1 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 # Security configuration
6 menu "Security options"
8 source "security/keys/Kconfig"
10 config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
11 bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
14 This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
17 If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
18 unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
20 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
23 bool "Enable different security models"
27 This allows you to choose different security modules to be
28 configured into your kernel.
30 If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
33 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
36 bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
38 This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
39 various security modules (AppArmor, IMA, SafeSetID, TOMOYO, TPM).
41 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
43 config SECURITY_NETWORK
44 bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
47 This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
48 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
49 implement socket and networking access controls.
50 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
52 config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
53 bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
54 depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
56 This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
57 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
58 implement Infiniband access controls.
59 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
61 config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
62 bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
63 depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
65 This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
66 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
67 implement per-packet access controls based on labels
68 derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are
69 designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
70 to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
72 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
75 bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
78 This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
79 If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
80 implement pathname based access controls.
81 If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
84 bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
85 depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
87 This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
88 Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
89 Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
90 of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
93 Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
94 initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to
95 create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
96 helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
97 correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
100 Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
101 confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
102 it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
103 providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
105 See <https://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
107 See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
108 See Documentation/arch/x86/intel_txt.rst for a description of how to enable
109 Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
111 If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
113 config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
114 int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
115 depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
116 default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
119 This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
120 from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
121 can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
123 For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
124 a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
125 On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
126 Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
127 this low address space will need the permission specific to the
130 config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
133 The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
134 validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
135 support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
137 config HARDENED_USERCOPY
138 bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
139 depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
142 This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
143 copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
144 copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
145 are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
146 separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
147 or are part of the kernel text. This prevents entire classes
148 of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
150 config FORTIFY_SOURCE
151 bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
152 depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
153 # https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459
154 depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 120001
155 # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/53645
156 depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || !X86_32
158 Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
159 where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
161 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
162 bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
164 By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
165 binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
166 interface. Some of these binaries are statically defined
167 either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
168 option. However, some of these are dynamically created at
169 runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
170 To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
171 calls through a single executable that can not have its name
174 Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
175 "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
176 passed to it. If desired, this program can filter and pick
177 and choose what real programs are called.
179 If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
180 disabled, choose this option and then set
181 STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
183 config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
184 string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
185 depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
186 default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
188 The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
189 program is wish to be run. The "real" application's name will
190 be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
193 If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
194 specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
196 source "security/selinux/Kconfig"
197 source "security/smack/Kconfig"
198 source "security/tomoyo/Kconfig"
199 source "security/apparmor/Kconfig"
200 source "security/loadpin/Kconfig"
201 source "security/yama/Kconfig"
202 source "security/safesetid/Kconfig"
203 source "security/lockdown/Kconfig"
204 source "security/landlock/Kconfig"
206 source "security/integrity/Kconfig"
209 prompt "First legacy 'major LSM' to be initialized"
210 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
211 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
212 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
213 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
214 default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
217 This choice is there only for converting CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY
218 in old kernel configs to CONFIG_LSM in new kernel configs. Don't
219 change this choice unless you are creating a fresh kernel config,
220 for this choice will be ignored after CONFIG_LSM has been set.
222 Selects the legacy "major security module" that will be
223 initialized first. Overridden by non-default CONFIG_LSM.
225 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
226 bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
228 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
229 bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
231 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
232 bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
234 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
235 bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
237 config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
238 bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
243 string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
244 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,smack,selinux,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
245 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,apparmor,selinux,smack,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
246 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,tomoyo,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
247 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,bpf" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
248 default "landlock,lockdown,yama,loadpin,safesetid,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor,bpf"
250 A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
251 Any LSMs left off this list, except for those with order
252 LSM_ORDER_FIRST and LSM_ORDER_LAST, which are always enabled
253 if selected in the kernel configuration, will be ignored.
254 This can be controlled at boot with the "lsm=" parameter.
256 If unsure, leave this as the default.
258 source "security/Kconfig.hardening"