2 * OpenConnect (SSL + DTLS) VPN client
4 * Copyright © 2008-2012 Intel Corporation.
6 * Author: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
8 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
9 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License
10 * version 2.1, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
13 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
15 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
18 * License along with this library; if not, write to:
20 * Free Software Foundation, Inc.
21 * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
22 * Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
26 #include <sys/types.h>
27 #include <netinet/in.h>
28 #include <arpa/inet.h>
31 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
32 #include <openssl/err.h>
33 #include <openssl/engine.h>
34 #include <openssl/evp.h>
35 #include <openssl/rand.h>
36 #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
37 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
38 #include <openssl/x509.h>
39 #include <openssl/bio.h>
41 #include "openconnect-internal.h"
43 int openconnect_sha1(unsigned char *result, void *data, int len)
48 EVP_Digest(data, len, result, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
49 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
54 int openconnect_get_cert_DER(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
55 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, unsigned char **buf)
57 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
61 if (!i2d_X509_bio(bp, cert)) {
66 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &certinfo);
73 memcpy(*buf, certinfo->data, l);
78 int openconnect_random(void *bytes, int len)
80 if (RAND_bytes(bytes, len) != 1)
85 /* Helper functions for reading/writing lines over SSL.
86 We could use cURL for the HTTP stuff, but it's overkill */
88 int openconnect_SSL_write(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
90 size_t orig_len = len;
93 int done = SSL_write(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf, len);
98 int err = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, done);
99 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
100 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
105 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
106 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
107 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
108 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
110 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to write to SSL socket"));
111 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
114 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
115 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
116 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
117 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
119 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
120 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
121 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
122 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL write cancelled\n"));
130 int openconnect_SSL_read(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
134 while ((done = SSL_read(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf, len)) == -1) {
135 int err = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, done);
136 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
137 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
142 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
143 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
144 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
145 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
147 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to read from SSL socket"));
148 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
151 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
152 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
153 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
154 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
156 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
157 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
158 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
159 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL read cancelled\n"));
166 int openconnect_SSL_gets(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
175 ret = SSL_read(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf + i, 1);
177 if (buf[i] == '\n') {
179 if (i && buf[i-1] == '\r') {
192 fd_set rd_set, wr_set;
193 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
198 ret = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, ret);
199 if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
200 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
201 else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
202 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
204 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to read from SSL socket\n"));
205 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
209 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
210 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
211 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
212 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
214 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
215 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
216 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
217 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL read cancelled\n"));
228 /* UI handling. All this just to handle the PIN callback from the TPM ENGINE,
229 and turn it into a call to our ->process_auth_form function */
232 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo;
233 struct oc_form_opt **last_opt;
234 struct oc_auth_form form;
238 struct oc_form_opt opt;
242 /* Ick. But there is no way to pass this sanely through OpenSSL */
243 static struct openconnect_info *ui_vpninfo;
245 static int ui_open(UI *ui)
247 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = ui_vpninfo; /* Ick */
248 struct ui_data *ui_data;
250 if (!vpninfo || !vpninfo->process_auth_form)
253 ui_data = malloc(sizeof(*ui_data));
257 memset(ui_data, 0, sizeof(*ui_data));
258 ui_data->last_opt = &ui_data->form.opts;
259 ui_data->vpninfo = vpninfo;
260 ui_data->form.auth_id = (char *)"openssl_ui";
261 UI_add_user_data(ui, ui_data);
266 static int ui_write(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
268 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
269 struct ui_form_opt *opt;
271 switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
273 ui_data->form.error = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
276 ui_data->form.message = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
279 opt = malloc(sizeof(*opt));
282 memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
284 opt->opt.label = opt->opt.name = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
285 if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO)
286 opt->opt.type = OC_FORM_OPT_TEXT;
288 opt->opt.type = OC_FORM_OPT_PASSWORD;
289 *(ui_data->last_opt) = &opt->opt;
290 ui_data->last_opt = &opt->opt.next;
294 fprintf(stderr, "Unhandled SSL UI request type %d\n",
295 UI_get_string_type(uis));
301 static int ui_flush(UI *ui)
303 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
304 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = ui_data->vpninfo;
305 struct ui_form_opt *opt;
308 ret = vpninfo->process_auth_form(vpninfo->cbdata, &ui_data->form);
312 for (opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)ui_data->form.opts; opt;
313 opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)opt->opt.next) {
314 if (opt->opt.value && opt->uis)
315 UI_set_result(ui, opt->uis, opt->opt.value);
320 static int ui_close(UI *ui)
322 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
323 struct ui_form_opt *opt, *next_opt;
325 opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)ui_data->form.opts;
327 next_opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)opt->opt.next;
329 free(opt->opt.value);
334 UI_add_user_data(ui, NULL);
339 static UI_METHOD *create_openssl_ui(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
341 UI_METHOD *ui_method = UI_create_method((char *)"AnyConnect VPN UI");
343 /* There is a race condition here because of the use of the
344 static ui_vpninfo pointer. This sucks, but it's OpenSSL's
345 fault and in practice it's *never* going to hurt us.
