security/landlock/fs.c

   1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
   2 /*
   3  * Landlock LSM - Filesystem management and hooks
   4  *
   5  * Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
   6  * Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
   7  */
   8
   9 #include <linux/atomic.h>
  10 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  11 #include <linux/bits.h>
  12 #include <linux/compiler_types.h>
  13 #include <linux/dcache.h>
  14 #include <linux/err.h>
  15 #include <linux/fs.h>
  16 #include <linux/init.h>
  17 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  18 #include <linux/limits.h>
  19 #include <linux/list.h>
  20 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
  21 #include <linux/mount.h>
  22 #include <linux/namei.h>
  23 #include <linux/path.h>
  24 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
  25 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  26 #include <linux/stat.h>
  27 #include <linux/types.h>
  28 #include <linux/wait_bit.h>
  29 #include <linux/workqueue.h>
  30 #include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
  31
  32 #include "common.h"
  33 #include "cred.h"
  34 #include "fs.h"
  35 #include "limits.h"
  36 #include "object.h"
  37 #include "ruleset.h"
  38 #include "setup.h"
  39
  40 /* Underlying object management */
  41
  42 static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object)
  43         __releases(object->lock)
  44 {
  45         struct inode *const inode = object->underobj;
  46         struct super_block *sb;
  47
  48         if (!inode) {
  49                 spin_unlock(&object->lock);
  50                 return;
  51         }
  52
  53         /*
  54          * Protects against concurrent use by hook_sb_delete() of the reference
  55          * to the underlying inode.
  56          */
  57         object->underobj = NULL;
  58         /*
  59          * Makes sure that if the filesystem is concurrently unmounted,
  60          * hook_sb_delete() will wait for us to finish iput().
  61          */
  62         sb = inode->i_sb;
  63         atomic_long_inc(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
  64         spin_unlock(&object->lock);
  65         /*
  66          * Because object->underobj was not NULL, hook_sb_delete() and
  67          * get_inode_object() guarantee that it is safe to reset
  68          * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.  It is therefore
  69          * not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
  70          */
  71         rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
  72         /*
  73          * Now, new rules can safely be tied to @inode with get_inode_object().
  74          */
  75
  76         iput(inode);
  77         if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs))
  78                 wake_up_var(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs);
  79 }
  80
  81 static const struct landlock_object_underops landlock_fs_underops = {
  82         .release = release_inode
  83 };
  84
  85 /* Ruleset management */
  86
  87 static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
  88 {
  89         struct landlock_object *object, *new_object;
  90         struct landlock_inode_security *inode_sec = landlock_inode(inode);
  91
  92         rcu_read_lock();
  93 retry:
  94         object = rcu_dereference(inode_sec->object);
  95         if (object) {
  96                 if (likely(refcount_inc_not_zero(&object->usage))) {
  97                         rcu_read_unlock();
  98                         return object;
  99                 }
 100                 /*
 101                  * We are racing with release_inode(), the object is going
 102                  * away.  Wait for release_inode(), then retry.
 103                  */
 104                 spin_lock(&object->lock);
 105                 spin_unlock(&object->lock);
 106                 goto retry;
 107         }
 108         rcu_read_unlock();
 109
 110         /*
 111          * If there is no object tied to @inode, then create a new one (without
 112          * holding any locks).
 113          */
 114         new_object = landlock_create_object(&landlock_fs_underops, inode);
 115         if (IS_ERR(new_object))
 116                 return new_object;
 117
 118         /*
 119          * Protects against concurrent calls to get_inode_object() or
 120          * hook_sb_delete().
 121          */
 122         spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
 123         if (unlikely(rcu_access_pointer(inode_sec->object))) {
 124                 /* Someone else just created the object, bail out and retry. */
 125                 spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 126                 kfree(new_object);
 127
 128                 rcu_read_lock();
 129                 goto retry;
 130         }
 131
 132         /*
 133          * @inode will be released by hook_sb_delete() on its superblock
 134          * shutdown, or by release_inode() when no more ruleset references the
 135          * related object.
 136          */
 137         ihold(inode);
 138         rcu_assign_pointer(inode_sec->object, new_object);
 139         spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 140         return new_object;
 141 }
 142
 143 /* All access rights that can be tied to files. */
 144 /* clang-format off */
 145 #define ACCESS_FILE ( \
 146         LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE | \
 147         LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE | \
 148         LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE)
 149 /* clang-format on */
 150
 151 /*
 152  * @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd().
 153  */
 154 int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
 155                             const struct path *const path,
 156                             access_mask_t access_rights)
 157 {
 158         int err;
 159         struct landlock_object *object;
 160
 161         /* Files only get access rights that make sense. */
 162         if (!d_is_dir(path->dentry) &&
 163             (access_rights | ACCESS_FILE) != ACCESS_FILE)
 164                 return -EINVAL;
 165         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ruleset->num_layers != 1))
 166                 return -EINVAL;
 167
 168         /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
 169         access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS & ~ruleset->fs_access_masks[0];
 170         object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
 171         if (IS_ERR(object))
 172                 return PTR_ERR(object);
 173         mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
 174         err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, object, access_rights);
 175         mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
 176         /*
 177          * No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule()
 178          * increments the refcount for the new object if needed.
 179          */
 180         landlock_put_object(object);
 181         return err;
 182 }
 183
 184 /* Access-control management */
 185
 186 static inline layer_mask_t
 187 unmask_layers(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
 188               const struct path *const path, const access_mask_t access_request,
 189               layer_mask_t layer_mask)
 190 {
 191         const struct landlock_rule *rule;
 192         const struct inode *inode;
 193         size_t i;
 194
 195         if (d_is_negative(path->dentry))
 196                 /* Ignore nonexistent leafs. */
 197                 return layer_mask;
 198         inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
 199         rcu_read_lock();
 200         rule = landlock_find_rule(
 201                 domain, rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object));
 202         rcu_read_unlock();
 203         if (!rule)
 204                 return layer_mask;
 205
 206         /*
 207          * An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least one rule
 208          * encountered on the pathwalk grants the requested accesses,
 209          * regardless of their position in the layer stack.  We must then check
 210          * the remaining layers for each inode, from the first added layer to
 211          * the last one.
 212          */
 213         for (i = 0; i < rule->num_layers; i++) {
 214                 const struct landlock_layer *const layer = &rule->layers[i];
 215                 const layer_mask_t layer_bit = BIT_ULL(layer->level - 1);
 216
 217                 /* Checks that the layer grants access to the full request. */
 218                 if ((layer->access & access_request) == access_request) {
 219                         layer_mask &= ~layer_bit;
 220
 221                         if (layer_mask == 0)
 222                                 return layer_mask;
 223                 }
 224         }
 225         return layer_mask;
 226 }
 227
 228 static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
 229                              const struct path *const path,
 230                              const access_mask_t access_request)
 231 {
 232         bool allowed = false;
 233         struct path walker_path;
 234         layer_mask_t layer_mask;
 235         size_t i;
 236
 237         if (!access_request)
 238                 return 0;
 239         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain || !path))
 240                 return 0;
 241         /*
 242          * Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable
 243          * (e.g. sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through
 244          * /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor> .
 245          */
 246         if ((path->dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
 247             (d_is_positive(path->dentry) &&
 248              unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))))
 249                 return 0;
 250         if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
 251                 return -EACCES;
 252
 253         /* Saves all layers handling a subset of requested accesses. */
 254         layer_mask = 0;
 255         for (i = 0; i < domain->num_layers; i++) {
 256                 if (domain->fs_access_masks[i] & access_request)
 257                         layer_mask |= BIT_ULL(i);
 258         }
 259         /* An access request not handled by the domain is allowed. */
 260         if (layer_mask == 0)
 261                 return 0;
 262
 263         walker_path = *path;
 264         path_get(&walker_path);
 265         /*
 266          * We need to walk through all the hierarchy to not miss any relevant
 267          * restriction.
 268          */
 269         while (true) {
 270                 struct dentry *parent_dentry;
 271
 272                 layer_mask = unmask_layers(domain, &walker_path, access_request,
 273                                            layer_mask);
 274                 if (layer_mask == 0) {
 275                         /* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */
 276                         allowed = true;
 277                         break;
 278                 }
 279
 280 jump_up:
 281                 if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) {
 282                         if (follow_up(&walker_path)) {
 283                                 /* Ignores hidden mount points. */
 284                                 goto jump_up;
 285                         } else {
 286                                 /*
 287                                  * Stops at the real root.  Denies access
 288                                  * because not all layers have granted access.
 289                                  */
 290                                 allowed = false;
 291                                 break;
 292                         }
 293                 }
 294                 if (unlikely(IS_ROOT(walker_path.dentry))) {
 295                         /*
 296                          * Stops at disconnected root directories.  Only allows
 297                          * access to internal filesystems (e.g. nsfs, which is
 298                          * reachable through /proc/<pid>/ns/<namespace>).
 299                          */
 300                         allowed = !!(walker_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_INTERNAL);
 301                         break;
 302                 }
 303                 parent_dentry = dget_parent(walker_path.dentry);
 304                 dput(walker_path.dentry);
 305                 walker_path.dentry = parent_dentry;
 306         }
 307         path_put(&walker_path);
 308         return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
 309 }
 310
 311 static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
 312                                             const access_mask_t access_request)
 313 {
 314         const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
 315                 landlock_get_current_domain();
 316
 317         if (!dom)
 318                 return 0;
 319         return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request);
 320 }
 321
 322 /* Inode hooks */
 323
 324 static void hook_inode_free_security(struct inode *const inode)
 325 {
 326         /*
 327          * All inodes must already have been untied from their object by
 328          * release_inode() or hook_sb_delete().
 329          */
 330         WARN_ON_ONCE(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
 331 }
 332
 333 /* Super-block hooks */
 334
 335 /*
 336  * Release the inodes used in a security policy.
 337  *
 338  * Cf. fsnotify_unmount_inodes() and invalidate_inodes()
 339  */
 340 static void hook_sb_delete(struct super_block *const sb)
 341 {
 342         struct inode *inode, *prev_inode = NULL;
 343
 344         if (!landlock_initialized)
 345                 return;
 346
 347         spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
 348         list_for_each_entry(inode, &sb->s_inodes, i_sb_list) {
 349                 struct landlock_object *object;
 350
 351                 /* Only handles referenced inodes. */
 352                 if (!atomic_read(&inode->i_count))
 353                         continue;
 354
 355                 /*
 356                  * Protects against concurrent modification of inode (e.g.
 357                  * from get_inode_object()).
 358                  */
 359                 spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
 360                 /*
 361                  * Checks I_FREEING and I_WILL_FREE  to protect against a race
 362                  * condition when release_inode() just called iput(), which
 363                  * could lead to a NULL dereference of inode->security or a
 364                  * second call to iput() for the same Landlock object.  Also
 365                  * checks I_NEW because such inode cannot be tied to an object.
 366                  */
 367                 if (inode->i_state & (I_FREEING | I_WILL_FREE | I_NEW)) {
 368                         spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 369                         continue;
 370                 }
 371
 372                 rcu_read_lock();
 373                 object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
 374                 if (!object) {
 375                         rcu_read_unlock();
 376                         spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 377                         continue;
 378                 }
 379                 /* Keeps a reference to this inode until the next loop walk. */
 380                 __iget(inode);
 381                 spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
 382
 383                 /*
 384                  * If there is no concurrent release_inode() ongoing, then we
 385                  * are in charge of calling iput() on this inode, otherwise we
 386                  * will just wait for it to finish.
 387                  */
 388                 spin_lock(&object->lock);
 389                 if (object->underobj == inode) {
 390                         object->underobj = NULL;
 391                         spin_unlock(&object->lock);
 392                         rcu_read_unlock();
 393
 394                         /*
 395                          * Because object->underobj was not NULL,
 396                          * release_inode() and get_inode_object() guarantee
 397                          * that it is safe to reset
 398                          * landlock_inode(inode)->object while it is not NULL.
 399                          * It is therefore not necessary to lock inode->i_lock.
 400                          */
 401                         rcu_assign_pointer(landlock_inode(inode)->object, NULL);
 402                         /*
 403                          * At this point, we own the ihold() reference that was
 404                          * originally set up by get_inode_object() and the
 405                          * __iget() reference that we just set in this loop
 406                          * walk.  Therefore the following call to iput() will
 407                          * not sleep nor drop the inode because there is now at
 408                          * least two references to it.
 409                          */
 410                         iput(inode);
 411                 } else {
 412                         spin_unlock(&object->lock);
 413                         rcu_read_unlock();
 414                 }
 415
 416                 if (prev_inode) {
 417                         /*
 418                          * At this point, we still own the __iget() reference
 419                          * that we just set in this loop walk.  Therefore we
 420                          * can drop the list lock and know that the inode won't
 421                          * disappear from under us until the next loop walk.
 422                          */
 423                         spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
 424                         /*
 425                          * We can now actually put the inode reference from the
 426                          * previous loop walk, which is not needed anymore.
 427                          */
 428                         iput(prev_inode);
 429                         cond_resched();
 430                         spin_lock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
 431                 }
 432                 prev_inode = inode;
 433         }
 434         spin_unlock(&sb->s_inode_list_lock);
 435
 436         /* Puts the inode reference from the last loop walk, if any. */
 437         if (prev_inode)
 438                 iput(prev_inode);
 439         /* Waits for pending iput() in release_inode(). */
 440         wait_var_event(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs,
 441                        !atomic_long_read(&landlock_superblock(sb)->inode_refs));
 442 }
 443
 444 /*
 445  * Because a Landlock security policy is defined according to the filesystem
 446  * topology (i.e. the mount namespace), changing it may grant access to files
 447  * not previously allowed.
 448  *
 449  * To make it simple, deny any filesystem topology modification by landlocked
 450  * processes.  Non-landlocked processes may still change the namespace of a
 451  * landlocked process, but this kind of threat must be handled by a system-wide
 452  * access-control security policy.
 453  *
 454  * This could be lifted in the future if Landlock can safely handle mount
 455  * namespace updates requested by a landlocked process.  Indeed, we could
 456  * update the current domain (which is currently read-only) by taking into
 457  * account the accesses of the source and the destination of a new mount point.
 458  * However, it would also require to make all the child domains dynamically
 459  * inherit these new constraints.  Anyway, for backward compatibility reasons,
 460  * a dedicated user space option would be required (e.g. as a ruleset flag).
 461  */
 462 static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name,
 463                          const struct path *const path, const char *const type,
 464                          const unsigned long flags, void *const data)
 465 {
 466         if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
 467                 return 0;
 468         return -EPERM;
 469 }
 470
 471 static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path,
 472                            const struct path *const to_path)
 473 {
 474         if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
 475                 return 0;
 476         return -EPERM;
 477 }
 478
 479 /*
 480  * Removing a mount point may reveal a previously hidden file hierarchy, which
 481  * may then grant access to files, which may have previously been forbidden.
 482  */
 483 static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags)
 484 {
 485         if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
 486                 return 0;
 487         return -EPERM;
 488 }
 489
 490 static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts)
 491 {
 492         if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
 493                 return 0;
 494         return -EPERM;
 495 }
 496
 497 /*
 498  * pivot_root(2), like mount(2), changes the current mount namespace.  It must
 499  * then be forbidden for a landlocked process.
 500  *
 501  * However, chroot(2) may be allowed because it only changes the relative root
 502  * directory of the current process.  Moreover, it can be used to restrict the
 503  * view of the filesystem.
 504  */
 505 static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path,
 506                              const struct path *const new_path)
 507 {
 508         if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
 509                 return 0;
 510         return -EPERM;
 511 }
 512
 513 /* Path hooks */
 514
 515 static inline access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
 516 {
 517         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
 518         case S_IFLNK:
 519                 return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM;
 520         case 0:
 521                 /* A zero mode translates to S_IFREG. */
 522         case S_IFREG:
 523                 return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_REG;
 524         case S_IFDIR:
 525                 return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR;
 526         case S_IFCHR:
 527                 return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_CHAR;
 528         case S_IFBLK:
 529                 return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_BLOCK;
 530         case S_IFIFO:
 531                 return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_FIFO;
 532         case S_IFSOCK:
 533                 return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SOCK;
 534         default:
 535                 WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
 536                 return 0;
 537         }
 538 }
 539
 540 /*
 541  * Creating multiple links or renaming may lead to privilege escalations if not
 542  * handled properly.  Indeed, we must be sure that the source doesn't gain more
 543  * privileges by being accessible from the destination.  This is getting more
 544  * complex when dealing with multiple layers.  The whole picture can be seen as
 545  * a multilayer partial ordering problem.  A future version of Landlock will
 546  * deal with that.
 547  */
 548 static int hook_path_link(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
 549                           const struct path *const new_dir,
 550                           struct dentry *const new_dentry)
 551 {
 552         const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
 553                 landlock_get_current_domain();
 554
 555         if (!dom)
 556                 return 0;
 557         /* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */
 558         if (old_dentry->d_parent != new_dir->dentry)
 559                 /* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */
 560                 return -EXDEV;
 561         if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry)))
 562                 return -ENOENT;
 563         return check_access_path(
 564                 dom, new_dir,
 565                 get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode));
 566 }
 567
 568 static inline access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
 569 {
 570         if (d_is_negative(dentry))
 571                 return 0;
 572         return d_is_dir(dentry) ? LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR :
 573                                   LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE;
 574 }
 575
 576 static int hook_path_rename(const struct path *const old_dir,
 577                             struct dentry *const old_dentry,
 578                             const struct path *const new_dir,
 579                             struct dentry *const new_dentry)
 580 {
 581         const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
 582                 landlock_get_current_domain();
 583
 584         if (!dom)
 585                 return 0;
 586         /* The mount points are the same for old and new paths, cf. EXDEV. */
 587         if (old_dir->dentry != new_dir->dentry)
 588                 /* Gracefully forbids reparenting. */
 589                 return -EXDEV;
 590         if (unlikely(d_is_negative(old_dentry)))
 591                 return -ENOENT;
 592         /* RENAME_EXCHANGE is handled because directories are the same. */
 593         return check_access_path(
 594                 dom, old_dir,
 595                 maybe_remove(old_dentry) | maybe_remove(new_dentry) |
 596                         get_mode_access(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_mode));
 597 }
 598
 599 static int hook_path_mkdir(const struct path *const dir,
 600                            struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode)
 601 {
 602         return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_DIR);
 603 }
 604
 605 static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir,
 606                            struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode,
 607                            const unsigned int dev)
 608 {
 609         const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
 610                 landlock_get_current_domain();
 611
 612         if (!dom)
 613                 return 0;
 614         return check_access_path(dom, dir, get_mode_access(mode));
 615 }
 616
 617 static int hook_path_symlink(const struct path *const dir,
 618                              struct dentry *const dentry,
 619                              const char *const old_name)
 620 {
 621         return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM);
 622 }
 623
 624 static int hook_path_unlink(const struct path *const dir,
 625                             struct dentry *const dentry)
 626 {
 627         return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_FILE);
 628 }
 629
 630 static int hook_path_rmdir(const struct path *const dir,
 631                            struct dentry *const dentry)
 632 {
 633         return current_check_access_path(dir, LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REMOVE_DIR);
 634 }
 635
 636 /* File hooks */
 637
 638 static inline access_mask_t get_file_access(const struct file *const file)
 639 {
 640         access_mask_t access = 0;
 641
 642         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) {
 643                 /* A directory can only be opened in read mode. */
 644                 if (S_ISDIR(file_inode(file)->i_mode))
 645                         return LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_DIR;
 646                 access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE;
 647         }
 648         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
 649                 access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_WRITE_FILE;
 650         /* __FMODE_EXEC is indeed part of f_flags, not f_mode. */
 651         if (file->f_flags & __FMODE_EXEC)
 652                 access |= LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_EXECUTE;
 653         return access;
 654 }
 655
 656 static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
 657 {
 658         const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
 659                 landlock_get_current_domain();
 660
 661         if (!dom)
 662                 return 0;
 663         /*
 664          * Because a file may be opened with O_PATH, get_file_access() may
 665          * return 0.  This case will be handled with a future Landlock
 666          * evolution.
 667          */
 668         return check_access_path(dom, &file->f_path, get_file_access(file));
 669 }
 670
 671 static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 672         LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, hook_inode_free_security),
 673
 674         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete),
 675         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount),
 676         LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, hook_move_mount),
 677         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, hook_sb_umount),
 678         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, hook_sb_remount),
 679         LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, hook_sb_pivotroot),
 680
 681         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, hook_path_link),
 682         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rename, hook_path_rename),
 683         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mkdir, hook_path_mkdir),
 684         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_mknod, hook_path_mknod),
 685         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, hook_path_symlink),
 686         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, hook_path_unlink),
 687         LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_rmdir, hook_path_rmdir),
 688
 689         LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, hook_file_open),
 690 };
 691
 692 __init void landlock_add_fs_hooks(void)
 693 {
 694         security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
 695                            LANDLOCK_NAME);
 696 }