1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
24 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
31 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
32 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
50 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
52 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
53 #include <linux/tty.h>
55 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
56 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
57 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
58 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
59 #include <net/netlabel.h>
60 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
61 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
62 #include <linux/atomic.h>
63 #include <linux/bitops.h>
64 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
65 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
66 #include <net/netlink.h>
67 #include <linux/tcp.h>
68 #include <linux/udp.h>
69 #include <linux/dccp.h>
70 #include <linux/sctp.h>
71 #include <net/sctp/structs.h>
72 #include <linux/quota.h>
73 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
75 #include <linux/parser.h>
76 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
78 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
79 #include <linux/personality.h>
80 #include <linux/audit.h>
81 #include <linux/string.h>
82 #include <linux/mutex.h>
83 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
84 #include <linux/syslog.h>
85 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
86 #include <linux/export.h>
87 #include <linux/msg.h>
88 #include <linux/shm.h>
89 #include <linux/bpf.h>
90 #include <linux/kernfs.h>
91 #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
92 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
93 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
94 #include <linux/fanotify.h>
103 #include "netlabel.h"
107 struct selinux_state selinux_state;
109 /* SECMARK reference count */
110 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
112 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
113 static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
115 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
117 unsigned long enforcing;
118 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
119 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
122 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
124 #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
127 int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
128 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
129 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
131 unsigned long enabled;
132 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
133 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
136 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
139 static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
140 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
142 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
144 unsigned long checkreqprot;
146 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
147 selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
149 pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
153 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
156 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
159 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
160 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
161 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
162 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
163 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
166 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
168 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
169 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
173 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
176 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
177 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
178 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
179 * is always considered enabled.
182 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
184 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
185 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
188 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
190 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
199 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
201 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
203 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
210 * initialise the security for the init task
212 static void cred_init_security(void)
214 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
215 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
217 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
218 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
222 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
224 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
226 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
228 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
233 * get the subjective security ID of a task
235 static inline u32 task_sid_subj(const struct task_struct *task)
240 sid = cred_sid(rcu_dereference(task->cred));
246 * get the objective security ID of a task
248 static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
253 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
259 * get the security ID of a task for use with binder
261 static inline u32 task_sid_binder(const struct task_struct *task)
264 * In many case where this function is used we should be using the
265 * task's subjective SID, but we can't reliably access the subjective
266 * creds of a task other than our own so we must use the objective
267 * creds/SID, which are safe to access. The downside is that if a task
268 * is temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected here;
269 * however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that case well
272 * If this ever changes and we can safely reference the subjective
273 * creds/SID of another task, this function will make it easier to
274 * identify the various places where we make use of the task SIDs in
275 * the binder code. It is also likely that we will need to adjust
276 * the main drivers/android binder code as well.
278 return task_sid_obj(task);
281 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
284 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
285 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
286 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
287 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
289 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
290 struct dentry *dentry,
293 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
295 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
297 if (selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) &&
298 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
303 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
304 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
305 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
307 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
312 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
314 return selinux_inode(inode);
317 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
321 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
323 return ERR_PTR(error);
324 return selinux_inode(inode);
328 * Get the security label of an inode.
330 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
332 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
333 return selinux_inode(inode);
336 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
338 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
340 return selinux_inode(inode);
344 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
346 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
348 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
350 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
351 return selinux_inode(inode);
354 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
356 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
357 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
361 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
363 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
364 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
365 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
367 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
368 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
369 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
370 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
372 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
373 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
374 list_del_init(&isec->list);
375 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
379 struct selinux_mnt_opts {
380 const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext;
383 static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
385 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
386 kfree(opts->fscontext);
387 kfree(opts->context);
388 kfree(opts->rootcontext);
389 kfree(opts->defcontext);
402 #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
412 A(rootcontext, true),
417 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
421 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
422 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
423 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
425 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
426 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
431 return tokens[i].opt;
436 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
438 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
439 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
440 const struct cred *cred)
442 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
445 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
446 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
447 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
451 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
452 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
453 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
457 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
458 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
459 const struct cred *cred)
461 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
463 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
464 tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
465 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
469 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
470 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
471 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
475 static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
477 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
478 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
479 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
480 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
481 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
482 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
483 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
484 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
485 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
488 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
490 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
493 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
494 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
496 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
498 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
499 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
500 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
501 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
502 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
505 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
506 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
508 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
509 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
510 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
516 static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
518 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
519 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
520 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
525 * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
526 * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
527 * the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
528 * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
529 * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
531 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
532 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
533 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
537 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
538 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
539 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
540 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
541 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
544 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
545 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
552 /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
553 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name, "/",
558 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
559 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
560 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
565 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
567 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
568 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
569 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
572 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
573 rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
578 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
581 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
582 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
583 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
585 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
586 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
588 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
590 /* Initialize the root inode. */
591 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
593 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
594 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
595 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
597 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
598 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
599 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
600 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
601 struct inode_security_struct, list);
602 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
603 list_del_init(&isec->list);
604 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
605 inode = igrab(inode);
607 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
608 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
611 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
613 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
617 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
618 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
620 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
622 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
623 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
624 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
625 (old_sid != new_sid))
628 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
629 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
631 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
632 if (mnt_flags & flag)
637 static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid)
639 int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s,
642 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
643 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
644 s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
649 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
650 * labeling information.
652 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
654 unsigned long kern_flags,
655 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
657 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
658 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
659 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
660 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
661 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
662 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
663 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
666 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
668 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
670 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
671 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
672 server is ready to handle calls. */
676 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
677 "before the security server is initialized\n");
680 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
681 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
682 * place the results is not allowed */
688 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
689 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
690 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
691 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
693 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
694 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
695 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
696 * will be used for both mounts)
698 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
702 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
705 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
706 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
707 * than once with different security options.
710 if (opts->fscontext) {
711 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid);
714 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
716 goto out_double_mount;
717 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
720 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid);
723 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
725 goto out_double_mount;
726 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
728 if (opts->rootcontext) {
729 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid);
732 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
734 goto out_double_mount;
735 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
737 if (opts->defcontext) {
738 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid);
741 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
743 goto out_double_mount;
744 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
748 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
749 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
750 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
751 goto out_double_mount;
756 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
757 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
759 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
760 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
761 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
762 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
763 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
764 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
766 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
767 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
768 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
769 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
771 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
773 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
776 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
778 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
779 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
785 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
786 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
787 * line and security labels must be ignored.
789 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
790 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
791 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
792 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
793 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
794 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
799 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
800 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
801 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
805 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
812 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
814 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
818 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
822 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
823 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
824 * the superblock context if not already set.
826 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
827 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
828 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
832 if (!fscontext_sid) {
833 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
837 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
839 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
844 if (!rootcontext_sid)
845 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
847 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
848 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
851 if (rootcontext_sid) {
852 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
857 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
858 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
861 if (defcontext_sid) {
862 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
863 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
865 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
866 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
870 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
871 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
877 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
881 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
883 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
887 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
888 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
893 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
894 const struct super_block *newsb)
896 struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
897 struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
898 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
899 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
901 if (oldflags != newflags)
903 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
905 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
907 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
909 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
910 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
911 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
912 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
917 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
918 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
919 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
923 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
924 struct super_block *newsb,
925 unsigned long kern_flags,
926 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
929 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
930 selinux_superblock(oldsb);
931 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
933 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
934 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
935 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
938 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
939 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
941 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
945 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
946 * place the results is not allowed.
948 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
951 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
952 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
954 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
955 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
956 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
957 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
958 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
961 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
963 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
965 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
966 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
967 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
969 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
970 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
971 rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
976 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
977 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
978 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
982 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
986 if (!set_rootcontext) {
987 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
990 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
992 if (set_rootcontext) {
993 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
994 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
996 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
999 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
1001 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
1005 static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
1007 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
1009 if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */
1013 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
1022 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
1027 if (opts->fscontext)
1029 opts->fscontext = s;
1031 case Opt_rootcontext:
1032 if (opts->rootcontext)
1034 opts->rootcontext = s;
1036 case Opt_defcontext:
1037 if (opts->context || opts->defcontext)
1039 opts->defcontext = s;
1044 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1048 static int selinux_add_mnt_opt(const char *option, const char *val, int len,
1051 int token = Opt_error;
1054 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
1055 if (strcmp(option, tokens[i].name) == 0) {
1056 token = tokens[i].opt;
1061 if (token == Opt_error)
1064 if (token != Opt_seclabel) {
1065 val = kmemdup_nul(val, len, GFP_KERNEL);
1071 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, val, mnt_opts);
1080 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
1086 static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1088 char *context = NULL;
1092 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid,
1095 bool has_comma = context && strchr(context, ',');
1100 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1108 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1110 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1113 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1116 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
1119 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1121 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1122 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1126 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1128 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1129 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1133 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1135 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1136 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1140 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1141 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
1142 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1144 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1145 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1149 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1151 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1156 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1158 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1160 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1162 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1164 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1166 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1168 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1170 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1172 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1176 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1179 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1181 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
1182 protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
1185 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1187 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1190 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1192 int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1198 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1199 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1202 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1209 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1210 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1211 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1212 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1213 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1215 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1217 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1218 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1219 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1220 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1221 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1223 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1225 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1227 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1233 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1234 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1235 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1237 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1239 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1240 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1241 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1243 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1245 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1246 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1247 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1248 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1249 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1250 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1251 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1252 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1253 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1254 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1255 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1256 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1257 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1258 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1259 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1261 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1262 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1263 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1265 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1268 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1270 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1272 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1278 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1280 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1282 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1284 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1286 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1288 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1290 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1292 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1294 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1296 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1298 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1300 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1302 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1304 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1306 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1308 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1310 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1312 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1314 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1316 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1318 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1320 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1322 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1324 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1326 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1328 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1330 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1332 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1334 return SECCLASS_MCTP_SOCKET;
1336 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1341 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1344 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1350 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1351 char *buffer, *path;
1353 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1357 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1361 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1362 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1363 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1364 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1365 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1370 rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
1372 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1373 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1374 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1378 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1382 static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1383 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1385 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1390 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1391 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1395 context[len] = '\0';
1396 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1397 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1400 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1401 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1406 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1410 context[len] = '\0';
1411 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1416 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1417 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1418 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1425 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state, context, rc, sid,
1428 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1429 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1431 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1432 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1435 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1436 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1443 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1444 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1446 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1447 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1448 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1450 struct dentry *dentry;
1453 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1456 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1457 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1460 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1461 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1463 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1464 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1465 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1466 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1467 server is ready to handle calls. */
1468 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1469 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1470 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1471 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1475 sclass = isec->sclass;
1476 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1478 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1479 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1481 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1482 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1484 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1485 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1486 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1489 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1490 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1492 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1493 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1496 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1497 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1498 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1499 * two, depending upon that...
1501 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1503 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1507 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1508 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1509 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1510 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1511 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1512 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1513 * be used again by userspace.
1518 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1524 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1527 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1528 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1531 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1532 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
1533 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1537 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1538 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1541 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1544 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1545 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1546 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1547 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1550 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1551 * d_splice_alias. */
1552 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1554 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1555 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1556 * a connected one, so try that first.
1558 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1560 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1563 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1564 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1565 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1566 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1567 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1568 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1569 * could be used again by userspace.
1573 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1574 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1580 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1581 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1582 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1595 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1596 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1598 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1601 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1606 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1610 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1611 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1612 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1615 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1619 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1620 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1626 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1627 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1630 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1631 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1634 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1635 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1638 /* All other signals. */
1639 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1646 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1647 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1650 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1651 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1652 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1654 struct common_audit_data ad;
1655 struct av_decision avd;
1657 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1658 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1661 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1664 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1666 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1669 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1672 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1677 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
1678 sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1679 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1680 int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
1681 sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1688 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1689 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1690 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1691 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1692 struct inode *inode,
1694 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1696 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1699 validate_creds(cred);
1701 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1704 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1705 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1707 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1708 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1711 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1712 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1713 pathname if needed. */
1714 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1715 struct dentry *dentry,
1718 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1719 struct common_audit_data ad;
1721 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1722 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1723 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1724 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1727 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1728 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1729 pathname if needed. */
1730 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1731 const struct path *path,
1734 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1735 struct common_audit_data ad;
1737 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1739 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1740 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1743 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1744 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1748 struct common_audit_data ad;
1750 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1752 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1755 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1756 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid);
1759 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1760 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1761 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1762 check a particular permission to the file.
1763 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1764 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1765 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1766 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1767 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1771 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1772 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1773 struct common_audit_data ad;
1774 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1777 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1780 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1781 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1790 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1791 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1796 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1799 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1806 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1809 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1811 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1814 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
1815 selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1817 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1818 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1819 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1820 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1822 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1824 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1825 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
1833 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1834 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1835 struct dentry *dentry,
1838 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1839 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1840 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1842 struct common_audit_data ad;
1845 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1846 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1850 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1851 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1853 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1854 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1855 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1860 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1865 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1866 sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1870 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1872 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1873 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1877 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1880 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1881 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1882 struct dentry *dentry,
1886 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1887 struct common_audit_data ad;
1888 u32 sid = current_sid();
1892 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1893 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1895 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1896 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1899 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1900 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1901 sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1916 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1921 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1922 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1926 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1927 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1928 struct inode *new_dir,
1929 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1931 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1932 struct common_audit_data ad;
1933 u32 sid = current_sid();
1935 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1938 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1939 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1940 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1941 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1943 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1945 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1946 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1947 sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1948 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1951 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1953 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1956 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1957 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1959 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1964 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1965 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1966 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1967 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1968 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1969 sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1972 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1973 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1974 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1975 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1978 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1986 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1987 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1988 struct super_block *sb,
1990 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1992 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1993 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1995 sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1996 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
1997 sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
2000 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
2001 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
2005 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
2006 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2007 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2008 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2011 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
2013 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2017 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
2019 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
2021 if (mask & MAY_READ)
2028 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
2029 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
2033 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
2035 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
2036 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
2043 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2052 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
2055 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2057 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2058 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2060 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2061 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2067 /* Hook functions begin here. */
2069 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
2071 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2072 current_sid(), task_sid_binder(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
2073 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2076 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
2077 struct task_struct *to)
2079 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2080 u32 fromsid = task_sid_binder(from);
2083 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2084 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2085 mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2086 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2091 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, task_sid_binder(to),
2092 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2095 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
2096 struct task_struct *to)
2098 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2099 task_sid_binder(from), task_sid_binder(to),
2100 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2104 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
2105 struct task_struct *to,
2108 u32 sid = task_sid_binder(to);
2109 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2110 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2111 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2112 struct common_audit_data ad;
2115 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2116 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2118 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2119 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2128 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2129 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2134 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2137 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2138 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2139 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2143 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2146 u32 sid = current_sid();
2147 u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
2149 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2150 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2151 sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2153 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2154 sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2157 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2159 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2160 task_sid_subj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
2161 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2164 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2165 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2167 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2168 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2169 PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2172 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2173 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2174 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2175 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2177 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2178 cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2179 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2183 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2184 * which was removed).
2186 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2187 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2188 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2189 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2192 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2193 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2195 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2198 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2200 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2215 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2223 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2224 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2227 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2233 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2235 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2237 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2240 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2243 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2244 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2245 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2246 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2247 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2248 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2249 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2250 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2251 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2252 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2253 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2254 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2257 /* All other syslog types */
2258 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2259 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2260 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2264 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2265 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2266 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2268 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2269 * processes that allocate mappings.
2271 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2273 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2275 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2276 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2280 return cap_sys_admin;
2283 /* binprm security operations */
2285 static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2288 struct task_struct *tracer;
2291 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2293 sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
2299 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2300 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2301 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2303 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2304 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2308 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2309 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2311 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2312 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2315 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2316 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2317 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2318 * the old and new contexts.
2320 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2323 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2325 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2326 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2327 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2328 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2334 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2335 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2336 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2338 rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2344 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2345 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2346 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2353 static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2355 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2356 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2357 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2358 struct common_audit_data ad;
2359 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2362 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2363 * the script interpreter */
2365 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2366 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2367 isec = inode_security(inode);
2369 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2370 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2371 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2373 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2374 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2375 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2376 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2378 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2379 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2380 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2381 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2383 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2384 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2388 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2389 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
2390 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2396 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2399 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2401 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2404 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2405 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2407 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2408 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2409 old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2410 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2414 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2415 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2416 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2417 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2421 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2422 new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2423 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2427 /* Check for shared state */
2428 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2429 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2430 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2431 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2437 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2438 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2439 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2440 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2442 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2443 ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2445 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2451 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2452 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2454 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2455 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2456 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2457 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2458 old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2459 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2461 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2467 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2469 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2472 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2473 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2474 struct files_struct *files)
2476 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2477 struct tty_struct *tty;
2481 tty = get_current_tty();
2483 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2484 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2485 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2487 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2488 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2489 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2490 open file may belong to another process and we are
2491 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2492 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2493 struct tty_file_private, list);
2494 file = file_priv->file;
2495 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2498 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2501 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2505 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2506 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2507 if (!n) /* none found? */
2510 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2511 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2513 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2515 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2516 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2522 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2524 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2526 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2527 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2530 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2531 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2534 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2535 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2537 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2538 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2540 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2541 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2542 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2544 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2545 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2546 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2547 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2548 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2550 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2551 new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2552 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2554 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2556 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2557 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2558 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2559 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2561 task_unlock(current);
2562 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2563 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2568 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2571 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2573 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2583 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2584 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2585 * flush and unblock signals.
2587 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2588 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2590 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
2591 osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2595 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2596 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2597 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2598 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2599 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2600 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2601 recalc_sigpending();
2603 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2606 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2607 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2608 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2609 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2610 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2613 /* superblock security operations */
2615 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2617 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2619 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2620 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2621 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2622 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2623 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2624 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2629 static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2631 bool open_quote = false;
2635 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2637 open_quote = !open_quote;
2638 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2644 static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2646 char *from = options;
2652 int len = opt_len(from);
2656 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2658 if (token != Opt_error) {
2663 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2668 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2674 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2680 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2685 memmove(to, from, len);
2698 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2704 static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2706 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2707 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2712 * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
2713 * options specified, otherwise accept.
2715 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2716 return opts ? 1 : 0;
2719 * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
2720 * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
2723 return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
2725 if (opts->fscontext) {
2726 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
2729 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2732 if (opts->context) {
2733 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
2736 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2739 if (opts->rootcontext) {
2740 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2742 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2743 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
2746 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2749 if (opts->defcontext) {
2750 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
2753 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2759 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2761 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2762 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2766 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2772 if (opts->fscontext) {
2773 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid);
2776 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2777 goto out_bad_option;
2779 if (opts->context) {
2780 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid);
2783 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2784 goto out_bad_option;
2786 if (opts->rootcontext) {
2787 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2788 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2789 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid);
2792 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2793 goto out_bad_option;
2795 if (opts->defcontext) {
2796 rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid);
2799 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2800 goto out_bad_option;
2805 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2806 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2811 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2813 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2814 struct common_audit_data ad;
2816 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2817 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2818 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2821 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2823 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2824 struct common_audit_data ad;
2826 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2827 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2828 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2831 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2832 const struct path *path,
2834 unsigned long flags,
2837 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2839 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2840 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2841 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2843 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2846 static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2847 const struct path *to_path)
2849 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2851 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2854 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2856 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2858 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2859 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2862 static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2863 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2865 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2866 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2871 fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2875 opts = fc->security;
2877 if (src->fscontext) {
2878 opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2879 if (!opts->fscontext)
2883 opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL);
2887 if (src->rootcontext) {
2888 opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2889 if (!opts->rootcontext)
2892 if (src->defcontext) {
2893 opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL);
2894 if (!opts->defcontext)
2900 static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2901 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2902 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2903 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2904 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2905 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2909 static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2910 struct fs_parameter *param)
2912 struct fs_parse_result result;
2915 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2919 rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2921 param->string = NULL;
2927 /* inode security operations */
2929 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2931 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2932 u32 sid = current_sid();
2934 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2935 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2936 isec->inode = inode;
2937 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2938 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2939 isec->task_sid = sid;
2940 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2945 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2947 inode_free_security(inode);
2950 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2951 const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2957 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2958 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2959 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2964 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
2968 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2970 const struct cred *old,
2975 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2977 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2978 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2979 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2984 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2985 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2989 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2990 const struct qstr *qstr,
2992 void **value, size_t *len)
2994 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2995 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3000 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
3002 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3004 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
3005 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
3010 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
3011 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
3012 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3013 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3015 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3018 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3019 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3023 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
3026 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3037 static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
3038 const struct qstr *name,
3039 const struct inode *context_inode)
3041 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3042 struct common_audit_data ad;
3043 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3046 if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)))
3049 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3052 * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has
3053 * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
3057 if (context_inode) {
3058 struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
3059 selinux_inode(context_inode);
3060 if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
3061 pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized");
3065 isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
3066 isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
3068 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
3069 rc = security_transition_sid(
3070 &selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
3071 isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
3076 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3078 * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
3079 * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
3082 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3085 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3093 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
3095 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
3098 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3100 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
3103 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3105 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
3108 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3110 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
3113 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
3115 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
3118 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3120 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3123 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3125 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3128 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3129 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3131 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3134 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3136 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3138 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3141 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3144 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3145 struct common_audit_data ad;
3146 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3149 validate_creds(cred);
3151 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3152 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3153 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3154 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3156 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3158 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3159 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3162 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3163 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3166 struct common_audit_data ad;
3167 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3169 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3172 return slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
3173 current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3174 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3177 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3179 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3182 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3183 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3185 struct av_decision avd;
3187 u32 audited, denied;
3189 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3190 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3192 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3196 validate_creds(cred);
3198 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3201 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3203 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3204 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3206 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3208 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
3209 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
3211 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3212 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3214 if (likely(!audited))
3217 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3223 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3225 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3226 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3227 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3228 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3230 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3231 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3232 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3238 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3239 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3240 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3242 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3243 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3244 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3245 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3248 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3251 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3253 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3256 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3258 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3259 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3261 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3263 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3268 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3269 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3270 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3272 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3273 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3274 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3275 struct common_audit_data ad;
3276 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3279 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3280 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3284 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3285 ordinary setattr permission. */
3286 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3289 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3290 return (inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3292 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3293 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3296 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
3299 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3300 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3302 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3303 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3304 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3305 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3309 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3311 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3312 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3313 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3316 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3317 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3319 const char *str = value;
3321 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3322 audit_size = size - 1;
3328 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3329 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3332 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3333 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3338 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
3344 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3345 sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3346 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3350 rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
3355 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3358 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3359 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3363 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3364 const void *value, size_t size,
3367 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3368 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3372 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3373 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3377 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) {
3378 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3379 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3380 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3381 * we've since initialized.
3386 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
3389 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3390 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3391 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3395 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3396 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3397 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3399 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3400 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3405 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3407 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3409 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3412 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3414 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3416 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3419 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3420 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3422 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3423 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(mnt_userns, dentry, name);
3427 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3428 ordinary setattr permission. */
3429 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3432 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3435 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3436 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3440 static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3441 unsigned int obj_type)
3446 struct common_audit_data ad;
3448 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3452 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3453 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3456 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3457 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3459 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3460 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3461 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3462 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3466 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3473 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3474 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3475 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3477 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3478 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3479 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3481 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3485 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3487 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3489 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
3490 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3491 void **buffer, bool alloc)
3495 char *context = NULL;
3496 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3499 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3500 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3502 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state) ||
3503 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3507 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3508 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3509 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3510 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3511 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3512 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3513 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3515 isec = inode_security(inode);
3516 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3517 error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
3518 isec->sid, &context,
3521 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
3535 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3536 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3538 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3539 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3543 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3546 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3547 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3550 if (!value || !size)
3553 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
3558 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3559 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3561 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3562 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3566 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3568 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3570 if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state))
3573 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3574 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3578 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3580 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3584 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3587 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3588 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3590 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3591 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3596 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3597 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3598 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3599 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3604 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3606 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3607 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3608 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3610 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3611 return 1; /* Discard */
3613 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3619 /* kernfs node operations */
3621 static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3622 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3624 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3625 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3629 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3636 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3640 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3646 rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, context, clen, &parent_sid,
3652 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3653 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3655 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3659 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3661 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
3662 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3668 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
3673 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3680 /* file security operations */
3682 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3684 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3685 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3687 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3688 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3691 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3692 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3695 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3697 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3698 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3699 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3700 u32 sid = current_sid();
3703 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3706 isec = inode_security(inode);
3707 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3708 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
3709 /* No change since file_open check. */
3712 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3715 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3717 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3718 u32 sid = current_sid();
3721 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3727 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3728 * operation to an inode.
3730 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3731 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3733 struct common_audit_data ad;
3734 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3735 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3736 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3737 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3738 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3740 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3741 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3743 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3746 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3748 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3749 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3758 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3761 isec = inode_security(inode);
3762 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
3763 ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3764 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3769 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3772 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3779 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3780 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3781 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3784 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3785 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3786 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3789 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3792 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3797 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3798 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3801 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3802 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3805 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3810 static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3812 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3814 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3815 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3818 if (default_noexec &&
3819 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3820 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3822 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3823 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3824 * This has an additional check.
3826 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3827 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3828 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3834 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3835 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3837 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3838 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3841 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3842 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3844 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3851 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3855 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3856 u32 sid = current_sid();
3857 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3858 sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3859 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3865 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3866 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3868 struct common_audit_data ad;
3872 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3874 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3880 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3883 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3884 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3887 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3888 unsigned long reqprot,
3891 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3892 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3894 if (checkreqprot_get(&selinux_state))
3897 if (default_noexec &&
3898 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3900 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3901 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3902 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3903 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3904 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3905 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3906 ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3907 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
3908 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3909 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
3910 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3911 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3912 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3914 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3915 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3916 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3917 * modified content. This typically should only
3918 * occur for text relocations.
3920 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3926 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3929 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3931 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3933 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3936 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3939 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3944 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3945 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3954 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3955 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3956 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3964 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3969 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3976 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3978 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3980 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3981 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3984 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3985 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3988 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
3990 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3992 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3993 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3995 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3998 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
4000 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
4002 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4003 fsec->fown_sid, sid,
4004 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4007 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
4009 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
4011 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
4014 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
4016 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4017 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4019 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4020 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4022 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
4023 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
4024 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
4025 * Task label is already saved in the file security
4026 * struct as its SID.
4028 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
4029 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
4031 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
4032 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
4033 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
4034 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
4035 * new inode label or new policy.
4036 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
4038 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
4041 /* task security operations */
4043 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
4044 unsigned long clone_flags)
4046 u32 sid = current_sid();
4048 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4049 sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
4053 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
4055 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
4058 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4059 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4066 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
4068 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
4070 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4071 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4076 static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
4078 *secid = cred_sid(c);
4082 * set the security data for a kernel service
4083 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
4085 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
4087 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4088 u32 sid = current_sid();
4091 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4093 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4094 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
4098 tsec->create_sid = 0;
4099 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
4100 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
4106 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
4107 * objective context of the specified inode
4109 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
4111 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
4112 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4113 u32 sid = current_sid();
4116 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4118 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4119 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4123 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4127 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4129 struct common_audit_data ad;
4131 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4132 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4134 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4135 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4136 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4139 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4141 struct common_audit_data ad;
4142 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4143 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4144 u32 sid = current_sid();
4149 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4150 sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4151 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4155 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4158 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4159 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4160 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4161 sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4166 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4167 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4168 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4169 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4172 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4173 enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4179 case READING_MODULE:
4180 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4189 static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4194 case LOADING_MODULE:
4195 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4204 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4206 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4207 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4208 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4211 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4213 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4214 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4215 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4218 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4220 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4221 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4222 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4225 static void selinux_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4227 *secid = task_sid_subj(p);
4230 static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4232 *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
4235 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4237 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4238 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4239 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4242 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4244 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4245 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4246 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4249 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4251 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4252 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4253 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4256 static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4263 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4264 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4265 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4266 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4267 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4268 cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4269 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4272 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4273 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4275 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4277 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4278 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4279 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4280 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4281 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4282 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4283 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
4284 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4289 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4291 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4292 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4293 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4296 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4298 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4299 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4300 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4303 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4305 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4306 current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4307 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4310 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4311 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4317 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4319 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4321 secid = current_sid();
4323 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4324 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4325 secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4328 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4329 struct inode *inode)
4331 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4332 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
4334 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4335 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4337 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4338 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4341 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4342 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4343 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4345 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4346 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4348 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4349 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4353 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4354 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4357 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4358 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4362 *proto = ih->protocol;
4364 switch (ih->protocol) {
4366 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4368 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4372 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4376 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4377 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4382 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4384 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4388 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4392 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4393 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4397 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4398 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4400 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4404 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4408 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4409 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4413 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4414 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4415 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4417 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4421 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4425 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4426 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4437 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4439 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4440 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4441 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4444 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4445 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4448 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4449 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4453 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4454 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4457 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4458 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4459 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4468 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4470 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4474 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4475 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4480 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4482 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4486 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4487 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4491 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4492 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4494 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4498 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4499 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4503 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4504 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4505 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4507 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4511 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4512 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4516 /* includes fragments */
4526 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4527 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4532 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4534 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4537 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4538 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4541 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4543 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4546 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4547 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4557 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4558 " unable to parse packet\n");
4568 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4570 * @family: protocol family
4571 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4574 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4575 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4576 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4577 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4578 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4582 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4589 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4592 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4596 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
4597 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4598 if (unlikely(err)) {
4600 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4601 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4609 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4610 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4611 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4612 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4614 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4615 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4616 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4617 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4620 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4624 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4625 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
4633 /* socket security operations */
4635 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4636 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4638 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4639 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4643 return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4644 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4647 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4649 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4650 struct common_audit_data ad;
4651 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4653 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4656 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4660 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4661 current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4665 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4666 int protocol, int kern)
4668 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4676 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4677 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4681 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4682 tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4685 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4686 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4688 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4689 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4690 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4691 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4692 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4696 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4701 isec->sclass = sclass;
4703 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4706 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4707 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4709 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4710 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4711 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4713 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4719 static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4720 struct socket *sockb)
4722 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4723 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4725 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4726 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4731 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4732 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4733 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4735 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4737 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4738 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4742 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4746 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4747 family = sk->sk_family;
4748 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4750 struct common_audit_data ad;
4751 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4752 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4753 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4755 unsigned short snum;
4759 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4760 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4761 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4762 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4764 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4766 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4767 switch (family_sa) {
4770 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4772 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4773 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4774 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4775 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4777 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4779 family_sa = AF_INET;
4781 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4782 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4785 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4787 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4788 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4789 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4795 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4797 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4798 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4803 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4805 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4806 snum < low || snum > high) {
4807 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4811 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4814 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4820 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4821 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4822 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4825 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4826 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4829 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4830 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4833 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4834 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4838 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4842 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4846 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4847 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4849 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4851 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4853 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4860 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4861 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4863 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4866 /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4867 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4869 static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4870 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4872 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4873 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4876 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4879 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4882 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4883 * way to disconnect the socket
4885 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4889 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4892 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4893 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4894 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4895 struct common_audit_data ad;
4896 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4897 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4898 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4899 unsigned short snum;
4902 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4903 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4904 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4905 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4907 switch (address->sa_family) {
4909 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4910 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4912 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4915 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4916 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4918 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4921 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4922 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4924 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4927 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4930 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4934 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4935 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4936 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4938 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4939 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4941 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4942 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4946 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4948 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4949 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4950 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
4951 sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4959 /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4960 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4961 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4964 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4966 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4970 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4973 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4975 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4978 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4981 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4982 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4986 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4990 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4991 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4992 sclass = isec->sclass;
4994 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4996 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4997 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4999 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
5004 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
5007 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
5010 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
5011 int size, int flags)
5013 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
5016 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
5018 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
5021 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
5023 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
5026 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
5030 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
5034 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
5037 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
5040 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
5043 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
5045 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
5048 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
5052 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
5053 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
5054 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
5055 struct common_audit_data ad;
5056 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5059 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5061 ad.u.net->sk = other;
5063 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5064 sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
5065 sksec_other->sclass,
5066 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
5070 /* server child socket */
5071 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
5072 err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
5073 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
5077 /* connecting socket */
5078 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
5083 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
5084 struct socket *other)
5086 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5087 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
5088 struct common_audit_data ad;
5089 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5091 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5093 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
5095 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5096 ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
5100 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
5101 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
5102 struct common_audit_data *ad)
5108 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
5111 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5113 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
5117 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
5120 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5122 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
5125 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5129 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5130 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5131 struct common_audit_data ad;
5132 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5135 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5137 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5138 ad.u.net->family = family;
5139 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5143 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
5144 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5145 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5151 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
5154 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5159 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5162 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5163 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5164 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5165 struct common_audit_data ad;
5166 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5171 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5174 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5175 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5178 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5179 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5180 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5181 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5182 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5183 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5185 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5186 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5187 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5190 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5192 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
5193 ad.u.net->family = family;
5194 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5198 if (peerlbl_active) {
5201 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5204 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5205 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5207 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5210 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5211 sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5214 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5219 if (secmark_active) {
5220 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5221 sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5230 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
5231 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
5236 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5237 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5239 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5240 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5241 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5242 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5243 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5244 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5246 err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
5251 if (scontext_len > len) {
5256 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5260 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
5266 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5268 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5270 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5272 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5274 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5277 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5281 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5282 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5283 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5285 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5288 *secid = peer_secid;
5289 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5294 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5296 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5298 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5302 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5303 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5304 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5305 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5306 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5311 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5313 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5315 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5316 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5320 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5322 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5323 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5325 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5326 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5327 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5329 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5332 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5335 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5337 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5339 *secid = sksec->sid;
5343 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5345 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5346 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5347 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5349 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5350 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5351 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5352 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5355 /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
5356 * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
5359 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
5360 struct sk_buff *skb)
5362 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
5363 struct common_audit_data ad;
5364 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5366 u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5370 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5373 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5375 if (peerlbl_active) {
5376 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5377 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5379 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
5384 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5385 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5388 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5389 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5391 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5392 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5393 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5394 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5396 sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
5397 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
5398 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5399 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5401 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5403 ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
5404 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5405 sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
5406 SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
5411 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5412 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5413 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5414 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5415 * plug this into the new socket.
5417 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
5421 ep->secid = conn_sid;
5422 ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
5424 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5425 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
5428 /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5429 * based on their @optname.
5431 static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5432 struct sockaddr *address,
5435 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5437 struct sockaddr *addr;
5438 struct socket *sock;
5440 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5443 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5444 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5447 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5448 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5452 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5455 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5458 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5464 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5470 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5471 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5472 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5473 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5475 /* Connect checks */
5476 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5477 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5478 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5479 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5480 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5484 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5485 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5486 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5487 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5488 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5489 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5490 * primary address is selected.
5491 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5492 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5493 * selinux_socket_connect().
5495 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5509 /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5510 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
5513 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5514 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5516 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5517 * the non-sctp clone version.
5519 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5520 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5522 newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
5523 newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
5524 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5525 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5528 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5529 struct request_sock *req)
5531 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5533 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5537 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5540 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5543 req->secid = connsid;
5544 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5546 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5549 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5550 const struct request_sock *req)
5552 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5554 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5555 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5556 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5557 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5558 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5559 time it will have been created and available. */
5561 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5562 * thread with access to newsksec */
5563 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5566 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5568 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5569 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5571 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5572 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5575 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5578 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5580 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5583 __tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5586 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5587 tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5591 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5593 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5596 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5598 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5601 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5602 struct flowi_common *flic)
5604 flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
5607 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5609 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5611 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5614 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5620 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5625 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5627 u32 sid = current_sid();
5629 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5630 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5631 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5632 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5633 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5634 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5636 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5637 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5641 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5643 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5645 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5646 current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5647 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5650 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5652 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5653 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5655 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5656 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5657 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5658 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5659 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5660 * protocols were being used */
5662 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5663 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5668 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5670 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5671 u32 sid = current_sid();
5674 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5675 sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5676 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5679 err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5680 sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5681 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5689 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5691 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
5692 const struct net_device *indev,
5698 struct common_audit_data ad;
5699 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5704 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5707 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5708 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
5709 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5710 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5713 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5716 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5718 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
5719 ad.u.net->family = family;
5720 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5723 if (peerlbl_active) {
5724 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
5725 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5727 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5733 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5734 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5735 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5739 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5740 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5741 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5743 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5749 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
5750 struct sk_buff *skb,
5751 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5753 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
5756 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5757 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
5758 struct sk_buff *skb,
5759 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5761 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
5765 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
5771 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5774 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5775 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5776 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5779 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5781 if (sk_listener(sk))
5782 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5783 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5784 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5785 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5786 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5787 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5788 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5789 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5790 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5791 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5792 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5793 * best we can do. */
5796 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5797 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5800 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5801 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
5807 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
5808 struct sk_buff *skb,
5809 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5811 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
5814 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
5815 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
5816 struct sk_buff *skb,
5817 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5819 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
5823 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5827 struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5828 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5829 struct common_audit_data ad;
5830 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5836 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5838 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5840 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5841 ad.u.net->family = family;
5842 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
5845 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5846 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5847 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5848 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5849 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5851 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5852 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5857 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
5858 const struct net_device *outdev,
5863 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
5865 struct common_audit_data ad;
5866 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
5871 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5872 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5873 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5874 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5875 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5876 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
5878 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5879 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5880 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5883 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5886 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5887 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5888 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5889 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5890 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5891 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5892 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5893 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5894 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5895 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5897 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5898 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5903 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5904 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5905 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5906 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5908 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5909 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5912 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5913 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5915 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5916 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5917 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5918 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5919 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5920 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5921 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5922 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5923 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5924 * for similar problems. */
5926 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5928 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5929 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5931 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5932 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5933 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5934 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5935 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5936 * pass the packet. */
5937 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5940 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5944 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5948 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5951 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5953 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5955 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5956 * associated socket. */
5957 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5958 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5959 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5962 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5964 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5965 ad.u.net->family = family;
5966 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5970 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5971 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5972 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5973 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5975 if (peerlbl_active) {
5979 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5981 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5983 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5984 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5986 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5988 if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
5990 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5991 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5997 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
5998 struct sk_buff *skb,
5999 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
6001 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
6004 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
6005 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
6006 struct sk_buff *skb,
6007 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
6009 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
6013 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6015 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
6018 unsigned int msg_len;
6019 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
6020 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
6021 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
6022 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
6023 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
6026 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
6027 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
6029 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
6030 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
6031 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
6032 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
6033 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
6035 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
6038 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
6040 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
6043 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
6044 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
6045 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
6046 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
6047 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
6048 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
6049 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
6050 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
6051 if (enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) &&
6052 !security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
6055 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
6056 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
6062 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
6063 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
6064 if (msg_len >= data_len)
6066 data_len -= msg_len;
6073 static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
6075 isec->sclass = sclass;
6076 isec->sid = current_sid();
6079 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
6082 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6083 struct common_audit_data ad;
6084 u32 sid = current_sid();
6086 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
6088 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6089 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
6091 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6092 sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
6095 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
6097 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6099 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6100 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
6105 /* message queue security operations */
6106 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
6108 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6109 struct common_audit_data ad;
6110 u32 sid = current_sid();
6113 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6114 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
6116 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6117 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6119 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6120 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6125 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
6127 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6128 struct common_audit_data ad;
6129 u32 sid = current_sid();
6131 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6133 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6134 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6136 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6137 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6138 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6141 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6149 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6150 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6151 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6152 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6156 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6159 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6162 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6168 err = ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6172 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6174 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6175 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6176 struct common_audit_data ad;
6177 u32 sid = current_sid();
6180 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6181 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6184 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6186 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6188 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6189 * message queue this message will be stored in
6191 rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
6192 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6197 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6198 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6200 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6201 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6202 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6205 /* Can this process send the message */
6206 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6207 sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6210 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6211 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6212 msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6213 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6218 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6219 struct task_struct *target,
6220 long type, int mode)
6222 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6223 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6224 struct common_audit_data ad;
6225 u32 sid = task_sid_subj(target);
6228 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6229 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6231 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6232 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6234 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6236 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6238 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6240 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6244 /* Shared Memory security operations */
6245 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6247 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6248 struct common_audit_data ad;
6249 u32 sid = current_sid();
6252 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6253 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6255 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6256 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6258 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6259 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6264 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6266 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6267 struct common_audit_data ad;
6268 u32 sid = current_sid();
6270 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6272 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6273 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6275 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6276 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6277 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6280 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6281 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6289 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6290 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6291 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6292 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6296 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6299 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6306 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6312 err = ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6316 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6317 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6321 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6324 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6326 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6329 /* Semaphore security operations */
6330 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6332 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6333 struct common_audit_data ad;
6334 u32 sid = current_sid();
6337 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6338 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6340 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6341 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6343 rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6344 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6349 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6351 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6352 struct common_audit_data ad;
6353 u32 sid = current_sid();
6355 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6357 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6358 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6360 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6361 sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6362 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6365 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6366 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6374 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6375 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6376 current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6377 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6381 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6392 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6395 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6400 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6406 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6410 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6411 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6416 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6420 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6423 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6429 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6431 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6436 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6439 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6441 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6445 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6448 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6451 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6452 char *name, char **value)
6454 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6460 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6463 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6464 current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6465 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6470 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6472 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6474 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6475 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6476 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6477 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6478 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6479 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6480 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6481 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6491 error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
6501 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6503 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6505 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6510 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6512 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6513 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6514 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6515 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6516 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6517 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6518 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6519 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6520 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6521 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6522 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6523 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6524 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6525 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6526 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6527 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6528 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6529 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6530 mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6531 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6537 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6538 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6539 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6543 error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
6545 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6546 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6547 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6550 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6551 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6552 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6553 audit_size = size - 1;
6556 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6561 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6562 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6567 error = security_context_to_sid_force(
6575 new = prepare_creds();
6579 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6580 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6581 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6582 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6583 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6584 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6585 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6586 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6587 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6588 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6589 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6590 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6592 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, sid,
6593 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6597 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6598 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6599 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6600 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6605 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6607 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6608 error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
6614 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6615 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6616 tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6617 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6621 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6622 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6623 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6625 error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6626 ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6627 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6646 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6648 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6651 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6653 return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
6657 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6659 return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
6663 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6668 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6670 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6672 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6673 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6674 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6678 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6680 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6682 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6684 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6685 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6689 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6691 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6693 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
6697 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6700 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&init_user_ns, inode,
6701 XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
6709 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6710 unsigned long flags)
6712 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6713 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6715 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6719 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6720 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6721 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6723 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6729 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6731 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6737 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6738 const struct cred *cred,
6739 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6742 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6745 switch (need_perm) {
6752 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6755 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6761 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6762 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6764 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6765 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6766 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6767 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6775 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6776 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6777 ksec = key->security;
6779 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6780 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6783 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6785 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6786 char *context = NULL;
6790 rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
6798 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6799 static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6801 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6802 u32 sid = current_sid();
6804 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6805 sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6810 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6811 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6813 struct common_audit_data ad;
6816 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6817 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6819 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6823 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6824 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6825 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6826 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6827 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6829 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6830 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6833 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6836 struct common_audit_data ad;
6839 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6840 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6842 err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
6848 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6849 ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
6850 ibendport.port = port_num;
6851 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6852 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6854 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6855 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6858 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6860 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6862 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6865 sec->sid = current_sid();
6871 static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6877 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6878 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6881 u32 sid = current_sid();
6885 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6886 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6887 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6891 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6892 sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6903 static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6907 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6908 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6909 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6910 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6914 /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6915 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf
6916 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6917 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6918 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6919 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6920 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6922 static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
6924 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6925 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6926 struct bpf_map *map;
6929 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6930 map = file->private_data;
6931 bpfsec = map->security;
6932 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6933 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6934 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6937 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6938 prog = file->private_data;
6939 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6940 ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6941 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6942 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6949 static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6951 u32 sid = current_sid();
6952 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6954 bpfsec = map->security;
6955 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6956 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6957 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6960 static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6962 u32 sid = current_sid();
6963 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6965 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6966 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
6967 sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6968 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6971 static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6973 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6975 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6979 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6980 map->security = bpfsec;
6985 static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6987 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6989 map->security = NULL;
6993 static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6995 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6997 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
7001 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
7002 aux->security = bpfsec;
7007 static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
7009 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
7011 aux->security = NULL;
7016 static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what)
7018 struct common_audit_data ad;
7019 u32 sid = current_sid();
7020 int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) ||
7021 (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) ||
7022 (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
7024 if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) {
7025 audit_log(audit_context(),
7026 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
7027 "lockdown_reason=invalid");
7031 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN;
7034 if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX)
7035 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
7036 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
7037 LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad);
7039 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
7040 sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
7041 LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad);
7044 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
7045 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
7046 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
7047 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
7048 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
7049 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
7050 .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
7053 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7054 static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
7056 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
7058 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
7059 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
7060 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
7061 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
7062 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
7063 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
7064 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
7065 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
7069 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
7073 static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
7075 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
7077 perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
7081 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
7082 event->security = perfsec;
7087 static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
7089 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7091 event->security = NULL;
7095 static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
7097 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7098 u32 sid = current_sid();
7100 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
7101 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
7104 static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
7106 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
7107 u32 sid = current_sid();
7109 return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, perfsec->sid,
7110 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
7115 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
7116 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
7117 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
7118 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
7120 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
7121 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
7123 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
7125 * This ordering is needed for SELinux runtime disable to work at least somewhat
7126 * safely. Breaking the ordering rules above might lead to NULL pointer derefs
7127 * when disabling SELinux at runtime.
7129 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
7130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
7132 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
7133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
7135 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
7137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
7138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
7140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
7141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
7142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
7148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
7152 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
7153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
7154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
7155 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
7156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
7157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
7159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
7160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
7162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
7164 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
7167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
7169 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
7170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7173 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7175 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7177 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7178 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7179 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7180 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7181 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7182 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7188 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7189 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7190 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7191 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7192 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7196 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7198 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7199 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7200 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7201 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7205 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7206 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7207 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7213 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7214 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7215 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7217 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7218 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7220 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7221 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7222 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7223 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7224 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_subj, selinux_task_getsecid_subj),
7225 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
7226 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7227 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7228 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7229 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7230 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7231 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7232 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7233 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7234 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7235 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7237 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7238 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7240 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7241 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7242 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7243 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7245 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7246 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7247 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7249 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7250 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7251 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7253 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7255 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7256 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7258 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7259 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7260 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7261 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7262 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7263 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7265 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7266 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7268 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7269 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7270 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7271 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7272 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7273 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7274 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7275 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7276 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7277 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7278 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7279 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7280 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7281 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7282 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7283 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7284 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7285 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7286 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7287 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7288 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7289 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7290 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7291 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7292 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7293 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7294 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7295 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7296 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7297 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7298 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7299 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7300 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7301 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7302 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7303 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7304 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7305 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7306 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7307 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7308 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7309 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7311 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7312 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7313 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7314 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7315 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7316 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7317 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7318 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7319 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7323 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7324 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7325 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7326 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7327 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7332 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7333 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7334 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7337 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7338 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7339 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7340 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7341 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7342 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7345 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7346 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7347 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7348 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7349 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7352 LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown),
7355 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7357 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7358 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7359 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7360 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_add_mnt_opt, selinux_add_mnt_opt),
7361 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7362 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7366 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7368 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7369 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7370 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7371 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7372 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7373 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7374 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7375 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7376 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7377 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7378 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7379 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7380 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7382 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7383 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7384 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7385 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7386 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7389 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7392 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7394 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7395 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7396 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7398 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7399 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7403 static __init int selinux_init(void)
7405 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7407 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7408 enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
7409 checkreqprot_set(&selinux_state, selinux_checkreqprot_boot);
7410 selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
7411 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7412 mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7414 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7415 cred_init_security();
7417 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7423 ebitmap_cache_init();
7425 hashtab_cache_init();
7427 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7429 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7430 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7432 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7433 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7435 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7436 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7438 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7440 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7445 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7447 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7450 void selinux_complete_init(void)
7452 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7454 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7455 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7456 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7459 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7460 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7461 DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7463 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7464 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7465 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7466 .init = selinux_init,
7469 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7471 static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7473 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
7475 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7476 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7479 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
7481 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7482 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7485 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
7487 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7488 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7490 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7492 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
7494 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7495 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7498 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
7500 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7501 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7504 .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
7506 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7507 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7512 static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7514 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7515 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7518 static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7520 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7521 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7524 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7525 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7526 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7529 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7533 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7536 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7538 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7540 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7544 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7546 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7547 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
7549 pr_debug("SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
7551 unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7555 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7557 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7558 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
7561 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
7563 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
7564 int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
7566 if (selinux_initialized(state)) {
7567 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
7571 if (selinux_disabled(state)) {
7572 /* Only do this once. */
7576 selinux_mark_disabled(state);
7578 pr_info("SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
7581 * Unregister netfilter hooks.
7582 * Must be done before security_delete_hooks() to avoid breaking
7585 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
7587 security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
7589 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
7592 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */