1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Integrity Measurement Architecture
5 * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
8 * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
9 * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
10 * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
11 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
14 * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
18 #include <linux/module.h>
19 #include <linux/file.h>
20 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
21 #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h>
22 #include <linux/mount.h>
23 #include <linux/mman.h>
24 #include <linux/slab.h>
25 #include <linux/xattr.h>
26 #include <linux/ima.h>
27 #include <linux/iversion.h>
32 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE
33 int ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
38 int __ro_after_init ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
39 static int hash_setup_done;
41 static struct notifier_block ima_lsm_policy_notifier = {
42 .notifier_call = ima_lsm_policy_change,
45 static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
47 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
53 if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
54 if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0) {
55 ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
56 } else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) {
57 ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
59 pr_err("invalid hash algorithm \"%s\" for template \"%s\"",
60 str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME);
66 i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, str);
68 pr_err("invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", str);
77 __setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
79 enum hash_algo ima_get_current_hash_algo(void)
84 /* Prevent mmap'ing a file execute that is already mmap'ed write */
85 static int mmap_violation_check(enum ima_hooks func, struct file *file,
86 char **pathbuf, const char **pathname,
92 if ((func == MMAP_CHECK) && mapping_writably_mapped(file->f_mapping)) {
94 inode = file_inode(file);
96 if (!*pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
97 *pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf,
99 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, *pathname,
100 "mmap_file", "mmapped_writers", rc, 0);
106 * ima_rdwr_violation_check
108 * Only invalidate the PCR for measured files:
109 * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
110 * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
111 * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
112 * could result in a file measurement error.
115 static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file,
116 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
119 const char **pathname,
122 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
123 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
124 bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false;
126 if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
127 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
129 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
130 /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */
131 if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE,
132 &iint->atomic_flags))
137 set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags);
138 if (inode_is_open_for_write(inode) && must_measure)
142 if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
145 *pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, pathbuf, filename);
148 ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
149 "invalid_pcr", "ToMToU");
151 ima_add_violation(file, *pathname, iint,
152 "invalid_pcr", "open_writers");
155 static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
156 struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
158 fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
161 if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
164 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
165 if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) {
166 update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR,
167 &iint->atomic_flags);
168 if (!IS_I_VERSION(inode) ||
169 !inode_eq_iversion(inode, iint->version) ||
170 (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
171 iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
172 iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
174 ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
177 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
181 * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
182 * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
184 * Flag files that changed, based on i_version
186 void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
188 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
189 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
191 if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
194 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
198 ima_check_last_writer(iint, inode, file);
201 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
202 u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
205 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
206 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
207 struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = NULL;
208 char *pathbuf = NULL;
209 char filename[NAME_MAX];
210 const char *pathname = NULL;
211 int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0;
212 int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
213 struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
214 struct modsig *modsig = NULL;
216 bool violation_check;
217 enum hash_algo hash_algo;
218 unsigned int allowed_algos = 0;
220 if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
223 /* Return an IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE, IMA_AUDIT action
224 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
225 * Included is the appraise submask.
227 action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(file), inode, cred, secid,
228 mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
230 violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
231 (ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
232 if (!action && !violation_check)
235 must_appraise = action & IMA_APPRAISE;
237 /* Is the appraise rule hook specific? */
238 if (action & IMA_FILE_APPRAISE)
244 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
249 if (!rc && violation_check)
250 ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE,
251 &pathbuf, &pathname, filename);
260 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
262 if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags))
263 /* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */
264 iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED |
265 IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK |
266 IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS);
269 * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the
270 * kernel has no way of detecting file change on the filesystem.
271 * (Limited to privileged mounted filesystems.)
273 if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags) ||
274 ((inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_IMA_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE) &&
275 !(inode->i_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_UNTRUSTED_MOUNTER) &&
276 !(action & IMA_FAIL_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGS))) {
277 iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
278 iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
281 /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask
282 * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED,
283 * IMA_AUDIT, IMA_AUDITED)
285 iint->flags |= action;
286 action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
287 action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
289 /* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */
290 if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)))
291 action ^= IMA_MEASURE;
293 /* HASH sets the digital signature and update flags, nothing else */
294 if ((action & IMA_HASH) &&
295 !(test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))) {
296 xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file),
297 &xattr_value, xattr_len);
298 if ((xattr_value && xattr_len > 2) &&
299 (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG))
300 set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);
301 iint->flags |= IMA_HASHED;
303 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
306 /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
309 rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf,
310 &pathname, filename);
312 rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, func);
317 if ((action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) ||
318 strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) != 0) {
319 /* read 'security.ima' */
320 xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file),
321 &xattr_value, xattr_len);
324 * Read the appended modsig if allowed by the policy, and allow
325 * an additional measurement list entry, if needed, based on the
326 * template format and whether the file was already measured.
328 if (iint->flags & IMA_MODSIG_ALLOWED) {
329 rc = ima_read_modsig(func, buf, size, &modsig);
331 if (!rc && ima_template_has_modsig(template_desc) &&
332 iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
333 action |= IMA_MEASURE;
337 hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len);
339 rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo, modsig);
343 if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */
344 pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
346 if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
347 ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
348 xattr_value, xattr_len, modsig, pcr,
350 if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) {
351 rc = ima_check_blacklist(iint, modsig, pcr);
354 rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file,
355 pathname, xattr_value,
360 rc = mmap_violation_check(func, file, &pathbuf,
361 &pathname, filename);
363 if (action & IMA_AUDIT)
364 ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname);
366 if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO))
369 /* Ensure the digest was generated using an allowed algorithm */
370 if (rc == 0 && must_appraise && allowed_algos != 0 &&
371 (allowed_algos & (1U << hash_algo)) == 0) {
374 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, file_inode(file),
375 pathname, "collect_data",
376 "denied-hash-algorithm", rc, 0);
379 if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) &&
380 !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE))
382 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
384 ima_free_modsig(modsig);
389 if (rc && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
391 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
392 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
398 * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
399 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
400 * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
402 * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
405 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
406 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
408 int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
412 if (file && (prot & PROT_EXEC)) {
413 security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
414 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
415 0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
422 * ima_file_mprotect - based on policy, limit mprotect change
423 * @vma: vm_area_struct protection is set to
424 * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
426 * Files can be mmap'ed read/write and later changed to execute to circumvent
427 * IMA's mmap appraisal policy rules. Due to locking issues (mmap semaphore
428 * would be taken before i_mutex), files can not be measured or appraised at
429 * this point. Eliminate this integrity gap by denying the mprotect
430 * PROT_EXECUTE change, if an mmap appraise policy rule exists.
432 * On mprotect change success, return 0. On failure, return -EACESS.
434 int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)
436 struct ima_template_desc *template = NULL;
438 char filename[NAME_MAX];
439 char *pathbuf = NULL;
440 const char *pathname = NULL;
447 /* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */
448 if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !vma->vm_file ||
449 !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
452 security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
453 inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
454 action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_user_ns(vma->vm_file), inode,
455 current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
456 &pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
458 /* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
459 if (!(action & (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)))
462 if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
466 pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename);
467 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, pathname,
468 "collect_data", "failed-mprotect", result, 0);
476 * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
477 * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
479 * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
480 * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
481 * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
482 * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
483 * what is being executed.
485 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
486 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
488 int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
493 security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
494 ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
495 MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
499 security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
500 return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
501 MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
505 * ima_file_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
506 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured
507 * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC or MAY_APPEND
509 * Measure files based on the ima_must_measure() policy decision.
511 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
512 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
514 int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
518 security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
519 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
520 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
521 MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
523 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
525 static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf,
528 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = NULL, tmp_iint;
531 if (ima_policy_flag) {
532 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
534 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
537 if ((!iint || !(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) && file) {
539 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
541 memset(&tmp_iint, 0, sizeof(tmp_iint));
542 tmp_iint.inode = inode;
543 mutex_init(&tmp_iint.mutex);
545 rc = ima_collect_measurement(&tmp_iint, file, NULL, 0,
546 ima_hash_algo, NULL);
548 /* ima_hash could be allocated in case of failure. */
550 kfree(tmp_iint.ima_hash);
556 mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
563 * ima_file_hash can be called when ima_collect_measurement has still
564 * not been called, we might not always have a hash.
566 if (!iint->ima_hash) {
567 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
574 copied_size = min_t(size_t, iint->ima_hash->length, buf_size);
575 memcpy(buf, iint->ima_hash->digest, copied_size);
577 hash_algo = iint->ima_hash->algo;
578 mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
580 if (iint == &tmp_iint)
581 kfree(iint->ima_hash);
587 * ima_file_hash - return a measurement of the file
588 * @file: pointer to the file
589 * @buf: buffer in which to store the hash
590 * @buf_size: length of the buffer
592 * On success, return the hash algorithm (as defined in the enum hash_algo).
593 * If buf is not NULL, this function also outputs the hash into buf.
594 * If the hash is larger than buf_size, then only buf_size bytes will be copied.
595 * It generally just makes sense to pass a buffer capable of holding the largest
596 * possible hash: IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE.
597 * The file hash returned is based on the entire file, including the appended
600 * If the measurement cannot be performed, return -EOPNOTSUPP.
601 * If the parameters are incorrect, return -EINVAL.
603 int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
608 return __ima_inode_hash(file_inode(file), file, buf, buf_size);
610 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_hash);
613 * ima_inode_hash - return the stored measurement if the inode has been hashed
614 * and is in the iint cache.
615 * @inode: pointer to the inode
616 * @buf: buffer in which to store the hash
617 * @buf_size: length of the buffer
619 * On success, return the hash algorithm (as defined in the enum hash_algo).
620 * If buf is not NULL, this function also outputs the hash into buf.
621 * If the hash is larger than buf_size, then only buf_size bytes will be copied.
622 * It generally just makes sense to pass a buffer capable of holding the largest
623 * possible hash: IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE.
624 * The hash returned is based on the entire contents, including the appended
627 * If IMA is disabled or if no measurement is available, return -EOPNOTSUPP.
628 * If the parameters are incorrect, return -EINVAL.
630 int ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, char *buf, size_t buf_size)
635 return __ima_inode_hash(inode, NULL, buf, buf_size);
637 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_inode_hash);
640 * ima_post_create_tmpfile - mark newly created tmpfile as new
641 * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
642 * @inode: inode of the newly created tmpfile
644 * No measuring, appraising or auditing of newly created tmpfiles is needed.
645 * Skip calling process_measurement(), but indicate which newly, created
646 * tmpfiles are in policy.
648 void ima_post_create_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
651 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
654 if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
657 must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
662 /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
663 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
667 /* needed for writing the security xattrs */
668 set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags);
669 iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_PASS;
673 * ima_post_path_mknod - mark as a new inode
674 * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
675 * @dentry: newly created dentry
677 * Mark files created via the mknodat syscall as new, so that the
678 * file data can be written later.
680 void ima_post_path_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
681 struct dentry *dentry)
683 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
684 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
687 if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
690 must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_ACCESS,
695 /* Nothing to do if we can't allocate memory */
696 iint = integrity_inode_get(inode);
700 /* needed for re-opening empty files */
701 iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE;
705 * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy
706 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
707 * @read_id: caller identifier
708 * @contents: whether a subsequent call will be made to ima_post_read_file()
710 * Permit reading a file based on policy. The policy rules are written
711 * in terms of the policy identifier. Appraising the integrity of
712 * a file requires a file descriptor.
714 * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
716 int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
723 * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the
724 * firmware being accessible to the device prior to the completion
725 * of IMA's signature verification any more than when using two
726 * buffers? It may be desirable to include the buffer address
727 * in this API and walk all the dma_map_single() mappings to check.
731 * There will be a call made to ima_post_read_file() with
732 * a filled buffer, so we don't need to perform an extra
738 /* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
739 func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
740 security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
741 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
745 const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {
746 [READING_FIRMWARE] = FIRMWARE_CHECK,
747 [READING_MODULE] = MODULE_CHECK,
748 [READING_KEXEC_IMAGE] = KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK,
749 [READING_KEXEC_INITRAMFS] = KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
750 [READING_POLICY] = POLICY_CHECK
754 * ima_post_read_file - in memory collect/appraise/audit measurement
755 * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit
756 * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
757 * @size: size of in memory file contents
758 * @read_id: caller identifier
760 * Measure/appraise/audit in memory file based on policy. Policy rules
761 * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
763 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
764 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
766 int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
767 enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
772 /* permit signed certs */
773 if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)
776 if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */
777 if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
782 func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
783 security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
784 return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
789 * ima_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
790 * @id: kernel load data caller identifier
791 * @contents: whether the full contents will be available in a later
792 * call to ima_post_load_data().
794 * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the
795 * data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requiring a file
796 * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image).
798 * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES.
800 int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents)
802 bool ima_enforce, sig_enforce;
805 (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) == IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
808 case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE:
809 if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
810 && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
811 pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
815 if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_KEXEC)) {
816 pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n");
817 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
820 case LOADING_FIRMWARE:
821 if (ima_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) && !contents) {
822 pr_err("Prevent firmware sysfs fallback loading.\n");
823 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
827 sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced();
829 if (ima_enforce && (!sig_enforce
830 && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES))) {
831 pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n");
832 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
842 * ima_post_load_data - appraise decision based on policy
843 * @buf: pointer to in memory file contents
844 * @size: size of in memory file contents
845 * @load_id: kernel load data caller identifier
846 * @description: @load_id-specific description of contents
848 * Measure/appraise/audit in memory buffer based on policy. Policy rules
849 * are written in terms of a policy identifier.
851 * On success return 0. On integrity appraisal error, assuming the file
852 * is in policy and IMA-appraisal is in enforcing mode, return -EACCES.
854 int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,
855 enum kernel_load_data_id load_id,
858 if (load_id == LOADING_FIRMWARE) {
859 if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE) &&
860 (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) {
861 pr_err("Prevent firmware loading_store.\n");
862 return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */
871 * process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash
872 * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
873 * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK)
874 * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.
875 * @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
876 * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
878 * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement
879 * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL
880 * @buf_hash: measure buffer data hash
881 * @digest: buffer digest will be written to
882 * @digest_len: buffer length
884 * Based on policy, either the buffer data or buffer data hash is measured
886 * Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, 1 if the digest
887 * has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry,
888 * a negative value otherwise.
890 int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
891 struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,
892 const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func,
893 int pcr, const char *func_data,
894 bool buf_hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len)
897 const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
898 struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
899 struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
900 struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
901 .filename = eventname,
904 struct ima_template_desc *template;
905 struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
906 char digest_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
907 int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
912 if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
915 if (!ima_policy_flag && !digest)
918 template = ima_template_desc_buf();
921 audit_cause = "ima_template_desc_buf";
926 * Both LSM hooks and auxilary based buffer measurements are
927 * based on policy. To avoid code duplication, differentiate
928 * between the LSM hooks and auxilary buffer measurements,
929 * retrieving the policy rule information only for the LSM hook
930 * buffer measurements.
933 security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
934 action = ima_get_action(mnt_userns, inode, current_cred(),
935 secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
937 if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
942 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
944 iint.ima_hash = &hash.hdr;
945 iint.ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
946 iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
948 ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash);
950 audit_cause = "hashing_error";
955 memcpy(digest_hash, hash.hdr.digest, digest_hash_len);
957 ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(digest_hash, digest_hash_len,
960 audit_cause = "hashing_error";
964 event_data.buf = digest_hash;
965 event_data.buf_len = digest_hash_len;
969 memcpy(digest, iint.ima_hash->digest, digest_hash_len);
971 if (!ima_policy_flag || (func && !(action & IMA_MEASURE)))
974 ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
976 audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
980 ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, event_data.buf, pcr);
982 audit_cause = "store_entry";
983 ima_free_template_entry(entry);
988 integrity_audit_message(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname,
989 func_measure_str(func),
990 audit_cause, ret, 0, ret);
996 * ima_kexec_cmdline - measure kexec cmdline boot args
997 * @kernel_fd: file descriptor of the kexec kernel being loaded
998 * @buf: pointer to buffer
999 * @size: size of buffer
1001 * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised.
1003 void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)
1010 f = fdget(kernel_fd);
1014 process_buffer_measurement(file_mnt_user_ns(f.file), file_inode(f.file),
1015 buf, size, "kexec-cmdline", KEXEC_CMDLINE, 0,
1016 NULL, false, NULL, 0);
1021 * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data
1022 * @event_label: unique event label for grouping and limiting critical data
1023 * @event_name: event name for the record in the IMA measurement list
1024 * @buf: pointer to buffer data
1025 * @buf_len: length of buffer data (in bytes)
1026 * @hash: measure buffer data hash
1027 * @digest: buffer digest will be written to
1028 * @digest_len: buffer length
1030 * Measure data critical to the integrity of the kernel into the IMA log
1031 * and extend the pcr. Examples of critical data could be various data
1032 * structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can
1033 * impact the integrity of the system.
1035 * Return: 0 if the buffer has been successfully measured, 1 if the digest
1036 * has been written to the passed location but not added to a measurement entry,
1037 * a negative value otherwise.
1039 int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_label,
1040 const char *event_name,
1041 const void *buf, size_t buf_len,
1042 bool hash, u8 *digest, size_t digest_len)
1044 if (!event_name || !event_label || !buf || !buf_len)
1047 return process_buffer_measurement(&init_user_ns, NULL, buf, buf_len,
1048 event_name, CRITICAL_DATA, 0,
1049 event_label, hash, digest,
1052 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_measure_critical_data);
1054 static int __init init_ima(void)
1058 ima_appraise_parse_cmdline();
1059 ima_init_template_list();
1060 hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
1063 if (error && strcmp(hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo],
1064 CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH) != 0) {
1065 pr_info("Allocating %s failed, going to use default hash algorithm %s\n",
1066 hash_algo_name[ima_hash_algo], CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
1067 hash_setup_done = 0;
1068 hash_setup(CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH);
1075 error = register_blocking_lsm_notifier(&ima_lsm_policy_notifier);
1077 pr_warn("Couldn't register LSM notifier, error %d\n", error);
1080 ima_update_policy_flags();
1085 late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */