2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
79 #include <linux/syslog.h>
90 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
92 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
93 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
95 /* SECMARK reference count */
96 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
98 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
99 int selinux_enforcing;
101 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
103 unsigned long enforcing;
104 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
105 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
108 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
111 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
112 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
114 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
116 unsigned long enabled;
117 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
118 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
121 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
123 int selinux_enabled = 1;
126 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
129 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
132 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
133 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
134 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
135 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
138 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
140 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
144 * initialise the security for the init task
146 static void cred_init_security(void)
148 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
149 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
151 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
153 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
155 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
156 cred->security = tsec;
160 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
162 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
164 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
166 tsec = cred->security;
171 * get the objective security ID of a task
173 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
178 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
184 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
186 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
188 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
193 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
195 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
197 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
198 u32 sid = current_sid();
200 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
204 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
205 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
207 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
208 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
209 isec->task_sid = sid;
210 inode->i_security = isec;
215 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
217 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
218 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
220 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
221 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
222 list_del_init(&isec->list);
223 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
225 inode->i_security = NULL;
226 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
229 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
231 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
232 u32 sid = current_sid();
234 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
239 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
240 file->f_security = fsec;
245 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
248 file->f_security = NULL;
252 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
254 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
256 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
260 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
261 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
262 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
264 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
265 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
266 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
267 sb->s_security = sbsec;
272 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
274 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
275 sb->s_security = NULL;
279 /* The security server must be initialized before
280 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
281 extern int ss_initialized;
283 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
285 static const char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
287 "uses transition SIDs",
289 "uses genfs_contexts",
290 "not configured for labeling",
291 "uses mountpoint labeling",
294 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
296 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
298 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
307 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
310 static const match_table_t tokens = {
311 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
312 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
313 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
314 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
315 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
319 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
321 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
322 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
323 const struct cred *cred)
325 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
328 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
329 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
333 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
334 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
338 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
339 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
340 const struct cred *cred)
342 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
344 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
345 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
349 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
350 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
354 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
356 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
357 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
358 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
361 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
362 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
363 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
364 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
365 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
366 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
367 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
368 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
369 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
373 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
374 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
375 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
376 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
377 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
378 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
380 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
381 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
382 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
387 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
389 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
390 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
391 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
393 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
394 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
395 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
397 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
398 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
399 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
400 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
401 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
403 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
404 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
405 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBLABELSUPP;
407 /* Initialize the root inode. */
408 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
410 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
411 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
412 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
414 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
416 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
417 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
418 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
419 struct inode_security_struct, list);
420 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
421 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
422 inode = igrab(inode);
424 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
428 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
429 list_del_init(&isec->list);
432 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
438 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
439 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
440 * mount options, or whatever.
442 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
443 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
446 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
447 char *context = NULL;
451 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
453 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
459 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
460 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
461 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
463 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
466 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
467 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
468 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
470 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
471 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
476 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
477 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
483 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
484 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
487 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
488 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
490 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
491 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
494 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
495 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
497 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
498 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
501 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
502 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
504 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
505 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
506 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
508 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
511 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
512 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
514 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
515 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
516 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
519 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
524 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
528 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
529 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
531 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
533 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
534 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
535 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
536 (old_sid != new_sid))
539 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
540 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
542 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
543 if (mnt_flags & flag)
549 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
550 * labeling information.
552 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
553 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
555 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
557 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
558 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
559 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
560 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
561 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
562 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
563 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
564 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
565 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
567 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
569 if (!ss_initialized) {
571 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
572 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
573 server is ready to handle calls. */
577 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
578 "before the security server is initialized\n");
583 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
584 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
585 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
586 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
588 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
589 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
590 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
591 * will be used for both mounts)
593 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
598 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
599 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
600 * than once with different security options.
602 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
605 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
607 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
608 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
610 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
611 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
612 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
619 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
621 goto out_double_mount;
623 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
628 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
630 goto out_double_mount;
632 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
634 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
635 rootcontext_sid = sid;
637 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
639 goto out_double_mount;
641 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
645 defcontext_sid = sid;
647 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
649 goto out_double_mount;
651 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
660 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
661 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
662 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
663 goto out_double_mount;
668 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
669 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
671 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
672 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
674 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
675 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
679 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
681 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
685 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
689 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
690 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
691 * the superblock context if not already set.
694 if (!fscontext_sid) {
695 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
699 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
701 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
706 if (!rootcontext_sid)
707 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
710 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
713 if (rootcontext_sid) {
714 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
719 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
720 root_isec->initialized = 1;
723 if (defcontext_sid) {
724 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
726 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
727 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
731 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
732 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
738 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
741 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
743 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
747 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
748 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
752 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
753 struct super_block *newsb)
755 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
756 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
758 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
759 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
760 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
763 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
764 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
769 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
770 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
772 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
773 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
776 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
778 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
780 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
781 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
782 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
785 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
789 if (!set_rootcontext) {
790 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
791 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
794 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
796 if (set_rootcontext) {
797 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
798 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
799 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
800 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
802 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
805 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
806 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
809 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
810 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
813 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
814 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
815 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
817 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
819 /* Standard string-based options. */
820 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
822 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
827 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
831 if (context || defcontext) {
833 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
836 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
846 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
849 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
856 case Opt_rootcontext:
859 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
862 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
870 if (context || defcontext) {
872 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
875 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
881 case Opt_labelsupport:
885 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
892 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
896 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
897 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
898 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
903 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
904 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
907 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
908 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
911 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
912 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
915 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
916 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
919 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
930 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
932 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
935 char *options = data;
936 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
938 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
943 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
945 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
950 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
953 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
957 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
958 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
963 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
966 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
967 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
971 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
973 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
976 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
978 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
979 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
982 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
986 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
991 /* we need a comma before each option */
996 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1002 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1004 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1007 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1009 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1015 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1017 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1022 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1024 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1026 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1028 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1030 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1034 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1036 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1038 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1042 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1045 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1047 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1050 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1052 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1055 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1061 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1062 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1064 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1071 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1072 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1074 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1076 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1077 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1079 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1081 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1089 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1090 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1102 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1104 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1105 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1106 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1107 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1109 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1112 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1114 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1116 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1122 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1123 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1128 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1130 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1135 end = buffer+buflen;
1140 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1141 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1145 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1150 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1151 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1155 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1163 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1164 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1166 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1167 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1169 struct dentry *dentry;
1170 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1171 char *context = NULL;
1175 if (isec->initialized)
1178 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1179 if (isec->initialized)
1182 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1183 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1184 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1185 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1186 server is ready to handle calls. */
1187 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1188 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1189 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1190 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1194 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1195 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1196 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1197 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1201 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1202 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1204 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1205 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1207 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1208 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1212 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1213 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1214 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1215 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1216 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1217 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1218 * be used again by userspace.
1223 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1224 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1230 context[len] = '\0';
1231 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1233 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1236 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1237 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1244 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1250 context[len] = '\0';
1251 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1257 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1258 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1259 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1260 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1264 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1265 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1268 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1272 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1273 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1275 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1276 if (printk_ratelimit())
1277 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1278 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1279 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1281 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1282 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1283 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1286 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1294 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1295 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1297 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1298 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1299 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1301 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1302 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1303 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1311 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1312 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1315 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1316 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1318 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1319 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1321 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1322 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1333 isec->initialized = 1;
1336 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1338 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1339 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1343 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1344 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1350 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1351 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1354 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1355 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1358 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1359 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1362 /* All other signals. */
1363 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1371 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1372 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1374 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1375 const struct cred *target,
1378 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1380 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1384 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1385 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1386 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1387 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1389 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1390 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1393 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1397 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1398 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1400 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1404 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1405 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1406 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1407 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1409 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1414 sid = current_sid();
1415 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1416 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1419 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1420 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1423 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1424 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1425 const struct cred *cred,
1428 struct common_audit_data ad;
1429 struct av_decision avd;
1431 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1432 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1435 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1439 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1441 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1444 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1448 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1452 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1453 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1454 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1458 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1459 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1464 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1465 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1468 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1469 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1470 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1471 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1472 struct inode *inode,
1474 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1476 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1477 struct common_audit_data ad;
1480 validate_creds(cred);
1482 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1485 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1486 isec = inode->i_security;
1490 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1491 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1494 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1497 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1498 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1499 pathname if needed. */
1500 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1501 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1502 struct dentry *dentry,
1505 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1506 struct common_audit_data ad;
1508 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1509 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1510 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1511 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1514 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1515 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1516 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1517 check a particular permission to the file.
