2 # Security configuration
5 menu "Security options"
7 source security/keys/Kconfig
9 config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
10 bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
13 This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
16 If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
17 unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
19 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
22 bool "Enable different security models"
26 This allows you to choose different security modules to be
27 configured into your kernel.
29 If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
32 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
34 config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
40 bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
42 This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
43 the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is
44 not used by SELinux or SMACK.
46 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
48 config SECURITY_NETWORK
49 bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
52 This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
53 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
54 implement socket and networking access controls.
55 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
57 config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
58 bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
60 depends on X86_64 && !UML
62 This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
63 ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
66 See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details.
68 config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
69 bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
70 depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
72 This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
73 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
74 implement Infiniband access controls.
75 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
77 config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
78 bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
79 depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
81 This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
82 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
83 implement per-packet access controls based on labels
84 derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
85 designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
86 to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
88 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
91 bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
94 This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
95 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
96 implement pathname based access controls.
97 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
100 bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
101 depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
103 This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
104 Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
105 Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
106 of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
109 Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
110 initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
111 create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
112 helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
113 correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
114 of the kernel itself.
116 Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
117 confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
118 it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
119 providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
121 See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
123 See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
124 See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
125 Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
127 If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
129 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
130 int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
131 depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
132 default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
135 This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
136 from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
137 can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
139 For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
140 a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
141 On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
142 Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
143 this low address space will need the permission specific to the
146 config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
149 The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
150 validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
151 support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
153 config HARDENED_USERCOPY
154 bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
155 depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
159 This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
160 copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
161 copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
162 are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
163 separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
164 or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
165 of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
167 config HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK
168 bool "Allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size"
169 depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
172 This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists
173 to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of
174 rejecting the copy, falling back to non-whitelisted hardened
175 usercopy that checks the slab allocation size instead of the
176 whitelist size. This option will be removed once it seems like
177 all missing usercopy whitelists have been identified and fixed.
178 Booting with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=Y/N" can change
181 config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
182 bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
183 depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
186 When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
187 hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
188 however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all
189 been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
190 trying to find such users.
192 config FORTIFY_SOURCE
193 bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
194 depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
196 Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
197 where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
199 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
200 bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
202 By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
203 binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
204 interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
205 either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
206 option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
207 runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
208 To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
209 calls through a single executable that can not have its name
212 Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
213 "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
214 passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
215 and choose what real programs are called.
217 If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
218 disabled, choose this option and then set
219 STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
221 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
222 string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
223 depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
224 default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
226 The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
227 program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will
228 be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
231 If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
232 specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
234 source security/selinux/Kconfig
235 source security/smack/Kconfig
236 source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
237 source security/apparmor/Kconfig
238 source security/loadpin/Kconfig
239 source security/yama/Kconfig
241 source security/integrity/Kconfig
244 prompt "Default security module"
245 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
246 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
247 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
248 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
249 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
252 Select the security module that will be used by default if the
253 kernel parameter security= is not specified.
255 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
256 bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
258 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
259 bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
261 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
262 bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
264 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
265 bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
267 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
268 bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
272 config DEFAULT_SECURITY
274 default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
275 default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
276 default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
277 default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
278 default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC