1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
5 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
7 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
8 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
9 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
10 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
12 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
13 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
14 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
15 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
16 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
17 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
18 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
19 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
20 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
24 #include <linux/init.h>
26 #include <linux/kernel.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
28 #include <linux/errno.h>
29 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
30 #include <linux/sched/task.h>
31 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
40 #include <linux/swap.h>
41 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
42 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
43 #include <linux/dcache.h>
44 #include <linux/file.h>
45 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
46 #include <linux/namei.h>
47 #include <linux/mount.h>
48 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
49 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
51 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
52 #include <linux/tty.h>
54 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
55 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
58 #include <net/netlabel.h>
59 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
60 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
61 #include <linux/atomic.h>
62 #include <linux/bitops.h>
63 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
64 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65 #include <net/netlink.h>
66 #include <linux/tcp.h>
67 #include <linux/udp.h>
68 #include <linux/dccp.h>
69 #include <linux/sctp.h>
70 #include <net/sctp/structs.h>
71 #include <linux/quota.h>
72 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
73 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
74 #include <linux/parser.h>
75 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
77 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
78 #include <linux/personality.h>
79 #include <linux/audit.h>
80 #include <linux/string.h>
81 #include <linux/mutex.h>
82 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
83 #include <linux/syslog.h>
84 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
85 #include <linux/export.h>
86 #include <linux/msg.h>
87 #include <linux/shm.h>
88 #include <linux/bpf.h>
89 #include <linux/kernfs.h>
90 #include <linux/stringhash.h> /* for hashlen_string() */
91 #include <uapi/linux/mount.h>
92 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
93 #include <linux/fanotify.h>
94 #include <linux/io_uring.h>
103 #include "netlabel.h"
107 #define SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 1
109 struct selinux_state selinux_state;
111 /* SECMARK reference count */
112 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
115 static int selinux_enforcing_boot __initdata;
117 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enforcing;
120 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
121 selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
126 #define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
129 int selinux_enabled_boot __initdata = 1;
130 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
131 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
133 unsigned long enabled;
134 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
135 selinux_enabled_boot = enabled ? 1 : 0;
138 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
141 static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
143 unsigned long checkreqprot;
145 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
147 pr_err("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is no longer supported.\n");
151 __setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
154 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
157 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
158 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
159 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
160 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
161 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
164 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
166 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
167 atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
171 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
174 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
175 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
176 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
177 * is always considered enabled.
180 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
182 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
183 netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
186 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
188 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
197 static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
199 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
201 call_blocking_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
208 * initialise the security for the init task
210 static void cred_init_security(void)
212 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
214 tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred));
215 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
219 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
221 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
223 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
225 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
229 static void __ad_net_init(struct common_audit_data *ad,
230 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
231 int ifindex, struct sock *sk, u16 family)
233 ad->type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
235 net->netif = ifindex;
237 net->family = family;
240 static void ad_net_init_from_sk(struct common_audit_data *ad,
241 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
244 __ad_net_init(ad, net, 0, sk, 0);
247 static void ad_net_init_from_iif(struct common_audit_data *ad,
248 struct lsm_network_audit *net,
249 int ifindex, u16 family)
251 __ad_net_init(ad, net, ifindex, NULL, family);
255 * get the objective security ID of a task
257 static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
262 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
267 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
270 * Try reloading inode security labels that have been marked as invalid. The
271 * @may_sleep parameter indicates when sleeping and thus reloading labels is
272 * allowed; when set to false, returns -ECHILD when the label is
273 * invalid. The @dentry parameter should be set to a dentry of the inode.
275 static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
276 struct dentry *dentry,
279 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
281 might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
283 if (selinux_initialized() &&
284 isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
289 * Try reloading the inode security label. This will fail if
290 * @opt_dentry is NULL and no dentry for this inode can be
291 * found; in that case, continue using the old label.
293 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
298 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_novalidate(struct inode *inode)
300 return selinux_inode(inode);
303 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security_rcu(struct inode *inode, bool rcu)
307 error = __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, !rcu);
309 return ERR_PTR(error);
310 return selinux_inode(inode);
314 * Get the security label of an inode.
316 static struct inode_security_struct *inode_security(struct inode *inode)
318 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, NULL, true);
319 return selinux_inode(inode);
322 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security_novalidate(struct dentry *dentry)
324 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
326 return selinux_inode(inode);
330 * Get the security label of a dentry's backing inode.
332 static struct inode_security_struct *backing_inode_security(struct dentry *dentry)
334 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
336 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
337 return selinux_inode(inode);
340 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
342 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
343 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
347 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
349 * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for
350 * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste
351 * time taking a lock doing nothing.
353 * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once.
354 * It should not be possible for this function to be called with
355 * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes
356 * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here.
358 if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) {
359 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
360 list_del_init(&isec->list);
361 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
365 struct selinux_mnt_opts {
372 static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts)
386 #define A(s, has_arg) {#s, sizeof(#s) - 1, Opt_##s, has_arg}
387 static const struct {
396 A(rootcontext, true),
401 static int match_opt_prefix(char *s, int l, char **arg)
405 for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tokens); i++) {
406 size_t len = tokens[i].len;
407 if (len > l || memcmp(s, tokens[i].name, len))
409 if (tokens[i].has_arg) {
410 if (len == l || s[len] != '=')
415 return tokens[i].opt;
420 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
422 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
423 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
424 const struct cred *cred)
426 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
429 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
430 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
434 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
435 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
439 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
440 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
441 const struct cred *cred)
443 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
445 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
446 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
450 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
451 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
455 static int selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(struct super_block *sb)
457 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
458 return !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
459 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
460 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
461 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
462 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
463 (selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
464 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
465 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
468 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
470 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
473 * IMPORTANT: Double-check logic in this function when adding a new
474 * SECURITY_FS_USE_* definition!
476 BUILD_BUG_ON(SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX != 7);
478 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
479 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
480 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
481 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
482 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
485 case SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS:
486 return selinux_is_genfs_special_handling(sb);
488 /* Never allow relabeling on context mounts */
489 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
490 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE:
496 static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb)
498 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
499 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
500 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
505 * Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
506 * error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
507 * the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
508 * the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
509 * assigned xattr values to the filesystem.
511 if (!(root_inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
512 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no xattr support\n",
513 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
517 rc = __vfs_getxattr(root, root_inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
518 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
519 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
520 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no security xattr handler\n",
521 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
524 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) getxattr errno %d\n",
525 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, -rc);
532 /* No xattr support - try to fallback to genfs if possible. */
533 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, "/",
538 pr_warn("SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) falling back to genfs\n",
539 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
540 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS;
545 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
547 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
548 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
549 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
552 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
553 rc = sb_check_xattr_support(sb);
558 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
561 * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
562 * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
563 * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
565 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
566 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
568 sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
570 /* Initialize the root inode. */
571 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
573 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
574 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
575 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
577 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
578 while (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
579 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
580 list_first_entry(&sbsec->isec_head,
581 struct inode_security_struct, list);
582 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
583 list_del_init(&isec->list);
584 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
585 inode = igrab(inode);
587 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
588 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
591 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
593 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
597 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
598 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
600 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
602 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
603 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
604 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
605 (old_sid != new_sid))
608 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
609 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
611 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
612 if (mnt_flags & flag)
618 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
619 * labeling information.
621 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
623 unsigned long kern_flags,
624 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
626 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
627 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
628 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
629 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
630 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
631 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
632 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
636 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
637 * place the results is not allowed
639 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
642 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
644 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
646 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
647 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
648 server is ready to handle calls. */
649 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
650 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
651 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
656 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
657 "before the security server is initialized\n");
662 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
663 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
664 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
665 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
667 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
668 * mount using this sb set explicit options and a second mount using
669 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
670 * will be used for both mounts)
672 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
676 root_isec = backing_inode_security_novalidate(root);
679 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
680 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
681 * than once with different security options.
684 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
685 fscontext_sid = opts->fscontext_sid;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
689 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
691 if (opts->context_sid) {
692 context_sid = opts->context_sid;
693 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
695 goto out_double_mount;
696 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
698 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
699 rootcontext_sid = opts->rootcontext_sid;
700 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
702 goto out_double_mount;
703 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
705 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
706 defcontext_sid = opts->defcontext_sid;
707 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
709 goto out_double_mount;
710 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
714 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
715 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
716 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !opts)
717 goto out_double_mount;
722 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
723 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
725 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
726 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
727 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
728 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
729 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
730 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
731 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
733 if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
734 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
735 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2"))
736 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS | SE_SBGENFS_XATTR;
738 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
740 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
743 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
745 pr_warn("%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
746 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
752 * If this is a user namespace mount and the filesystem type is not
753 * explicitly whitelisted, then no contexts are allowed on the command
754 * line and security labels must be ignored.
756 if (sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns &&
757 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tmpfs") &&
758 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "ramfs") &&
759 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "devpts") &&
760 strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "overlay")) {
761 if (context_sid || fscontext_sid || rootcontext_sid ||
766 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
767 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
768 rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(),
771 &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
778 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
780 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
784 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
788 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
789 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
790 * the superblock context if not already set.
792 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBNATIVE) {
794 * This means we are initializing a superblock that has been
795 * mounted before the SELinux was initialized and the
796 * filesystem requested native labeling. We had already
797 * returned SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS in *set_kern_flags
798 * in the original mount attempt, so now we just need to set
799 * the SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE behavior.
801 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
802 } else if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
803 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
804 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
808 if (!fscontext_sid) {
809 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
813 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
815 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
820 if (!rootcontext_sid)
821 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
823 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
824 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
827 if (rootcontext_sid) {
828 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
833 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
834 root_isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
837 if (defcontext_sid) {
838 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
839 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
841 pr_warn("SELinux: defcontext option is "
842 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
846 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
847 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
853 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
857 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
859 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
863 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
864 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id,
869 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
870 const struct super_block *newsb)
872 struct superblock_security_struct *old = selinux_superblock(oldsb);
873 struct superblock_security_struct *new = selinux_superblock(newsb);
874 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
875 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
877 if (oldflags != newflags)
879 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
881 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
883 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
885 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
886 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
887 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
888 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
893 pr_warn("SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
894 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
895 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
899 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
900 struct super_block *newsb,
901 unsigned long kern_flags,
902 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
905 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec =
906 selinux_superblock(oldsb);
907 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = selinux_superblock(newsb);
909 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
910 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
911 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
914 * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
915 * place the results is not allowed.
917 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
920 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
923 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
924 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
926 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
927 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) {
928 newsbsec->flags |= SE_SBNATIVE;
929 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
934 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
935 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
937 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
938 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
939 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
940 if ((kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context)
941 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
942 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
945 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
947 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
948 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
949 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
951 if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
952 !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
953 rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
958 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
959 newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
960 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
964 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
968 if (!set_rootcontext) {
969 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
972 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
974 if (set_rootcontext) {
975 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = backing_inode_security(oldsb->s_root);
976 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = backing_inode_security(newsb->s_root);
978 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
981 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
983 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
988 * NOTE: the caller is responsible for freeing the memory even if on error.
990 static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts)
992 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts;
996 if (token == Opt_seclabel)
997 /* eaten and completely ignored */
1002 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
1003 pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n");
1008 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
1016 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
1018 dst_sid = &opts->context_sid;
1021 if (opts->fscontext_sid)
1023 dst_sid = &opts->fscontext_sid;
1025 case Opt_rootcontext:
1026 if (opts->rootcontext_sid)
1028 dst_sid = &opts->rootcontext_sid;
1030 case Opt_defcontext:
1031 if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid)
1033 dst_sid = &opts->defcontext_sid;
1039 rc = security_context_str_to_sid(s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL);
1041 pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n",
1046 pr_warn(SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
1050 static int show_sid(struct seq_file *m, u32 sid)
1052 char *context = NULL;
1056 rc = security_sid_to_context(sid, &context, &len);
1058 bool has_comma = strchr(context, ',');
1063 seq_escape(m, context, "\"\n\\");
1071 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1073 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1076 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
1079 if (!selinux_initialized())
1082 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
1084 seq_puts(m, FSCONTEXT_STR);
1085 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->sid);
1089 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
1091 seq_puts(m, CONTEXT_STR);
1092 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
1096 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
1098 seq_puts(m, DEFCONTEXT_STR);
1099 rc = show_sid(m, sbsec->def_sid);
1103 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
1104 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
1105 struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
1107 seq_puts(m, ROOTCONTEXT_STR);
1108 rc = show_sid(m, isec->sid);
1112 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
1114 seq_puts(m, SECLABEL_STR);
1119 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1121 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1123 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1125 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1127 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1129 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1131 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1133 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1135 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1139 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1142 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1144 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ||
1145 protocol == IPPROTO_MPTCP);
1148 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1150 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1153 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1155 bool extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
1161 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1162 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1165 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1172 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1173 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1174 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1175 else if (extsockclass && protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP)
1176 return SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET;
1178 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1180 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1181 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1182 else if (extsockclass && (protocol == IPPROTO_ICMP ||
1183 protocol == IPPROTO_ICMPV6))
1184 return SECCLASS_ICMP_SOCKET;
1186 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1188 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1190 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1196 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1197 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1198 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1200 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1202 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1203 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET;
1208 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1209 case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP:
1210 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET;
1211 case NETLINK_CONNECTOR:
1212 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET;
1213 case NETLINK_NETFILTER:
1214 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET;
1215 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1216 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1217 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1218 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1219 case NETLINK_GENERIC:
1220 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET;
1221 case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT:
1222 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET;
1224 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET;
1225 case NETLINK_CRYPTO:
1226 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET;
1228 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1231 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1233 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1235 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1241 return SECCLASS_AX25_SOCKET;
1243 return SECCLASS_IPX_SOCKET;
1245 return SECCLASS_NETROM_SOCKET;
1247 return SECCLASS_ATMPVC_SOCKET;
1249 return SECCLASS_X25_SOCKET;
1251 return SECCLASS_ROSE_SOCKET;
1253 return SECCLASS_DECNET_SOCKET;
1255 return SECCLASS_ATMSVC_SOCKET;
1257 return SECCLASS_RDS_SOCKET;
1259 return SECCLASS_IRDA_SOCKET;
1261 return SECCLASS_PPPOX_SOCKET;
1263 return SECCLASS_LLC_SOCKET;
1265 return SECCLASS_CAN_SOCKET;
1267 return SECCLASS_TIPC_SOCKET;
1269 return SECCLASS_BLUETOOTH_SOCKET;
1271 return SECCLASS_IUCV_SOCKET;
1273 return SECCLASS_RXRPC_SOCKET;
1275 return SECCLASS_ISDN_SOCKET;
1277 return SECCLASS_PHONET_SOCKET;
1279 return SECCLASS_IEEE802154_SOCKET;
1281 return SECCLASS_CAIF_SOCKET;
1283 return SECCLASS_ALG_SOCKET;
1285 return SECCLASS_NFC_SOCKET;
1287 return SECCLASS_VSOCK_SOCKET;
1289 return SECCLASS_KCM_SOCKET;
1291 return SECCLASS_QIPCRTR_SOCKET;
1293 return SECCLASS_SMC_SOCKET;
1295 return SECCLASS_XDP_SOCKET;
1297 return SECCLASS_MCTP_SOCKET;
1299 #error New address family defined, please update this function.
1304 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1307 static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1313 struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
1314 char *buffer, *path;
1316 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1320 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1324 if (flags & SE_SBPROC) {
1325 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1326 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1327 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1328 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1333 rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name,
1335 if (rc == -ENOENT) {
1336 /* No match in policy, mark as unlabeled. */
1337 *sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
1341 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1345 static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry,
1346 u32 def_sid, u32 *sid)
1348 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1353 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1354 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1358 context[len] = '\0';
1359 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len);
1360 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1363 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1364 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
1369 context = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
1373 context[len] = '\0';
1374 rc = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1379 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1380 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1381 __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1388 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, sid,
1391 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1392 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1394 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1395 pr_notice_ratelimited("SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the filesystem in question.\n",
1398 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1399 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1406 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1407 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1409 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1410 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1411 u32 task_sid, sid = 0;
1413 struct dentry *dentry;
1416 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1419 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1420 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)
1423 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1424 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1426 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
1427 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1428 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1429 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1430 server is ready to handle calls. */
1431 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1432 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1433 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1434 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1438 sclass = isec->sclass;
1439 task_sid = isec->task_sid;
1441 isec->initialized = LABEL_PENDING;
1442 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1444 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1446 * In case of SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE we need to re-fetch the labels
1447 * via xattr when called from delayed_superblock_init().
1449 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1450 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1451 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1452 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1455 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1456 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1458 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1459 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1462 * Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry.
1463 * Some filesystems really want a connected one, so try
1464 * that first. We could split SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR in
1465 * two, depending upon that...
1467 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1469 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1473 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1474 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1475 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1476 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1477 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1478 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1479 * be used again by userspace.
1484 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry, sbsec->def_sid,
1490 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1493 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1494 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1497 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1498 rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid,
1499 sclass, NULL, &sid);
1503 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1504 sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1507 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1510 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
1511 (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
1512 selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
1513 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1516 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1517 * d_splice_alias. */
1518 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1520 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1521 * find a dentry. Some filesystems really want
1522 * a connected one, so try that first.
1524 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1526 dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
1529 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1530 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1531 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1532 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1533 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1534 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1535 * could be used again by userspace.
1539 rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, sclass,
1540 sbsec->flags, &sid);
1546 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS_XATTR) &&
1547 (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
1548 rc = inode_doinit_use_xattr(inode, dentry,
1561 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1562 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1564 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1567 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
1572 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1576 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
1577 if (isec->initialized == LABEL_PENDING) {
1578 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
1581 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
1585 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1586 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1592 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1593 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1596 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1597 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1600 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1601 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1604 /* All other signals. */
1605 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1612 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1613 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1616 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1617 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1618 int cap, unsigned int opts, bool initns)
1620 struct common_audit_data ad;
1621 struct av_decision avd;
1623 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1624 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1627 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1630 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1632 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY : SECCLASS_CAP_USERNS;
1635 sclass = initns ? SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2 : SECCLASS_CAP2_USERNS;
1638 pr_err("SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1643 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1644 if (!(opts & CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {
1645 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1652 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1653 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1654 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1655 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1656 struct inode *inode,
1658 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1660 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1663 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1666 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1667 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
1669 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1672 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1673 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1674 pathname if needed. */
1675 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1676 struct dentry *dentry,
1679 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1680 struct common_audit_data ad;
1682 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1683 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1684 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, dentry, true);
1685 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1688 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1689 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1690 pathname if needed. */
1691 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1692 const struct path *path,
1695 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1696 struct common_audit_data ad;
1698 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1700 __inode_security_revalidate(inode, path->dentry, true);
1701 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1704 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1705 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1709 struct common_audit_data ad;
1711 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1713 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1716 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1717 static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid);
1720 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1721 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1722 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1723 check a particular permission to the file.
1724 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1725 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1726 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1727 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1728 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1732 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
1733 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1734 struct common_audit_data ad;
1735 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1738 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
1741 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1742 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1750 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
1751 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred));
1756 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1759 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1766 * Determine the label for an inode that might be unioned.
1769 selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
1771 const struct qstr *name, u16 tclass,
1774 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
1775 selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1777 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
1778 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) {
1779 *_new_isid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1780 } else if ((sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) &&
1782 *_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
1784 const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
1785 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
1793 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1794 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1795 struct dentry *dentry,
1798 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
1799 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1800 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1802 struct common_audit_data ad;
1805 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1806 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
1810 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1811 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1813 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1814 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1819 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, &dentry->d_name, tclass,
1824 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1828 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1829 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1830 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1834 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1837 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1838 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1839 struct dentry *dentry,
1843 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1844 struct common_audit_data ad;
1845 u32 sid = current_sid();
1849 dsec = inode_security(dir);
1850 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
1852 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1853 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1856 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1857 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1872 pr_warn("SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1877 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1881 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1882 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1883 struct inode *new_dir,
1884 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1886 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1887 struct common_audit_data ad;
1888 u32 sid = current_sid();
1890 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1893 old_dsec = inode_security(old_dir);
1894 old_isec = backing_inode_security(old_dentry);
1895 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1896 new_dsec = inode_security(new_dir);
1898 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1900 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1901 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1902 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1905 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1906 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1909 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1910 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1911 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1916 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1917 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1918 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1919 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1920 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1923 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1924 new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
1925 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1926 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1928 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1936 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1937 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1938 struct super_block *sb,
1940 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1942 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1943 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1945 sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
1946 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1949 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1950 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1954 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1955 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1956 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1957 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1960 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1962 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1966 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1968 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1970 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1977 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1978 static inline u32 file_to_av(const struct file *file)
1982 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1984 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1985 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1992 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
2001 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct
2004 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
2006 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
2007 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
2009 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
2010 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
2016 /* Hook functions begin here. */
2018 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
2020 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
2021 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
2024 static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
2025 const struct cred *to)
2027 u32 mysid = current_sid();
2028 u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
2029 u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
2032 if (mysid != fromsid) {
2033 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
2034 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
2039 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid,
2040 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
2043 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
2044 const struct cred *to)
2046 return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
2047 SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
2051 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
2052 const struct cred *to,
2053 const struct file *file)
2055 u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
2056 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
2057 struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
2058 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2059 struct common_audit_data ad;
2062 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2063 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
2065 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
2066 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
2074 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
2075 rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid);
2080 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))))
2083 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
2084 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
2088 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
2091 u32 sid = current_sid();
2092 u32 csid = task_sid_obj(child);
2094 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
2095 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ,
2098 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE,
2102 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2104 return avc_has_perm(task_sid_obj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
2105 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2108 static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2109 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2111 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(target),
2112 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
2115 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2116 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2117 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2118 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2120 return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2121 PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
2125 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2126 * which was removed).
2128 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2129 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2130 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2131 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2134 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2135 int cap, unsigned int opts)
2137 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, opts, ns == &init_user_ns);
2140 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2142 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2157 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2165 case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
2166 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2169 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2175 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2177 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2179 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2182 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2185 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2186 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2187 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2188 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
2189 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2190 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2191 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2192 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2193 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2194 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
2197 /* All other syslog types */
2198 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
2199 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
2203 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2204 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2205 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2207 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2208 * processes that allocate mappings.
2210 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2212 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2214 rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2215 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true);
2219 return cap_sys_admin;
2222 /* binprm security operations */
2224 static u32 ptrace_parent_sid(void)
2227 struct task_struct *tracer;
2230 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2232 sid = task_sid_obj(tracer);
2238 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2239 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2240 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2242 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2243 int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
2247 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2248 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2250 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2251 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2254 * If the policy enables the nnp_nosuid_transition policy capability,
2255 * then we permit transitions under NNP or nosuid if the
2256 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
2257 * the old and new contexts.
2259 if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
2262 av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
2264 av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
2265 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2266 SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
2272 * We also permit NNP or nosuid transitions to bounded SIDs,
2273 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
2274 * of the permissions of the current SID.
2276 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid,
2282 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2283 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2284 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2291 static int selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2293 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2294 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2295 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2296 struct common_audit_data ad;
2297 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2300 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2301 * the script interpreter */
2303 old_tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2304 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2305 isec = inode_security(inode);
2307 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2308 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2309 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2311 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2312 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2313 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2314 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2316 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2317 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2318 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2319 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2321 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2322 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2326 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2327 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid,
2328 isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2334 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2337 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2339 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2342 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
2343 ad.u.file = bprm->file;
2345 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2346 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2347 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2351 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2352 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2353 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2357 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2358 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2362 /* Check for shared state */
2363 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2364 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2365 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2371 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2372 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2373 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
2374 u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
2376 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2378 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2384 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2385 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2387 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2388 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2389 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2390 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2391 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
2393 bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
2399 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2401 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2404 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2405 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2406 struct files_struct *files)
2408 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2409 struct tty_struct *tty;
2413 tty = get_current_tty();
2415 spin_lock(&tty->files_lock);
2416 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2417 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2419 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2420 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2421 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2422 open file may belong to another process and we are
2423 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2424 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2425 struct tty_file_private, list);
2426 file = file_priv->file;
2427 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2430 spin_unlock(&tty->files_lock);
2433 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2437 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2438 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2439 if (!n) /* none found? */
2442 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2443 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2445 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2447 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2448 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2454 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2456 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2458 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2459 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2462 new_tsec = selinux_cred(bprm->cred);
2463 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2466 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2467 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2469 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2470 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2472 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2473 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2474 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2476 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2477 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2478 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2479 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2480 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2482 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2483 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2485 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2487 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2488 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2489 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2490 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2492 task_unlock(current);
2493 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS))
2494 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2499 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2502 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2504 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2514 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2515 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2516 * flush and unblock signals.
2518 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2519 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2521 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2525 spin_lock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2526 if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
2527 flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending);
2528 flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending);
2529 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2530 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2531 recalc_sigpending();
2533 spin_unlock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock);
2536 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2537 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2538 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2539 __wake_up_parent(current, unrcu_pointer(current->real_parent));
2540 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2543 /* superblock security operations */
2545 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2547 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2549 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
2550 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
2551 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
2552 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2553 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
2554 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2559 static inline int opt_len(const char *s)
2561 bool open_quote = false;
2565 for (len = 0; (c = s[len]) != '\0'; len++) {
2567 open_quote = !open_quote;
2568 if (c == ',' && !open_quote)
2574 static int selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts)
2576 char *from = options;
2582 int len = opt_len(from);
2586 token = match_opt_prefix(from, len, &arg);
2588 if (token != Opt_error) {
2593 for (p = q = arg; p < from + len; p++) {
2598 arg = kmemdup_nul(arg, q - arg, GFP_KERNEL);
2604 rc = selinux_add_opt(token, arg, mnt_opts);
2611 if (!first) { // copy with preceding comma
2616 memmove(to, from, len);
2629 selinux_free_mnt_opts(*mnt_opts);
2635 static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2637 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2638 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2641 * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any
2642 * options specified, otherwise accept.
2644 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2645 return opts ? 1 : 0;
2648 * Superblock initialized and no options specified - reject if
2649 * superblock has any options set, otherwise accept.
2652 return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0;
2654 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2655 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2656 opts->fscontext_sid))
2659 if (opts->context_sid) {
2660 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2664 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2665 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2667 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2668 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2669 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2672 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2673 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2674 opts->defcontext_sid))
2680 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts)
2682 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts;
2683 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb);
2685 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2691 if (opts->fscontext_sid) {
2692 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
2693 opts->fscontext_sid))
2694 goto out_bad_option;
2696 if (opts->context_sid) {
2697 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
2699 goto out_bad_option;
2701 if (opts->rootcontext_sid) {
2702 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2703 root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root);
2704 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
2705 opts->rootcontext_sid))
2706 goto out_bad_option;
2708 if (opts->defcontext_sid) {
2709 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
2710 opts->defcontext_sid))
2711 goto out_bad_option;
2716 pr_warn("SELinux: unable to change security options "
2717 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2722 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb)
2724 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2725 struct common_audit_data ad;
2727 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2728 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2729 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2732 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2734 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2735 struct common_audit_data ad;
2737 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2738 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2739 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2742 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2743 const struct path *path,
2745 unsigned long flags,
2748 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2750 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2751 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2752 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2754 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2757 static int selinux_move_mount(const struct path *from_path,
2758 const struct path *to_path)
2760 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2762 return path_has_perm(cred, to_path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2765 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2767 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2769 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2770 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2773 static int selinux_fs_context_submount(struct fs_context *fc,
2774 struct super_block *reference)
2776 const struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(reference);
2777 struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts;
2780 * Ensure that fc->security remains NULL when no options are set
2781 * as expected by selinux_set_mnt_opts().
2783 if (!(sbsec->flags & (FSCONTEXT_MNT|CONTEXT_MNT|DEFCONTEXT_MNT)))
2786 opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL);
2790 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT)
2791 opts->fscontext_sid = sbsec->sid;
2792 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT)
2793 opts->context_sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2794 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT)
2795 opts->defcontext_sid = sbsec->def_sid;
2796 fc->security = opts;
2800 static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc,
2801 struct fs_context *src_fc)
2803 const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security;
2808 fc->security = kmemdup(src, sizeof(*src), GFP_KERNEL);
2809 return fc->security ? 0 : -ENOMEM;
2812 static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = {
2813 fsparam_string(CONTEXT_STR, Opt_context),
2814 fsparam_string(DEFCONTEXT_STR, Opt_defcontext),
2815 fsparam_string(FSCONTEXT_STR, Opt_fscontext),
2816 fsparam_string(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, Opt_rootcontext),
2817 fsparam_flag (SECLABEL_STR, Opt_seclabel),
2821 static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc,
2822 struct fs_parameter *param)
2824 struct fs_parse_result result;
2827 opt = fs_parse(fc, selinux_fs_parameters, param, &result);
2831 return selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security);
2834 /* inode security operations */
2836 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2838 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2839 u32 sid = current_sid();
2841 spin_lock_init(&isec->lock);
2842 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
2843 isec->inode = inode;
2844 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2845 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
2846 isec->task_sid = sid;
2847 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
2852 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2854 inode_free_security(inode);
2857 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2858 const struct qstr *name,
2859 const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
2865 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(current_cred()),
2866 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2867 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2873 *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
2875 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx,
2879 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2881 const struct cred *old,
2886 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2888 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(selinux_cred(old),
2889 d_inode(dentry->d_parent), name,
2890 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2895 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
2896 tsec->create_sid = newsid;
2900 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2901 const struct qstr *qstr,
2902 struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
2904 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2905 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2906 struct xattr *xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
2911 sbsec = selinux_superblock(dir->i_sb);
2913 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2915 rc = selinux_determine_inode_label(tsec, dir, qstr,
2916 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2921 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2922 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2923 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2924 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2926 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2929 if (!selinux_initialized() ||
2930 !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2934 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
2938 xattr->value = context;
2939 xattr->value_len = clen;
2940 xattr->name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2946 static int selinux_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
2947 const struct qstr *name,
2948 const struct inode *context_inode)
2950 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
2951 struct common_audit_data ad;
2952 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2955 if (unlikely(!selinux_initialized()))
2958 isec = selinux_inode(inode);
2961 * We only get here once per ephemeral inode. The inode has
2962 * been initialized via inode_alloc_security but is otherwise
2966 if (context_inode) {
2967 struct inode_security_struct *context_isec =
2968 selinux_inode(context_inode);
2969 if (context_isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
2970 pr_err("SELinux: context_inode is not initialized\n");
2974 isec->sclass = context_isec->sclass;
2975 isec->sid = context_isec->sid;
2977 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_ANON_INODE;
2978 rc = security_transition_sid(
2979 tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2980 isec->sclass, name, &isec->sid);
2985 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
2987 * Now that we've initialized security, check whether we're
2988 * allowed to actually create this type of anonymous inode.
2991 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_ANONINODE;
2992 ad.u.anonclass = name ? (const char *)name->name : "?";
2994 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid,
3001 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
3003 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
3006 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3008 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
3011 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3013 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
3016 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3018 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
3021 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
3023 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
3026 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
3028 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
3031 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
3033 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
3036 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
3037 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
3039 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
3042 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
3044 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3046 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
3049 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
3052 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3053 struct common_audit_data ad;
3054 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3057 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3058 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3059 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3060 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, rcu);
3062 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3064 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad);
3067 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
3068 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
3071 struct common_audit_data ad;
3072 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
3074 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
3077 return slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
3078 audited, denied, result, &ad);
3081 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
3083 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3086 bool no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
3087 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3089 struct av_decision avd;
3091 u32 audited, denied;
3093 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
3094 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
3096 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3100 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3103 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
3105 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3106 isec = inode_security_rcu(inode, no_block);
3108 return PTR_ERR(isec);
3110 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0,
3112 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
3113 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
3115 if (likely(!audited))
3118 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc);
3124 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
3126 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3127 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3128 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
3129 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
3131 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
3132 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
3133 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
3139 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
3140 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
3141 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3143 if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
3144 inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
3145 (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
3146 !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
3149 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
3152 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
3154 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
3157 static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
3159 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3160 unsigned int opts = audit ? CAP_OPT_NONE : CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT;
3162 if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts))
3164 if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, opts, true))
3169 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3170 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3171 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3173 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3174 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3175 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3176 struct common_audit_data ad;
3177 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
3180 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3181 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
3185 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3186 ordinary setattr permission. */
3187 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3190 if (!selinux_initialized())
3191 return (inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM);
3193 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3194 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3197 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode))
3200 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3201 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3203 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3204 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3205 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3209 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
3211 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3212 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
3213 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3216 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3217 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3219 const char *str = value;
3221 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3222 audit_size = size - 1;
3228 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
3229 GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3232 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3233 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3238 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value,
3244 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3245 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3249 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid,
3254 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3256 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3257 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3261 static int selinux_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3262 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name,
3263 struct posix_acl *kacl)
3265 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3268 static int selinux_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3269 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3271 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3274 static int selinux_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3275 struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name)
3277 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3280 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3281 const void *value, size_t size,
3284 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3285 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3289 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3290 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3294 if (!selinux_initialized()) {
3295 /* If we haven't even been initialized, then we can't validate
3296 * against a policy, so leave the label as invalid. It may
3297 * resolve to a valid label on the next revalidation try if
3298 * we've since initialized.
3303 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
3306 pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3307 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3308 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3312 isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
3313 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3314 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3316 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3317 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3320 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3322 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3324 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3327 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3329 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3331 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3334 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3335 struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3337 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3338 int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name);
3342 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
3343 ordinary setattr permission. */
3344 return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
3347 if (!selinux_initialized())
3350 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3351 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3355 static int selinux_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask,
3356 unsigned int obj_type)
3361 struct common_audit_data ad;
3363 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
3367 * Set permission needed based on the type of mark being set.
3368 * Performs an additional check for sb watches.
3371 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT:
3372 perm = FILE__WATCH_MOUNT;
3374 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB:
3375 perm = FILE__WATCH_SB;
3376 ret = superblock_has_perm(current_cred(), path->dentry->d_sb,
3377 FILESYSTEM__WATCH, &ad);
3381 case FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE:
3388 /* blocking watches require the file:watch_with_perm permission */
3389 if (mask & (ALL_FSNOTIFY_PERM_EVENTS))
3390 perm |= FILE__WATCH_WITH_PERM;
3392 /* watches on read-like events need the file:watch_reads permission */
3393 if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_ACCESS_PERM | FS_CLOSE_NOWRITE))
3394 perm |= FILE__WATCH_READS;
3396 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, perm);
3400 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3402 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3404 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
3405 struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3406 void **buffer, bool alloc)
3410 char *context = NULL;
3411 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3414 * If we're not initialized yet, then we can't validate contexts, so
3415 * just let vfs_getxattr fall back to using the on-disk xattr.
3417 if (!selinux_initialized() ||
3418 strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3422 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3423 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3424 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3425 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3426 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3427 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3428 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3430 isec = inode_security(inode);
3431 if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
3432 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3435 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid,
3449 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3450 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3452 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3453 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
3457 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3460 sbsec = selinux_superblock(inode->i_sb);
3461 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3464 if (!value || !size)
3467 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid,
3472 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
3473 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3475 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
3476 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
3480 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3482 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3484 if (!selinux_initialized())
3487 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3488 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3492 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3494 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(inode);
3498 static int selinux_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new)
3501 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3502 struct cred *new_creds = *new;
3504 if (new_creds == NULL) {
3505 new_creds = prepare_creds();
3510 tsec = selinux_cred(new_creds);
3511 /* Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid */
3512 selinux_inode_getsecid(d_inode(src), &sid);
3513 tsec->create_sid = sid;
3518 static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
3520 /* The copy_up hook above sets the initial context on an inode, but we
3521 * don't then want to overwrite it by blindly copying all the lower
3522 * xattrs up. Instead, we have to filter out SELinux-related xattrs.
3524 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0)
3525 return 1; /* Discard */
3527 * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported
3533 /* kernfs node operations */
3535 static int selinux_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
3536 struct kernfs_node *kn)
3538 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
3539 u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
3543 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
3550 context = kmalloc(clen, GFP_KERNEL);
3554 rc = kernfs_xattr_get(kn_dir, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen);
3560 rc = security_context_to_sid(context, clen, &parent_sid,
3566 if (tsec->create_sid) {
3567 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
3569 u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(kn->mode);
3573 q.hash_len = hashlen_string(kn_dir, kn->name);
3575 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
3576 parent_sid, secclass, &q,
3582 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
3587 rc = kernfs_xattr_set(kn, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, clen,
3594 /* file security operations */
3596 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3598 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3599 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3601 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3602 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3605 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3606 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3609 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3611 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3612 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3613 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3614 u32 sid = current_sid();
3617 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3620 isec = inode_security(inode);
3621 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3622 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3623 /* No change since file_open check. */
3626 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3629 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3631 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3632 u32 sid = current_sid();
3635 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
3641 * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd
3642 * operation to an inode.
3644 static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
3645 u32 requested, u16 cmd)
3647 struct common_audit_data ad;
3648 struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
3649 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3650 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3651 struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl;
3652 u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred);
3654 u8 driver = cmd >> 8;
3655 u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff;
3657 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP;
3660 ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
3662 if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
3663 rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
3671 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
3674 isec = inode_security(inode);
3675 rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3676 requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
3681 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3684 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3691 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3692 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3693 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3696 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3697 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3698 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3701 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3704 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3709 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3710 CAP_OPT_NONE, true);
3715 if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec())
3716 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3719 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3720 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3723 error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd);
3728 static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3732 * If we are in a 64-bit kernel running 32-bit userspace, we need to
3733 * make sure we don't compare 32-bit flags to 64-bit flags.
3736 case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
3737 cmd = FS_IOC_GETFLAGS;
3739 case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
3740 cmd = FS_IOC_SETFLAGS;
3742 case FS_IOC32_GETVERSION:
3743 cmd = FS_IOC_GETVERSION;
3745 case FS_IOC32_SETVERSION:
3746 cmd = FS_IOC_SETVERSION;
3752 return selinux_file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
3755 static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
3757 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3759 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3760 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3763 if (default_noexec &&
3764 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3765 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3767 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3768 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3769 * This has an additional check.
3771 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3772 PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
3778 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3779 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3781 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3782 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3785 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3786 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3788 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3795 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3799 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3800 u32 sid = current_sid();
3801 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3802 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3808 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file,
3809 unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
3810 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3812 struct common_audit_data ad;
3816 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
3818 rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
3824 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3825 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3828 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3829 unsigned long reqprot __always_unused,
3832 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3833 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
3835 if (default_noexec &&
3836 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3838 if (vma_is_initial_heap(vma)) {
3839 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3840 PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
3841 } else if (!vma->vm_file && (vma_is_initial_stack(vma) ||
3842 vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
3843 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
3844 PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
3845 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3847 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3848 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3849 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3850 * modified content. This typically should only
3851 * occur for text relocations.
3853 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3859 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3862 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3864 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3866 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3869 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3872 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3877 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3878 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3887 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3888 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3889 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3897 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3902 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3909 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3911 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3913 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3914 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3917 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3918 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3921 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(tsk);
3923 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3925 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3926 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3928 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3931 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3933 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3935 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3936 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3939 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3941 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3943 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3946 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file)
3948 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3949 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3951 fsec = selinux_file(file);
3952 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
3954 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3955 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3956 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3957 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3958 * struct as its SID.
3960 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3961 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3963 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3964 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3965 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3966 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3967 * new inode label or new policy.
3968 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3970 return file_path_has_perm(file->f_cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3973 /* task security operations */
3975 static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
3976 unsigned long clone_flags)
3978 u32 sid = current_sid();
3980 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
3984 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3986 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3989 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
3990 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
3997 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3999 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
4001 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = selinux_cred(old);
4002 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4007 static void selinux_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
4009 *secid = cred_sid(c);
4013 * set the security data for a kernel service
4014 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
4016 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
4018 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4019 u32 sid = current_sid();
4022 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
4023 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4024 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
4028 tsec->create_sid = 0;
4029 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
4030 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
4036 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
4037 * objective context of the specified inode
4039 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
4041 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security(inode);
4042 struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(new);
4043 u32 sid = current_sid();
4046 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4047 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
4048 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
4052 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
4056 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
4058 struct common_audit_data ad;
4060 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
4061 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
4063 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4064 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
4067 static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
4069 struct common_audit_data ad;
4070 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4071 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
4072 u32 sid = current_sid();
4077 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4078 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
4082 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
4085 fsec = selinux_file(file);
4086 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
4087 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
4092 isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
4093 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
4094 SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
4097 static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
4098 enum kernel_read_file_id id,
4104 case READING_MODULE:
4105 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(contents ? file : NULL);
4114 static int selinux_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
4119 case LOADING_MODULE:
4120 rc = selinux_kernel_module_from_file(NULL);
4129 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
4131 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4132 PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
4135 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
4137 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4138 PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
4141 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
4143 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4144 PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
4147 static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
4149 *secid = current_sid();
4152 static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
4154 *secid = task_sid_obj(p);
4157 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
4159 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4160 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4163 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
4165 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4166 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4169 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
4171 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4172 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4175 static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred,
4182 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE)
4183 av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
4184 if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
4185 av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
4186 return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
4187 SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
4190 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
4191 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
4193 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
4195 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
4196 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
4197 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
4198 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
4199 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
4200 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p),
4201 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
4206 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4208 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4209 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4212 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
4214 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4215 PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
4218 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
4220 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
4221 PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
4224 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
4225 int sig, const struct cred *cred)
4231 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
4233 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
4235 secid = current_sid();
4237 secid = cred_sid(cred);
4238 return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid_obj(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
4241 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
4242 struct inode *inode)
4244 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
4245 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(p);
4247 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4248 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
4250 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4251 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4254 static int selinux_userns_create(const struct cred *cred)
4256 u32 sid = current_sid();
4258 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_USER_NAMESPACE,
4259 USER_NAMESPACE__CREATE, NULL);
4262 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4263 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
4264 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4266 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
4267 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
4269 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4270 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
4274 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
4275 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
4278 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
4279 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
4283 *proto = ih->protocol;
4285 switch (ih->protocol) {
4287 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4289 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4293 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4297 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4298 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4303 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4305 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4309 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4313 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4314 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4318 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4319 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4321 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4325 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4329 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4330 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4334 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4335 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4336 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4338 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
4342 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4346 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4347 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4358 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4360 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
4361 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
4362 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
4365 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
4366 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
4369 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
4370 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
4374 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
4375 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
4378 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
4379 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
4380 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
4389 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
4391 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
4395 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
4396 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
4401 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
4403 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
4407 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
4408 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
4412 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
4413 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
4415 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
4419 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
4420 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
4424 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
4425 case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
4426 struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
4428 sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
4432 ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
4433 ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
4437 /* includes fragments */
4447 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
4448 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
4453 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
4455 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
4458 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
4459 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
4462 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
4464 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
4467 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
4468 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
4478 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
4479 " unable to parse packet\n");
4489 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
4491 * @family: protocol family
4492 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
4495 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
4496 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
4497 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
4498 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
4499 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
4503 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
4510 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
4513 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
4517 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid,
4518 nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
4519 if (unlikely(err)) {
4521 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
4522 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
4530 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
4531 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
4532 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
4533 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
4535 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
4536 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
4537 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then @conn_sid is simply a copy
4538 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
4541 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
4545 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
4546 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid,
4554 /* socket security operations */
4556 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4557 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4559 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4560 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4564 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
4565 secclass, NULL, socksid);
4568 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4570 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4571 struct common_audit_data ad;
4572 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4574 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4577 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, sk);
4579 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
4583 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4584 int protocol, int kern)
4586 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4594 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4595 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4599 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4602 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4603 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4605 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
4606 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4607 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4608 u16 sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4609 u32 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4613 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, sclass, &sid);
4618 isec->sclass = sclass;
4620 isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4623 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4624 sksec->sclass = sclass;
4626 /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
4627 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4628 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
4630 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4636 static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka,
4637 struct socket *sockb)
4639 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security;
4640 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security;
4642 sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid;
4643 sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid;
4648 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4649 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4650 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4652 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4654 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4655 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4659 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4663 /* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
4664 family = sk->sk_family;
4665 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4667 struct common_audit_data ad;
4668 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4669 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4670 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4672 unsigned short snum;
4676 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4677 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
4678 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4679 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4681 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4683 family_sa = address->sa_family;
4684 switch (family_sa) {
4687 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4689 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4690 if (family_sa == AF_UNSPEC) {
4691 if (family == PF_INET6) {
4692 /* Length check from inet6_bind_sk() */
4693 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4695 /* Family check from __inet6_bind() */
4698 /* see __inet_bind(), we only want to allow
4699 * AF_UNSPEC if the address is INADDR_ANY
4701 if (addr4->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
4703 family_sa = AF_INET;
4705 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4706 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4709 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4711 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4712 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4713 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4719 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4721 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4722 ad.u.net->family = family_sa;
4727 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4729 if (inet_port_requires_bind_service(sock_net(sk), snum) ||
4730 snum < low || snum > high) {
4731 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4735 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4737 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4743 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4744 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4745 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4748 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4749 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4752 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4753 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4756 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4757 node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4761 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4765 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family_sa, &sid);
4769 if (family_sa == AF_INET)
4770 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4772 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4774 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4775 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4782 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, others -EAFNOSUPPORT. */
4783 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4785 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4788 /* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
4789 * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/SCTP.rst
4791 static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
4792 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4794 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4795 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4798 err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4801 if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
4804 /* connect(AF_UNSPEC) has special handling, as it is a documented
4805 * way to disconnect the socket
4807 if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC)
4811 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
4814 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4815 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
4816 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
4817 struct common_audit_data ad;
4818 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4819 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4820 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4821 unsigned short snum;
4824 /* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
4825 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
4826 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
4827 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
4829 switch (address->sa_family) {
4831 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4832 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4834 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4837 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4838 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4840 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4843 /* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
4844 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
4846 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
4849 return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
4852 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4856 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4857 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4858 perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4860 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4861 perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4863 case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
4864 perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4868 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4870 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4871 ad.u.net->family = address->sa_family;
4872 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4880 /* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
4881 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
4882 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4885 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4887 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
4891 return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4894 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4896 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4899 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4902 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4903 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4907 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4911 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
4912 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
4913 sclass = isec->sclass;
4915 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
4917 newisec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(newsock));
4918 newisec->sclass = sclass;
4920 newisec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
4925 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4928 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4931 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4932 int size, int flags)
4934 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4937 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4939 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4942 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4944 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4947 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4951 err = sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4955 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4958 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4961 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4964 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4966 return sock_has_perm(sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4969 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4973 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4974 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4975 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4976 struct common_audit_data ad;
4977 struct lsm_network_audit net;
4980 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other);
4982 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4983 sksec_other->sclass,
4984 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4988 /* server child socket */
4989 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4990 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid,
4991 sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
4995 /* connecting socket */
4996 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
5001 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
5002 struct socket *other)
5004 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5005 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
5006 struct common_audit_data ad;
5007 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5009 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, other->sk);
5011 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
5015 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
5016 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
5017 struct common_audit_data *ad)
5023 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
5026 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5027 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
5031 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
5034 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5035 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
5038 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5042 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5043 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5044 struct common_audit_data ad;
5045 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5048 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
5049 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5053 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
5054 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5060 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
5063 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
5068 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5070 int err, peerlbl_active, secmark_active;
5071 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5072 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5073 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
5074 struct common_audit_data ad;
5075 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5078 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
5081 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5082 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5085 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5086 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
5087 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5088 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5089 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5090 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
5092 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5093 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5094 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5097 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, skb->skb_iif, family);
5098 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
5102 if (peerlbl_active) {
5105 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
5108 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
5109 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5111 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5114 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
5117 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
5122 if (secmark_active) {
5123 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
5132 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
5133 sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen,
5137 char *scontext = NULL;
5139 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
5140 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
5142 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
5143 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
5144 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
5145 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5146 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
5147 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
5149 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext,
5153 if (scontext_len > len) {
5158 if (copy_to_sockptr(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
5161 if (copy_to_sockptr(optlen, &scontext_len, sizeof(scontext_len)))
5167 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
5169 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5171 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
5173 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5175 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
5178 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
5182 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) {
5183 isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(sock));
5184 peer_secid = isec->sid;
5186 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
5189 *secid = peer_secid;
5190 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5195 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
5197 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5199 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
5203 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5204 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5205 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET;
5206 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
5207 sk->sk_security = sksec;
5212 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
5214 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5216 sk->sk_security = NULL;
5217 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
5221 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
5223 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5224 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5226 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5227 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
5228 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5230 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
5233 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(const struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
5236 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
5238 const struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5240 *secid = sksec->sid;
5244 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
5246 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
5247 inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent));
5248 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5250 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
5251 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
5252 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
5253 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
5257 * Determines peer_secid for the asoc and updates socket's peer label
5258 * if it's the first association on the socket.
5260 static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5261 struct sk_buff *skb)
5263 struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
5264 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5265 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5266 struct common_audit_data ad;
5267 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5270 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5271 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5274 if (selinux_peerlbl_enabled()) {
5275 asoc->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
5277 /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
5278 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
5280 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &asoc->peer_secid);
5284 if (asoc->peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
5285 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5287 asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5290 if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
5291 sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
5293 /* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
5294 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
5295 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
5296 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
5298 sksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5299 } else if (sksec->peer_sid != asoc->peer_secid) {
5300 /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
5301 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
5303 ad_net_init_from_sk(&ad, &net, asoc->base.sk);
5304 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid,
5305 sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION,
5313 /* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk. This
5314 * happens on an incoming connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or
5315 * sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already present).
5317 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5318 struct sk_buff *skb)
5320 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5324 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5327 err = selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5331 /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
5332 * the information in asoc. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
5333 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
5334 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
5335 * plug this into the new socket.
5337 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, asoc->peer_secid, &conn_sid);
5341 asoc->secid = conn_sid;
5343 /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
5344 return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(asoc, skb);
5347 /* Called when SCTP receives a COOKIE ACK chunk as the final
5348 * response to an association request (initited by us).
5350 static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc,
5351 struct sk_buff *skb)
5353 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security;
5355 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5358 /* Inherit secid from the parent socket - this will be picked up
5359 * by selinux_sctp_sk_clone() if the association gets peeled off
5360 * into a new socket.
5362 asoc->secid = sksec->sid;
5364 return selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb);
5367 /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
5368 * based on their @optname.
5370 static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
5371 struct sockaddr *address,
5374 int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
5376 struct sockaddr *addr;
5377 struct socket *sock;
5379 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5382 /* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
5383 sock = sk->sk_socket;
5386 while (walk_size < addrlen) {
5387 if (walk_size + sizeof(sa_family_t) > addrlen)
5391 switch (addr->sa_family) {
5394 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
5397 len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
5403 if (walk_size + len > addrlen)
5409 case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5410 case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
5411 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
5412 err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
5414 /* Connect checks */
5415 case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
5416 case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
5417 case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
5418 case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
5419 err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
5423 /* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
5424 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
5425 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked()
5426 * is called here. The situations handled are:
5427 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
5428 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
5429 * primary address is selected.
5430 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
5431 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
5432 * selinux_socket_connect().
5434 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
5448 /* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
5449 static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk,
5452 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5453 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5455 /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
5456 * the non-sctp clone version.
5458 if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
5459 return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
5461 newsksec->sid = asoc->secid;
5462 newsksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid;
5463 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5464 selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
5467 static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
5469 struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = ssk->sk_security;
5470 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5472 ssksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
5473 ssksec->sid = sksec->sid;
5475 /* replace the existing subflow label deleting the existing one
5476 * and re-recreating a new label using the updated context
5478 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssksec);
5479 return selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(ssk, ssk->sk_family);
5482 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
5483 struct request_sock *req)
5485 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5487 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
5491 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
5494 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
5497 req->secid = connsid;
5498 req->peer_secid = peersid;
5500 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
5503 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
5504 const struct request_sock *req)
5506 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
5508 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
5509 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
5510 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
5511 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
5512 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
5513 time it will have been created and available. */
5515 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
5516 * thread with access to newsksec */
5517 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
5520 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5522 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
5523 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5525 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
5526 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
5529 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
5532 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
5534 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5537 tsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
5540 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
5544 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
5546 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5549 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
5551 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
5554 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
5555 struct flowi_common *flic)
5557 flic->flowic_secid = req->secid;
5560 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
5562 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
5564 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
5567 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
5573 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
5578 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
5580 u32 sid = current_sid();
5582 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
5583 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
5584 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
5585 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
5586 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
5587 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
5589 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
5593 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
5595 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5597 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5598 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
5601 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
5603 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5604 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5606 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
5607 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
5608 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
5609 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
5610 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
5611 * protocols were being used */
5613 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
5614 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
5619 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
5621 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
5622 u32 sid = current_sid();
5625 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5626 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
5629 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
5630 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
5638 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
5640 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5641 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5647 struct common_audit_data ad;
5648 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5649 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5651 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5654 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5655 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5656 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5660 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
5663 ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
5664 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
5665 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
5668 if (peerlbl_active) {
5671 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
5672 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
5674 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
5680 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5681 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
5684 if (netlbl_enabled())
5685 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
5686 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
5687 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
5689 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
5695 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
5696 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5701 if (!netlbl_enabled())
5704 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
5705 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
5706 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
5709 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5711 if (sk_listener(sk))
5712 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
5713 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
5714 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
5715 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
5716 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
5717 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
5718 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
5719 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
5720 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
5721 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
5722 * security label in the packet itself this is the
5723 * best we can do. */
5726 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
5727 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5730 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5731 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
5738 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
5739 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5742 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5743 struct common_audit_data ad;
5744 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5747 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5750 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5752 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, state->out->ifindex, state->pf);
5753 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
5756 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
5757 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
5758 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
5759 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5761 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
5762 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5767 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
5768 struct sk_buff *skb,
5769 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5776 struct common_audit_data ad;
5777 struct lsm_network_audit net;
5779 int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
5781 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
5782 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
5783 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
5784 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
5785 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
5786 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
5788 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
5789 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
5790 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
5793 sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
5796 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
5797 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
5798 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
5799 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
5800 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
5801 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
5802 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
5803 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
5804 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
5805 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
5807 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
5808 !(sk && sk_listener(sk)))
5814 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
5815 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
5816 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
5817 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
5819 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
5820 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5823 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5824 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5826 } else if (sk_listener(sk)) {
5827 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5828 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5829 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5830 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5831 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5832 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5833 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5834 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5835 * for similar problems. */
5837 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
5839 sksec = sk->sk_security;
5840 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5842 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5843 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5844 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5845 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5846 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5847 * pass the packet. */
5848 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5851 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5855 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5859 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5862 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5864 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5866 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5867 * associated socket. */
5868 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5869 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5870 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5873 ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
5874 ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, ifindex, family);
5875 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5879 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5880 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5881 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5883 if (peerlbl_active) {
5887 if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
5889 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5890 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5891 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5893 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5895 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5896 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5897 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5902 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5904 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5907 unsigned int msg_len;
5908 unsigned int data_len = skb->len;
5909 unsigned char *data = skb->data;
5910 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
5911 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5912 u16 sclass = sksec->sclass;
5915 while (data_len >= nlmsg_total_size(0)) {
5916 nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)data;
5918 /* NOTE: the nlmsg_len field isn't reliably set by some netlink
5919 * users which means we can't reject skb's with bogus
5920 * length fields; our solution is to follow what
5921 * netlink_rcv_skb() does and simply skip processing at
5922 * messages with length fields that are clearly junk
5924 if (nlh->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_HDRLEN || nlh->nlmsg_len > data_len)
5927 rc = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
5929 rc = sock_has_perm(sk, perm);
5932 } else if (rc == -EINVAL) {
5933 /* -EINVAL is a missing msg/perm mapping */
5934 pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: unrecognized netlink"
5935 " message: protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s"
5936 " pid=%d comm=%s\n",
5937 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
5938 secclass_map[sclass - 1].name,
5939 task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
5940 if (enforcing_enabled() &&
5941 !security_get_allow_unknown())
5944 } else if (rc == -ENOENT) {
5945 /* -ENOENT is a missing socket/class mapping, ignore */
5951 /* move to the next message after applying netlink padding */
5952 msg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(nlh->nlmsg_len);
5953 if (msg_len >= data_len)
5955 data_len -= msg_len;
5962 static void ipc_init_security(struct ipc_security_struct *isec, u16 sclass)
5964 isec->sclass = sclass;
5965 isec->sid = current_sid();
5968 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5971 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5972 struct common_audit_data ad;
5973 u32 sid = current_sid();
5975 isec = selinux_ipc(ipc_perms);
5977 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5978 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5980 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5983 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5985 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5987 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
5988 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5993 /* message queue security operations */
5994 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
5996 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5997 struct common_audit_data ad;
5998 u32 sid = current_sid();
6000 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6001 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
6003 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6004 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6006 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6010 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
6012 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6013 struct common_audit_data ad;
6014 u32 sid = current_sid();
6016 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6018 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6019 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6021 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6022 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6025 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
6032 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6033 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6034 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6038 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
6041 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
6044 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
6050 return ipc_has_perm(msq, perms);
6053 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
6055 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6056 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6057 struct common_audit_data ad;
6058 u32 sid = current_sid();
6061 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6062 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6065 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
6067 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
6069 * Compute new sid based on current process and
6070 * message queue this message will be stored in
6072 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid,
6073 SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
6078 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6079 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6081 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
6082 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6085 /* Can this process send the message */
6086 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
6089 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
6090 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
6091 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
6096 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
6097 struct task_struct *target,
6098 long type, int mode)
6100 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6101 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
6102 struct common_audit_data ad;
6103 u32 sid = task_sid_obj(target);
6106 isec = selinux_ipc(msq);
6107 msec = selinux_msg_msg(msg);
6109 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6110 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
6112 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
6113 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
6115 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
6116 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
6120 /* Shared Memory security operations */
6121 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
6123 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6124 struct common_audit_data ad;
6125 u32 sid = current_sid();
6127 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6128 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SHM);
6130 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6131 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6133 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6137 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
6139 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6140 struct common_audit_data ad;
6141 u32 sid = current_sid();
6143 isec = selinux_ipc(shp);
6145 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6146 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
6148 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
6149 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6152 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
6153 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
6160 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6161 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6162 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6166 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
6169 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
6176 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
6182 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6185 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp,
6186 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
6190 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
6193 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
6195 return ipc_has_perm(shp, perms);
6198 /* Semaphore security operations */
6199 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
6201 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6202 struct common_audit_data ad;
6203 u32 sid = current_sid();
6205 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6206 ipc_init_security(isec, SECCLASS_SEM);
6208 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6209 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6211 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6215 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
6217 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
6218 struct common_audit_data ad;
6219 u32 sid = current_sid();
6221 isec = selinux_ipc(sma);
6223 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
6224 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
6226 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
6227 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
6230 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
6231 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
6239 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
6240 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
6241 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
6245 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
6256 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
6259 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
6264 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
6270 err = ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6274 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma,
6275 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
6280 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
6284 return ipc_has_perm(sma, perms);
6287 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
6293 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
6295 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
6300 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
6303 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
6305 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = selinux_ipc(ipcp);
6309 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
6312 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
6315 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
6316 const char *name, char **value)
6318 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
6324 __tsec = selinux_cred(__task_cred(p));
6327 error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
6328 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
6333 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6335 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
6337 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6338 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
6339 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6340 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
6341 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6342 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
6343 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6344 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
6354 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
6364 static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
6366 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6368 u32 mysid = current_sid(), sid = 0, ptsid;
6373 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
6375 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
6376 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6377 PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
6378 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
6379 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6380 PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
6381 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
6382 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6383 PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
6384 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
6385 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6386 PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
6387 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
6388 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6389 PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
6395 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
6396 if (size && str[0] && str[0] != '\n') {
6397 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
6401 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size,
6403 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6404 if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
6405 struct audit_buffer *ab;
6408 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
6409 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
6410 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
6411 audit_size = size - 1;
6414 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(),
6419 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
6420 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
6425 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
6432 new = prepare_creds();
6436 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
6437 performed during the actual operation (execve,
6438 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
6439 operation. See selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec for the execve
6440 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
6441 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
6442 tsec = selinux_cred(new);
6443 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
6444 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
6445 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
6446 tsec->create_sid = sid;
6447 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
6449 error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid,
6450 SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
6454 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
6455 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
6456 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
6457 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
6462 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
6463 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
6464 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
6469 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
6470 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6471 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
6475 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
6476 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
6477 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
6479 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
6480 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
6499 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
6501 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
6504 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
6506 return security_sid_to_context(secid,
6510 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
6512 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen,
6516 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
6521 static void selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode)
6523 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6525 spin_lock(&isec->lock);
6526 isec->initialized = LABEL_INVALID;
6527 spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
6531 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6533 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6535 int rc = selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
6537 /* Do not return error when suppressing label (SBLABEL_MNT not set). */
6538 return rc == -EOPNOTSUPP ? 0 : rc;
6542 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
6544 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
6546 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
6550 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
6553 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(&nop_mnt_idmap, inode,
6554 XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
6562 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
6563 unsigned long flags)
6565 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
6566 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6568 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
6572 tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
6573 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
6574 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
6576 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
6582 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
6584 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
6590 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
6591 const struct cred *cred,
6592 enum key_need_perm need_perm)
6595 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
6598 switch (need_perm) {
6605 case KEY_NEED_WRITE:
6608 case KEY_NEED_SEARCH:
6614 case KEY_NEED_SETATTR:
6615 perm = KEY__SETATTR;
6617 case KEY_NEED_UNLINK:
6618 case KEY_SYSADMIN_OVERRIDE:
6619 case KEY_AUTHTOKEN_OVERRIDE:
6620 case KEY_DEFER_PERM_CHECK:
6628 sid = cred_sid(cred);
6629 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
6630 ksec = key->security;
6632 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
6635 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
6637 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6638 char *context = NULL;
6642 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid,
6650 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
6651 static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key)
6653 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
6654 u32 sid = current_sid();
6656 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL);
6661 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
6662 static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
6664 struct common_audit_data ad;
6667 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6668 struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
6670 err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
6674 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
6675 ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
6676 ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
6677 ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
6678 return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
6679 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
6680 INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
6683 static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
6686 struct common_audit_data ad;
6689 struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
6690 struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
6692 err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num,
6698 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
6699 ibendport.dev_name = dev_name;
6700 ibendport.port = port_num;
6701 ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
6702 return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
6703 SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
6704 INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
6707 static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
6709 struct ib_security_struct *sec;
6711 sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
6714 sec->sid = current_sid();
6720 static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
6726 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
6727 static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
6730 u32 sid = current_sid();
6734 case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
6735 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
6739 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
6750 static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode)
6754 if (fmode & FMODE_READ)
6755 av |= BPF__MAP_READ;
6756 if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
6757 av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE;
6761 /* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see
6762 * if it is a bpf related object. And apply corresponding checks on the bpf
6763 * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and
6764 * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode.
6765 * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to
6766 * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in
6767 * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files.
6769 static int bpf_fd_pass(const struct file *file, u32 sid)
6771 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6772 struct bpf_prog *prog;
6773 struct bpf_map *map;
6776 if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
6777 map = file->private_data;
6778 bpfsec = map->security;
6779 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6780 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
6783 } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
6784 prog = file->private_data;
6785 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6786 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6787 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6794 static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
6796 u32 sid = current_sid();
6797 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6799 bpfsec = map->security;
6800 return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6801 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
6804 static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
6806 u32 sid = current_sid();
6807 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6809 bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
6810 return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
6811 BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
6814 static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map)
6816 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6818 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6822 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6823 map->security = bpfsec;
6828 static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map)
6830 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security;
6832 map->security = NULL;
6836 static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6838 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
6840 bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6844 bpfsec->sid = current_sid();
6845 aux->security = bpfsec;
6850 static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
6852 struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security;
6854 aux->security = NULL;
6859 struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
6860 .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
6861 .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
6862 .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6863 .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct),
6864 .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct),
6865 .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct),
6866 .lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
6869 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
6870 static int selinux_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type)
6872 u32 requested, sid = current_sid();
6874 if (type == PERF_SECURITY_OPEN)
6875 requested = PERF_EVENT__OPEN;
6876 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_CPU)
6877 requested = PERF_EVENT__CPU;
6878 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL)
6879 requested = PERF_EVENT__KERNEL;
6880 else if (type == PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT)
6881 requested = PERF_EVENT__TRACEPOINT;
6885 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT,
6889 static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event)
6891 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec;
6893 perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL);
6897 perfsec->sid = current_sid();
6898 event->security = perfsec;
6903 static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event)
6905 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6907 event->security = NULL;
6911 static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event)
6913 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6914 u32 sid = current_sid();
6916 return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
6917 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__READ, NULL);
6920 static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
6922 struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security;
6923 u32 sid = current_sid();
6925 return avc_has_perm(sid, perfsec->sid,
6926 SECCLASS_PERF_EVENT, PERF_EVENT__WRITE, NULL);
6930 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
6932 * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
6933 * @new: the target creds
6935 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
6936 * to service an io_uring operation.
6938 static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
6940 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
6941 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
6945 * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
6947 * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
6948 * kernel polling thread.
6950 static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
6952 u32 sid = current_sid();
6954 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid,
6955 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
6959 * selinux_uring_cmd - check if IORING_OP_URING_CMD is allowed
6960 * @ioucmd: the io_uring command structure
6962 * Check to see if the current domain is allowed to execute an
6963 * IORING_OP_URING_CMD against the device/file specified in @ioucmd.
6966 static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
6968 struct file *file = ioucmd->file;
6969 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
6970 struct inode_security_struct *isec = selinux_inode(inode);
6971 struct common_audit_data ad;
6973 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
6976 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), isec->sid,
6977 SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__CMD, &ad);
6979 #endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
6982 * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
6983 * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
6984 * 2. hooks that both access structures allocated by other hooks, and allocate
6985 * structures that can be later accessed by other hooks (mostly "cloning"
6987 * 3. hooks that only allocate structures that can be later accessed by other
6988 * hooks ("allocating" hooks).
6990 * Please follow block comment delimiters in the list to keep this order.
6992 static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
6993 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr),
6994 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction),
6995 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder),
6996 LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file),
6998 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
6999 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
7000 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
7001 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
7002 LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),
7003 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl),
7004 LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on),
7005 LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog),
7006 LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory),
7008 LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send),
7010 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_for_exec, selinux_bprm_creds_for_exec),
7011 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds),
7012 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds),
7014 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_mnt_opts, selinux_free_mnt_opts),
7015 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mnt_opts_compat, selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat),
7016 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount),
7017 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
7018 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
7019 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
7020 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
7021 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
7022 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
7023 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
7025 LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
7027 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security),
7028 LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, selinux_dentry_create_files_as),
7030 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security),
7031 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security),
7032 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security_anon, selinux_inode_init_security_anon),
7033 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create),
7034 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link),
7035 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink),
7036 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink),
7037 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir),
7038 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir),
7039 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod),
7040 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename),
7041 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink),
7042 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link),
7043 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission),
7044 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr),
7045 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr),
7046 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr),
7047 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr),
7048 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr),
7049 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr),
7050 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr),
7051 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_set_acl, selinux_inode_set_acl),
7052 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_get_acl, selinux_inode_get_acl),
7053 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_remove_acl, selinux_inode_remove_acl),
7054 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity),
7055 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity),
7056 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity),
7057 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid),
7058 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
7059 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
7060 LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_notify, selinux_path_notify),
7062 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernfs_init_security, selinux_kernfs_init_security),
7064 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
7065 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
7066 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
7067 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, selinux_file_ioctl_compat),
7068 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
7069 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
7070 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
7071 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock),
7072 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl),
7073 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner),
7074 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask),
7075 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive),
7077 LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
7079 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
7080 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
7081 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer),
7082 LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_getsecid, selinux_cred_getsecid),
7083 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as),
7084 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as),
7085 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request),
7086 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, selinux_kernel_load_data),
7087 LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, selinux_kernel_read_file),
7088 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
7089 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
7090 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
7091 LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
7092 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
7093 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
7094 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
7095 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),
7096 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit),
7097 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit),
7098 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler),
7099 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler),
7100 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
7101 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
7102 LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
7103 LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, selinux_userns_create),
7105 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
7106 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
7108 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate),
7109 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl),
7110 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd),
7111 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv),
7113 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate),
7114 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl),
7115 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat),
7117 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate),
7118 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl),
7119 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop),
7121 LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
7123 LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
7124 LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
7126 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel),
7127 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid),
7128 LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx),
7129 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_invalidate_secctx, selinux_inode_invalidate_secctx),
7130 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx),
7131 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx),
7133 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect),
7134 LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send),
7136 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create),
7137 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create),
7138 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_socketpair, selinux_socket_socketpair),
7139 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind),
7140 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect),
7141 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen),
7142 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept),
7143 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg),
7144 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg),
7145 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname),
7146 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername),
7147 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt),
7148 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt),
7149 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown),
7150 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
7151 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream,
7152 selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream),
7153 LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
7154 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security),
7155 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
7156 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
7157 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
7158 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
7159 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
7160 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
7161 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established),
7162 LSM_HOOK_INIT(mptcp_add_subflow, selinux_mptcp_add_subflow),
7163 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
7164 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
7165 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
7166 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet),
7167 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc),
7168 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec),
7169 LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow),
7170 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security),
7171 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create),
7172 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
7173 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
7174 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
7175 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7176 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
7177 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
7178 selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
7179 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
7181 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7182 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free),
7183 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete),
7184 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free),
7185 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete),
7186 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup),
7187 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
7188 selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match),
7189 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session),
7193 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free),
7194 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission),
7195 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity),
7196 #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS
7197 LSM_HOOK_INIT(watch_key, selinux_watch_key),
7202 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known),
7203 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match),
7204 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free),
7207 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7208 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf),
7209 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map),
7210 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog),
7211 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free),
7212 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free),
7215 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7216 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open),
7217 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free),
7218 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read),
7219 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
7222 #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
7223 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
7224 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
7225 LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_cmd, selinux_uring_cmd),
7229 * PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
7231 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_submount, selinux_fs_context_submount),
7232 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_dup, selinux_fs_context_dup),
7233 LSM_HOOK_INIT(fs_context_parse_param, selinux_fs_context_parse_param),
7234 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_eat_lsm_opts, selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts),
7235 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7236 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
7240 * PUT "ALLOCATING" HOOKS HERE
7242 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security),
7243 LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security,
7244 selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security),
7245 LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security),
7246 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security),
7247 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security),
7248 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security),
7249 LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx),
7250 LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx),
7251 LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security),
7252 LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security),
7253 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
7254 LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
7256 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
7257 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
7258 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc),
7259 LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
7260 selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire),
7263 LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc),
7266 LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init),
7268 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
7269 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc),
7270 LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc),
7272 #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
7273 LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc),
7277 static __init int selinux_init(void)
7279 pr_info("SELinux: Initializing.\n");
7281 memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
7282 enforcing_set(selinux_enforcing_boot);
7284 mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
7285 mutex_init(&selinux_state.policy_mutex);
7287 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
7288 cred_init_security();
7290 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
7291 if (!default_noexec)
7292 pr_notice("SELinux: virtual memory is executable by default\n");
7298 ebitmap_cache_init();
7300 hashtab_cache_init();
7302 security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
7304 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7305 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
7307 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
7308 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
7310 if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
7311 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
7313 pr_debug("SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
7315 fs_validate_description("selinux", selinux_fs_parameters);
7320 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
7322 selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, NULL, 0, NULL);
7325 void selinux_complete_init(void)
7327 pr_debug("SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
7329 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
7330 pr_debug("SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
7331 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
7334 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
7335 all processes and objects when they are created. */
7336 DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
7338 .flags = LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR | LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE,
7339 .enabled = &selinux_enabled_boot,
7340 .blobs = &selinux_blob_sizes,
7341 .init = selinux_init,
7344 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
7345 static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
7347 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7349 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7350 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7353 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7355 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7356 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7359 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7361 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7362 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7364 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
7366 .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
7368 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
7369 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
7372 .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
7374 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
7375 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7378 .hook = selinux_ip_output,
7380 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
7381 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
7386 static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
7388 return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7389 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7392 static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
7394 nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
7395 ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
7398 static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
7399 .init = selinux_nf_register,
7400 .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
7403 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
7407 if (!selinux_enabled_boot)
7410 pr_debug("SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
7412 err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
7414 panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
7418 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
7419 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */