                                 isec->sid = sid;
1382                         }
1383                 }
1384                 break;
1385         }
1386
1387         isec->initialized = 1;
1388
1389 out_unlock:
1390         mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1391 out:
1392         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1393                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1394         return rc;
1395 }
1396
1397 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1398 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1399 {
1400         u32 perm = 0;
1401
1402         switch (sig) {
1403         case SIGCHLD:
1404                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1405                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1406                 break;
1407         case SIGKILL:
1408                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1409                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1410                 break;
1411         case SIGSTOP:
1412                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1413                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1414                 break;
1415         default:
1416                 /* All other signals. */
1417                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1418                 break;
1419         }
1420
1421         return perm;
1422 }
1423
1424 /*
1425  * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1426  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1427  */
1428 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1429                          const struct cred *target,
1430                          u32 perms)
1431 {
1432         u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1433
1434         return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1435 }
1436
1437 /*
1438  * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1439  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1440  * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1441  * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1442  */
1443 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1444                          const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1445                          u32 perms)
1446 {
1447         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1448         u32 sid1, sid2;
1449
1450         rcu_read_lock();
1451         __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security;  sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1452         __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security;  sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1453         rcu_read_unlock();
1454         return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1455 }
1456
1457 /*
1458  * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1459  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1460  * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1461  * - this uses current's subjective creds
1462  */
1463 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1464                             u32 perms)
1465 {
1466         u32 sid, tsid;
1467
1468         sid = current_sid();
1469         tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1470         return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1471 }
1472
1473 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1474 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1475 #endif
1476
1477 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1478 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1479                                const struct cred *cred,
1480                                int cap, int audit)
1481 {
1482         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1483         struct av_decision avd;
1484         u16 sclass;
1485         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1486         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1487         int rc;
1488
1489         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1490         ad.tsk = tsk;
1491         ad.u.cap = cap;
1492
1493         switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1494         case 0:
1495                 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1496                 break;
1497         case 1:
1498                 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1499                 break;
1500         default:
1501                 printk(KERN_ERR
1502                        "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1503                 BUG();
1504         }
1505
1506         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1507         if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1508                 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1509         return rc;
1510 }
1511
1512 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1513 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1514                            u32 perms)
1515 {
1516         u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1517
1518         return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1519                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1520 }
1521
1522 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1523    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1524    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1525 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1526                           struct inode *inode,
1527                           u32 perms,
1528                           struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1529 {
1530         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1531         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1532         u32 sid;
1533
1534         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1535                 return 0;
1536
1537         sid = cred_sid(cred);
1538         isec = inode->i_security;
1539
1540         if (!adp) {
1541                 adp = &ad;
1542                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1543                 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1544         }
1545
1546         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1547 }
1548
1549 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1550    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1551    pathname if needed. */
1552 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1553                                   struct vfsmount *mnt,
1554                                   struct dentry *dentry,
1555                                   u32 av)
1556 {
1557         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1558         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1559
1560         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1561         ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1562         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1563         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1564 }
1565
1566 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1567    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1568    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1569    check a particular permission to the file.
1570    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1571    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1572    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1573    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1574 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1575                          struct file *file,
1576                          u32 av)
1577 {
1578         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1579         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1580         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1581         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1582         int rc;
1583
1584         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1585         ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1586
1587         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1588                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1589                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1590                                   FD__USE,
1591                                   &ad);
1592                 if (rc)
1593                         goto out;
1594         }
1595
1596         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1597         rc = 0;
1598         if (av)
1599                 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1600
1601 out:
1602         return rc;
1603 }
1604
1605 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1606 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1607                       struct dentry *dentry,
1608                       u16 tclass)
1609 {
1610         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1611         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1612         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1613         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1614         u32 sid, newsid;
1615         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1616         int rc;
1617
1618         dsec = dir->i_security;
1619         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1620
1621         sid = tsec->sid;
1622         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1623
1624         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1625         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1626
1627         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1628                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1629                           &ad);
1630         if (rc)
1631                 return rc;
1632
1633         if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1634                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1635                 if (rc)
1636                         return rc;
1637         }
1638
1639         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1640         if (rc)
1641                 return rc;
1642
1643         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1644                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1645                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1646 }
1647
1648 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1649 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1650                           struct task_struct *ctx)
1651 {
1652         u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1653
1654         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1655 }
1656
1657 #define MAY_LINK        0
1658 #define MAY_UNLINK      1
1659 #define MAY_RMDIR       2
1660
1661 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1662 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1663                     struct dentry *dentry,
1664                     int kind)
1665
1666 {
1667         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1668         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1669         u32 sid = current_sid();
1670         u32 av;
1671         int rc;
1672
1673         dsec = dir->i_security;
1674         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1675
1676         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1677         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1678
1679         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1680         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1681         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1682         if (rc)
1683                 return rc;
1684
1685         switch (kind) {
1686         case MAY_LINK:
1687                 av = FILE__LINK;
1688                 break;
1689         case MAY_UNLINK:
1690                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1691                 break;
1692         case MAY_RMDIR:
1693                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1694                 break;
1695         default:
1696                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized kind %d\n",
1697                         __func__, kind);
1698                 return 0;
1699         }
1700
1701         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1702         return rc;
1703 }
1704
1705 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1706                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1707                              struct inode *new_dir,
1708                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1709 {
1710         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1711         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1712         u32 sid = current_sid();
1713         u32 av;
1714         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1715         int rc;
1716
1717         old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1718         old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1719         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1720         new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1721
1722         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1723
1724         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1725         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1726                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1727         if (rc)
1728                 return rc;
1729         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1730                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1731         if (rc)
1732                 return rc;
1733         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1734                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1735                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1736                 if (rc)
1737                         return rc;
1738         }
1739
1740         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1741         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1742         if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1743                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1744         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1745         if (rc)
1746                 return rc;
1747         if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1748                 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1749                 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1750                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1751                                   new_isec->sclass,
1752                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1753                 if (rc)
1754                         return rc;
1755         }
1756
1757         return 0;
1758 }
1759
1760 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1761 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1762                                struct super_block *sb,
1763                                u32 perms,
1764                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1765 {
1766         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1767         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1768
1769         sbsec = sb->s_security;
1770         return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1771 }
1772
1773 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1774 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1775 {
1776         u32 av = 0;
1777
1778         if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1779                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1780                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1781                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1782                         av |= FILE__READ;
1783
1784                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1785                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1786                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1787                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1788
1789         } else {
1790                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1791                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1792                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1793                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
1794                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1795                         av |= DIR__READ;
1796         }
1797
1798         return av;
1799 }
1800
1801 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1802 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1803 {
1804         u32 av = 0;
1805
1806         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1807                 av |= FILE__READ;
1808         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1809                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1810                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1811                 else
1812                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1813         }
1814         if (!av) {
1815                 /*
1816                  * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1817                  */
1818                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1819         }
1820
1821         return av;
1822 }
1823
1824 /*
1825  * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1826  * open permission.
1827  */
1828 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1829 {
1830         u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1831
1832         if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1833                 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1834                 /*
1835                  * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1836                  */
1837                 if (S_ISREG(mode))
1838                         av |= FILE__OPEN;
1839                 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1840                         av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1841                 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1842                         av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1843                 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1844                         av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1845                 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1846                         av |= DIR__OPEN;
1847                 else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
1848                         av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
1849                 else
1850                         printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1851                                 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1852         }
1853         return av;
1854 }
1855
1856 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1857
1858 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1859                                      unsigned int mode)
1860 {
1861         int rc;
1862
1863         rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1864         if (rc)
1865                 return rc;
1866
1867         if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1868                 u32 sid = current_sid();
1869                 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1870                 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1871         }
1872
1873         return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1874 }
1875
1876 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1877 {
1878         int rc;
1879
1880         rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1881         if (rc)
1882                 return rc;
1883
1884         return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1885 }
1886
1887 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1888                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1889 {
1890         int error;
1891
1892         error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1893         if (error)
1894                 return error;
1895
1896         return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1897 }
1898
1899 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1900                           const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1901                           const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1902                           const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1903 {
1904         int error;
1905
1906         error = cap_capset(new, old,
1907                                       effective, inheritable, permitted);
1908         if (error)
1909                 return error;
1910
1911         return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1912 }
1913
1914 /*
1915  * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1916  * which was removed).
1917  *
1918  * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1919  * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1920  * need to control this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use of
1921  * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1922  */
1923
1924 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1925                            int cap, int audit)
1926 {
1927         int rc;
1928
1929         rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1930         if (rc)
1931                 return rc;
1932
1933         return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1934 }
1935
1936 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1937 {
1938         int buflen, rc;
1939         char *buffer, *path, *end;
1940
1941         rc = -ENOMEM;
1942         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1943         if (!buffer)
1944                 goto out;
1945
1946         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1947         end = buffer+buflen;
1948         *--end = '\0';
1949         buflen--;
1950         path = end-1;
1951         *path = '/';
1952         while (table) {
1953                 const char *name = table->procname;
1954                 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1955                 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1956                 if (buflen < 0)
1957                         goto out_free;
1958                 end -= namelen;
1959                 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1960                 *--end = '/';
1961                 path = end;
1962                 table = table->parent;
1963         }
1964         buflen -= 4;
1965         if (buflen < 0)
1966                 goto out_free;
1967         end -= 4;
1968         memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1969         path = end;
1970         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1971 out_free:
1972         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1973 out:
1974         return rc;
1975 }
1976
1977 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1978 {
1979         int error = 0;
1980         u32 av;
1981         u32 tsid, sid;
1982         int rc;
1983
1984         rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1985         if (rc)
1986                 return rc;
1987
1988         sid = current_sid();
1989
1990         rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1991                                     SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1992         if (rc) {
1993                 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1994                 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1995         }
1996
1997         /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1998          * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1999         if (op == 001) {
2000                 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2001                                      SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
2002         } else {
2003                 av = 0;
2004                 if (op & 004)
2005                         av |= FILE__READ;
2006                 if (op & 002)
2007                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
2008                 if (av)
2009                         error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
2010                                              SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
2011         }
2012
2013         return error;
2014 }
2015
2016 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2017 {
2018         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2019         int rc = 0;
2020
2021         if (!sb)
2022                 return 0;
2023
2024         switch (cmds) {
2025         case Q_SYNC:
2026         case Q_QUOTAON:
2027         case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2028         case Q_SETINFO:
2029         case Q_SETQUOTA:
2030                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2031                 break;
2032         case Q_GETFMT:
2033         case Q_GETINFO:
2034         case Q_GETQUOTA:
2035                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2036                 break;
2037         default:
2038                 rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2039                 break;
2040         }
2041         return rc;
2042 }
2043
2044 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2045 {
2046         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2047
2048         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2049 }
2050
2051 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2052 {
2053         int rc;
2054
2055         rc = cap_syslog(type);
2056         if (rc)
2057                 return rc;
2058
2059         switch (type) {
2060         case 3:         /* Read last kernel messages */
2061         case 10:        /* Return size of the log buffer */
2062                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2063                 break;
2064         case 6:         /* Disable logging to console */
2065         case 7:         /* Enable logging to console */
2066         case 8:         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2067                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2068                 break;
2069         case 0:         /* Close log */
2070         case 1:         /* Open log */
2071         case 2:         /* Read from log */
2072         case 4:         /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2073         case 5:         /* Clear ring buffer */
2074         default:
2075                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2076                 break;
2077         }
2078         return rc;
2079 }
2080
2081 /*
2082  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2083  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2084  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2085  *
2086  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2087  * processes that allocate mappings.
2088  */
2089 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2090 {
2091         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2092
2093         rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2094                              SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2095         if (rc == 0)
2096                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2097
2098         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2099 }
2100
2101 /* binprm security operations */
2102
2103 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2104 {
2105         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2106         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2107         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2108         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2109         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2110         int rc;
2111
2112         rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2113         if (rc)
2114                 return rc;
2115
2116         /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2117          * the script interpreter */
2118         if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2119                 return 0;
2120
2121         old_tsec = current_security();
2122         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2123         isec = inode->i_security;
2124
2125         /* Default to the current task SID. */
2126         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2127         new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2128
2129         /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2130         new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2131         new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2132         new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2133
2134         if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2135                 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2136                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2137                 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2138         } else {
2139                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2140                 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2141                                              SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2142                 if (rc)
2143                         return rc;
2144         }
2145
2146         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2147         ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2148
2149         if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2150                 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2151
2152         if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2153                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2154                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2155                 if (rc)
2156                         return rc;
2157         } else {
2158                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2159                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2160                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2161                 if (rc)
2162                         return rc;
2163
2164                 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2165                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2166                 if (rc)
2167                         return rc;
2168
2169                 /* Check for shared state */
2170                 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2171                         rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2172                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2173                                           NULL);
2174                         if (rc)
2175                                 return -EPERM;
2176                 }
2177
2178                 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2179                  * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2180                 if (bprm->unsafe &
2181                     (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2182                         struct task_struct *tracer;
2183                         struct task_security_struct *sec;
2184                         u32 ptsid = 0;
2185
2186                         rcu_read_lock();
2187                         tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2188                         if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2189                                 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2190                                 ptsid = sec->sid;
2191                         }
2192                         rcu_read_unlock();
2193
2194                         if (ptsid != 0) {
2195                                 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2196                                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2197                                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2198                                 if (rc)
2199                                         return -EPERM;
2200                         }
2201                 }
2202
2203                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2204                 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2205         }
2206
2207         return 0;
2208 }
2209
2210 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2211 {
2212         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2213         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2214         u32 sid, osid;
2215         int atsecure = 0;
2216
2217         sid = tsec->sid;
2218         osid = tsec->osid;
2219
2220         if (osid != sid) {
2221                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2222                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
2223                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2224                 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2225                                         SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2226                                         PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2227         }
2228
2229         return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2230 }
2231
2232 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2233 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2234
2235 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2236 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2237                                             struct files_struct *files)
2238 {
2239         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2240         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2241         struct tty_struct *tty;
2242         struct fdtable *fdt;
2243         long j = -1;
2244         int drop_tty = 0;
2245
2246         tty = get_current_tty();
2247         if (tty) {
2248                 file_list_lock();
2249                 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2250                         struct inode *inode;
2251
2252                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2253                            Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2254                            than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2255                            file may belong to another process and we are only
2256                            interested in the inode-based check here. */
2257                         file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2258                         inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2259                         if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2260                                            FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2261                                 drop_tty = 1;
2262                         }
2263                 }
2264                 file_list_unlock();
2265                 tty_kref_put(tty);
2266         }
2267         /* Reset controlling tty. */
2268         if (drop_tty)
2269                 no_tty();
2270
2271         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2272
2273         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2274
2275         spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2276         for (;;) {
2277                 unsigned long set, i;
2278                 int fd;
2279
2280                 j++;
2281                 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2282                 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2283                 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2284                         break;
2285                 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2286                 if (!set)
2287                         continue;
2288                 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2289                 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2290                         if (set & 1) {
2291                                 file = fget(i);
2292                                 if (!file)
2293                                         continue;
2294                                 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2295                                                   file,
2296                                                   file_to_av(file))) {
2297                                         sys_close(i);
2298                                         fd = get_unused_fd();
2299                                         if (fd != i) {
2300                                                 if (fd >= 0)
2301                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
2302                                                 fput(file);
2303                                                 continue;
2304                                         }
2305                                         if (devnull) {
2306                                                 get_file(devnull);
2307                                         } else {
2308                                                 devnull = dentry_open(
2309                                                         dget(selinux_null),
2310                                                         mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2311                                                         O_RDWR, cred);
2312                                                 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2313                                                         devnull = NULL;
2314                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
2315                                                         fput(file);
2316                                                         continue;
2317                                                 }
2318                                         }
2319                                         fd_install(fd, devnull);
2320                                 }
2321                                 fput(file);
2322                         }
2323                 }
2324                 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2325
2326         }
2327         spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2328 }
2329
2330 /*
2331  * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2332  */
2333 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2334 {
2335         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2336         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2337         int rc, i;
2338
2339         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2340         if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2341                 return;
2342
2343         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2344         flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2345
2346         /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2347         current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2348
2349         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2350          * SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2351          * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2352          *
2353          * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2354          * controlled by the setrlimit check.  The inclusion of the init task's
2355          * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2356          * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2357          * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2358          */
2359         rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2360                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2361         if (rc) {
2362                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2363                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2364                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2365                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2366                 }
2367                 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2368         }
2369 }
2370
2371 /*
2372  * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2373  * due to exec
2374  */
2375 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2376 {
2377         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2378         struct itimerval itimer;
2379         struct sighand_struct *psig;
2380         u32 osid, sid;
2381         int rc, i;
2382         unsigned long flags;
2383
2384         osid = tsec->osid;
2385         sid = tsec->sid;
2386
2387         if (sid == osid)
2388                 return;
2389
2390         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2391          * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2392          * flush and unblock signals.
2393          *
2394          * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2395          * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2396          */
2397         rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2398         if (rc) {
2399                 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2400                 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2401                         do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2402                 flush_signals(current);
2403                 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2404                 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2405                 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2406                 recalc_sigpending();
2407                 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2408         }
2409
2410         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2411          * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2412         read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2413         psig = current->parent->sighand;
2414         spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2415         wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2416         spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2417         read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2418 }
2419
2420 /* superblock security operations */
2421
2422 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2423 {
2424         return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2425 }
2426
2427 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2428 {
2429         superblock_free_security(sb);
2430 }
2431
2432 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2433 {
2434         if (plen > olen)
2435                 return 0;
2436
2437         return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2438 }
2439
2440 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2441 {
2442         return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2443                 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2444                 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2445                 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2446                 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2447 }
2448
2449 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2450 {
2451         if (!*first) {
2452                 **to = ',';
2453                 *to += 1;
2454         } else
2455                 *first = 0;
2456         memcpy(*to, from, len);
2457         *to += len;
2458 }
2459
2460 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2461                                        int len)
2462 {
2463         int current_size = 0;
2464
2465         if (!*first) {
2466                 **to = '|';
2467                 *to += 1;
2468         } else
2469                 *first = 0;
2470
2471         while (current_size < len) {
2472                 if (*from != '"') {
2473                         **to = *from;
2474                         *to += 1;
2475                 }
2476                 from += 1;
2477                 current_size += 1;
2478         }
2479 }
2480
2481 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2482 {
2483         int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2484         char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2485         char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2486         int open_quote = 0;
2487
2488         in_curr = orig;
2489         sec_curr = copy;
2490
2491         nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2492         if (!nosec) {
2493                 rc = -ENOMEM;
2494                 goto out;
2495         }
2496
2497         nosec_save = nosec;
2498         fnosec = fsec = 1;
2499         in_save = in_end = orig;
2500
2501         do {
2502                 if (*in_end == '"')
2503                         open_quote = !open_quote;
2504                 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2505                                 *in_end == '\0') {
2506                         int len = in_end - in_curr;
2507
2508                         if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2509                                 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2510                         else
2511                                 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2512
2513                         in_curr = in_end + 1;
2514                 }
2515         } while (*in_end++);
2516
2517         strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2518         free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2519 out:
2520         return rc;
2521 }
2522
2523 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2524 {
2525         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2526         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2527         int rc;
2528
2529         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2530         if (rc)
2531                 return rc;
2532
2533         /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2534         if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2535                 return 0;
2536
2537         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2538         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2539         return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2540 }
2541
2542 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2543 {
2544         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2545         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2546
2547         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2548         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2549         return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2550 }
2551
2552 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2553                          struct path *path,
2554                          char *type,
2555                          unsigned long flags,
2556                          void *data)
2557 {
2558         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2559
2560         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2561                 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2562                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2563         else
2564                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2565                                        FILE__MOUNTON);
2566 }
2567
2568 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2569 {
2570         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2571
2572         return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2573                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2574 }
2575
2576 /* inode security operations */
2577
2578 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2579 {
2580         return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2581 }
2582
2583 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2584 {
2585         inode_free_security(inode);
2586 }
2587
2588 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2589                                        char **name, void **value,
2590                                        size_t *len)
2591 {
2592         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2593         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2594         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2595         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2596         u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2597         int rc;
2598         char *namep = NULL, *context;
2599
2600         dsec = dir->i_security;
2601         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2602
2603         sid = tsec->sid;
2604         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2605
2606         if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2607                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2608                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2609                                              &newsid);
2610                 if (rc) {
2611                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
2612                                "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2613                                "ino=%ld)\n",
2614                                __func__,
2615                                -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2616                         return rc;
2617                 }
2618         }
2619
2620         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2621         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2622                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2623                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2624                 isec->sid = newsid;
2625                 isec->initialized = 1;
2626         }
2627
2628         if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2629                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2630
2631         if (name) {
2632                 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2633                 if (!namep)
2634                         return -ENOMEM;
2635                 *name = namep;
2636         }
2637
2638         if (value && len) {
2639                 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2640                 if (rc) {
2641                         kfree(namep);
2642                         return rc;
2643                 }
2644                 *value = context;
2645                 *len = clen;
2646         }
2647
2648         return 0;
2649 }
2650
2651 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2652 {
2653         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2654 }
2655
2656 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2657 {
2658         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2659 }
2660
2661 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2662 {
2663         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2664 }
2665
2666 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2667 {
2668         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2669 }
2670
2671 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2672 {
2673         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2674 }
2675
2676 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2677 {
2678         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2679 }
2680
2681 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2682 {
2683         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2684 }
2685
2686 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2687                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2688 {
2689         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2690 }
2691
2692 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2693 {
2694         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2695
2696         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2697 }
2698
2699 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2700 {
2701         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2702
2703         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2704 }
2705
2706 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2707 {
2708         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2709
2710         if (!mask) {
2711                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2712                 return 0;
2713         }
2714
2715         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2716                               file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2717 }
2718
2719 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2720 {
2721         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2722
2723         if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2724                 return 0;
2725
2726         if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2727                                ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2728                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2729
2730         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2731 }
2732
2733 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2734 {
2735         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2736
2737         return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2738 }
2739
2740 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2741 {
2742         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2743
2744         if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2745                      sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2746                 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2747                         if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2748                                 return -EPERM;
2749                 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2750                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2751                            Restrict to administrator. */
2752                         return -EPERM;
2753                 }
2754         }
2755
2756         /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2757            ordinary setattr permission. */
2758         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2759 }
2760
2761 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2762                                   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2763 {
2764         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2765         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2766         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2767         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2768         u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2769         int rc = 0;
2770
2771         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2772                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2773
2774         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2775         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2776                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2777
2778         if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2779                 return -EPERM;
2780
2781         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2782         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2783
2784         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2785                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2786         if (rc)
2787                 return rc;
2788
2789         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2790         if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2791                 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2792                         return rc;
2793                 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2794         }
2795         if (rc)
2796                 return rc;
2797
2798         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2799                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2800         if (rc)
2801                 return rc;
2802
2803         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2804                                           isec->sclass);
2805         if (rc)
2806                 return rc;
2807
2808         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2809                             sbsec->sid,
2810                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2811                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2812                             &ad);
2813 }
2814
2815 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2816                                         const void *value, size_t size,
2817                                         int flags)
2818 {
2819         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2820         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2821         u32 newsid;
2822         int rc;
2823
2824         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2825                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2826                 return;
2827         }
2828
2829         rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2830         if (rc) {
2831                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
2832                        "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2833                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2834                 return;
2835         }
2836
2837         isec->sid = newsid;
2838         return;
2839 }
2840
2841 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2842 {
2843         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2844
2845         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2846 }
2847
2848 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2849 {
2850         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2851
2852         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2853 }
2854
2855 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2856 {
2857         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2858                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2859
2860         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2861            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2862         return -EACCES;
2863 }
2864
2865 /*
2866  * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2867  *
2868  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2869  */
2870 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2871 {
2872         u32 size;
2873         int error;
2874         char *context = NULL;
2875         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2876
2877         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2878                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2879
2880         /*
2881          * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2882          * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2883          * use the in-core value under current policy.
2884          * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2885          * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2886          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2887          * in-core context value, not a denial.
2888          */
2889         error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2890                                 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2891         if (!error)
2892                 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2893                                                       &size);
2894         else
2895                 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2896         if (error)
2897                 return error;
2898         error = size;
2899         if (alloc) {
2900                 *buffer = context;
2901                 goto out_nofree;
2902         }
2903         kfree(context);
2904 out_nofree:
2905         return error;
2906 }
2907
2908 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2909                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2910 {
2911         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2912         u32 newsid;
2913         int rc;
2914
2915         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2916                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2917
2918         if (!value || !size)
2919                 return -EACCES;
2920
2921         rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2922         if (rc)
2923                 return rc;
2924
2925         isec->sid = newsid;
2926         return 0;
2927 }
2928
2929 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2930 {
2931         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2932         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2933                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2934         return len;
2935 }
2936
2937 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2938 {
2939         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2940         *secid = isec->sid;
2941 }
2942
2943 /* file security operations */
2944
2945 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2946 {
2947         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2948         int rc;
2949         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2950
2951         if (!mask) {
2952                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2953                 return 0;
2954         }
2955
2956         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2957         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2958                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2959
2960         rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2961                            file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2962         if (rc)
2963                 return rc;
2964
2965         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2966 }
2967
2968 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2969 {
2970         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2971         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2972         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2973         u32 sid = current_sid();
2974
2975         if (!mask) {
2976                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2977                 return 0;
2978         }
2979
2980         if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2981             && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2982                 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2983
2984         return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2985 }
2986
2987 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2988 {
2989         return file_alloc_security(file);
2990 }
2991
2992 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2993 {
2994         file_free_security(file);
2995 }
2996
2997 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2998                               unsigned long arg)
2999 {
3000         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3001         u32 av = 0;
3002
3003         if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
3004                 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3005         if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3006                 av |= FILE__READ;
3007         if (!av)
3008                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
3009
3010         return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3011 }
3012
3013 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3014 {
3015         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3016         int rc = 0;
3017
3018 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3019         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3020                 /*
3021                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3022                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3023                  * This has an additional check.
3024                  */
3025                 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3026                 if (rc)
3027                         goto error;
3028         }
3029 #endif
3030
3031         if (file) {
3032                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3033                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3034
3035                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3036                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3037                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
3038
3039                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3040                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3041
3042                 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3043         }
3044
3045 error:
3046         return rc;
3047 }
3048
3049 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3050                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3051                              unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3052 {
3053         int rc = 0;
3054         u32 sid = current_sid();
3055
3056         if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3057                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3058                                   MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3059         if (rc || addr_only)
3060                 return rc;
3061
3062         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3063                 prot = reqprot;
3064
3065         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3066                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3067 }
3068
3069 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3070                                  unsigned long reqprot,
3071                                  unsigned long prot)
3072 {
3073         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3074
3075         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3076                 prot = reqprot;
3077
3078 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3079         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3080                 int rc = 0;
3081                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3082                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3083                         rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3084                 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3085                            vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3086                            vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3087                         rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3088                 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3089                         /*
3090                          * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3091                          * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3092                          * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3093                          * modified content.  This typically should only
3094                          * occur for text relocations.
3095                          */
3096                         rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3097                 }
3098                 if (rc)
3099                         return rc;
3100         }
3101 #endif
3102
3103         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3104 }
3105
3106 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3107 {
3108         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3109
3110         return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3111 }
3112
3113 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3114                               unsigned long arg)
3115 {
3116         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3117         int err = 0;
3118
3119         switch (cmd) {
3120         case F_SETFL:
3121                 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3122                         err = -EINVAL;
3123                         break;
3124                 }
3125
3126                 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3127                         err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3128                         break;
3129                 }
3130                 /* fall through */
3131         case F_SETOWN:
3132         case F_SETSIG:
3133         case F_GETFL:
3134         case F_GETOWN:
3135         case F_GETSIG:
3136                 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3137                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3138                 break;
3139         case F_GETLK:
3140         case F_SETLK:
3141         case F_SETLKW:
3142 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3143         case F_GETLK64:
3144         case F_SETLK64:
3145         case F_SETLKW64:
3146 #endif
3147                 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3148                         err = -EINVAL;
3149                         break;
3150                 }
3151                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3152                 break;
3153         }
3154
3155         return err;
3156 }
3157
3158 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3159 {
3160         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3161
3162         fsec = file->f_security;
3163         fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3164
3165         return 0;
3166 }
3167
3168 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3169                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3170 {
3171         struct file *file;
3172         u32 sid = current_sid();
3173         u32 perm;
3174         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3175
3176         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3177         file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3178
3179         fsec = file->f_security;
3180
3181         if (!signum)
3182                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3183         else
3184                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3185
3186         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3187                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3188 }
3189
3190 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3191 {
3192         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3193
3194         return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3195 }
3196
3197 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3198 {
3199         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3200         struct inode *inode;
3201         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3202
3203         inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3204         fsec = file->f_security;
3205         isec = inode->i_security;
3206         /*
3207          * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3208          * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3209          * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3210          * Task label is already saved in the file security
3211          * struct as its SID.
3212          */
3213         fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3214         fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3215         /*
3216          * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3217          * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3218          * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3219          * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3220          * new inode label or new policy.
3221          * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3222          */
3223         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3224 }
3225
3226 /* task security operations */
3227
3228 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3229 {
3230         return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3231 }
3232
3233 /*
3234  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3235  */
3236 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3237 {
3238         struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3239         cred->security = NULL;
3240         kfree(tsec);
3241 }
3242
3243 /*
3244  * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3245  */
3246 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3247                                 gfp_t gfp)
3248 {
3249         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3250         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3251
3252         old_tsec = old->security;
3253
3254         tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3255         if (!tsec)
3256                 return -ENOMEM;
3257
3258         new->security = tsec;
3259         return 0;
3260 }
3261
3262 /*
3263  * set the security data for a kernel service
3264  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3265  */
3266 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3267 {
3268         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3269         u32 sid = current_sid();
3270         int ret;
3271
3272         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3273                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3274                            KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3275                            NULL);
3276         if (ret == 0) {
3277                 tsec->sid = secid;
3278                 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3279                 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3280                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3281         }
3282         return ret;
3283 }
3284
3285 /*
3286  * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3287  * objective context of the specified inode
3288  */
3289 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3290 {
3291         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3292         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3293         u32 sid = current_sid();
3294         int ret;
3295
3296         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3297                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3298                            KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3299                            NULL);
3300
3301         if (ret == 0)
3302                 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3303         return 0;
3304 }
3305
3306 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3307 {
3308         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3309 }
3310
3311 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3312 {
3313         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3314 }
3315
3316 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3317 {
3318         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3319 }
3320
3321 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3322 {
3323         *secid = task_sid(p);
3324 }
3325
3326 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3327 {
3328         int rc;
3329
3330         rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3331         if (rc)
3332                 return rc;
3333
3334         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3335 }
3336
3337 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3338 {
3339         int rc;
3340
3341         rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3342         if (rc)
3343                 return rc;
3344
3345         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3346 }
3347
3348 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3349 {
3350         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3351 }
3352
3353 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3354 {
3355         struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3356
3357         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3358            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3359            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3360            upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3361         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3362                 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3363
3364         return 0;
3365 }
3366
3367 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3368 {
3369         int rc;
3370
3371         rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3372         if (rc)
3373                 return rc;
3374
3375         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3376 }
3377
3378 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3379 {
3380         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3381 }
3382
3383 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3384 {
3385         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3386 }
3387
3388 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3389                                 int sig, u32 secid)
3390 {
3391         u32 perm;
3392         int rc;
3393
3394         if (!sig)
3395                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3396         else
3397                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3398         if (secid)
3399                 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3400                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3401         else
3402                 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3403         return rc;
3404 }
3405
3406 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3407 {
3408         return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3409 }
3410
3411 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3412                                   struct inode *inode)
3413 {
3414         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3415         u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3416
3417         isec->sid = sid;
3418         isec->initialized = 1;
3419 }
3420
3421 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3422 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3423                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3424 {
3425         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3426         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3427
3428         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3429         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3430         if (ih == NULL)
3431                 goto out;
3432
3433         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3434         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3435                 goto out;
3436
3437         ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3438         ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3439         ret = 0;
3440
3441         if (proto)
3442                 *proto = ih->protocol;
3443
3444         switch (ih->protocol) {
3445         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3446                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3447
3448                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3449                         break;
3450
3451                 offset += ihlen;
3452                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3453                 if (th == NULL)
3454                         break;
3455
3456                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3457                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3458                 break;
3459         }
3460
3461         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3462                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3463
3464                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3465                         break;
3466
3467                 offset += ihlen;
3468                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3469                 if (uh == NULL)
3470                         break;
3471
3472                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3473                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3474                 break;
3475         }
3476
3477         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3478                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3479
3480                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3481                         break;
3482
3483                 offset += ihlen;
3484                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3485                 if (dh == NULL)
3486                         break;
3487
3488                 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3489                 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3490                 break;
3491         }
3492
3493         default:
3494                 break;
3495         }
3496 out:
3497         return ret;
3498 }
3499
3500 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3501
3502 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3503 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3504                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3505 {
3506         u8 nexthdr;
3507         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3508         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3509
3510         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3511         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3512         if (ip6 == NULL)
3513                 goto out;
3514
3515         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3516         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3517         ret = 0;
3518
3519         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3520         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3521         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3522         if (offset < 0)
3523                 goto out;
3524
3525         if (proto)
3526                 *proto = nexthdr;
3527
3528         switch (nexthdr) {
3529         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3530                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3531
3532                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3533                 if (th == NULL)
3534                         break;
3535
3536                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3537                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3538                 break;
3539         }
3540
3541         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3542                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3543
3544                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3545                 if (uh == NULL)
3546                         break;
3547
3548                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3549                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3550                 break;
3551         }
3552
3553         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3554                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3555
3556                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3557                 if (dh == NULL)
3558                         break;
3559
3560                 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3561                 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3562                 break;
3563         }
3564
3565         /* includes fragments */
3566         default:
3567                 break;
3568         }
3569 out:
3570         return ret;
3571 }
3572
3573 #endif /* IPV6 */
3574
3575 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3576                              char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3577 {
3578         char *addrp;
3579         int ret;
3580
3581         switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3582         case PF_INET:
3583                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3584                 if (ret)
3585                         goto parse_error;
3586                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3587                                        &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3588                 goto okay;
3589
3590 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3591         case PF_INET6:
3592                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3593                 if (ret)
3594                         goto parse_error;
3595                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3596                                        &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3597                 goto okay;
3598 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3599         default:
3600                 addrp = NULL;
3601                 goto okay;
3602         }
3603
3604 parse_error:
3605         printk(KERN_WARNING
3606                "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3607                " unable to parse packet\n");
3608         return ret;
3609
3610 okay:
3611         if (_addrp)
3612                 *_addrp = addrp;
3613         return 0;
3614 }
3615
3616 /**
3617  * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3618  * @skb: the packet
3619  * @family: protocol family
3620  * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3621  *
3622  * Description:
3623  * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3624  * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3625  * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
3626  * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3627  * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3628  * peer labels.
3629  *
3630  */
3631 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3632 {
3633         int err;
3634         u32 xfrm_sid;
3635         u32 nlbl_sid;
3636         u32 nlbl_type;
3637
3638         selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3639         selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3640
3641         err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3642         if (unlikely(err)) {
3643                 printk(KERN_WARNING
3644                        "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3645                        " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3646                 return -EACCES;
3647         }
3648
3649         return 0;
3650 }
3651
3652 /* socket security operations */
3653 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3654                            u32 perms)
3655 {
3656         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3657         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3658         u32 sid;
3659         int err = 0;
3660
3661         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3662
3663         if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3664                 goto out;
3665         sid = task_sid(task);
3666
3667         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3668         ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3669         err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3670
3671 out:
3672         return err;
3673 }
3674
3675 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3676                                  int protocol, int kern)
3677 {
3678         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3679         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3680         u32 sid, newsid;
3681         u16 secclass;
3682         int err = 0;
3683
3684         if (kern)
3685                 goto out;
3686
3687         sid = tsec->sid;
3688         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3689
3690         secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3691         err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3692
3693 out:
3694         return err;
3695 }
3696
3697 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3698                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
3699 {
3700         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3701         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3702         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3703         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3704         u32 sid, newsid;
3705         int err = 0;
3706
3707         sid = tsec->sid;
3708         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3709
3710         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3711
3712         if (kern)
3713                 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3714         else if (newsid)
3715                 isec->sid = newsid;
3716         else
3717                 isec->sid = sid;
3718
3719         isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3720         isec->initialized = 1;
3721
3722         if (sock->sk) {
3723                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3724                 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3725                 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3726                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3727         }
3728
3729         return err;
3730 }
3731
3732 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3733    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3734    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3735
3736 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3737 {
3738         u16 family;
3739         int err;
3740
3741         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3742         if (err)
3743                 goto out;
3744
3745         /*
3746          * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3747          * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3748          * check the first address now.
3749          */
3750         family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3751         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3752                 char *addrp;
3753                 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3754                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3755                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3756                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3757                 unsigned short snum;
3758                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3759                 u32 sid, node_perm;
3760
3761                 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3762
3763                 if (family == PF_INET) {
3764                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3765                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3766                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3767                 } else {
3768                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3769                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3770                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3771                 }
3772
3773                 if (snum) {
3774                         int low, high;
3775
3776                         inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3777
3778                         if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3779                                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3780                                                       snum, &sid);
3781                                 if (err)
3782                                         goto out;
3783                                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3784                                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3785                                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3786                                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3787                                                    isec->sclass,
3788                                                    SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3789                                 if (err)
3790                                         goto out;
3791                         }
3792                 }
3793
3794                 switch (isec->sclass) {
3795                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3796                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3797                         break;
3798
3799                 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3800                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3801                         break;
3802
3803                 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3804                         node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3805                         break;
3806
3807                 default:
3808                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3809                         break;
3810                 }
3811
3812                 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3813                 if (err)
3814                         goto out;
3815
3816                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3817                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3818                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3819
3820                 if (family == PF_INET)
3821                         ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3822                 else
3823                         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3824
3825                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3826                                    isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3827                 if (err)
3828                         goto out;
3829         }
3830 out:
3831         return err;
3832 }
3833
3834 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3835 {
3836         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3837         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3838         int err;
3839
3840         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3841         if (err)
3842                 return err;
3843
3844         /*
3845          * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3846          */
3847         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3848         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3849             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3850                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3851                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3852                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3853                 unsigned short snum;
3854                 u32 sid, perm;
3855
3856                 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3857                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3858                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3859                                 return -EINVAL;
3860                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3861                 } else {
3862                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3863                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3864                                 return -EINVAL;
3865                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3866                 }
3867
3868                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3869                 if (err)
3870                         goto out;
3871
3872                 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3873                        TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3874
3875                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3876                 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3877                 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3878                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3879                 if (err)
3880                         goto out;
3881         }
3882
3883         err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3884
3885 out:
3886         return err;
3887 }
3888
3889 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3890 {
3891         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3892 }
3893
3894 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3895 {
3896         int err;
3897         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3898         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3899
3900         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3901         if (err)
3902                 return err;
3903
3904         newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3905
3906         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3907         newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3908         newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3909         newisec->initialized = 1;
3910
3911         return 0;
3912 }
3913
3914 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3915                                   int size)
3916 {
3917         int rc;
3918
3919         rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3920         if (rc)
3921                 return rc;
3922
3923         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3924 }
3925
3926 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3927                                   int size, int flags)
3928 {
3929         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3930 }
3931
3932 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3933 {
3934         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3935 }
3936
3937 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3938 {
3939         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3940 }
3941
3942 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3943 {
3944         int err;
3945
3946         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3947         if (err)
3948                 return err;
3949
3950         return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3951 }
3952
3953 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3954                                      int optname)
3955 {
3956         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3957 }
3958
3959 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3960 {
3961         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3962 }
3963
3964 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3965                                               struct socket *other,
3966                                               struct sock *newsk)
3967 {
3968         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3969         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3970         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3971         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3972         int err;
3973
3974         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3975         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3976
3977         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3978         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3979
3980         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3981                            isec->sclass,
3982                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3983         if (err)
3984                 return err;
3985
3986         /* connecting socket */
3987         ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3988         ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3989
3990         /* server child socket */
3991         ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3992         ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3993         err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3994
3995         return err;
3996 }
3997
3998 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3999                                         struct socket *other)
4000 {
4001         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4002         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4003         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4004         int err;
4005
4006         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4007         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4008
4009         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4010         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4011
4012         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4013                            isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4014         if (err)
4015                 return err;
4016
4017         return 0;
4018 }
4019
4020 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4021                                     u32 peer_sid,
4022                                     struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4023 {
4024         int err;
4025         u32 if_sid;
4026         u32 node_sid;
4027
4028         err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4029         if (err)
4030                 return err;
4031         err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4032                            SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4033         if (err)
4034                 return err;
4035
4036         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4037         if (err)
4038                 return err;
4039         return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4040                             SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4041 }
4042
4043 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4044                                                 struct sk_buff *skb,
4045                                                 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4046                                                 u16 family,
4047                                                 char *addrp)
4048 {
4049         int err;
4050         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4051         u16 sk_class;
4052         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4053         u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4054
4055         sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4056         sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4057
4058         switch (sk_class) {
4059         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4060                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4061                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4062                 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4063                 break;
4064         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4065                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4066                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4067                 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4068                 break;
4069         case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4070                 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4071                 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4072                 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4073                 break;
4074         default:
4075                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4076                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4077                 recv_perm = 0;
4078                 break;
4079         }
4080
4081         err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4082         if (err)
4083                 return err;
4084         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4085         if (err)
4086                 return err;
4087
4088         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4089         if (err)
4090                 return err;
4091         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4092         if (err)
4093                 return err;
4094
4095         if (!recv_perm)
4096                 return 0;
4097         err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4098                               ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4099         if (unlikely(err)) {
4100                 printk(KERN_WARNING
4101                        "SELinux: failure in"
4102                        " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4103                        " network port label not found\n");
4104                 return err;
4105         }
4106         return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4107 }
4108
4109 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4110                                        u16 family)
4111 {
4112         int err = 0;
4113         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4114         u32 peer_sid;
4115         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4116         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4117         char *addrp;
4118
4119         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4120         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4121         ad.u.net.family = family;
4122         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4123         if (err)
4124                 return err;
4125
4126         if (selinux_compat_net)
4127                 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4128                                                            family, addrp);
4129         else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4130                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4131                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4132         if (err)
4133                 return err;
4134
4135         if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4136                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4137                 if (err)
4138                         return err;
4139                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4140                                    SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4141                 if (err)
4142                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4143         } else {
4144                 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4145                 if (err)
4146                         return err;
4147                 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4148         }
4149
4150         return err;
4151 }
4152
4153 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4154 {
4155         int err;
4156         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4157         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4158         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4159         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4160         char *addrp;
4161         u8 secmark_active;
4162         u8 peerlbl_active;
4163
4164         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4165                 return 0;
4166
4167         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4168         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4169                 family = PF_INET;
4170
4171         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4172          * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4173          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4174          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4175         if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4176                 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4177
4178         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4179         peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4180         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4181                 return 0;
4182
4183         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4184         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4185         ad.u.net.family = family;
4186         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4187         if (err)
4188                 return err;
4189
4190         if (peerlbl_active) {
4191                 u32 peer_sid;
4192
4193                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4194                 if (err)
4195                         return err;
4196                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4197                                                peer_sid, &ad);
4198                 if (err) {
4199                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4200                         return err;
4201                 }
4202                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4203                                    PEER__RECV, &ad);
4204                 if (err)
4205                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4206         }
4207
4208         if (secmark_active) {
4209                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4210                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4211                 if (err)
4212                         return err;
4213         }
4214
4215         return err;
4216 }
4217
4218 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4219                                             int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4220 {
4221         int err = 0;
4222         char *scontext;
4223         u32 scontext_len;
4224         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4225         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4226         u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4227
4228         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4229
4230         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4231             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4232                 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4233                 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4234         }
4235         if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4236                 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
4237                 goto out;
4238         }
4239
4240         err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4241
4242         if (err)
4243                 goto out;
4244
4245         if (scontext_len > len) {
4246                 err = -ERANGE;
4247                 goto out_len;
4248         }
4249
4250         if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4251                 err = -EFAULT;
4252
4253 out_len:
4254         if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4255                 err = -EFAULT;
4256
4257         kfree(scontext);
4258 out:
4259         return err;
4260 }
4261
4262 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4263 {
4264         u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4265         u16 family;
4266
4267         if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4268                 family = PF_INET;
4269         else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4270                 family = PF_INET6;
4271         else if (sock)
4272                 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4273         else
4274                 goto out;
4275
4276         if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4277                 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4278         else if (skb)
4279                 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4280
4281 out:
4282         *secid = peer_secid;
4283         if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4284                 return -EINVAL;
4285         return 0;
4286 }
4287
4288 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4289 {
4290         return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4291 }
4292
4293 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4294 {
4295         sk_free_security(sk);
4296 }
4297
4298 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4299 {
4300         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4301         struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4302
4303         newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4304         newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4305         newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4306
4307         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4308 }
4309
4310 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4311 {
4312         if (!sk)
4313                 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4314         else {
4315                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4316
4317                 *secid = sksec->sid;
4318         }
4319 }
4320
4321 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4322 {
4323         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4324         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4325
4326         if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4327             sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4328                 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4329         sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4330 }
4331
4332 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4333                                      struct request_sock *req)
4334 {
4335         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4336         int err;
4337         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4338         u32 newsid;
4339         u32 peersid;
4340
4341         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4342         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4343                 family = PF_INET;
4344
4345         err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4346         if (err)
4347                 return err;
4348         if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4349                 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4350                 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4351                 return 0;
4352         }
4353
4354         err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4355         if (err)
4356                 return err;
4357
4358         req->secid = newsid;
4359         req->peer_secid = peersid;
4360         return 0;
4361 }
4362
4363 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4364                                    const struct request_sock *req)
4365 {
4366         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4367
4368         newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4369         newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4370         /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4371            new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4372            So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4373            time it will have been created and available. */
4374
4375         /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4376          * thread with access to newsksec */
4377         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4378 }
4379
4380 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4381 {
4382         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4383         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4384
4385         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4386         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4387                 family = PF_INET;
4388
4389         selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4390
4391         selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4392 }
4393
4394 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4395                                       struct flowi *fl)
4396 {
4397         fl->secid = req->secid;
4398 }
4399
4400 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4401 {
4402         int err = 0;
4403         u32 perm;
4404         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4405         struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4406         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4407
4408         if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4409                 err = -EINVAL;
4410                 goto out;
4411         }
4412         nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4413
4414         err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4415         if (err) {
4416                 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4417                         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4418                                   "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
4419                                   " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4420                                   nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4421                         if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4422                                 err = 0;
4423                 }
4424
4425                 /* Ignore */
4426                 if (err == -ENOENT)
4427                         err = 0;
4428                 goto out;
4429         }
4430
4431         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4432 out:
4433         return err;
4434 }
4435
4436 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4437
4438 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4439                                        u16 family)
4440 {
4441         int err;
4442         char *addrp;
4443         u32 peer_sid;
4444         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4445         u8 secmark_active;
4446         u8 netlbl_active;
4447         u8 peerlbl_active;
4448
4449         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4450                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4451
4452         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4453         netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4454         peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4455         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4456                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4457
4458         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4459                 return NF_DROP;
4460
4461         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4462         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4463         ad.u.net.family = family;
4464         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4465                 return NF_DROP;
4466
4467         if (peerlbl_active) {
4468                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4469                                                peer_sid, &ad);
4470                 if (err) {
4471                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4472                         return NF_DROP;
4473                 }
4474         }
4475
4476         if (secmark_active)
4477                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4478                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4479                         return NF_DROP;
4480
4481         if (netlbl_active)
4482                 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4483                  * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4484                  * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4485                  * protection */
4486                 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4487                         return NF_DROP;
4488
4489         return NF_ACCEPT;
4490 }
4491
4492 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4493                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
4494                                          const struct net_device *in,
4495                                          const struct net_device *out,
4496                                          int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4497 {
4498         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4499 }
4500
4501 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4502 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4503                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
4504                                          const struct net_device *in,
4505                                          const struct net_device *out,
4506                                          int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4507 {
4508         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4509 }
4510 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4511
4512 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4513                                       u16 family)
4514 {
4515         u32 sid;
4516
4517         if (!netlbl_enabled())
4518                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4519
4520         /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4521          * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4522          * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4523         if (skb->sk) {
4524                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4525                 sid = sksec->sid;
4526         } else
4527                 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4528         if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4529                 return NF_DROP;
4530
4531         return NF_ACCEPT;
4532 }
4533
4534 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4535                                         struct sk_buff *skb,
4536                                         const struct net_device *in,
4537                                         const struct net_device *out,
4538                                         int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4539 {
4540         return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4541 }
4542
4543 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4544                                                 int ifindex,
4545                                                 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4546                                                 u16 family, char *addrp)
4547 {
4548         int err;
4549         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4550         u16 sk_class;
4551         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4552         u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4553
4554         sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4555         sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4556
4557         switch (sk_class) {
4558         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4559                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4560                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4561                 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4562                 break;
4563         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4564                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4565                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4566                 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4567                 break;
4568         case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4569                 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4570                 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4571                 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4572                 break;
4573         default:
4574                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4575                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4576                 send_perm = 0;
4577                 break;
4578         }
4579
4580         err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4581         if (err)
4582                 return err;
4583         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4584                 return err;
4585
4586         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4587         if (err)
4588                 return err;
4589         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4590         if (err)
4591                 return err;
4592
4593         if (send_perm != 0)
4594                 return 0;
4595
4596         err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4597                               ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4598         if (unlikely(err)) {
4599                 printk(KERN_WARNING
4600                        "SELinux: failure in"
4601                        " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4602                        " network port label not found\n");
4603                 return err;
4604         }
4605         return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4606 }
4607
4608 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4609                                                 int ifindex,
4610                                                 u16 family)
4611 {
4612         struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4613         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4614         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4615         char *addrp;
4616         u8 proto;
4617
4618         if (sk == NULL)
4619                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4620         sksec = sk->sk_security;
4621
4622         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4623         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4624         ad.u.net.family = family;
4625         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4626                 return NF_DROP;
4627
4628         if (selinux_compat_net) {
4629                 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4630                                                          &ad, family, addrp))
4631                         return NF_DROP;
4632         } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4633                 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4634                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4635                         return NF_DROP;
4636         }
4637
4638         if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4639                 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4640                         return NF_DROP;
4641
4642         return NF_ACCEPT;
4643 }
4644
4645 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4646                                          u16 family)
4647 {
4648         u32 secmark_perm;
4649         u32 peer_sid;
4650         struct sock *sk;
4651         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4652         char *addrp;
4653         u8 secmark_active;
4654         u8 peerlbl_active;
4655
4656         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4657          * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4658          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4659          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4660         if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4661                 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4662 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4663         /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4664          * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4665          * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4666          * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4667          * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4668          *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4669         if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4670                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4671 #endif
4672         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4673         peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4674         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4675                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4676
4677         /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4678          * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4679          * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4680          * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4681         sk = skb->sk;
4682         if (sk == NULL) {
4683                 switch (family) {
4684                 case PF_INET:
4685                         if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4686                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4687                         else
4688                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4689                         break;
4690                 case PF_INET6:
4691                         if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4692                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4693                         else
4694                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4695                         break;
4696                 default:
4697                         return NF_DROP;
4698                 }
4699                 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4700                         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4701                                 return NF_DROP;
4702                 } else
4703                         peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4704         } else {
4705                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4706                 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4707                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4708         }
4709
4710         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4711         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4712         ad.u.net.family = family;
4713         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4714                 return NF_DROP;
4715
4716         if (secmark_active)
4717                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4718                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4719                         return NF_DROP;
4720
4721         if (peerlbl_active) {
4722                 u32 if_sid;
4723                 u32 node_sid;
4724
4725                 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4726                         return NF_DROP;
4727                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4728                                  SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4729                         return NF_DROP;
4730
4731                 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4732                         return NF_DROP;
4733                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4734                                  SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4735                         return NF_DROP;
4736         }
4737
4738         return NF_ACCEPT;
4739 }
4740
4741 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4742                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
4743                                            const struct net_device *in,
4744                                            const struct net_device *out,
4745                                            int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4746 {
4747         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4748 }
4749
4750 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4751 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4752                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
4753                                            const struct net_device *in,
4754                                            const struct net_device *out,
4755                                            int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4756 {
4757         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4758 }
4759 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4760
4761 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4762
4763 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4764 {
4765         int err;
4766
4767         err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4768         if (err)
4769                 return err;
4770
4771         if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4772                 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4773
4774         return err;
4775 }
4776
4777 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4778 {
4779         int err;
4780         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4781
4782         err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4783         if (err)
4784                 return err;
4785
4786         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4787         ad.u.cap = capability;
4788
4789         return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4790                             SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4791 }
4792
4793 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4794                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4795                               u16 sclass)
4796 {
4797         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4798         u32 sid;
4799
4800         isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4801         if (!isec)
4802                 return -ENOMEM;
4803
4804         sid = task_sid(task);
4805         isec->sclass = sclass;
4806         isec->sid = sid;
4807         perm->security = isec;
4808
4809         return 0;
4810 }
4811
4812 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4813 {
4814         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4815         perm->security = NULL;
4816         kfree(isec);
4817 }
4818
4819 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4820 {
4821         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4822
4823         msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4824         if (!msec)
4825                 return -ENOMEM;
4826
4827         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4828         msg->security = msec;
4829
4830         return 0;
4831 }
4832
4833 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4834 {
4835         struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4836
4837         msg->security = NULL;
4838         kfree(msec);
4839 }
4840
4841 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4842                         u32 perms)
4843 {
4844         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4845         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4846         u32 sid = current_sid();
4847
4848         isec = ipc_perms->security;
4849
4850         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4851         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4852
4853         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4854 }
4855
4856 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4857 {
4858         return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4859 }
4860
4861 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4862 {
4863         msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4864 }
4865
4866 /* message queue security operations */
4867 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4868 {
4869         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4870         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4871         u32 sid = current_sid();
4872         int rc;
4873
4874         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4875         if (rc)
4876                 return rc;
4877
4878         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4879
4880         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4881         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4882
4883         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4884                           MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4885         if (rc) {
4886                 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4887                 return rc;
4888         }
4889         return 0;
4890 }
4891
4892 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4893 {
4894         ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4895 }
4896
4897 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4898 {
4899         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4900         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4901         u32 sid = current_sid();
4902
4903         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4904
4905         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4906         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4907
4908         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4909                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4910 }
4911
4912 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4913 {
4914         int err;
4915         int perms;
4916
4917         switch (cmd) {
4918         case IPC_INFO:
4919         case MSG_INFO:
4920                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4921                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4922         case IPC_STAT:
4923         case MSG_STAT:
4924                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4925                 break;
4926         case IPC_SET:
4927                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4928                 break;
4929         case IPC_RMID:
4930                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4931                 break;
4932         default:
4933                 return 0;
4934         }
4935
4936         err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4937         return err;
4938 }
4939
4940 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4941 {
4942         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4943         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4944         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4945         u32 sid = current_sid();
4946         int rc;
4947
4948         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4949         msec = msg->security;
4950
4951         /*
4952          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4953          */
4954         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4955                 /*
4956                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
4957                  * message queue this message will be stored in
4958                  */
4959                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4960                                              &msec->sid);
4961                 if (rc)
4962                         return rc;
4963         }
4964
4965         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4966         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4967
4968         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4969         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4970                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4971         if (!rc)
4972                 /* Can this process send the message */
4973                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4974                                   MSG__SEND, &ad);
4975         if (!rc)
4976                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4977                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4978                                   MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4979
4980         return rc;
4981 }
4982
4983 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4984                                     struct task_struct *target,
4985                                     long type, int mode)
4986 {
4987         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4988         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4989         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4990         u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4991         int rc;
4992
4993         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4994         msec = msg->security;
4995
4996         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4997         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4998
4999         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5000                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5001         if (!rc)
5002                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5003                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5004         return rc;
5005 }
5006
5007 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5008 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5009 {
5010         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5011         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5012         u32 sid = current_sid();
5013         int rc;
5014
5015         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5016         if (rc)
5017                 return rc;
5018
5019         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5020
5021         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5022         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5023
5024         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5025                           SHM__CREATE, &ad);
5026         if (rc) {
5027                 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5028                 return rc;
5029         }
5030         return 0;
5031 }
5032
5033 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5034 {
5035         ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5036 }
5037
5038 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5039 {
5040         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5041         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5042         u32 sid = current_sid();
5043
5044         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5045
5046         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5047         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5048
5049         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5050                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5051 }
5052
5053 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5054 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5055 {
5056         int perms;
5057         int err;
5058
5059         switch (cmd) {
5060         case IPC_INFO:
5061         case SHM_INFO:
5062                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5063                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5064         case IPC_STAT:
5065         case SHM_STAT:
5066                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5067                 break;
5068         case IPC_SET:
5069                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5070                 break;
5071         case SHM_LOCK:
5072         case SHM_UNLOCK:
5073                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5074                 break;
5075         case IPC_RMID:
5076                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5077                 break;
5078         default:
5079                 return 0;
5080         }
5081
5082         err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5083         return err;
5084 }
5085
5086 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5087                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5088 {
5089         u32 perms;
5090
5091         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5092                 perms = SHM__READ;
5093         else
5094                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5095
5096         return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5097 }
5098
5099 /* Semaphore security operations */
5100 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5101 {
5102         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5103         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5104         u32 sid = current_sid();
5105         int rc;
5106
5107         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5108         if (rc)
5109                 return rc;
5110
5111         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5112
5113         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5114         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5115
5116         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5117                           SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5118         if (rc) {
5119                 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5120                 return rc;
5121         }
5122         return 0;
5123 }
5124
5125 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5126 {
5127         ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5128 }
5129
5130 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5131 {
5132         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5133         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5134         u32 sid = current_sid();
5135
5136         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5137
5138         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5139         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5140
5141         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5142                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5143 }
5144
5145 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5146 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5147 {
5148         int err;
5149         u32 perms;
5150
5151         switch (cmd) {
5152         case IPC_INFO:
5153         case SEM_INFO:
5154                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5155                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5156         case GETPID:
5157         case GETNCNT:
5158         case GETZCNT:
5159                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5160                 break;
5161         case GETVAL:
5162         case GETALL:
5163                 perms = SEM__READ;
5164                 break;
5165         case SETVAL:
5166         case SETALL:
5167                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5168                 break;
5169         case IPC_RMID:
5170                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5171                 break;
5172         case IPC_SET:
5173                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5174                 break;
5175         case IPC_STAT:
5176         case SEM_STAT:
5177                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5178                 break;
5179         default:
5180                 return 0;
5181         }
5182
5183         err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5184         return err;
5185 }
5186
5187 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5188                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5189 {
5190         u32 perms;
5191
5192         if (alter)
5193                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5194         else
5195                 perms = SEM__READ;
5196
5197         return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5198 }
5199
5200 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5201 {
5202         u32 av = 0;
5203
5204         av = 0;
5205         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5206                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5207         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5208                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5209
5210         if (av == 0)
5211                 return 0;
5212
5213         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5214 }
5215
5216 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5217 {
5218         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5219         *secid = isec->sid;
5220 }
5221
5222 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5223 {
5224         if (inode)
5225                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5226 }
5227
5228 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5229                                char *name, char **value)
5230 {
5231         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5232         u32 sid;
5233         int error;
5234         unsigned len;
5235
5236         if (current != p) {
5237                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5238                 if (error)
5239                         return error;
5240         }
5241
5242         rcu_read_lock();
5243         __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5244
5245         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5246                 sid = __tsec->sid;
5247         else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5248                 sid = __tsec->osid;
5249         else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5250                 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5251         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5252                 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5253         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5254                 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5255         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5256                 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5257         else
5258                 goto invalid;
5259         rcu_read_unlock();
5260
5261         if (!sid)
5262                 return 0;
5263
5264         error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5265         if (error)
5266                 return error;
5267         return len;
5268
5269 invalid:
5270         rcu_read_unlock();
5271         return -EINVAL;
5272 }
5273
5274 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5275                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5276 {
5277         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5278         struct task_struct *tracer;
5279         struct cred *new;
5280         u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5281         int error;
5282         char *str = value;
5283
5284         if (current != p) {
5285                 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5286                    security attributes. */
5287                 return -EACCES;
5288         }
5289
5290         /*
5291          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5292          * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5293          * above restriction is ever removed.
5294          */
5295         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5296                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5297         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5298                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5299         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5300                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5301         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5302                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5303         else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5304                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5305         else
5306                 error = -EINVAL;
5307         if (error)
5308                 return error;
5309
5310         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5311         if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5312                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5313                         str[size-1] = 0;
5314                         size--;
5315                 }
5316                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5317                 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5318                         if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5319                                 return error;
5320                         error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5321                                                               &sid);
5322                 }
5323                 if (error)
5324                         return error;
5325         }
5326
5327         new = prepare_creds();
5328         if (!new)
5329                 return -ENOMEM;
5330
5331         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5332            performed during the actual operation (execve,
5333            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5334            operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5335            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5336            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5337         tsec = new->security;
5338         if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5339                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5340         } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5341                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5342         } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5343                 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5344                 if (error)
5345                         goto abort_change;
5346                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5347         } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5348                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5349         } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5350                 error = -EINVAL;
5351                 if (sid == 0)
5352                         goto abort_change;
5353
5354                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5355                 error = -EPERM;
5356                 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5357                         error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5358                         if (error)
5359                                 goto abort_change;
5360                 }
5361
5362                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5363                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5364                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5365                 if (error)
5366                         goto abort_change;
5367
5368                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5369                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5370                 ptsid = 0;
5371                 task_lock(p);
5372                 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5373                 if (tracer)
5374                         ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5375                 task_unlock(p);
5376
5377                 if (tracer) {
5378                         error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5379                                              PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5380                         if (error)
5381                                 goto abort_change;
5382                 }
5383
5384                 tsec->sid = sid;
5385         } else {
5386                 error = -EINVAL;
5387                 goto abort_change;
5388         }
5389
5390         commit_creds(new);
5391         return size;
5392
5393 abort_change:
5394         abort_creds(new);
5395         return error;
5396 }
5397
5398 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5399 {
5400         return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5401 }
5402
5403 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5404 {
5405         return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5406 }
5407
5408 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5409 {
5410         kfree(secdata);
5411 }
5412
5413 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5414
5415 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5416                              unsigned long flags)
5417 {
5418         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5419         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5420
5421         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5422         if (!ksec)
5423                 return -ENOMEM;
5424
5425         tsec = cred->security;
5426         if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5427                 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5428         else
5429                 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5430
5431         k->security = ksec;
5432         return 0;
5433 }
5434
5435 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5436 {
5437         struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5438
5439         k->security = NULL;
5440         kfree(ksec);
5441 }
5442
5443 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5444                                   const struct cred *cred,
5445                                   key_perm_t perm)
5446 {
5447         struct key *key;
5448         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5449         u32 sid;
5450
5451         /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5452            permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5453            appear to be created. */
5454         if (perm == 0)
5455                 return 0;
5456
5457         sid = cred_sid(cred);
5458
5459         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5460         ksec = key->security;
5461
5462         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5463 }
5464
5465 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5466 {
5467         struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5468         char *context = NULL;
5469         unsigned len;
5470         int rc;
5471
5472         rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5473         if (!rc)
5474                 rc = len;
5475         *_buffer = context;
5476         return rc;
5477 }
5478
5479 #endif
5480
5481 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5482         .name =                         "selinux",
5483
5484         .ptrace_may_access =            selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5485         .ptrace_traceme =               selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5486         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
5487         .capset =                       selinux_capset,
5488         .sysctl =                       selinux_sysctl,
5489         .capable =                      selinux_capable,
5490         .quotactl =                     selinux_quotactl,
5491         .quota_on =                     selinux_quota_on,
5492         .syslog =                       selinux_syslog,
5493         .vm_enough_memory =             selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5494
5495         .netlink_send =                 selinux_netlink_send,
5496         .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
5497
5498         .bprm_set_creds =               selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5499         .bprm_committing_creds =        selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5500         .bprm_committed_creds =         selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5501         .bprm_secureexec =              selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5502
5503         .sb_alloc_security =            selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5504         .sb_free_security =             selinux_sb_free_security,
5505         .sb_copy_data =                 selinux_sb_copy_data,
5506         .sb_kern_mount =                selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5507         .sb_show_options =              selinux_sb_show_options,
5508         .sb_statfs =                    selinux_sb_statfs,
5509         .sb_mount =                     selinux_mount,
5510         .sb_umount =                    selinux_umount,
5511         .sb_set_mnt_opts =              selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5512         .sb_clone_mnt_opts =            selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5513         .sb_parse_opts_str =            selinux_parse_opts_str,
5514
5515
5516         .inode_alloc_security =         selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5517         .inode_free_security =          selinux_inode_free_security,
5518         .inode_init_security =          selinux_inode_init_security,
5519         .inode_create =                 selinux_inode_create,
5520         .inode_link =                   selinux_inode_link,
5521         .inode_unlink =                 selinux_inode_unlink,
5522         .inode_symlink =                selinux_inode_symlink,
5523         .inode_mkdir =                  selinux_inode_mkdir,
5524         .inode_rmdir =                  selinux_inode_rmdir,
5525         .inode_mknod =                  selinux_inode_mknod,
5526         .inode_rename =                 selinux_inode_rename,
5527         .inode_readlink =               selinux_inode_readlink,
5528         .inode_follow_link =            selinux_inode_follow_link,
5529         .inode_permission =             selinux_inode_permission,
5530         .inode_setattr =                selinux_inode_setattr,
5531         .inode_getattr =                selinux_inode_getattr,
5532         .inode_setxattr =               selinux_inode_setxattr,
5533         .inode_post_setxattr =          selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5534         .inode_getxattr =               selinux_inode_getxattr,
5535         .inode_listxattr =              selinux_inode_listxattr,
5536         .inode_removexattr =            selinux_inode_removexattr,
5537         .inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5538         .inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5539         .inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5540         .inode_getsecid =               selinux_inode_getsecid,
5541
5542         .file_permission =              selinux_file_permission,
5543         .file_alloc_security =          selinux_file_alloc_security,
5544         .file_free_security =           selinux_file_free_security,
5545         .file_ioctl =                   selinux_file_ioctl,
5546         .file_mmap =                    selinux_file_mmap,
5547         .file_mprotect =                selinux_file_mprotect,
5548         .file_lock =                    selinux_file_lock,
5549         .file_fcntl =                   selinux_file_fcntl,
5550         .file_set_fowner =              selinux_file_set_fowner,
5551         .file_send_sigiotask =          selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5552         .file_receive =                 selinux_file_receive,
5553
5554         .dentry_open =                  selinux_dentry_open,
5555
5556         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
5557         .cred_free =                    selinux_cred_free,
5558         .cred_prepare =                 selinux_cred_prepare,
5559         .kernel_act_as =                selinux_kernel_act_as,
5560         .kernel_create_files_as =       selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5561         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
5562         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
5563         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
5564         .task_getsecid =                selinux_task_getsecid,
5565         .task_setnice =                 selinux_task_setnice,
5566         .task_setioprio =               selinux_task_setioprio,
5567         .task_getioprio =               selinux_task_getioprio,
5568         .task_setrlimit =               selinux_task_setrlimit,
5569         .task_setscheduler =            selinux_task_setscheduler,
5570         .task_getscheduler =            selinux_task_getscheduler,
5571         .task_movememory =              selinux_task_movememory,
5572         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
5573         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
5574         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
5575
5576         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,
5577         .ipc_getsecid =                 selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5578
5579         .msg_msg_alloc_security =       selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5580         .msg_msg_free_security =        selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5581
5582         .msg_queue_alloc_security =     selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5583         .msg_queue_free_security =      selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5584         .msg_queue_associate =          selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5585         .msg_queue_msgctl =             selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5586         .msg_queue_msgsnd =             selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5587         .msg_queue_msgrcv =             selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5588
5589         .shm_alloc_security =           selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5590         .shm_free_security =            selinux_shm_free_security,
5591         .shm_associate =                selinux_shm_associate,
5592         .shm_shmctl =                   selinux_shm_shmctl,
5593         .shm_shmat =                    selinux_shm_shmat,
5594
5595         .sem_alloc_security =           selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5596         .sem_free_security =            selinux_sem_free_security,
5597         .sem_associate =                selinux_sem_associate,
5598         .sem_semctl =                   selinux_sem_semctl,
5599         .sem_semop =                    selinux_sem_semop,
5600
5601         .d_instantiate =                selinux_d_instantiate,
5602
5603         .getprocattr =                  selinux_getprocattr,
5604         .setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
5605
5606         .secid_to_secctx =              selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5607         .secctx_to_secid =              selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5608         .release_secctx =               selinux_release_secctx,
5609
5610         .unix_stream_connect =          selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5611         .unix_may_send =                selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5612
5613         .socket_create =                selinux_socket_create,
5614         .socket_post_create =           selinux_socket_post_create,
5615         .socket_bind =                  selinux_socket_bind,
5616         .socket_connect =               selinux_socket_connect,
5617         .socket_listen =                selinux_socket_listen,
5618         .socket_accept =                selinux_socket_accept,
5619         .socket_sendmsg =               selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5620         .socket_recvmsg =               selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5621         .socket_getsockname =           selinux_socket_getsockname,
5622         .socket_getpeername =           selinux_socket_getpeername,
5623         .socket_getsockopt =            selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5624         .socket_setsockopt =            selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5625         .socket_shutdown =              selinux_socket_shutdown,
5626         .socket_sock_rcv_skb =          selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5627         .socket_getpeersec_stream =     selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5628         .socket_getpeersec_dgram =      selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5629         .sk_alloc_security =            selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5630         .sk_free_security =             selinux_sk_free_security,
5631         .sk_clone_security =            selinux_sk_clone_security,
5632         .sk_getsecid =                  selinux_sk_getsecid,
5633         .sock_graft =                   selinux_sock_graft,
5634         .inet_conn_request =            selinux_inet_conn_request,
5635         .inet_csk_clone =               selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5636         .inet_conn_established =        selinux_inet_conn_established,
5637         .req_classify_flow =            selinux_req_classify_flow,
5638
5639 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5640         .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5641         .xfrm_policy_clone_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5642         .xfrm_policy_free_security =    selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5643         .xfrm_policy_delete_security =  selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5644         .xfrm_state_alloc_security =    selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5645         .xfrm_state_free_security =     selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5646         .xfrm_state_delete_security =   selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5647         .xfrm_policy_lookup =           selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5648         .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =    selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5649         .xfrm_decode_session =          selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5650 #endif
5651
5652 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5653         .key_alloc =                    selinux_key_alloc,
5654         .key_free =                     selinux_key_free,
5655         .key_permission =               selinux_key_permission,
5656         .key_getsecurity =              selinux_key_getsecurity,
5657 #endif
5658
5659 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5660         .audit_rule_init =              selinux_audit_rule_init,
5661         .audit_rule_known =             selinux_audit_rule_known,
5662         .audit_rule_match =             selinux_audit_rule_match,
5663         .audit_rule_free =              selinux_audit_rule_free,
5664 #endif
5665 };
5666
5667 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5668 {
5669         if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5670                 selinux_enabled = 0;
5671                 return 0;
5672         }
5673
5674         if (!selinux_enabled) {
5675                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
5676                 return 0;
5677         }
5678
5679         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
5680
5681         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5682         cred_init_security();
5683
5684         sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5685                                             sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5686                                             0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5687         avc_init();
5688
5689         secondary_ops = security_ops;
5690         if (!secondary_ops)
5691                 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5692         if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5693                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5694
5695         if (selinux_enforcing)
5696                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5697         else
5698                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
5699
5700         return 0;
5701 }
5702
5703 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5704 {
5705         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
5706
5707         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5708         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5709         spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5710         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5711 next_sb:
5712         if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5713                 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5714                                 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5715                                            struct superblock_security_struct,
5716                                            list);
5717                 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5718                 sb->s_count++;
5719                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5720                 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5721                 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5722                 if (sb->s_root)
5723                         superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5724                 drop_super(sb);
5725                 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5726                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5727                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5728                 goto next_sb;
5729         }
5730         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5731         spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5732 }
5733
5734 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5735    all processes and objects when they are created. */
5736 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5737
5738 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5739
5740 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5741         {
5742                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5743                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5744                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5745                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5746                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5747         },
5748         {
5749                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_forward,
5750                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5751                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5752                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
5753                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5754         },
5755         {
5756                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_output,
5757                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5758                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5759                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5760                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5761         }
5762 };
5763
5764 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5765
5766 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5767         {
5768                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5769                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5770                 .pf =           PF_INET6,
5771                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5772                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5773         },
5774         {
5775                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_forward,
5776                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5777                 .pf =           PF_INET6,
5778                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
5779                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5780         }
5781 };
5782
5783 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5784
5785 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5786 {
5787         int err = 0;
5788
5789         if (!selinux_enabled)
5790                 goto out;
5791
5792         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5793
5794         err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5795         if (err)
5796                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5797
5798 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5799         err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5800         if (err)
5801                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5802 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5803
5804 out:
5805         return err;
5806 }
5807
5808 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5809
5810 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5811 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5812 {
5813         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5814
5815         nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5816 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5817         nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5818 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5819 }
5820 #endif
5821
5822 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5823
5824 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5825 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5826 #endif
5827
5828 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5829
5830 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5831 static int selinux_disabled;
5832
5833 int selinux_disable(void)
5834 {
5835         extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5836
5837         if (ss_initialized) {
5838                 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5839                 return -EINVAL;
5840         }
5841
5842         if (selinux_disabled) {
5843                 /* Only do this once. */
5844                 return -EINVAL;
5845         }
5846
5847         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
5848
5849         selinux_disabled = 1;
5850         selinux_enabled = 0;
5851
5852         /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5853         security_ops = secondary_ops;
5854
5855         /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5856         selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5857
5858         /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5859         exit_sel_fs();
5860
5861         return 0;
5862 }
5863 #endif