xen/scsifront: harden driver against malicious backend
[platform/kernel/linux-starfive.git] / security / apparmor / net.c
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /*
3  * AppArmor security module
4  *
5  * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
6  *
7  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
8  * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
9  */
10
11 #include "include/apparmor.h"
12 #include "include/audit.h"
13 #include "include/cred.h"
14 #include "include/label.h"
15 #include "include/net.h"
16 #include "include/policy.h"
17 #include "include/secid.h"
18
19 #include "net_names.h"
20
21
22 struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_network[] = {
23         AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("af_mask",   AA_SFS_AF_MASK),
24         { }
25 };
26
27 static const char * const net_mask_names[] = {
28         "unknown",
29         "send",
30         "receive",
31         "unknown",
32
33         "create",
34         "shutdown",
35         "connect",
36         "unknown",
37
38         "setattr",
39         "getattr",
40         "setcred",
41         "getcred",
42
43         "chmod",
44         "chown",
45         "chgrp",
46         "lock",
47
48         "mmap",
49         "mprot",
50         "unknown",
51         "unknown",
52
53         "accept",
54         "bind",
55         "listen",
56         "unknown",
57
58         "setopt",
59         "getopt",
60         "unknown",
61         "unknown",
62
63         "unknown",
64         "unknown",
65         "unknown",
66         "unknown",
67 };
68
69
70 /* audit callback for net specific fields */
71 void audit_net_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
72 {
73         struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
74
75         if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family])
76                 audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"%s\"",
77                                  address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
78         else
79                 audit_log_format(ab, " family=\"unknown(%d)\"",
80                                  sa->u.net->family);
81         if (sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type])
82                 audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"%s\"",
83                                  sock_type_names[aad(sa)->net.type]);
84         else
85                 audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=\"unknown(%d)\"",
86                                  aad(sa)->net.type);
87         audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", aad(sa)->net.protocol);
88
89         if (aad(sa)->request & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
90                 audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=");
91                 aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request, NULL, 0,
92                                    net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
93
94                 if (aad(sa)->denied & NET_PERMS_MASK) {
95                         audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=");
96                         aa_audit_perm_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied, NULL, 0,
97                                            net_mask_names, NET_PERMS_MASK);
98                 }
99         }
100         if (aad(sa)->peer) {
101                 audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
102                 aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
103                                 FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
104         }
105 }
106
107 /* Generic af perm */
108 int aa_profile_af_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct common_audit_data *sa,
109                        u32 request, u16 family, int type)
110 {
111         struct aa_perms perms = { };
112         unsigned int state;
113         __be16 buffer[2];
114
115         AA_BUG(family >= AF_MAX);
116         AA_BUG(type < 0 || type >= SOCK_MAX);
117
118         if (profile_unconfined(profile))
119                 return 0;
120         state = PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_NET);
121         if (!state)
122                 return 0;
123
124         buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(family);
125         buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16((u16) type);
126         state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
127                                  4);
128         aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
129         aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
130
131         return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
132 }
133
134 int aa_af_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request, u16 family,
135                int type, int protocol)
136 {
137         struct aa_profile *profile;
138         DEFINE_AUDIT_NET(sa, op, NULL, family, type, protocol);
139
140         return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
141                         aa_profile_af_perm(profile, &sa, request, family,
142                                            type));
143 }
144
145 static int aa_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
146                             struct sock *sk)
147 {
148         int error = 0;
149
150         AA_BUG(!label);
151         AA_BUG(!sk);
152
153         if (!unconfined(label)) {
154                 struct aa_profile *profile;
155                 DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
156
157                 error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
158                             aa_profile_af_sk_perm(profile, &sa, request, sk));
159         }
160
161         return error;
162 }
163
164 int aa_sk_perm(const char *op, u32 request, struct sock *sk)
165 {
166         struct aa_label *label;
167         int error;
168
169         AA_BUG(!sk);
170         AA_BUG(in_interrupt());
171
172         /* TODO: switch to begin_current_label ???? */
173         label = begin_current_label_crit_section();
174         error = aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sk);
175         end_current_label_crit_section(label);
176
177         return error;
178 }
179
180
181 int aa_sock_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, const char *op, u32 request,
182                       struct socket *sock)
183 {
184         AA_BUG(!label);
185         AA_BUG(!sock);
186         AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
187
188         return aa_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
189 }
190
191 #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK
192 static int apparmor_secmark_init(struct aa_secmark *secmark)
193 {
194         struct aa_label *label;
195
196         if (secmark->label[0] == '*') {
197                 secmark->secid = AA_SECID_WILDCARD;
198                 return 0;
199         }
200
201         label = aa_label_strn_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label,
202                                     secmark->label, strlen(secmark->label),
203                                     GFP_ATOMIC, false, false);
204
205         if (IS_ERR(label))
206                 return PTR_ERR(label);
207
208         secmark->secid = label->secid;
209
210         return 0;
211 }
212
213 static int aa_secmark_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 request, u32 secid,
214                            struct common_audit_data *sa)
215 {
216         int i, ret;
217         struct aa_perms perms = { };
218
219         if (profile->secmark_count == 0)
220                 return 0;
221
222         for (i = 0; i < profile->secmark_count; i++) {
223                 if (!profile->secmark[i].secid) {
224                         ret = apparmor_secmark_init(&profile->secmark[i]);
225                         if (ret)
226                                 return ret;
227                 }
228
229                 if (profile->secmark[i].secid == secid ||
230                     profile->secmark[i].secid == AA_SECID_WILDCARD) {
231                         if (profile->secmark[i].deny)
232                                 perms.deny = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
233                         else
234                                 perms.allow = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
235
236                         if (profile->secmark[i].audit)
237                                 perms.audit = ALL_PERMS_MASK;
238                 }
239         }
240
241         aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
242
243         return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_net_cb);
244 }
245
246 int apparmor_secmark_check(struct aa_label *label, char *op, u32 request,
247                            u32 secid, const struct sock *sk)
248 {
249         struct aa_profile *profile;
250         DEFINE_AUDIT_SK(sa, op, sk);
251
252         return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
253                                     aa_secmark_perm(profile, request, secid,
254                                                     &sa));
255 }
256 #endif