347 This UI is only used for loading certificates from a TPM; for
348 PKCS#12 and PEM files we hook the passphrase request differently.
349 The ui_vpninfo variable is set here, and is used from ui_open()
350 when the TPM ENGINE decides it needs to ask the user for a PIN.
352 The race condition exists because theoretically, there
353 could be more than one thread using libopenconnect and
354 trying to authenticate to a VPN server, within the *same*
355 process. And if *both* are using certificates from the TPM,
356 and *both* manage to be within that short window of time
357 between setting ui_vpninfo and invoking ui_open() to fetch
358 the PIN, then one connection's ->process_auth_form() could
359 get a PIN request for the *other* connection.
361 However, the only thing that ever does run libopenconnect more
362 than once from the same process is KDE's NetworkManager support,
363 and NetworkManager doesn't *support* having more than one VPN
364 connected anyway, so first that would have to be fixed and then
365 you'd have to connect to two VPNs simultaneously by clicking
366 'connect' on both at *exactly* the same time and then getting
369 Oh, and the KDE support won't be using OpenSSL anyway because of
370 licensing conflicts... so although this sucks, I'm not going to
373 ui_vpninfo = vpninfo;
375 /* Set up a UI method of our own for password/passphrase requests */
376 UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, ui_open);
377 UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ui_write);
378 UI_method_set_flusher(ui_method, ui_flush);
379 UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, ui_close);
384 static int pem_pw_cb(char *buf, int len, int w, void *v)
386 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = v;
390 if (vpninfo->cert_password) {
391 pass = vpninfo->cert_password;
392 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
393 } else if (request_passphrase(vpninfo, "openconnect_pem",
394 &pass, _("Enter PEM pass phrase:")))
400 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
401 _("PEM password too long (%d >= %d)\n"),
407 memcpy(buf, pass, plen+1);
412 static int load_pkcs12_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, PKCS12 *p12)
414 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
420 pass = vpninfo->cert_password;
421 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
423 /* We do this every time round the loop, to work around a bug in
424 OpenSSL < 1.0.0-beta2 -- where the stack at *ca will be freed
425 when PKCS12_parse() returns an error, but *ca is left pointing
426 to the freed memory. */
428 if (!pass && request_passphrase(vpninfo, "openconnect_pkcs12", &pass,
429 _("Enter PKCS#12 pass phrase:")) < 0) {
433 if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, &pkey, &cert, &ca)) {
434 unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
436 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
438 if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PKCS12 &&
439 ERR_GET_FUNC(err) == PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE &&
440 ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE) {
441 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
442 _("Parse PKCS#12 failed (wrong passphrase?)\n"));
448 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
449 _("Parse PKCS#12 failed (see above errors)\n"));
457 vpninfo->cert_x509 = cert;
458 SSL_CTX_use_certificate(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert);
459 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
460 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
461 _("Using client certificate '%s'\n"), buf);
463 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
464 _("PKCS#12 contained no certificate!"));
469 SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(vpninfo->https_ctx, pkey);
472 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
473 _("PKCS#12 contained no private key!"));
477 /* Only include supporting certificates which are actually necessary */
481 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) {
482 X509 *cert2 = sk_X509_value(ca, i);
483 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert) == X509_V_OK) {
488 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert2) == X509_V_OK)
491 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert2),
493 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_DEBUG,
494 _("Extra cert from PKCS#12: '%s'\n"), buf);
495 CRYPTO_add(&cert2->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
496 SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert2);
501 sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
509 static int load_tpm_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
513 UI_METHOD *meth = NULL;
516 ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
518 e = ENGINE_by_id("tpm");
520 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Can't load TPM engine.\n"));
521 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
524 if (!ENGINE_init(e) || !ENGINE_set_default_RSA(e) ||
525 !ENGINE_set_default_RAND(e)) {
526 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to init TPM engine\n"));
527 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
532 if (vpninfo->cert_password) {
533 if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "PIN", strlen(vpninfo->cert_password),
534 vpninfo->cert_password, NULL, 0)) {
535 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
536 _("Failed to set TPM SRK password\n"));
537 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
539 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
540 free(vpninfo->cert_password);
542 /* Provide our own UI method to handle the PIN callback. */
543 meth = create_openssl_ui(vpninfo);
545 key = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, vpninfo->sslkey, meth, NULL);
547 UI_destroy_method(meth);
549 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
550 _("Failed to load TPM private key\n"));
551 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
555 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(vpninfo->https_ctx, key)) {
556 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Add key from TPM failed\n"));
557 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
567 static int load_tpm_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
569 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
570 _("This version of OpenConnect was built without TPM support\n"));
575 static int reload_pem_cert(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
577 BIO *b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
583 if (BIO_read_filename(b, vpninfo->cert) <= 0) {
586 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
587 _("Failed to reload X509 cert for expiry check\n"));
588 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
591 vpninfo->cert_x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
593 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
596 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(vpninfo->cert_x509), buf, sizeof(buf));
597 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
598 _("Using client certificate '%s'\n"), buf);
603 #ifdef ANDROID_KEYSTORE
604 static BIO *BIO_from_keystore(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, const char *item)
606 char content[KEYSTORE_MESSAGE_SIZE];
609 const char *p = item + 9;
611 /* Skip first two slashes if the user has given it as
612 keystore://foo ... */
617 len = keystore_get(p, strlen(p), content);
619 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
620 _("Failed to lead item '%s' from keystore\n"),
624 if (!(b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) || BIO_write(b, content, len) != len) {
625 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
626 _("Failed to create BIO for keystore item '%s'\n"),
635 static int is_pem_password_error(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
637 unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
639 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
641 #ifndef EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX
642 #define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL
644 /* If the user fat-fingered the passphrase, try again */
645 if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_EVP &&
646 ERR_GET_FUNC(err) == EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX &&
647 ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT) {
648 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
649 _("Loading private key failed (wrong passphrase?)\n"));
653 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
654 _("Loading private key failed (see above errors)\n"));
658 static int load_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
660 if (!strncmp(vpninfo->sslkey, "pkcs11:", 7) ||
661 !strncmp(vpninfo->cert, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
662 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
663 _("This binary built without PKCS#11 support\n"));
667 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
668 _("Using certificate file %s\n"), vpninfo->cert);
670 if (strncmp(vpninfo->cert, "keystore:", 9) &&
671 (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_PKCS12 ||
672 vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) {
676 f = fopen(vpninfo->cert, "r");
678 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
679 _("Failed to open certificate file %s: %s\n"),
680 vpninfo->cert, strerror(errno));
683 p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(f, NULL);
686 return load_pkcs12_certificate(vpninfo, p12);
689 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_PKCS12) {
690 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Read PKCS#12 failed\n"));
691 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
694 /* Clear error and fall through to see if it's a PEM file... */
698 /* It's PEM or TPM now, and either way we need to load the plain cert: */
699 #ifdef ANDROID_KEYSTORE
700 if (!strncmp(vpninfo->cert, "keystore:", 9)) {
701 BIO *b = BIO_from_keystore(vpninfo, vpninfo->cert);
704 vpninfo->cert_x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(b, NULL, pem_pw_cb, vpninfo);
706 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509) {
707 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
708 _("Failed to load X509 certificate from keystore\n"));
709 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
713 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo->cert_x509)) {
714 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
715 _("Failed to use X509 certificate from keystore\n"));
716 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
717 X509_free(vpninfo->cert_x509);
718 vpninfo->cert_x509 = NULL;
722 #endif /* ANDROID_KEYSTORE */
724 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(vpninfo->https_ctx,
726 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
727 _("Loading certificate failed\n"));
728 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
732 /* Ew, we can't get it back from the OpenSSL CTX in any sane fashion */
733 reload_pem_cert(vpninfo);
736 #ifdef ANDROID_KEYSTORE
737 if (!strncmp(vpninfo->sslkey, "keystore:", 9)) {
742 b = BIO_from_keystore(vpninfo, vpninfo->sslkey);
745 key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b, NULL, pem_pw_cb, vpninfo);
748 if (is_pem_password_error(vpninfo))
752 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(vpninfo->https_ctx, key)) {
753 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
754 _("Failed to use private key from keystore\n"));
756 X509_free(vpninfo->cert_x509);
757 vpninfo->cert_x509 = NULL;
764 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
765 FILE *f = fopen(vpninfo->sslkey, "r");
769 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
770 _("Failed to open private key file %s: %s\n"),
771 vpninfo->cert, strerror(errno));
776 while (fgets(buf, 255, f)) {
777 if (!strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN TSS KEY BLOB-----\n")) {
778 vpninfo->cert_type = CERT_TYPE_TPM;
780 } else if (!strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n") ||
781 !strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n") ||
782 !strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----\n")) {
783 vpninfo->cert_type = CERT_TYPE_PEM;
788 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
789 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
790 _("Failed to identify private key type in '%s'\n"),
796 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_TPM)
797 return load_tpm_certificate(vpninfo);
799 /* Standard PEM certificate */
800 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(vpninfo->https_ctx, pem_pw_cb);
801 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo);
803 if (!SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo->sslkey,
805 if (is_pem_password_error(vpninfo))
812 static int get_cert_fingerprint(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
813 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, const EVP_MD *type,
816 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
819 if (!X509_digest(cert, type, md, &n))
822 for (i=0; i < n; i++)
823 sprintf(&buf[i*2], "%02X", md[i]);
828 int get_cert_md5_fingerprint(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
829 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, char *buf)
831 return get_cert_fingerprint(vpninfo, cert, EVP_md5(), buf);
834 int openconnect_get_cert_sha1(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
835 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, char *buf)
837 return get_cert_fingerprint(vpninfo, cert, EVP_sha1(), buf);
840 static int check_server_cert(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, X509 *cert)
842 char fingerprint[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
845 ret = openconnect_get_cert_sha1(vpninfo, cert, fingerprint);
849 if (strcasecmp(vpninfo->servercert, fingerprint)) {
850 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
851 _("Server SSL certificate didn't match: %s\n"), fingerprint);
857 static int match_hostname_elem(const char *hostname, int helem_len,
858 const char *match, int melem_len)
860 if (!helem_len && !melem_len)
863 if (!helem_len || !melem_len)
867 if (match[0] == '*') {
870 for (i = 1 ; i <= helem_len; i++) {
871 if (!match_hostname_elem(hostname + i, helem_len - i,
872 match + 1, melem_len - 1))
878 /* From the NetBSD (5.1) man page for ctype(3):
879 Values of type char or signed char must first be cast to unsigned char,
880 to ensure that the values are within the correct range. The result
881 should then be cast to int to avoid warnings from some compilers.
882 We do indeed get warning "array subscript has type 'char'" without
884 if (toupper((int)(unsigned char)hostname[0]) ==
885 toupper((int)(unsigned char)match[0]))
886 return match_hostname_elem(hostname + 1, helem_len - 1,
887 match + 1, melem_len - 1);
892 static int match_hostname(const char *hostname, const char *match)
895 const char *h_dot, *m_dot;
896 int helem_len, melem_len;
898 h_dot = strchr(hostname, '.');
899 m_dot = strchr(match, '.');
901 if (h_dot && m_dot) {
902 helem_len = h_dot - hostname + 1;
903 melem_len = m_dot - match + 1;
904 } else if (!h_dot && !m_dot) {
905 helem_len = strlen(hostname);
906 melem_len = strlen(match);
911 if (match_hostname_elem(hostname, helem_len,
915 hostname += helem_len;
924 /* cf. RFC2818 and RFC2459 */
925 static int match_cert_hostname(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, X509 *peer_cert)
927 STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
929 ASN1_STRING *subjasn1;
930 char *subjstr = NULL;
933 char addrbuf[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
936 /* Allow GEN_IP in the certificate only if we actually connected
937 by IP address rather than by name. */
938 if (inet_pton(AF_INET, vpninfo->hostname, addrbuf) > 0)
940 else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, vpninfo->hostname, addrbuf) > 0)
942 else if (vpninfo->hostname[0] == '[' &&
943 vpninfo->hostname[strlen(vpninfo->hostname)-1] == ']') {
944 char *p = &vpninfo->hostname[strlen(vpninfo->hostname)-1];
946 if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, vpninfo->hostname + 1, addrbuf) > 0)
951 altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(peer_cert, NID_subject_alt_name,
953 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames); i++) {
954 const GENERAL_NAME *this = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
956 if (this->type == GEN_DNS) {
959 int len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&str, this->d.ia5);
965 /* We don't like names with embedded NUL */
966 if (strlen(str) != len)
969 if (!match_hostname(vpninfo->hostname, str)) {
970 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
971 _("Matched DNS altname '%s'\n"),
973 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
977 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
978 _("No match for altname '%s'\n"),
982 } else if (this->type == GEN_IPADD && addrlen) {
986 if (this->d.ip->length == 4) {
988 } else if (this->d.ip->length == 16) {
991 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
992 _("Certificate has GEN_IPADD altname with bogus length %d\n"),
997 /* We only do this for the debug messages */
998 inet_ntop(family, this->d.ip->data, host, sizeof(host));
1000 if (this->d.ip->length == addrlen &&
1001 !memcmp(addrbuf, this->d.ip->data, addrlen)) {
1002 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1003 _("Matched %s address '%s'\n"),
1004 (family == AF_INET6)?"IPv6":"IPv4",
1006 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
1009 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1010 _("No match for %s address '%s'\n"),
1011 (family == AF_INET6)?"IPv6":"IPv4",
1014 } else if (this->type == GEN_URI) {
1016 char *url_proto, *url_host, *url_path, *url_host2;
1018 int len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&str, this->d.ia5);
1023 /* We don't like names with embedded NUL */
1024 if (strlen(str) != len)
1027 if (internal_parse_url(str, &url_proto, &url_host, &url_port, &url_path, 0)) {
1032 if (!url_proto || strcasecmp(url_proto, "https"))
1035 if (url_port != vpninfo->port)
1038 /* Leave url_host as it was so that it can be freed */
1039 url_host2 = url_host;
1040 if (addrlen == 16 && vpninfo->hostname[0] != '[' &&
1041 url_host[0] == '[' && url_host[strlen(url_host)-1] == ']') {
1042 /* Cope with https://[IPv6]/ when the hostname is bare IPv6 */
1043 url_host[strlen(url_host)-1] = 0;
1047 if (strcasecmp(vpninfo->hostname, url_host2))
1051 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1052 _("URI '%s' has non-empty path; ignoring\n"),
1054 goto no_uri_match_silent;
1056 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1057 _("Matched URI '%s'\n"),
1063 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
1067 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1068 _("No match for URI '%s'\n"),
1070 no_uri_match_silent:
1077 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
1079 /* According to RFC2818, we don't use the legacy subject name if
1080 there was an altname with DNS type. */
1082 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1083 _("No altname in peer cert matched '%s'\n"),
1088 subjname = X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert);
1090 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1091 _("No subject name in peer cert!\n"));
1095 /* Find the _last_ (most specific) commonName */
1098 int j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subjname, NID_commonName, i);
1105 subjasn1 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(subjname, i));
1107 i = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&subjstr, subjasn1);
1109 if (!subjstr || strlen(subjstr) != i) {
1110 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1111 _("Failed to parse subject name in peer cert\n"));
1116 if (match_hostname(vpninfo->hostname, subjstr)) {
1117 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1118 _("Peer cert subject mismatch ('%s' != '%s')\n"),
1119 subjstr, vpninfo->hostname);
1122 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1123 _("Matched peer certificate subject name '%s'\n"),
1127 OPENSSL_free(subjstr);
1131 static int verify_peer(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, SSL *https_ssl)
1136 peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(https_ssl);
1138 if (vpninfo->servercert) {
1139 /* If given a cert fingerprint on the command line, that's
1141 ret = check_server_cert(vpninfo, peer_cert);
1143 int vfy = SSL_get_verify_result(https_ssl);
1144 const char *err_string = NULL;
1146 if (vfy != X509_V_OK)
1147 err_string = X509_verify_cert_error_string(vfy);
1148 else if (match_cert_hostname(vpninfo, peer_cert))
1149 err_string = _("certificate does not match hostname");
1152 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
1153 _("Server certificate verify failed: %s\n"),
1156 if (vpninfo->validate_peer_cert)
1157 ret = vpninfo->validate_peer_cert(vpninfo->cbdata,
1166 X509_free(peer_cert);
1171 static void workaround_openssl_certchain_bug(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1174 /* OpenSSL has problems with certificate chains -- if there are
1175 multiple certs with the same name, it doesn't necessarily
1176 choose the _right_ one. (RT#1942)
1177 Pick the right ones for ourselves and add them manually. */
1178 X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
1180 X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1183 if (!cert || !store)
1186 /* If we already have 'supporting' certs, don't add them again */
1187 if (vpninfo->https_ctx->extra_certs)
1190 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, NULL, NULL))
1193 while (ctx.get_issuer(&cert2, &ctx, cert) == 1) {
1197 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert2) == X509_V_OK)
1200 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
1202 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_DEBUG,
1203 _("Extra cert from cafile: '%s'\n"), buf);
1204 SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert);
1206 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1209 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000
1210 static int ssl_app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
1212 /* We've seen certificates in the wild which don't have the
1213 purpose fields filled in correctly */
1214 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, X509_PURPOSE_ANY);
1215 return X509_verify_cert(ctx);
1219 static int check_certificate_expiry(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
1221 ASN1_TIME *notAfter;
1222 const char *reason = NULL;
1226 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
1230 notAfter = X509_get_notAfter(vpninfo->cert_x509);
1231 i = X509_cmp_time(notAfter, &t);
1233 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1234 _("Error in client cert notAfter field\n"));
1237 reason = _("Client certificate has expired at");
1239 t += vpninfo->cert_expire_warning;
1240 i = X509_cmp_time(notAfter, &t);
1242 reason = _("Client certificate expires soon at");
1246 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1248 const char *expiry = _("<error>");
1252 ASN1_TIME_print(bp, notAfter);
1253 BIO_write(bp, &zero, 1);
1254 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &bm);
1257 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, "%s: %s\n", reason, expiry);
1263 int openconnect_open_https(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
1265 method_const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_method;
1271 if (vpninfo->https_ssl)
1274 if (vpninfo->peer_cert) {
1275 X509_free(vpninfo->peer_cert);
1276 vpninfo->peer_cert = NULL;
1279 ssl_sock = connect_https_socket(vpninfo);
1283 ssl3_method = TLSv1_client_method();
1284 if (!vpninfo->https_ctx) {
1285 vpninfo->https_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(ssl3_method);
1287 /* Some servers (or their firewalls) really don't like seeing
1289 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
1290 SSL_CTX_set_options (vpninfo->https_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
1293 if (vpninfo->cert) {
1294 err = load_certificate(vpninfo);
1296 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1297 _("Loading certificate failed. Aborting.\n"));
1300 check_certificate_expiry(vpninfo);
1303 /* We just want to do:
1304 SSL_CTX_set_purpose(vpninfo->https_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_ANY);
1305 ... but it doesn't work with OpenSSL < 0.9.8k because of
1306 problems with inheritance (fixed in v1.1.4.6 of
1307 crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c) so we have to play silly buggers
1308 instead. This trick doesn't work _either_ in < 0.9.7 but
1309 I don't know of _any_ workaround which will, and can't
1310 be bothered to find out either. */
1311 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000
1312 SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(vpninfo->https_ctx,
1313 ssl_app_verify_callback, NULL);
1315 SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1317 if (vpninfo->cafile) {
1318 if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo->cafile, NULL)) {
1319 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1320 _("Failed to open CA file '%s'\n"),
1322 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
1329 https_ssl = SSL_new(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1330 workaround_openssl_certchain_bug(vpninfo, https_ssl);
1332 https_bio = BIO_new_socket(ssl_sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
1333 BIO_set_nbio(https_bio, 1);
1334 SSL_set_bio(https_ssl, https_bio, https_bio);
1336 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO, _("SSL negotiation with %s\n"),
1339 while ((err = SSL_connect(https_ssl)) <= 0) {
1340 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
1341 int maxfd = ssl_sock;
1346 err = SSL_get_error(https_ssl, err);
1347 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
1348 FD_SET(ssl_sock, &rd_set);
1349 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
1350 FD_SET(ssl_sock, &wr_set);
1352 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL connection failure\n"));
1353 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
1354 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1359 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
1360 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
1361 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > ssl_sock)
1362 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
1364 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
1365 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
1366 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
1367 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL connection cancelled\n"));
1368 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1374 if (verify_peer(vpninfo, https_ssl)) {
1375 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1380 vpninfo->ssl_fd = ssl_sock;
1381 vpninfo->https_ssl = https_ssl;
1383 /* Stash this now, because it might not be available later if the
1384 server has disconnected. */
1385 vpninfo->peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(vpninfo->https_ssl);
1387 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO, _("Connected to HTTPS on %s\n"),
1393 void openconnect_close_https(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, int final)
1395 if (vpninfo->peer_cert) {
1396 X509_free(vpninfo->peer_cert);
1397 vpninfo->peer_cert = NULL;
1399 if (vpninfo->https_ssl) {
1400 SSL_free(vpninfo->https_ssl);
1401 vpninfo->https_ssl = NULL;
1403 if (vpninfo->ssl_fd != -1) {
1404 close(vpninfo->ssl_fd);
1405 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_rfds);
1406 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_wfds);
1407 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_efds);
1408 vpninfo->ssl_fd = -1;
1411 if (vpninfo->https_ctx) {
1412 SSL_CTX_free(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1413 vpninfo->https_ctx = NULL;
1415 if (vpninfo->cert_x509) {
1416 X509_free(vpninfo->cert_x509);
1417 vpninfo->cert_x509 = NULL;
1422 void openconnect_init_ssl(void)
1424 SSL_library_init ();
1426 SSL_load_error_strings ();
1427 OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms ();
1430 char *openconnect_get_cert_details(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1431 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert)
1433 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1438 X509_print_ex(bp, cert, 0, 0);
1439 BIO_write(bp, &zero, 1);
1440 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &certinfo);
1442 ret = strdup(certinfo->data);
1448 int openconnect_local_cert_md5(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1453 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
1456 if (get_cert_md5_fingerprint(vpninfo, vpninfo->cert_x509, buf))