1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Copyright (C) 2005-2010 IBM Corporation
6 * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
7 * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
10 * Using root's kernel master key (kmk), calculate the HMAC
13 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "EVM: "fmt
15 #include <linux/export.h>
16 #include <linux/crypto.h>
17 #include <linux/xattr.h>
18 #include <linux/evm.h>
19 #include <keys/encrypted-type.h>
20 #include <crypto/hash.h>
21 #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
24 #define EVMKEY "evm-key"
25 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128
26 static unsigned char evmkey[MAX_KEY_SIZE];
27 static const int evmkey_len = MAX_KEY_SIZE;
29 static struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm;
30 static struct crypto_shash *evm_tfm[HASH_ALGO__LAST];
32 static DEFINE_MUTEX(mutex);
34 #define EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY 0
36 static unsigned long evm_set_key_flags;
38 static const char evm_hmac[] = "hmac(sha1)";
41 * evm_set_key() - set EVM HMAC key from the kernel
42 * @key: pointer to a buffer with the key data
43 * @size: length of the key data
45 * This function allows setting the EVM HMAC key from the kernel
46 * without using the "encrypted" key subsystem keys. It can be used
47 * by the crypto HW kernel module which has its own way of managing
50 * key length should be between 32 and 128 bytes long
52 int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen)
57 if (test_and_set_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags))
60 if (keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE)
62 memcpy(evmkey, key, keylen);
63 evm_initialized |= EVM_INIT_HMAC;
64 pr_info("key initialized\n");
67 clear_bit(EVM_SET_KEY_BUSY, &evm_set_key_flags);
69 pr_err("key initialization failed\n");
72 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(evm_set_key);
74 static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type, uint8_t hash_algo)
78 struct crypto_shash **tfm, *tmp_tfm;
79 struct shash_desc *desc;
81 if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
82 if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) {
83 pr_err_once("HMAC key is not set\n");
84 return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
89 if (hash_algo >= HASH_ALGO__LAST)
90 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
92 tfm = &evm_tfm[hash_algo];
93 algo = hash_algo_name[hash_algo];
102 tmp_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(algo, 0, CRYPTO_NOLOAD);
103 if (IS_ERR(tmp_tfm)) {
104 pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %ld)\n", algo,
106 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
107 return ERR_CAST(tmp_tfm);
109 if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) {
110 rc = crypto_shash_setkey(tmp_tfm, evmkey, evmkey_len);
112 crypto_free_shash(tmp_tfm);
113 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
119 mutex_unlock(&mutex);
121 desc = kmalloc(sizeof(*desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(*tfm),
124 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
128 rc = crypto_shash_init(desc);
136 /* Protect against 'cutting & pasting' security.evm xattr, include inode
139 * (Additional directory/file metadata needs to be added for more complete
142 static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode,
143 char type, char *digest)
153 memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc));
154 /* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable
157 if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) {
158 hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino;
159 hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation;
161 /* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user
162 * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding
163 * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack
164 * where first they are written in an unprivileged fuse mount
165 * of a filesystem and then the system is tricked to mount the
166 * filesystem for real on next boot and trust it because
167 * everything is signed.
169 hmac_misc.uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_uid);
170 hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid);
171 hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode;
172 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc));
173 if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) &&
174 type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
175 crypto_shash_update(desc, (u8 *)&inode->i_sb->s_uuid, UUID_SIZE);
176 crypto_shash_final(desc, digest);
178 pr_debug("hmac_misc: (%zu) [%*phN]\n", sizeof(struct h_misc),
179 (int)sizeof(struct h_misc), &hmac_misc);
183 * Dump large security xattr values as a continuous ascii hexademical string.
184 * (pr_debug is limited to 64 bytes.)
186 static void dump_security_xattr(const char *prefix, const void *src,
189 #if defined(DEBUG) || defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG)
192 p = asciihex = kmalloc(count * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
196 p = bin2hex(p, src, count);
198 pr_debug("%s: (%zu) %.*s\n", prefix, count, (int)count * 2, asciihex);
204 * Calculate the HMAC value across the set of protected security xattrs.
206 * Instead of retrieving the requested xattr, for performance, calculate
207 * the hmac using the requested xattr value. Don't alloc/free memory for
208 * each xattr, but attempt to re-use the previously allocated memory.
210 static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
211 const char *req_xattr_name,
212 const char *req_xattr_value,
213 size_t req_xattr_value_len,
214 uint8_t type, struct evm_digest *data)
216 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
217 struct xattr_list *xattr;
218 struct shash_desc *desc;
219 size_t xattr_size = 0;
220 char *xattr_value = NULL;
222 int size, user_space_size;
223 bool ima_present = false;
225 if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) ||
226 inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns)
229 desc = init_desc(type, data->hdr.algo);
231 return PTR_ERR(desc);
233 data->hdr.length = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
236 list_for_each_entry_lockless(xattr, &evm_config_xattrnames, list) {
239 if (strcmp(xattr->name, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0)
243 * Skip non-enabled xattrs for locally calculated
246 if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !xattr->enabled)
249 if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value)
250 && !strcmp(xattr->name, req_xattr_name)) {
252 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value,
253 req_xattr_value_len);
257 if (req_xattr_value_len < 64)
258 pr_debug("%s: (%zu) [%*phN]\n", req_xattr_name,
260 (int)req_xattr_value_len,
263 dump_security_xattr(req_xattr_name,
265 req_xattr_value_len);
268 size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, xattr->name,
269 &xattr_value, xattr_size, GFP_NOFS);
270 if (size == -ENOMEM) {
277 user_space_size = vfs_getxattr(&init_user_ns, dentry,
278 xattr->name, NULL, 0);
279 if (user_space_size != size)
280 pr_debug("file %s: xattr %s size mismatch (kernel: %d, user: %d)\n",
281 dentry->d_name.name, xattr->name, size,
285 crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size);
290 pr_debug("%s: (%zu) [%*phN]", xattr->name, xattr_size,
291 (int)xattr_size, xattr_value);
293 dump_security_xattr(xattr->name, xattr_value,
296 hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, data->digest);
298 /* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */
299 if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present)
307 int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
308 const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
309 struct evm_digest *data)
311 return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
312 req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, data);
315 int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
316 const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len,
317 char type, struct evm_digest *data)
319 return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value,
320 req_xattr_value_len, type, data);
323 static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
325 const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL;
326 struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
329 iint = integrity_iint_find(inode);
330 if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG))
333 /* Do this the hard way */
334 rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM,
335 (char **)&xattr_data, 0, GFP_NOFS);
341 if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
352 * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr
354 * Expects to be called with i_mutex locked.
356 int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
357 const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
359 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
360 struct evm_digest data;
364 * Don't permit any transformation of the EVM xattr if the signature
365 * is of an immutable type
367 rc = evm_is_immutable(dentry, inode);
373 data.hdr.algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
374 rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
375 xattr_value_len, &data);
377 data.hdr.xattr.sha1.type = EVM_XATTR_HMAC;
378 rc = __vfs_setxattr_noperm(&init_user_ns, dentry,
380 &data.hdr.xattr.data[1],
381 SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE + 1, 0);
382 } else if (rc == -ENODATA && (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) {
383 rc = __vfs_removexattr(&init_user_ns, dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM);
388 int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
391 struct shash_desc *desc;
393 desc = init_desc(EVM_XATTR_HMAC, HASH_ALGO_SHA1);
395 pr_info("init_desc failed\n");
396 return PTR_ERR(desc);
399 crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
400 hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val);
406 * Get the key from the TPM for the SHA1-HMAC
408 int evm_init_key(void)
411 struct encrypted_key_payload *ekp;
414 evm_key = request_key(&key_type_encrypted, EVMKEY, NULL);
418 down_read(&evm_key->sem);
419 ekp = evm_key->payload.data[0];
421 rc = evm_set_key(ekp->decrypted_data, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
423 /* burn the original key contents */
424 memset(ekp->decrypted_data, 0, ekp->decrypted_datalen);
425 up_read(&evm_key->sem);