ASoC: meson: axg-frddr: set fifo depth according to the period
[platform/kernel/linux-starfive.git] / security / apparmor / ipc.c
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
2 /*
3  * AppArmor security module
4  *
5  * This file contains AppArmor ipc mediation
6  *
7  * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
8  * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd.
9  */
10
11 #include <linux/gfp.h>
12 #include <linux/ptrace.h>
13
14 #include "include/audit.h"
15 #include "include/capability.h"
16 #include "include/cred.h"
17 #include "include/policy.h"
18 #include "include/ipc.h"
19 #include "include/sig_names.h"
20
21 /**
22  * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
23  * @mask: permission mask to convert
24  *
25  * Returns: pointer to static string
26  */
27 static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
28 {
29         switch (mask) {
30         case MAY_READ:
31                 return "read";
32         case MAY_WRITE:
33                 return "trace";
34         case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
35                 return "readby";
36         case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
37                 return "tracedby";
38         }
39         return "";
40 }
41
42 /* call back to audit ptrace fields */
43 static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
44 {
45         struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
46
47         if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
48                 audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
49                                  audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
50
51                 if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
52                         audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
53                                          audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
54                 }
55         }
56         audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
57         aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
58                         FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
59 }
60
61 /* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
62 /* TODO: conditionals */
63 static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
64                              struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
65                              struct common_audit_data *sa)
66 {
67         struct aa_perms perms = { };
68
69         aad(sa)->peer = peer;
70         aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
71                                &perms);
72         aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
73         return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
74 }
75
76 static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
77                                struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
78                                struct common_audit_data *sa)
79 {
80         if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
81             !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
82                 return 0;
83
84         return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
85 }
86
87 static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
88                                struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
89                                struct common_audit_data *sa)
90 {
91         if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
92                 return 0;
93
94         if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
95                 return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
96
97         /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
98         if (&tracer->label == tracee)
99                 return 0;
100
101         aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
102         aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
103         aad(sa)->request = 0;
104         aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
105                                     CAP_OPT_NONE);
106
107         return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
108 }
109
110 /**
111  * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
112  * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing  (NOT NULL)
113  * @tracee: task label to be traced
114  * @request: permission request
115  *
116  * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
117  */
118 int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
119                   u32 request)
120 {
121         struct aa_profile *profile;
122         u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
123         DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
124
125         return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
126                         profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
127                         profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
128 }
129
130
131 static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
132 {
133         if (sig > SIGRTMAX)
134                 return SIGUNKNOWN;
135         else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN)
136                 return sig - SIGRTMIN + SIGRT_BASE;
137         else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG)
138                 return sig_map[sig];
139         return SIGUNKNOWN;
140 }
141
142 /**
143  * audit_signal_mask - convert mask to permission string
144  * @mask: permission mask to convert
145  *
146  * Returns: pointer to static string
147  */
148 static const char *audit_signal_mask(u32 mask)
149 {
150         if (mask & MAY_READ)
151                 return "receive";
152         if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
153                 return "send";
154         return "";
155 }
156
157 /**
158  * audit_cb - call back for signal specific audit fields
159  * @ab: audit_buffer  (NOT NULL)
160  * @va: audit struct to audit values of  (NOT NULL)
161  */
162 static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
163 {
164         struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
165
166         if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
167                 audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
168                                  audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->request));
169                 if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) {
170                         audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
171                                          audit_signal_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
172                 }
173         }
174         if (aad(sa)->signal == SIGUNKNOWN)
175                 audit_log_format(ab, "signal=unknown(%d)",
176                                  aad(sa)->unmappedsig);
177         else if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIGNAME)
178                 audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]);
179         else
180                 audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d",
181                                  aad(sa)->signal - SIGRT_BASE);
182         audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
183         aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
184                         FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
185 }
186
187 static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
188                                struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
189                                struct common_audit_data *sa)
190 {
191         struct aa_perms perms;
192         unsigned int state;
193
194         if (profile_unconfined(profile) ||
195             !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL))
196                 return 0;
197
198         aad(sa)->peer = peer;
199         /* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */
200         state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa,
201                             profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL],
202                             aad(sa)->signal);
203         aa_label_match(profile, peer, state, false, request, &perms);
204         aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
205         return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb);
206 }
207
208 int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig)
209 {
210         struct aa_profile *profile;
211         DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL);
212
213         aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig);
214         aad(&sa)->unmappedsig = sig;
215         return xcheck_labels(sender, target, profile,
216                         profile_signal_perm(profile, target, MAY_WRITE, &sa),
217                         profile_signal_perm(profile, sender, MAY_READ, &sa));
218 }