1518 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1519 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1520 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1521 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1522 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1526 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1527 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1528 struct common_audit_data ad;
1529 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1532 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1533 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1535 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1536 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1544 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1547 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1553 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1554 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1555 struct dentry *dentry,
1558 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1559 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1560 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1562 struct common_audit_data ad;
1565 dsec = dir->i_security;
1566 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1569 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1571 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1572 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1574 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1575 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1580 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1581 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1586 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1590 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1591 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1592 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1595 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1596 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1597 struct task_struct *ctx)
1599 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1601 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1605 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1608 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1609 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1610 struct dentry *dentry,
1614 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1615 struct common_audit_data ad;
1616 u32 sid = current_sid();
1620 dsec = dir->i_security;
1621 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1623 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1624 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1627 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1628 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1643 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1648 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1652 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1653 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1654 struct inode *new_dir,
1655 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1657 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1658 struct common_audit_data ad;
1659 u32 sid = current_sid();
1661 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1664 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1665 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1666 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1667 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1669 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1671 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1672 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1673 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1676 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1677 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1680 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1681 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1682 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1687 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1688 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1689 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1690 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1691 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1694 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1695 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1696 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1697 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1699 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1707 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1708 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1709 struct super_block *sb,
1711 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1713 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1714 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1716 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1717 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1720 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1721 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1725 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1726 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1727 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1728 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1731 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1733 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1737 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1739 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1741 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1748 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1749 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1753 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1755 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1756 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1763 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1772 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1775 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1777 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1779 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1785 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1787 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1792 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1796 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1797 u32 sid = current_sid();
1798 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1799 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1802 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1805 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1809 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1813 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1816 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1817 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1821 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1825 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1828 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1829 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1830 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1831 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1835 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1836 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1840 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1844 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1845 * which was removed).
1847 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1848 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1849 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1850 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
1853 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1858 rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1862 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1865 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1868 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1871 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1876 end = buffer+buflen;
1882 const char *name = table->procname;
1883 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1884 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1888 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1891 table = table->parent;
1897 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1899 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1901 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1906 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1913 sid = current_sid();
1915 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1916 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1918 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1919 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1922 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1923 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1925 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1926 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1934 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1935 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1941 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1943 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1955 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
1960 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
1963 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1969 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1971 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1973 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1976 static int selinux_syslog(int type, bool from_file)
1980 rc = cap_syslog(type, from_file);
1985 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
1986 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1987 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1989 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
1990 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
1991 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1992 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
1993 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1995 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
1996 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
1997 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
1998 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1999 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2001 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2008 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2009 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2010 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2012 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2013 * processes that allocate mappings.
2015 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2017 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2019 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2020 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2024 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2027 /* binprm security operations */
2029 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2031 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2032 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2033 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2034 struct common_audit_data ad;
2035 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2038 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2042 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2043 * the script interpreter */
2044 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2047 old_tsec = current_security();
2048 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2049 isec = inode->i_security;
2051 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2052 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2053 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2055 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2056 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2057 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2058 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2060 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2061 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2062 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2063 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2065 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2066 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2067 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2072 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2073 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2075 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2076 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2078 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2079 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2080 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2084 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2085 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2086 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2090 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2091 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2095 /* Check for shared state */
2096 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2097 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2098 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2104 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2105 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2107 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2108 struct task_struct *tracer;
2109 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2113 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2114 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2115 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2121 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2123 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2129 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2130 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2136 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2138 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2146 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2147 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2148 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2149 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2151 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2154 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2157 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2158 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2160 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2161 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2162 struct files_struct *files)
2164 struct common_audit_data ad;
2165 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2166 struct tty_struct *tty;
2167 struct fdtable *fdt;
2171 tty = get_current_tty();
2174 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2175 struct inode *inode;
2177 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2178 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2179 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2180 file may belong to another process and we are only
2181 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2182 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2183 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2184 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2185 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2192 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2196 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2198 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2200 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2202 unsigned long set, i;
2207 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2208 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2210 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2213 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2214 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2219 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2221 file_to_av(file))) {
2223 fd = get_unused_fd();
2233 devnull = dentry_open(
2235 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2237 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2244 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2249 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2252 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2256 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2258 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2260 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2261 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2264 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2265 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2268 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2269 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2271 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2272 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2274 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2275 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2276 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2278 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2279 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2280 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2281 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2282 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2284 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2285 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2287 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2289 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2290 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2291 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2292 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2294 task_unlock(current);
2295 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2300 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2303 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2305 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2306 struct itimerval itimer;
2316 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2317 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2318 * flush and unblock signals.
2320 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2321 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2323 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2325 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2326 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2327 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2328 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2329 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2330 __flush_signals(current);
2331 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2332 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2334 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2337 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2338 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2339 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2340 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2341 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2344 /* superblock security operations */
2346 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2348 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2351 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2353 superblock_free_security(sb);
2356 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2361 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2364 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2366 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2367 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2368 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2369 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2370 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2373 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2380 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2384 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2387 int current_size = 0;
2395 while (current_size < len) {
2405 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2407 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2408 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2409 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2415 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2423 in_save = in_end = orig;
2427 open_quote = !open_quote;
2428 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2430 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2432 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2433 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2435 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2437 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2439 } while (*in_end++);
2441 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2442 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2447 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2449 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2450 struct common_audit_data ad;
2453 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2457 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2458 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2461 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2462 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2463 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2466 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2468 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2469 struct common_audit_data ad;
2471 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2472 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2473 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2476 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2479 unsigned long flags,
2482 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2484 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2485 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2486 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2488 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2492 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2494 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2496 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2497 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2500 /* inode security operations */
2502 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2504 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2507 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2509 inode_free_security(inode);
2512 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2513 char **name, void **value,
2516 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2517 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2518 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2519 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2521 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2523 dsec = dir->i_security;
2524 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2527 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2529 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2530 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2531 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2534 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2535 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2538 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2543 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2544 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2545 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2546 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2548 isec->initialized = 1;
2551 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2555 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2562 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2574 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2576 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2579 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2581 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2584 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2586 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2589 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2591 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2594 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2596 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2599 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2601 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2604 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2606 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2609 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2610 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2612 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2615 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2617 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2619 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2622 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2624 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2626 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2629 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2631 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2632 struct common_audit_data ad;
2636 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2637 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2639 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2643 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2644 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
2647 ad.selinux_audit_data.auditdeny |= FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS;
2649 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2651 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, perms, &ad);
2654 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2656 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2657 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2659 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2660 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2661 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2667 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2668 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2669 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2671 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2674 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2676 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2678 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2681 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2683 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2685 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2686 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2687 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2688 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2690 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2691 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2692 Restrict to administrator. */
2697 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2698 ordinary setattr permission. */
2699 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2702 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2703 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2705 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2706 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2707 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2708 struct common_audit_data ad;
2709 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2712 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2713 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2715 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2716 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2719 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2722 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2725 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2726 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2730 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2731 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2732 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2734 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2739 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2740 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2744 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2749 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2751 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2752 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2756 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2757 const void *value, size_t size,
2760 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2761 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2765 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2766 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2770 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2772 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2773 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2774 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2782 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2784 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2786 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2789 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2791 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2793 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2796 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2798 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2799 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2801 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2802 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2807 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2809 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2811 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2815 char *context = NULL;
2816 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2818 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2822 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2823 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2824 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2825 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2826 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2827 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2828 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2830 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2831 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2833 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2836 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2849 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2850 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2852 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2856 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2859 if (!value || !size)
2862 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2867 isec->initialized = 1;
2871 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2873 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2874 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2875 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2879 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2881 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2885 /* file security operations */
2887 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2889 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2890 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2892 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2893 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2896 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
2897 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2900 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2902 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2903 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2904 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2905 u32 sid = current_sid();
2908 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2911 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
2912 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2913 /* No change since dentry_open check. */
2916 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2919 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2921 return file_alloc_security(file);
2924 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2926 file_free_security(file);
2929 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2932 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2935 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2937 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2942 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2945 static int default_noexec;
2947 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2949 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2952 if (default_noexec &&
2953 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2955 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2956 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2957 * This has an additional check.
2959 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2965 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2966 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2968 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2969 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2972 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2973 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2975 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2982 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2983 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2984 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2987 u32 sid = current_sid();
2990 * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before
2991 * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt
2992 * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even
2993 * if DAC would have also denied the operation.
2995 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
2996 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
2997 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3002 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3003 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
3004 if (rc || addr_only)
3007 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3010 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3011 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3014 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3015 unsigned long reqprot,
3018 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3020 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3023 if (default_noexec &&
3024 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3026 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3027 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3028 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3029 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3030 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3031 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3032 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3033 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3035 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3036 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3037 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3038 * modified content. This typically should only
3039 * occur for text relocations.
3041 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3047 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3050 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3052 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3054 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3057 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3060 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3065 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3070 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3071 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3080 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3081 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3086 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3091 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3095 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3102 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3104 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3106 fsec = file->f_security;
3107 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3112 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3113 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3116 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3118 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3120 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3121 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3123 fsec = file->f_security;
3126 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3128 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3130 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3131 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3134 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3136 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3138 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3141 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3143 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3144 struct inode *inode;
3145 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3147 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3148 fsec = file->f_security;
3149 isec = inode->i_security;
3151 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3152 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3153 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3154 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3155 * struct as its SID.
3157 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3158 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3160 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3161 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3162 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3163 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3164 * new inode label or new policy.
3165 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3167 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3170 /* task security operations */
3172 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3174 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3178 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3180 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3182 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3184 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3188 cred->security = tsec;
3193 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3195 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3197 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3199 BUG_ON((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3200 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3205 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3207 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3210 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3211 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3213 old_tsec = old->security;
3215 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3219 new->security = tsec;
3224 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3226 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3228 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3229 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3235 * set the security data for a kernel service
3236 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3238 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3240 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3241 u32 sid = current_sid();
3244 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3245 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3246 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3250 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3251 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3252 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3258 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3259 * objective context of the specified inode
3261 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3263 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3264 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3265 u32 sid = current_sid();
3268 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3269 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3270 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3274 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3278 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3281 struct common_audit_data ad;
3283 sid = task_sid(current);
3285 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, KMOD);
3286 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3288 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3289 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3292 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3294 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3297 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3299 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3302 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3304 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3307 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3309 *secid = task_sid(p);
3312 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3316 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3320 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3323 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3327 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3331 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3334 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3336 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3339 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3340 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3342 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3344 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3345 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3346 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3347 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3348 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3349 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3354 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3358 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3362 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3365 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3367 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3370 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3372 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3375 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3382 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3384 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3386 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3387 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3389 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3393 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3395 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3398 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3399 struct inode *inode)
3401 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3402 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3405 isec->initialized = 1;
3408 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3409 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3410 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3412 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3413 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3415 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3416 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3420 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3421 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3424 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3425 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3429 *proto = ih->protocol;
3431 switch (ih->protocol) {
3433 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3435 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3439 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3443 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3444 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3449 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3451 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3455 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3459 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3460 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3464 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3465 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3467 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3471 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3475 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3476 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3487 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3489 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3490 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3491 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3494 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3495 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3497 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3498 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3502 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3503 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3506 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3507 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3508 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3517 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3519 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3523 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3524 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3529 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3531 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3535 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3536 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3540 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3541 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3543 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3547 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3548 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3552 /* includes fragments */
3562 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3563 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3568 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3570 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3573 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3574 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3577 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3579 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3582 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3583 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3593 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3594 " unable to parse packet\n");
3604 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3606 * @family: protocol family
3607 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3610 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3611 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3612 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3613 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3614 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3618 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3625 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3626 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3628 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3629 if (unlikely(err)) {
3631 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3632 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3639 /* socket security operations */
3641 static u32 socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec)
3643 return tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3646 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3648 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3649 struct common_audit_data ad;
3650 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3652 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3655 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3658 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3661 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3662 int protocol, int kern)
3664 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3671 newsid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
3672 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3673 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3676 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3677 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3679 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3680 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3681 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3685 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3687 isec->sid = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec);
3689 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3690 isec->initialized = 1;
3693 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3694 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3695 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3696 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
3702 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3703 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3704 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3706 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3708 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3712 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
3717 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3718 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3719 * check the first address now.
3721 family = sk->sk_family;
3722 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3724 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3725 struct common_audit_data ad;
3726 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3727 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3728 unsigned short snum;
3731 if (family == PF_INET) {
3732 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3733 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3734 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3736 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3737 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3738 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3744 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3746 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3747 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3751 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3752 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3753 ad.u.net.family = family;
3754 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3756 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3762 switch (sksec->sclass) {
3763 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3764 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3767 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3768 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3771 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3772 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3776 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3780 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3784 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3785 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3786 ad.u.net.family = family;
3788 if (family == PF_INET)
3789 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3791 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3793 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
3794 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3802 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3804 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3805 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3808 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3813 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3815 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3816 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3817 struct common_audit_data ad;
3818 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3819 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3820 unsigned short snum;
3823 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3824 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3825 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3827 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3829 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3830 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3832 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3835 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3839 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3840 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3842 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3843 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3844 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3845 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3850 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3856 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3858 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3861 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3864 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3865 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3867 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3871 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3873 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3874 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3875 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3876 newisec->initialized = 1;
3881 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3884 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
3887 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3888 int size, int flags)
3890 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
3893 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3895 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3898 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3900 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3903 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3907 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3911 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3914 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3917 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3920 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3922 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3925 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3926 struct socket *other,
3929 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk->sk_security;
3930 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk->sk_security;
3931 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
3932 struct common_audit_data ad;
3935 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3936 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3938 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
3939 sksec_other->sclass,
3940 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3944 /* server child socket */
3945 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
3946 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
3951 /* connecting socket */
3952 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
3957 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3958 struct socket *other)
3960 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3961 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
3962 struct common_audit_data ad;
3964 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3965 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3967 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
3971 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3973 struct common_audit_data *ad)
3979 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
3982 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
3983 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
3987 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
3990 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
3991 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
3994 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3998 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4000 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4001 struct common_audit_data ad;
4004 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4005 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4006 ad.u.net.family = family;
4007 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4011 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4012 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4018 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4019 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4022 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4023 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4025 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4027 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4030 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4036 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4039 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4040 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4041 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4042 struct common_audit_data ad;
4047 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4050 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4051 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4054 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4055 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4056 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4057 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4058 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4059 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4061 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4062 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4063 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4066 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4067 ad.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
4068 ad.u.net.family = family;
4069 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4073 if (peerlbl_active) {
4076 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4079 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->skb_iif, addrp, family,
4082 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4085 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4088 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4091 if (secmark_active) {
4092 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4101 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4102 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4107 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4108 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4110 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4111 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4112 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4113 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4114 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4116 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4120 if (scontext_len > len) {
4125 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4129 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4135 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4137 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4140 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4142 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4145 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4149 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4150 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4152 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4155 *secid = peer_secid;
4156 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4161 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4163 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4165 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4169 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4170 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4171 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4172 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4177 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4179 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4181 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4182 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4186 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4188 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4189 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4191 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4192 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4193 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4195 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4198 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4201 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4203 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4205 *secid = sksec->sid;
4209 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4211 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4212 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4214 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4215 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4216 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4217 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4220 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4221 struct request_sock *req)
4223 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4225 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4229 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4230 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4233 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4236 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4237 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4238 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4240 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4243 req->secid = newsid;
4244 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4247 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4250 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4251 const struct request_sock *req)
4253 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4255 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4256 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4257 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4258 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4259 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4260 time it will have been created and available. */
4262 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4263 * thread with access to newsksec */
4264 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4267 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4269 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4270 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4272 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4273 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4276 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4279 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4282 fl->secid = req->secid;
4285 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4287 u32 sid = current_sid();
4289 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4290 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4291 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4292 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4293 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4294 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4296 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4300 static void selinux_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
4302 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4304 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4305 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4306 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4307 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4308 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4309 * protocols were being used */
4311 /* see the comments in selinux_tun_dev_create() about why we don't use
4312 * the sockcreate SID here */
4314 sksec->sid = current_sid();
4315 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4318 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
4320 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4321 u32 sid = current_sid();
4324 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4325 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4328 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4329 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4338 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4342 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4343 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4345 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4349 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4351 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4353 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4354 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4355 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4356 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4357 nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4358 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4368 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4373 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4375 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4381 struct common_audit_data ad;
4386 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4389 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4390 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4391 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4392 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4395 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4398 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4399 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4400 ad.u.net.family = family;
4401 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4404 if (peerlbl_active) {
4405 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4408 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4414 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4415 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4419 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4420 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4421 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4423 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4429 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4430 struct sk_buff *skb,
4431 const struct net_device *in,
4432 const struct net_device *out,
4433 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4435 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4438 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4439 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4440 struct sk_buff *skb,
4441 const struct net_device *in,
4442 const struct net_device *out,
4443 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4445 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4449 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4454 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4457 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4458 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4459 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4461 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4464 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4465 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4471 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4472 struct sk_buff *skb,
4473 const struct net_device *in,
4474 const struct net_device *out,
4475 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4477 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4480 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4484 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4485 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4486 struct common_audit_data ad;
4492 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4494 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4495 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4496 ad.u.net.family = family;
4497 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4500 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4501 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4502 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4505 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4506 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4512 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4518 struct common_audit_data ad;
4523 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4524 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4525 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4526 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4527 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4528 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4530 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4531 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4532 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4533 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4534 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4535 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4536 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL)
4539 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4540 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4541 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4544 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4545 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4546 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4547 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4552 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4553 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4555 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4558 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4559 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4561 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4566 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4567 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4570 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4572 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4573 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4574 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4577 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4578 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4579 ad.u.net.family = family;
4580 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4584 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4585 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4588 if (peerlbl_active) {
4592 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4594 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4595 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4598 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4600 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4601 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4608 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4609 struct sk_buff *skb,
4610 const struct net_device *in,
4611 const struct net_device *out,
4612 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4614 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4617 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4618 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4619 struct sk_buff *skb,
4620 const struct net_device *in,
4621 const struct net_device *out,
4622 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4624 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4628 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4630 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4634 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
4638 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4641 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4644 struct common_audit_data ad;
4646 err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4650 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4651 ad.u.cap = capability;
4653 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4654 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4657 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4658 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4661 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4664 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4668 sid = task_sid(task);
4669 isec->sclass = sclass;
4671 perm->security = isec;
4676 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4678 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4679 perm->security = NULL;
4683 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4685 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4687 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4691 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4692 msg->security = msec;
4697 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4699 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4701 msg->security = NULL;
4705 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4708 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4709 struct common_audit_data ad;
4710 u32 sid = current_sid();
4712 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4714 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4715 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4717 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4720 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4722 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4725 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4727 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4730 /* message queue security operations */
4731 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4733 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4734 struct common_audit_data ad;
4735 u32 sid = current_sid();
4738 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4742 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4744 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4745 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4747 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4750 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4756 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4758 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4761 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4763 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4764 struct common_audit_data ad;
4765 u32 sid = current_sid();
4767 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4769 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4770 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4772 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4773 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4776 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4784 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4785 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4788 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4791 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4794 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4800 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4804 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4806 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4807 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4808 struct common_audit_data ad;
4809 u32 sid = current_sid();
4812 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4813 msec = msg->security;
4816 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4818 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4820 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4821 * message queue this message will be stored in
4823 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4829 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4830 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4832 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4833 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4836 /* Can this process send the message */
4837 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4840 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4841 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4842 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4847 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4848 struct task_struct *target,
4849 long type, int mode)
4851 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4852 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4853 struct common_audit_data ad;
4854 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
4857 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4858 msec = msg->security;
4860 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4861 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4863 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
4864 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4866 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
4867 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4871 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4872 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4874 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4875 struct common_audit_data ad;
4876 u32 sid = current_sid();
4879 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4883 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4885 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4886 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4888 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4891 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4897 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4899 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4902 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4904 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4905 struct common_audit_data ad;
4906 u32 sid = current_sid();
4908 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4910 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4911 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4913 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4914 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4917 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4918 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4926 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4927 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4930 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4933 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4940 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4946 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4950 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4951 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4955 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4958 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4960 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4963 /* Semaphore security operations */
4964 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4966 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4967 struct common_audit_data ad;
4968 u32 sid = current_sid();
4971 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4975 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4977 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4978 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
4980 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
4983 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4989 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4991 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
4994 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
4996 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4997 struct common_audit_data ad;
4998 u32 sid = current_sid();
5000 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5002 COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5003 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5005 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5006 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5009 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5010 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5018 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5019 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5023 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5034 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5037 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5041 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5047 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5051 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5052 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5057 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5061 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5064 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5070 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5072 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5077 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5080 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5082 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5086 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5089 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5092 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5093 char *name, char **value)
5095 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5101 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5107 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5109 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5111 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5113 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5114 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5115 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5116 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5117 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5118 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5119 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5120 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5128 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5138 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5139 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5141 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5142 struct task_struct *tracer;
5149 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5150 security attributes. */
5155 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5156 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5157 * above restriction is ever removed.
5159 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5160 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5161 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5162 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5163 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5164 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5165 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5166 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5167 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5168 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5174 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5175 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5176 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5180 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5181 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5182 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5184 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5191 new = prepare_creds();
5195 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5196 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5197 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5198 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5199 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5200 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5201 tsec = new->security;
5202 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5203 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5204 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5205 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5206 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5207 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5210 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5211 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5212 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5213 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5218 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5220 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5221 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5226 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5227 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5228 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5232 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5233 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5236 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5238 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5242 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5243 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5262 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5264 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5267 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5269 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5272 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5278 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5280 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5282 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5286 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5288 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5290 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5293 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5296 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5305 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5306 unsigned long flags)
5308 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5309 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5311 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5315 tsec = cred->security;
5316 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5317 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5319 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5325 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5327 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5333 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5334 const struct cred *cred,
5338 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5341 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5342 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5343 appear to be created. */
5347 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5349 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5350 ksec = key->security;
5352 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5355 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5357 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5358 char *context = NULL;
5362 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5371 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5374 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5375 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5376 .capget = selinux_capget,
5377 .capset = selinux_capset,
5378 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5379 .capable = selinux_capable,
5380 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5381 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5382 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5383 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5385 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5386 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5388 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5389 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5390 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5391 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5393 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5394 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5395 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5396 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5397 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5398 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5399 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5400 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5401 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5402 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5403 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5406 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5407 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5408 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5409 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5410 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5411 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5412 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5413 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5414 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5415 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5416 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5417 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5418 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5419 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5420 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5421 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5422 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5423 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5424 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5425 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5426 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5427 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5428 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5429 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5430 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5432 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5433 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5434 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5435 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5436 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5437 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5438 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5439 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5440 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5441 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5442 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5444 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5446 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5447 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5448 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5449 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5450 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5451 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5452 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5453 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5454 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5455 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5456 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5457 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5458 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5459 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5460 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5461 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5462 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5463 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5464 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5465 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5466 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5467 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5469 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5470 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5472 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5473 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5475 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5476 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5477 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5478 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5479 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5480 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5482 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5483 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5484 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5485 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5486 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5488 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5489 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5490 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5491 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5492 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5494 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5496 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5497 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5499 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5500 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5501 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5502 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5503 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5504 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5506 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5507 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5509 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5510 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5511 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5512 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5513 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5514 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5515 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5516 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5517 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5518 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5519 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5520 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5521 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5522 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5523 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5524 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5525 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5526 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5527 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5528 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5529 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5530 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5531 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5532 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5533 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5534 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5535 .tun_dev_post_create = selinux_tun_dev_post_create,
5536 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5538 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5539 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5540 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5541 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5542 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5543 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5544 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5545 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5546 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5547 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5548 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5552 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5553 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5554 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5555 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5559 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5560 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5561 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5562 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5566 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5568 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5569 selinux_enabled = 0;
5573 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5574 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5578 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5580 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5581 cred_init_security();
5583 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
5585 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5586 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5587 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5590 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5591 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5593 if (selinux_enforcing)
5594 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5596 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5601 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
5603 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5606 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5608 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5610 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5611 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5612 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
5615 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5616 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5617 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5619 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5621 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5623 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5624 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5626 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5627 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5630 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5631 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5633 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5634 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5637 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5638 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5640 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5641 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5645 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5647 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5649 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5650 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5652 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5653 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5656 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5657 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5659 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5660 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5666 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5670 if (!selinux_enabled)
5673 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5675 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5677 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5679 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5680 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5682 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5689 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5691 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5692 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5694 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5696 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5697 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5698 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5703 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5705 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5706 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5709 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5711 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5712 static int selinux_disabled;
5714 int selinux_disable(void)
5716 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5718 if (ss_initialized) {
5719 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5723 if (selinux_disabled) {
5724 /* Only do this once. */
5728 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5730 selinux_disabled = 1;
5731 selinux_enabled = 0;
5733 reset_security_ops();
5735 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
5738 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5739 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5741 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */