2 # Security configuration
5 menu "Security options"
7 source security/keys/Kconfig
9 config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
10 bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
13 This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
16 If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
17 unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
19 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
22 bool "Enable different security models"
26 This allows you to choose different security modules to be
27 configured into your kernel.
29 If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
32 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
34 config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
40 bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
42 This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
43 the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is
44 not used by SELinux or SMACK.
46 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
48 config SECURITY_NETWORK
49 bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
52 This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
53 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
54 implement socket and networking access controls.
55 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
57 config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
58 bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
59 depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
61 This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
62 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
63 implement per-packet access controls based on labels
64 derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
65 designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
66 to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
68 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
71 bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
74 This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
75 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
76 implement pathname based access controls.
77 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
80 bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
81 depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
83 This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
84 Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
85 Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
86 of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
89 Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
90 initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
91 create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
92 helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
93 correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
96 Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
97 confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
98 it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
99 providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
101 See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
103 See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
104 See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
105 Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
107 If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
109 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
110 int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
111 depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
112 default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
115 This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
116 from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
117 can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
119 For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
120 a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
121 On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
122 Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
123 this low address space will need the permission specific to the
126 config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
129 The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
130 validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
131 support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
133 config HARDENED_USERCOPY
134 bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
135 depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
138 This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
139 copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
140 copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
141 are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
142 separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack,
143 or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
144 of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
146 config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
147 bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
148 depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
151 When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
152 hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
153 however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all
154 been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
155 trying to find such users.
157 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
158 bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
160 By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
161 binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
162 interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
163 either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
164 option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
165 runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
166 To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
167 calls through a single executable that can not have its name
170 Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
171 "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
172 passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
173 and choose what real programs are called.
175 If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
176 disabled, choose this option and then set
177 STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
179 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
180 string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
181 depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
182 default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
184 The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
185 program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will
186 be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
189 If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
190 specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
192 source security/selinux/Kconfig
193 source security/smack/Kconfig
194 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
195 source security/apparmor/Kconfig
196 source security/loadpin/Kconfig
197 source security/yama/Kconfig
199 source security/integrity/Kconfig
202 prompt "Default security module"
203 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
204 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
205 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
206 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
207 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
210 Select the security module that will be used by default if the
211 kernel parameter security= is not specified.
213 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
214 bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
216 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
217 bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
219 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
220 bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
222 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
223 bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
225 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
226 bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
230 config DEFAULT_SECURITY
232 default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
233 default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
234 default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
235 default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
236 default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC