1 /* Userspace key control operations
3 * Copyright (C) 2004-5 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
4 * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
6 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
7 * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
8 * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
9 * 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
12 #include <linux/module.h>
13 #include <linux/init.h>
14 #include <linux/sched.h>
15 #include <linux/slab.h>
16 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
17 #include <linux/keyctl.h>
19 #include <linux/capability.h>
20 #include <linux/string.h>
21 #include <linux/err.h>
22 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
23 #include <linux/security.h>
24 #include <asm/uaccess.h>
27 static int key_get_type_from_user(char *type,
28 const char __user *_type,
33 ret = strncpy_from_user(type, _type, len);
36 if (ret == 0 || ret >= len)
45 * Extract the description of a new key from userspace and either add it as a
46 * new key to the specified keyring or update a matching key in that keyring.
48 * The keyring must be writable so that we can attach the key to it.
50 * If successful, the new key's serial number is returned, otherwise an error
53 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
54 const char __user *, _description,
55 const void __user *, _payload,
59 key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
60 char type[32], *description;
66 if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
69 /* draw all the data into kernel space */
70 ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
74 description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
75 if (IS_ERR(description)) {
76 ret = PTR_ERR(description);
80 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
86 payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
88 if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
91 payload = vmalloc(plen);
97 if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
101 /* find the target keyring (which must be writable) */
102 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
103 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
104 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
108 /* create or update the requested key and add it to the target
110 key_ref = key_create_or_update(keyring_ref, type, description,
111 payload, plen, KEY_PERM_UNDEF,
113 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
114 ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
115 key_ref_put(key_ref);
118 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
121 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
134 * Search the process keyrings and keyring trees linked from those for a
135 * matching key. Keyrings must have appropriate Search permission to be
138 * If a key is found, it will be attached to the destination keyring if there's
139 * one specified and the serial number of the key will be returned.
141 * If no key is found, /sbin/request-key will be invoked if _callout_info is
142 * non-NULL in an attempt to create a key. The _callout_info string will be
143 * passed to /sbin/request-key to aid with completing the request. If the
144 * _callout_info string is "" then it will be changed to "-".
146 SYSCALL_DEFINE4(request_key, const char __user *, _type,
147 const char __user *, _description,
148 const char __user *, _callout_info,
149 key_serial_t, destringid)
151 struct key_type *ktype;
155 char type[32], *description, *callout_info;
158 /* pull the type into kernel space */
159 ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
163 /* pull the description into kernel space */
164 description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
165 if (IS_ERR(description)) {
166 ret = PTR_ERR(description);
170 /* pull the callout info into kernel space */
174 callout_info = strndup_user(_callout_info, PAGE_SIZE);
175 if (IS_ERR(callout_info)) {
176 ret = PTR_ERR(callout_info);
179 callout_len = strlen(callout_info);
182 /* get the destination keyring if specified */
185 dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
187 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
188 ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
193 /* find the key type */
194 ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
196 ret = PTR_ERR(ktype);
201 key = request_key_and_link(ktype, description, callout_info,
202 callout_len, NULL, key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref),
209 /* wait for the key to finish being constructed */
210 ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, 1);
221 key_ref_put(dest_ref);
231 * Get the ID of the specified process keyring.
233 * The requested keyring must have search permission to be found.
235 * If successful, the ID of the requested keyring will be returned.
237 long keyctl_get_keyring_ID(key_serial_t id, int create)
240 unsigned long lflags;
243 lflags = create ? KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE : 0;
244 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, lflags, KEY_SEARCH);
245 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
246 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
250 ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
251 key_ref_put(key_ref);
257 * Join a (named) session keyring.
259 * Create and join an anonymous session keyring or join a named session
260 * keyring, creating it if necessary. A named session keyring must have Search
261 * permission for it to be joined. Session keyrings without this permit will
264 * If successful, the ID of the joined session keyring will be returned.
266 long keyctl_join_session_keyring(const char __user *_name)
271 /* fetch the name from userspace */
274 name = strndup_user(_name, PAGE_SIZE);
281 /* join the session */
282 ret = join_session_keyring(name);
290 * Update a key's data payload from the given data.
292 * The key must grant the caller Write permission and the key type must support
293 * updating for this to work. A negative key can be positively instantiated
296 * If successful, 0 will be returned. If the key type does not support
297 * updating, then -EOPNOTSUPP will be returned.
299 long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
300 const void __user *_payload,
308 if (plen > PAGE_SIZE)
311 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
315 payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
320 if (copy_from_user(payload, _payload, plen) != 0)
324 /* find the target key (which must be writable) */
325 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
326 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
327 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
332 ret = key_update(key_ref, payload, plen);
334 key_ref_put(key_ref);
344 * The key must be grant the caller Write or Setattr permission for this to
345 * work. The key type should give up its quota claim when revoked. The key
346 * and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected after a
347 * certain amount of time (/proc/sys/kernel/keys/gc_delay).
349 * If successful, 0 is returned.
351 long keyctl_revoke_key(key_serial_t id)
356 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_WRITE);
357 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
358 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
361 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, 0, KEY_SETATTR);
362 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
363 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
368 key_revoke(key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
371 key_ref_put(key_ref);
377 * Clear the specified keyring, creating an empty process keyring if one of the
378 * special keyring IDs is used.
380 * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work. If
381 * successful, 0 will be returned.
383 long keyctl_keyring_clear(key_serial_t ringid)
385 key_ref_t keyring_ref;
388 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
389 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
390 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
394 ret = keyring_clear(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref));
396 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
402 * Create a link from a keyring to a key if there's no matching key in the
403 * keyring, otherwise replace the link to the matching key with a link to the
406 * The key must grant the caller Link permission and the the keyring must grant
407 * the caller Write permission. Furthermore, if an additional link is created,
408 * the keyring's quota will be extended.
410 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
412 long keyctl_keyring_link(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
414 key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
417 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
418 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
419 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
423 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_LINK);
424 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
425 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
429 ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
431 key_ref_put(key_ref);
433 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
439 * Unlink a key from a keyring.
441 * The keyring must grant the caller Write permission for this to work; the key
442 * itself need not grant the caller anything. If the last link to a key is
443 * removed then that key will be scheduled for destruction.
445 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
447 long keyctl_keyring_unlink(key_serial_t id, key_serial_t ringid)
449 key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref;
452 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_WRITE);
453 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
454 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
458 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK, 0);
459 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
460 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
464 ret = key_unlink(key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
466 key_ref_put(key_ref);
468 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
474 * Return a description of a key to userspace.
476 * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work.
478 * If there's a buffer, we place up to buflen bytes of data into it formatted
479 * in the following way:
481 * type;uid;gid;perm;description<NUL>
483 * If successful, we return the amount of description available, irrespective
484 * of how much we may have copied into the buffer.
486 long keyctl_describe_key(key_serial_t keyid,
490 struct key *key, *instkey;
495 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
496 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
497 /* viewing a key under construction is permitted if we have the
498 * authorisation token handy */
499 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) {
500 instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
501 if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
503 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid,
506 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
511 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
516 /* calculate how much description we're going to return */
518 tmpbuf = kmalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
522 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
524 ret = snprintf(tmpbuf, PAGE_SIZE - 1,
530 key->description ?: "");
532 /* include a NUL char at the end of the data */
533 if (ret > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
538 /* consider returning the data */
539 if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
543 if (copy_to_user(buffer, tmpbuf, buflen) != 0)
549 key_ref_put(key_ref);
555 * Search the specified keyring and any keyrings it links to for a matching
556 * key. Only keyrings that grant the caller Search permission will be searched
557 * (this includes the starting keyring). Only keys with Search permission can
560 * If successful, the found key will be linked to the destination keyring if
561 * supplied and the key has Link permission, and the found key ID will be
564 long keyctl_keyring_search(key_serial_t ringid,
565 const char __user *_type,
566 const char __user *_description,
567 key_serial_t destringid)
569 struct key_type *ktype;
570 key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_ref, dest_ref;
571 char type[32], *description;
574 /* pull the type and description into kernel space */
575 ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type));
579 description = strndup_user(_description, PAGE_SIZE);
580 if (IS_ERR(description)) {
581 ret = PTR_ERR(description);
585 /* get the keyring at which to begin the search */
586 keyring_ref = lookup_user_key(ringid, 0, KEY_SEARCH);
587 if (IS_ERR(keyring_ref)) {
588 ret = PTR_ERR(keyring_ref);
592 /* get the destination keyring if specified */
595 dest_ref = lookup_user_key(destringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE,
597 if (IS_ERR(dest_ref)) {
598 ret = PTR_ERR(dest_ref);
603 /* find the key type */
604 ktype = key_type_lookup(type);
606 ret = PTR_ERR(ktype);
611 key_ref = keyring_search(keyring_ref, ktype, description);
612 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
613 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
615 /* treat lack or presence of a negative key the same */
621 /* link the resulting key to the destination keyring if we can */
623 ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_LINK);
627 ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref));
632 ret = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref)->serial;
635 key_ref_put(key_ref);
639 key_ref_put(dest_ref);
641 key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
649 * Read a key's payload.
651 * The key must either grant the caller Read permission, or it must grant the
652 * caller Search permission when searched for from the process keyrings.
654 * If successful, we place up to buflen bytes of data into the buffer, if one
655 * is provided, and return the amount of data that is available in the key,
656 * irrespective of how much we copied into the buffer.
658 long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
664 /* find the key first */
665 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, 0, 0);
666 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
671 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
673 /* see if we can read it directly */
674 ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_READ);
680 /* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings
681 * - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be
682 * dangling off an instantiation key
684 if (!is_key_possessed(key_ref)) {
689 /* the key is probably readable - now try to read it */
691 ret = key_validate(key);
694 if (key->type->read) {
695 /* read the data with the semaphore held (since we
697 down_read(&key->sem);
698 ret = key->type->read(key, buffer, buflen);
710 * Change the ownership of a key
712 * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though
713 * the key need not be fully instantiated yet. For the UID to be changed, or
714 * for the GID to be changed to a group the caller is not a member of, the
715 * caller must have sysadmin capability. If either uid or gid is -1 then that
716 * attribute is not changed.
718 * If the UID is to be changed, the new user must have sufficient quota to
719 * accept the key. The quota deduction will be removed from the old user to
720 * the new user should the attribute be changed.
722 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
724 long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
726 struct key_user *newowner, *zapowner = NULL;
732 if (uid == (uid_t) -1 && gid == (gid_t) -1)
735 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
737 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
738 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
742 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
744 /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chown races */
746 down_write(&key->sem);
748 if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
749 /* only the sysadmin can chown a key to some other UID */
750 if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && key->uid != uid)
753 /* only the sysadmin can set the key's GID to a group other
754 * than one of those that the current process subscribes to */
755 if (gid != (gid_t) -1 && gid != key->gid && !in_group_p(gid))
760 if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && uid != key->uid) {
762 newowner = key_user_lookup(uid, current_user_ns());
766 /* transfer the quota burden to the new user */
767 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA, &key->flags)) {
768 unsigned maxkeys = (uid == 0) ?
769 key_quota_root_maxkeys : key_quota_maxkeys;
770 unsigned maxbytes = (uid == 0) ?
771 key_quota_root_maxbytes : key_quota_maxbytes;
773 spin_lock(&newowner->lock);
774 if (newowner->qnkeys + 1 >= maxkeys ||
775 newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen >= maxbytes ||
776 newowner->qnbytes + key->quotalen <
781 newowner->qnbytes += key->quotalen;
782 spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
784 spin_lock(&key->user->lock);
786 key->user->qnbytes -= key->quotalen;
787 spin_unlock(&key->user->lock);
790 atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys);
791 atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys);
793 if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
794 atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys);
795 atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys);
798 zapowner = key->user;
799 key->user = newowner;
804 if (gid != (gid_t) -1)
813 key_user_put(zapowner);
818 spin_unlock(&newowner->lock);
825 * Change the permission mask on a key.
827 * The key must grant the caller Setattr permission for this to work, though
828 * the key need not be fully instantiated yet. If the caller does not have
829 * sysadmin capability, it may only change the permission on keys that it owns.
831 long keyctl_setperm_key(key_serial_t id, key_perm_t perm)
838 if (perm & ~(KEY_POS_ALL | KEY_USR_ALL | KEY_GRP_ALL | KEY_OTH_ALL))
841 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
843 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
844 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
848 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
850 /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent chown/chmod races */
852 down_write(&key->sem);
854 /* if we're not the sysadmin, we can only change a key that we own */
855 if (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || key->uid == current_fsuid()) {
867 * Get the destination keyring for instantiation and check that the caller has
868 * Write permission on it.
870 static long get_instantiation_keyring(key_serial_t ringid,
871 struct request_key_auth *rka,
872 struct key **_dest_keyring)
876 *_dest_keyring = NULL;
878 /* just return a NULL pointer if we weren't asked to make a link */
882 /* if a specific keyring is nominated by ID, then use that */
884 dkref = lookup_user_key(ringid, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE, KEY_WRITE);
886 return PTR_ERR(dkref);
887 *_dest_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(dkref);
891 if (ringid == KEY_SPEC_REQKEY_AUTH_KEY)
894 /* otherwise specify the destination keyring recorded in the
895 * authorisation key (any KEY_SPEC_*_KEYRING) */
896 if (ringid >= KEY_SPEC_REQUESTOR_KEYRING) {
897 *_dest_keyring = key_get(rka->dest_keyring);
905 * Change the request_key authorisation key on the current process.
907 static int keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(struct key *key)
911 new = prepare_creds();
915 key_put(new->request_key_auth);
916 new->request_key_auth = key_get(key);
918 return commit_creds(new);
922 * Copy the iovec data from userspace
924 static long copy_from_user_iovec(void *buffer, const struct iovec *iov,
927 for (; ioc > 0; ioc--) {
928 if (copy_from_user(buffer, iov->iov_base, iov->iov_len) != 0)
930 buffer += iov->iov_len;
937 * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
938 * destination keyring if one is given.
940 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
941 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
943 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
945 long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
946 const struct iovec *payload_iov,
951 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
952 struct request_key_auth *rka;
953 struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
958 kenter("%d,,%zu,%d", id, plen, ringid);
961 if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
964 /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
965 * assumed before calling this */
967 instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
971 rka = instkey->payload.data;
972 if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
975 /* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
980 payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
982 if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
985 payload = vmalloc(plen);
990 ret = copy_from_user_iovec(payload, payload_iov, ioc);
995 /* find the destination keyring amongst those belonging to the
997 ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
1001 /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
1002 ret = key_instantiate_and_link(rka->target_key, payload, plen,
1003 dest_keyring, instkey);
1005 key_put(dest_keyring);
1007 /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
1008 * instantiation of the key */
1010 keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
1022 * Instantiate a key with the specified payload and link the key into the
1023 * destination keyring if one is given.
1025 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1026 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1028 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1030 long keyctl_instantiate_key(key_serial_t id,
1031 const void __user *_payload,
1033 key_serial_t ringid)
1035 if (_payload && plen) {
1036 struct iovec iov[1] = {
1037 [0].iov_base = (void __user *)_payload,
1041 return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, 1, plen, ringid);
1044 return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
1048 * Instantiate a key with the specified multipart payload and link the key into
1049 * the destination keyring if one is given.
1051 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1052 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1054 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1056 long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
1057 const struct iovec __user *_payload_iov,
1059 key_serial_t ringid)
1061 struct iovec iovstack[UIO_FASTIOV], *iov = iovstack;
1064 if (_payload_iov == 0 || ioc == 0)
1067 ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
1068 ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov, 1);
1072 goto no_payload_free;
1074 ret = keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, iov, ioc, ret, ringid);
1076 if (iov != iovstack)
1081 if (iov != iovstack)
1084 return keyctl_instantiate_key_common(id, NULL, 0, 0, ringid);
1088 * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and link
1089 * the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
1091 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1092 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1094 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
1095 * after the timeout expires.
1097 * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
1098 * them to return -ENOKEY until the negative key expires.
1100 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1102 long keyctl_negate_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, key_serial_t ringid)
1104 return keyctl_reject_key(id, timeout, ENOKEY, ringid);
1108 * Negatively instantiate the key with the given timeout (in seconds) and error
1109 * code and link the key into the destination keyring if one is given.
1111 * The caller must have the appropriate instantiation permit set for this to
1112 * work (see keyctl_assume_authority). No other permissions are required.
1114 * The key and any links to the key will be automatically garbage collected
1115 * after the timeout expires.
1117 * Negative keys are used to rate limit repeated request_key() calls by causing
1118 * them to return the specified error code until the negative key expires.
1120 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1122 long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
1123 key_serial_t ringid)
1125 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1126 struct request_key_auth *rka;
1127 struct key *instkey, *dest_keyring;
1130 kenter("%d,%u,%u,%d", id, timeout, error, ringid);
1132 /* must be a valid error code and mustn't be a kernel special */
1134 error >= MAX_ERRNO ||
1135 error == ERESTARTSYS ||
1136 error == ERESTARTNOINTR ||
1137 error == ERESTARTNOHAND ||
1138 error == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1141 /* the appropriate instantiation authorisation key must have been
1142 * assumed before calling this */
1144 instkey = cred->request_key_auth;
1148 rka = instkey->payload.data;
1149 if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
1152 /* find the destination keyring if present (which must also be
1154 ret = get_instantiation_keyring(ringid, rka, &dest_keyring);
1158 /* instantiate the key and link it into a keyring */
1159 ret = key_reject_and_link(rka->target_key, timeout, error,
1160 dest_keyring, instkey);
1162 key_put(dest_keyring);
1164 /* discard the assumed authority if it's just been disabled by
1165 * instantiation of the key */
1167 keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
1174 * Read or set the default keyring in which request_key() will cache keys and
1175 * return the old setting.
1177 * If a process keyring is specified then this will be created if it doesn't
1178 * yet exist. The old setting will be returned if successful.
1180 long keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(int reqkey_defl)
1183 int ret, old_setting;
1185 old_setting = current_cred_xxx(jit_keyring);
1187 if (reqkey_defl == KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE)
1190 new = prepare_creds();
1194 switch (reqkey_defl) {
1195 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING:
1196 ret = install_thread_keyring_to_cred(new);
1201 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_PROCESS_KEYRING:
1202 ret = install_process_keyring_to_cred(new);
1210 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT:
1211 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING:
1212 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_KEYRING:
1213 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_USER_SESSION_KEYRING:
1214 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_REQUESTOR_KEYRING:
1217 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_NO_CHANGE:
1218 case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_GROUP_KEYRING:
1225 new->jit_keyring = reqkey_defl;
1234 * Set or clear the timeout on a key.
1236 * Either the key must grant the caller Setattr permission or else the caller
1237 * must hold an instantiation authorisation token for the key.
1239 * The timeout is either 0 to clear the timeout, or a number of seconds from
1240 * the current time. The key and any links to the key will be automatically
1241 * garbage collected after the timeout expires.
1243 * If successful, 0 is returned.
1245 long keyctl_set_timeout(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout)
1247 struct timespec now;
1248 struct key *key, *instkey;
1253 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id, KEY_LOOKUP_CREATE | KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL,
1255 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
1256 /* setting the timeout on a key under construction is permitted
1257 * if we have the authorisation token handy */
1258 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) == -EACCES) {
1259 instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id);
1260 if (!IS_ERR(instkey)) {
1262 key_ref = lookup_user_key(id,
1265 if (!IS_ERR(key_ref))
1270 ret = PTR_ERR(key_ref);
1275 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
1277 /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent races */
1278 down_write(&key->sem);
1282 now = current_kernel_time();
1283 expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout;
1286 key->expiry = expiry;
1287 key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay);
1289 up_write(&key->sem);
1298 * Assume (or clear) the authority to instantiate the specified key.
1300 * This sets the authoritative token currently in force for key instantiation.
1301 * This must be done for a key to be instantiated. It has the effect of making
1302 * available all the keys from the caller of the request_key() that created a
1303 * key to request_key() calls made by the caller of this function.
1305 * The caller must have the instantiation key in their process keyrings with a
1306 * Search permission grant available to the caller.
1308 * If the ID given is 0, then the setting will be cleared and 0 returned.
1310 * If the ID given has a matching an authorisation key, then that key will be
1311 * set and its ID will be returned. The authorisation key can be read to get
1312 * the callout information passed to request_key().
1314 long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id)
1316 struct key *authkey;
1319 /* special key IDs aren't permitted */
1324 /* we divest ourselves of authority if given an ID of 0 */
1326 ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
1330 /* attempt to assume the authority temporarily granted to us whilst we
1331 * instantiate the specified key
1332 * - the authorisation key must be in the current task's keyrings
1335 authkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(id);
1336 if (IS_ERR(authkey)) {
1337 ret = PTR_ERR(authkey);
1341 ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey);
1346 ret = authkey->serial;
1352 * Get a key's the LSM security label.
1354 * The key must grant the caller View permission for this to work.
1356 * If there's a buffer, then up to buflen bytes of data will be placed into it.
1358 * If successful, the amount of information available will be returned,
1359 * irrespective of how much was copied (including the terminal NUL).
1361 long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
1362 char __user *buffer,
1365 struct key *key, *instkey;
1370 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, KEY_VIEW);
1371 if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) {
1372 if (PTR_ERR(key_ref) != -EACCES)
1373 return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
1375 /* viewing a key under construction is also permitted if we
1376 * have the authorisation token handy */
1377 instkey = key_get_instantiation_authkey(keyid);
1378 if (IS_ERR(instkey))
1379 return PTR_ERR(instkey);
1382 key_ref = lookup_user_key(keyid, KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL, 0);
1383 if (IS_ERR(key_ref))
1384 return PTR_ERR(key_ref);
1387 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
1388 ret = security_key_getsecurity(key, &context);
1390 /* if no information was returned, give userspace an empty
1393 if (buffer && buflen > 0 &&
1394 copy_to_user(buffer, "", 1) != 0)
1396 } else if (ret > 0) {
1397 /* return as much data as there's room for */
1398 if (buffer && buflen > 0) {
1402 if (copy_to_user(buffer, context, buflen) != 0)
1409 key_ref_put(key_ref);
1414 * Attempt to install the calling process's session keyring on the process's
1417 * The keyring must exist and must grant the caller LINK permission, and the
1418 * parent process must be single-threaded and must have the same effective
1419 * ownership as this process and mustn't be SUID/SGID.
1421 * The keyring will be emplaced on the parent when it next resumes userspace.
1423 * If successful, 0 will be returned.
1425 long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
1427 #ifdef TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME
1428 struct task_struct *me, *parent;
1429 const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
1430 struct cred *cred, *oldcred;
1431 key_ref_t keyring_r;
1434 keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
1435 if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
1436 return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
1438 /* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
1439 * and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
1442 cred = cred_alloc_blank();
1446 cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
1451 write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1453 parent = me->real_parent;
1456 /* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
1457 if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
1460 /* the parent must be single threaded */
1461 if (!thread_group_empty(parent))
1464 /* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
1465 * there's no point */
1466 mycred = current_cred();
1467 pcred = __task_cred(parent);
1468 if (mycred == pcred ||
1469 mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring)
1472 /* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
1474 if (pcred->uid != mycred->euid ||
1475 pcred->euid != mycred->euid ||
1476 pcred->suid != mycred->euid ||
1477 pcred->gid != mycred->egid ||
1478 pcred->egid != mycred->egid ||
1479 pcred->sgid != mycred->egid)
1482 /* the keyrings must have the same UID */
1483 if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring &&
1484 pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) ||
1485 mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
1488 /* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace
1490 oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring;
1492 /* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
1494 parent->replacement_session_keyring = cred;
1496 set_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(parent), TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
1498 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1507 write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
1513 key_ref_put(keyring_r);
1516 #else /* !TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME */
1518 * To be removed when TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME has been implemented on
1521 #warning TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME not implemented
1523 #endif /* !TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME */
1527 * The key control system call
1529 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(keyctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
1530 unsigned long, arg4, unsigned long, arg5)
1533 case KEYCTL_GET_KEYRING_ID:
1534 return keyctl_get_keyring_ID((key_serial_t) arg2,
1537 case KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING:
1538 return keyctl_join_session_keyring((const char __user *) arg2);
1541 return keyctl_update_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1542 (const void __user *) arg3,
1546 return keyctl_revoke_key((key_serial_t) arg2);
1548 case KEYCTL_DESCRIBE:
1549 return keyctl_describe_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1550 (char __user *) arg3,
1554 return keyctl_keyring_clear((key_serial_t) arg2);
1557 return keyctl_keyring_link((key_serial_t) arg2,
1558 (key_serial_t) arg3);
1561 return keyctl_keyring_unlink((key_serial_t) arg2,
1562 (key_serial_t) arg3);
1565 return keyctl_keyring_search((key_serial_t) arg2,
1566 (const char __user *) arg3,
1567 (const char __user *) arg4,
1568 (key_serial_t) arg5);
1571 return keyctl_read_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1572 (char __user *) arg3,
1576 return keyctl_chown_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1580 case KEYCTL_SETPERM:
1581 return keyctl_setperm_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1584 case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE:
1585 return keyctl_instantiate_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1586 (const void __user *) arg3,
1588 (key_serial_t) arg5);
1591 return keyctl_negate_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1593 (key_serial_t) arg4);
1595 case KEYCTL_SET_REQKEY_KEYRING:
1596 return keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(arg2);
1598 case KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT:
1599 return keyctl_set_timeout((key_serial_t) arg2,
1602 case KEYCTL_ASSUME_AUTHORITY:
1603 return keyctl_assume_authority((key_serial_t) arg2);
1605 case KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY:
1606 return keyctl_get_security((key_serial_t) arg2,
1607 (char __user *) arg3,
1610 case KEYCTL_SESSION_TO_PARENT:
1611 return keyctl_session_to_parent();
1614 return keyctl_reject_key((key_serial_t) arg2,
1617 (key_serial_t) arg5);
1619 case KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV:
1620 return keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
1621 (key_serial_t) arg2,
1622 (const struct iovec __user *) arg3,
1624 (key_serial_t) arg5);