2 * OpenConnect (SSL + DTLS) VPN client
4 * Copyright © 2008-2012 Intel Corporation.
6 * Author: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
8 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
9 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License
10 * version 2.1, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
13 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
15 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
18 * License along with this library; if not, write to:
20 * Free Software Foundation, Inc.
21 * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
22 * Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
26 #include <sys/types.h>
27 #include <netinet/in.h>
28 #include <arpa/inet.h>
31 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
32 #include <openssl/err.h>
33 #include <openssl/engine.h>
34 #include <openssl/evp.h>
35 #include <openssl/rand.h>
36 #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
37 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
38 #include <openssl/x509.h>
39 #include <openssl/bio.h>
41 #include "openconnect-internal.h"
43 int openconnect_sha1(unsigned char *result, void *data, int len)
48 EVP_Digest(data, len, result, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
49 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
54 int openconnect_get_cert_DER(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
55 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, unsigned char **buf)
57 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
61 if (!i2d_X509_bio(bp, cert)) {
66 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &certinfo);
73 memcpy(*buf, certinfo->data, l);
78 int openconnect_random(void *bytes, int len)
80 if (RAND_bytes(bytes, len) != 1)
85 /* Helper functions for reading/writing lines over SSL.
86 We could use cURL for the HTTP stuff, but it's overkill */
88 int openconnect_SSL_write(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
90 size_t orig_len = len;
93 int done = SSL_write(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf, len);
98 int err = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, done);
99 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
100 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
105 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
106 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
107 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
108 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
110 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to write to SSL socket"));
111 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
114 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
115 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
116 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
117 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
119 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
120 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
121 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
122 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL write cancelled\n"));
130 int openconnect_SSL_read(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
134 while ((done = SSL_read(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf, len)) == -1) {
135 int err = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, done);
136 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
137 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
142 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
143 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
144 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
145 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
147 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to read from SSL socket"));
148 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
151 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
152 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
153 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
154 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
156 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
157 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
158 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
159 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL read cancelled\n"));
166 int openconnect_SSL_gets(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
175 ret = SSL_read(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf + i, 1);
177 if (buf[i] == '\n') {
179 if (i && buf[i-1] == '\r') {
192 fd_set rd_set, wr_set;
193 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
198 ret = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, ret);
199 if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
200 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
201 else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
202 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
204 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to read from SSL socket\n"));
205 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
209 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
210 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
211 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
212 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
214 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
215 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
216 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
217 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL read cancelled\n"));
228 /* UI handling. All this just to handle the PIN callback from the TPM ENGINE,
229 and turn it into a call to our ->process_auth_form function */
232 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo;
233 struct oc_form_opt **last_opt;
234 struct oc_auth_form form;
238 struct oc_form_opt opt;
242 /* Ick. But there is no way to pass this sanely through OpenSSL */
243 static struct openconnect_info *ui_vpninfo;
245 static int ui_open(UI *ui)
247 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = ui_vpninfo; /* Ick */
248 struct ui_data *ui_data;
250 if (!vpninfo || !vpninfo->process_auth_form)
253 ui_data = malloc(sizeof(*ui_data));
257 memset(ui_data, 0, sizeof(*ui_data));
258 ui_data->last_opt = &ui_data->form.opts;
259 ui_data->vpninfo = vpninfo;
260 UI_add_user_data(ui, ui_data);
265 static int ui_write(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
267 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
268 struct ui_form_opt *opt;
270 switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
272 ui_data->form.error = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
275 ui_data->form.message = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
278 opt = malloc(sizeof(*opt));
281 memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
283 opt->opt.label = opt->opt.name = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
284 if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO)
285 opt->opt.type = OC_FORM_OPT_TEXT;
287 opt->opt.type = OC_FORM_OPT_PASSWORD;
288 *(ui_data->last_opt) = &opt->opt;
289 ui_data->last_opt = &opt->opt.next;
293 fprintf(stderr, "Unhandled SSL UI request type %d\n",
294 UI_get_string_type(uis));
300 static int ui_flush(UI *ui)
302 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
303 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = ui_data->vpninfo;
304 struct ui_form_opt *opt;
307 ret = vpninfo->process_auth_form(vpninfo->cbdata, &ui_data->form);
311 for (opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)ui_data->form.opts; opt;
312 opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)opt->opt.next) {
313 if (opt->opt.value && opt->uis)
314 UI_set_result(ui, opt->uis, opt->opt.value);
319 static int ui_close(UI *ui)
321 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
322 struct ui_form_opt *opt, *next_opt;
324 opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)ui_data->form.opts;
326 next_opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)opt->opt.next;
328 free(opt->opt.value);
333 UI_add_user_data(ui, NULL);
338 static UI_METHOD *create_openssl_ui(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
340 UI_METHOD *ui_method = UI_create_method((char *)"AnyConnect VPN UI");
342 /* There is a race condition here because of the use of the
343 static ui_vpninfo pointer. This sucks, but it's OpenSSL's
344 fault and in practice it's *never* going to hurt us.
346 This UI is only used for loading certificates from a TPM; for
347 PKCS#12 and PEM files we hook the passphrase request differently.
348 The ui_vpninfo variable is set here, and is used from ui_open()
349 when the TPM ENGINE decides it needs to ask the user for a PIN.
351 The race condition exists because theoretically, there
352 could be more than one thread using libopenconnect and
353 trying to authenticate to a VPN server, within the *same*
354 process. And if *both* are using certificates from the TPM,
355 and *both* manage to be within that short window of time
356 between setting ui_vpninfo and invoking ui_open() to fetch
357 the PIN, then one connection's ->process_auth_form() could
358 get a PIN request for the *other* connection.
360 However, the only thing that ever does run libopenconnect more
361 than once from the same process is KDE's NetworkManager support,
362 and NetworkManager doesn't *support* having more than one VPN
363 connected anyway, so first that would have to be fixed and then
364 you'd have to connect to two VPNs simultaneously by clicking
365 'connect' on both at *exactly* the same time and then getting
368 Oh, and the KDE support won't be using OpenSSL anyway because of
369 licensing conflicts... so although this sucks, I'm not going to
372 ui_vpninfo = vpninfo;
374 /* Set up a UI method of our own for password/passphrase requests */
375 UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, ui_open);
376 UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ui_write);
377 UI_method_set_flusher(ui_method, ui_flush);
378 UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, ui_close);
383 static int pem_pw_cb(char *buf, int len, int w, void *v)
385 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = v;
389 if (vpninfo->cert_password) {
390 pass = vpninfo->cert_password;
391 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
392 } else if (request_passphrase(vpninfo, &pass,
393 _("Enter PEM pass phrase:")))
399 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
400 _("PEM password too long (%d >= %d)\n"),
406 memcpy(buf, pass, plen+1);
411 static int load_pkcs12_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, PKCS12 *p12)
413 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
419 pass = vpninfo->cert_password;
420 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
422 /* We do this every time round the loop, to work around a bug in
423 OpenSSL < 1.0.0-beta2 -- where the stack at *ca will be freed
424 when PKCS12_parse() returns an error, but *ca is left pointing
425 to the freed memory. */
427 if (!pass && request_passphrase(vpninfo, &pass,
428 _("Enter PKCS#12 pass phrase:")) < 0) {
432 if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, &pkey, &cert, &ca)) {
433 unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
435 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
437 if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PKCS12 &&
438 ERR_GET_FUNC(err) == PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE &&
439 ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE) {
440 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
441 _("Parse PKCS#12 failed (wrong passphrase?)\n"));
447 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
448 _("Parse PKCS#12 failed (see above errors)\n"));
454 vpninfo->cert_x509 = cert;
455 SSL_CTX_use_certificate(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert);
456 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
457 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
458 _("Using client certificate '%s'\n"), buf);
460 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
461 _("PKCS#12 contained no certificate!"));
466 SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(vpninfo->https_ctx, pkey);
469 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
470 _("PKCS#12 contained no private key!"));
474 /* Only include supporting certificates which are actually necessary */
478 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) {
479 X509 *cert2 = sk_X509_value(ca, i);
480 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert) == X509_V_OK) {
485 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert2) == X509_V_OK)
488 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert2),
490 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_DEBUG,
491 _("Extra cert from PKCS#12: '%s'\n"), buf);
492 CRYPTO_add(&cert2->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
493 SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert2);
498 sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
506 static int load_tpm_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
510 UI_METHOD *meth = NULL;
511 ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
513 e = ENGINE_by_id("tpm");
515 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Can't load TPM engine.\n"));
516 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
519 if (!ENGINE_init(e) || !ENGINE_set_default_RSA(e) ||
520 !ENGINE_set_default_RAND(e)) {
521 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to init TPM engine\n"));
522 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
527 if (vpninfo->cert_password) {
528 if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "PIN", strlen(vpninfo->cert_password),
529 vpninfo->cert_password, NULL, 0)) {
530 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
531 _("Failed to set TPM SRK password\n"));
532 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
535 /* Provide our own UI method to handle the PIN callback. */
536 meth = create_openssl_ui(vpninfo);
538 key = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, vpninfo->sslkey, meth, NULL);
540 UI_destroy_method(meth);
542 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
543 _("Failed to load TPM private key\n"));
544 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
549 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(vpninfo->https_ctx, key)) {
550 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Add key from TPM failed\n"));
551 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
559 static int load_tpm_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
561 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
562 _("This version of OpenConnect was built without TPM support\n"));
567 static int reload_pem_cert(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
569 BIO *b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
575 if (BIO_read_filename(b, vpninfo->cert) <= 0) {
578 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
579 _("Failed to reload X509 cert for expiry check\n"));
580 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
583 vpninfo->cert_x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
584 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
587 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(vpninfo->cert_x509), buf, sizeof(buf));
588 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
589 _("Using client certificate '%s'\n"), buf);
594 static int load_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
596 if (!strncmp(vpninfo->sslkey, "pkcs11:", 7) ||
597 !strncmp(vpninfo->cert, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
598 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
599 _("This binary built without PKCS#11 support\n"));
603 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
604 _("Using certificate file %s\n"), vpninfo->cert);
606 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_PKCS12 ||
607 vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
611 f = fopen(vpninfo->cert, "r");
613 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
614 _("Failed to open certificate file %s: %s\n"),
615 vpninfo->cert, strerror(errno));
618 p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(f, NULL);
621 return load_pkcs12_certificate(vpninfo, p12);
624 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_PKCS12) {
625 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Read PKCS#12 failed\n"));
626 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
629 /* Clear error and fall through to see if it's a PEM file... */
633 /* It's PEM or TPM now, and either way we need to load the plain cert: */
634 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(vpninfo->https_ctx,
636 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
637 _("Loading certificate failed\n"));
638 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
642 /* Ew, we can't get it back from the OpenSSL CTX in any sane fashion */
643 reload_pem_cert(vpninfo);
645 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
646 FILE *f = fopen(vpninfo->sslkey, "r");
650 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
651 _("Failed to open private key file %s: %s\n"),
652 vpninfo->cert, strerror(errno));
657 while (fgets(buf, 255, f)) {
658 if (!strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN TSS KEY BLOB-----\n")) {
659 vpninfo->cert_type = CERT_TYPE_TPM;
661 } else if (!strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n") ||
662 !strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n") ||
663 !strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----\n")) {
664 vpninfo->cert_type = CERT_TYPE_PEM;
669 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
670 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
671 _("Failed to identify private key type in '%s'\n"),
677 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_TPM)
678 return load_tpm_certificate(vpninfo);
680 /* Standard PEM certificate */
681 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(vpninfo->https_ctx, pem_pw_cb);
682 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo);
684 if (!SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo->sslkey,
686 unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
688 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
690 #ifndef EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX
691 #define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL
693 /* If the user fat-fingered the passphrase, try again */
694 if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_EVP &&
695 ERR_GET_FUNC(err) == EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX &&
696 ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT) {
697 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
698 _("Loading private key failed (wrong passphrase?)\n"));
702 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
703 _("Loading private key failed (see above errors)\n"));
709 static int get_cert_fingerprint(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
710 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, const EVP_MD *type,
713 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
716 if (!X509_digest(cert, type, md, &n))
719 for (i=0; i < n; i++)
720 sprintf(&buf[i*2], "%02X", md[i]);
725 int get_cert_md5_fingerprint(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
726 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, char *buf)
728 return get_cert_fingerprint(vpninfo, cert, EVP_md5(), buf);
731 int openconnect_get_cert_sha1(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
732 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, char *buf)
734 return get_cert_fingerprint(vpninfo, cert, EVP_sha1(), buf);
737 static int check_server_cert(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, X509 *cert)
739 char fingerprint[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
742 ret = openconnect_get_cert_sha1(vpninfo, cert, fingerprint);
746 if (strcasecmp(vpninfo->servercert, fingerprint)) {
747 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
748 _("Server SSL certificate didn't match: %s\n"), fingerprint);
754 static int match_hostname_elem(const char *hostname, int helem_len,
755 const char *match, int melem_len)
757 if (!helem_len && !melem_len)
760 if (!helem_len || !melem_len)
764 if (match[0] == '*') {
767 for (i = 1 ; i <= helem_len; i++) {
768 if (!match_hostname_elem(hostname + i, helem_len - i,
769 match + 1, melem_len - 1))
775 /* From the NetBSD (5.1) man page for ctype(3):
776 Values of type char or signed char must first be cast to unsigned char,
777 to ensure that the values are within the correct range. The result
778 should then be cast to int to avoid warnings from some compilers.
779 We do indeed get warning "array subscript has type 'char'" without
781 if (toupper((int)(unsigned char)hostname[0]) ==
782 toupper((int)(unsigned char)match[0]))
783 return match_hostname_elem(hostname + 1, helem_len - 1,
784 match + 1, melem_len - 1);
789 static int match_hostname(const char *hostname, const char *match)
792 const char *h_dot, *m_dot;
793 int helem_len, melem_len;
795 h_dot = strchr(hostname, '.');
796 m_dot = strchr(match, '.');
798 if (h_dot && m_dot) {
799 helem_len = h_dot - hostname + 1;
800 melem_len = m_dot - match + 1;
801 } else if (!h_dot && !m_dot) {
802 helem_len = strlen(hostname);
803 melem_len = strlen(match);
808 if (match_hostname_elem(hostname, helem_len,
812 hostname += helem_len;
821 /* cf. RFC2818 and RFC2459 */
822 static int match_cert_hostname(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, X509 *peer_cert)
824 STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
826 ASN1_STRING *subjasn1;
827 char *subjstr = NULL;
830 char addrbuf[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
833 /* Allow GEN_IP in the certificate only if we actually connected
834 by IP address rather than by name. */
835 if (inet_pton(AF_INET, vpninfo->hostname, addrbuf) > 0)
837 else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, vpninfo->hostname, addrbuf) > 0)
839 else if (vpninfo->hostname[0] == '[' &&
840 vpninfo->hostname[strlen(vpninfo->hostname)-1] == ']') {
841 char *p = &vpninfo->hostname[strlen(vpninfo->hostname)-1];
843 if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, vpninfo->hostname + 1, addrbuf) > 0)
848 altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(peer_cert, NID_subject_alt_name,
850 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames); i++) {
851 const GENERAL_NAME *this = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
853 if (this->type == GEN_DNS) {
856 int len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&str, this->d.ia5);
862 /* We don't like names with embedded NUL */
863 if (strlen(str) != len)
866 if (!match_hostname(vpninfo->hostname, str)) {
867 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
868 _("Matched DNS altname '%s'\n"),
870 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
874 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
875 _("No match for altname '%s'\n"),
879 } else if (this->type == GEN_IPADD && addrlen) {
883 if (this->d.ip->length == 4) {
885 } else if (this->d.ip->length == 16) {
888 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
889 _("Certificate has GEN_IPADD altname with bogus length %d\n"),
894 /* We only do this for the debug messages */
895 inet_ntop(family, this->d.ip->data, host, sizeof(host));
897 if (this->d.ip->length == addrlen &&
898 !memcmp(addrbuf, this->d.ip->data, addrlen)) {
899 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
900 _("Matched %s address '%s'\n"),
901 (family == AF_INET6)?"IPv6":"IPv4",
903 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
906 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
907 _("No match for %s address '%s'\n"),
908 (family == AF_INET6)?"IPv6":"IPv4",
911 } else if (this->type == GEN_URI) {
913 char *url_proto, *url_host, *url_path, *url_host2;
915 int len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&str, this->d.ia5);
920 /* We don't like names with embedded NUL */
921 if (strlen(str) != len)
924 if (internal_parse_url(str, &url_proto, &url_host, &url_port, &url_path, 0)) {
929 if (!url_proto || strcasecmp(url_proto, "https"))
932 if (url_port != vpninfo->port)
935 /* Leave url_host as it was so that it can be freed */
936 url_host2 = url_host;
937 if (addrlen == 16 && vpninfo->hostname[0] != '[' &&
938 url_host[0] == '[' && url_host[strlen(url_host)-1] == ']') {
939 /* Cope with https://[IPv6]/ when the hostname is bare IPv6 */
940 url_host[strlen(url_host)-1] = 0;
944 if (strcasecmp(vpninfo->hostname, url_host2))
948 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
949 _("URI '%s' has non-empty path; ignoring\n"),
951 goto no_uri_match_silent;
953 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
954 _("Matched URI '%s'\n"),
960 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
964 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
965 _("No match for URI '%s'\n"),
974 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
976 /* According to RFC2818, we don't use the legacy subject name if
977 there was an altname with DNS type. */
979 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
980 _("No altname in peer cert matched '%s'\n"),
985 subjname = X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert);
987 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
988 _("No subject name in peer cert!\n"));
992 /* Find the _last_ (most specific) commonName */
995 int j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subjname, NID_commonName, i);
1002 subjasn1 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(subjname, i));
1004 i = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&subjstr, subjasn1);
1006 if (!subjstr || strlen(subjstr) != i) {
1007 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1008 _("Failed to parse subject name in peer cert\n"));
1013 if (match_hostname(vpninfo->hostname, subjstr)) {
1014 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1015 _("Peer cert subject mismatch ('%s' != '%s')\n"),
1016 subjstr, vpninfo->hostname);
1019 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1020 _("Matched peer certificate subject name '%s'\n"),
1024 OPENSSL_free(subjstr);
1028 static int verify_peer(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, SSL *https_ssl)
1033 peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(https_ssl);
1035 if (vpninfo->servercert) {
1036 /* If given a cert fingerprint on the command line, that's
1038 ret = check_server_cert(vpninfo, peer_cert);
1040 int vfy = SSL_get_verify_result(https_ssl);
1041 const char *err_string = NULL;
1043 if (vfy != X509_V_OK)
1044 err_string = X509_verify_cert_error_string(vfy);
1045 else if (match_cert_hostname(vpninfo, peer_cert))
1046 err_string = _("certificate does not match hostname");
1049 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
1050 _("Server certificate verify failed: %s\n"),
1053 if (vpninfo->validate_peer_cert)
1054 ret = vpninfo->validate_peer_cert(vpninfo->cbdata,
1063 X509_free(peer_cert);
1068 static void workaround_openssl_certchain_bug(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1071 /* OpenSSL has problems with certificate chains -- if there are
1072 multiple certs with the same name, it doesn't necessarily
1073 choose the _right_ one. (RT#1942)
1074 Pick the right ones for ourselves and add them manually. */
1075 X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
1077 X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1080 if (!cert || !store)
1083 /* If we already have 'supporting' certs, don't add them again */
1084 if (vpninfo->https_ctx->extra_certs)
1087 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, NULL, NULL))
1090 while (ctx.get_issuer(&cert2, &ctx, cert) == 1) {
1094 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert2) == X509_V_OK)
1097 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
1099 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_DEBUG,
1100 _("Extra cert from cafile: '%s'\n"), buf);
1101 SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert);
1103 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1106 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000
1107 static int ssl_app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
1109 /* We've seen certificates in the wild which don't have the
1110 purpose fields filled in correctly */
1111 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, X509_PURPOSE_ANY);
1112 return X509_verify_cert(ctx);
1116 static int check_certificate_expiry(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
1118 ASN1_TIME *notAfter;
1119 const char *reason = NULL;
1123 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
1127 notAfter = X509_get_notAfter(vpninfo->cert_x509);
1128 i = X509_cmp_time(notAfter, &t);
1130 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1131 _("Error in client cert notAfter field\n"));
1134 reason = _("Client certificate has expired at");
1136 t += vpninfo->cert_expire_warning;
1137 i = X509_cmp_time(notAfter, &t);
1139 reason = _("Client certificate expires soon at");
1143 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1145 const char *expiry = _("<error>");
1149 ASN1_TIME_print(bp, notAfter);
1150 BIO_write(bp, &zero, 1);
1151 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &bm);
1154 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, "%s: %s\n", reason, expiry);
1160 int openconnect_open_https(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
1162 method_const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_method;
1168 if (vpninfo->https_ssl)
1171 if (vpninfo->peer_cert) {
1172 X509_free(vpninfo->peer_cert);
1173 vpninfo->peer_cert = NULL;
1176 ssl_sock = connect_https_socket(vpninfo);
1180 ssl3_method = TLSv1_client_method();
1181 if (!vpninfo->https_ctx) {
1182 vpninfo->https_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(ssl3_method);
1184 /* Some servers (or their firewalls) really don't like seeing
1186 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
1187 SSL_CTX_set_options (vpninfo->https_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
1190 if (vpninfo->cert) {
1191 err = load_certificate(vpninfo);
1193 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1194 _("Loading certificate failed. Aborting.\n"));
1197 check_certificate_expiry(vpninfo);
1200 /* We just want to do:
1201 SSL_CTX_set_purpose(vpninfo->https_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_ANY);
1202 ... but it doesn't work with OpenSSL < 0.9.8k because of
1203 problems with inheritance (fixed in v1.1.4.6 of
1204 crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c) so we have to play silly buggers
1205 instead. This trick doesn't work _either_ in < 0.9.7 but
1206 I don't know of _any_ workaround which will, and can't
1207 be bothered to find out either. */
1208 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000
1209 SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(vpninfo->https_ctx,
1210 ssl_app_verify_callback, NULL);
1212 SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1214 if (vpninfo->cafile) {
1215 if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo->cafile, NULL)) {
1216 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1217 _("Failed to open CA file '%s'\n"),
1219 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
1226 https_ssl = SSL_new(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1227 workaround_openssl_certchain_bug(vpninfo, https_ssl);
1229 https_bio = BIO_new_socket(ssl_sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
1230 BIO_set_nbio(https_bio, 1);
1231 SSL_set_bio(https_ssl, https_bio, https_bio);
1233 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO, _("SSL negotiation with %s\n"),
1236 while ((err = SSL_connect(https_ssl)) <= 0) {
1237 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
1238 int maxfd = ssl_sock;
1243 err = SSL_get_error(https_ssl, err);
1244 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
1245 FD_SET(ssl_sock, &rd_set);
1246 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
1247 FD_SET(ssl_sock, &wr_set);
1249 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL connection failure\n"));
1250 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
1251 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1256 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
1257 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
1258 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > ssl_sock)
1259 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
1261 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
1262 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
1263 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
1264 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL connection cancelled\n"));
1265 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1271 if (verify_peer(vpninfo, https_ssl)) {
1272 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1277 vpninfo->ssl_fd = ssl_sock;
1278 vpninfo->https_ssl = https_ssl;
1280 /* Stash this now, because it might not be available later if the
1281 server has disconnected. */
1282 vpninfo->peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(vpninfo->https_ssl);
1284 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO, _("Connected to HTTPS on %s\n"),
1290 void openconnect_close_https(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, int final)
1292 if (vpninfo->peer_cert) {
1293 X509_free(vpninfo->peer_cert);
1294 vpninfo->peer_cert = NULL;
1296 if (vpninfo->https_ssl) {
1297 SSL_free(vpninfo->https_ssl);
1298 vpninfo->https_ssl = NULL;
1300 if (vpninfo->ssl_fd != -1) {
1301 close(vpninfo->ssl_fd);
1302 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_rfds);
1303 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_wfds);
1304 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_efds);
1305 vpninfo->ssl_fd = -1;
1307 if (final && vpninfo->https_ctx) {
1308 SSL_CTX_free(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1309 vpninfo->https_ctx = NULL;
1313 void openconnect_init_ssl(void)
1315 SSL_library_init ();
1317 SSL_load_error_strings ();
1318 OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms ();
1321 char *openconnect_get_cert_details(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1322 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert)
1324 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1329 X509_print_ex(bp, cert, 0, 0);
1330 BIO_write(bp, &zero, 1);
1331 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &certinfo);
1333 ret = strdup(certinfo->data);
1339 int openconnect_local_cert_md5(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1344 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
1347 if (get_cert_md5_fingerprint(vpninfo, vpninfo->cert_x509, buf))