2 * OpenConnect (SSL + DTLS) VPN client
4 * Copyright © 2008-2012 Intel Corporation.
6 * Author: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
8 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
9 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License
10 * version 2.1, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
13 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
15 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
18 * License along with this library; if not, write to:
20 * Free Software Foundation, Inc.
21 * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
22 * Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
26 #include <sys/types.h>
27 #include <netinet/in.h>
28 #include <arpa/inet.h>
31 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
32 #include <openssl/err.h>
33 #include <openssl/engine.h>
34 #include <openssl/evp.h>
35 #include <openssl/rand.h>
36 #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
37 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
38 #include <openssl/x509.h>
39 #include <openssl/bio.h>
41 #include "openconnect-internal.h"
43 int openconnect_sha1(unsigned char *result, void *data, int len)
48 EVP_Digest(data, len, result, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
49 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
54 int openconnect_get_cert_DER(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
55 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, unsigned char **buf)
57 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
61 if (!i2d_X509_bio(bp, cert)) {
66 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &certinfo);
73 memcpy(*buf, certinfo->data, l);
78 int openconnect_random(void *bytes, int len)
80 if (RAND_bytes(bytes, len) != 1)
85 /* Helper functions for reading/writing lines over SSL.
86 We could use cURL for the HTTP stuff, but it's overkill */
88 int openconnect_SSL_write(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
90 size_t orig_len = len;
93 int done = SSL_write(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf, len);
98 int err = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, done);
99 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
100 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
105 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
106 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
107 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
108 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
110 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to write to SSL socket"));
111 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
114 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
115 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
116 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
117 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
119 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
120 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
121 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
122 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL write cancelled\n"));
130 int openconnect_SSL_read(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
134 while ((done = SSL_read(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf, len)) == -1) {
135 int err = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, done);
136 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
137 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
142 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
143 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
144 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
145 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
147 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to read from SSL socket"));
148 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
151 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
152 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
153 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
154 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
156 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
157 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
158 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
159 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL read cancelled\n"));
166 int openconnect_SSL_gets(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
175 ret = SSL_read(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf + i, 1);
177 if (buf[i] == '\n') {
179 if (i && buf[i-1] == '\r') {
192 fd_set rd_set, wr_set;
193 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
198 ret = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, ret);
199 if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
200 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
201 else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
202 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
204 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to read from SSL socket\n"));
205 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
209 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
210 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
211 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
212 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
214 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
215 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
216 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
217 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL read cancelled\n"));
228 /* UI handling. All this just to handle the PIN callback from the TPM ENGINE,
229 and turn it into a call to our ->process_auth_form function */
232 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo;
233 struct oc_form_opt **last_opt;
234 struct oc_auth_form form;
238 struct oc_form_opt opt;
242 /* Ick. But there is no way to pass this sanely through OpenSSL */
243 static struct openconnect_info *ui_vpninfo;
245 static int ui_open(UI *ui)
247 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = ui_vpninfo; /* Ick */
248 struct ui_data *ui_data;
250 if (!vpninfo || !vpninfo->process_auth_form)
253 ui_data = malloc(sizeof(*ui_data));
257 memset(ui_data, 0, sizeof(*ui_data));
258 ui_data->last_opt = &ui_data->form.opts;
259 ui_data->vpninfo = vpninfo;
260 UI_add_user_data(ui, ui_data);
265 static int ui_write(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
267 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
268 struct ui_form_opt *opt;
270 switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
272 ui_data->form.error = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
275 ui_data->form.message = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
278 opt = malloc(sizeof(*opt));
281 memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
283 opt->opt.label = opt->opt.name = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
284 if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO)
285 opt->opt.type = OC_FORM_OPT_TEXT;
287 opt->opt.type = OC_FORM_OPT_PASSWORD;
288 *(ui_data->last_opt) = &opt->opt;
289 ui_data->last_opt = &opt->opt.next;
293 fprintf(stderr, "Unhandled SSL UI request type %d\n",
294 UI_get_string_type(uis));
300 static int ui_flush(UI *ui)
302 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
303 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = ui_data->vpninfo;
304 struct ui_form_opt *opt;
307 ret = vpninfo->process_auth_form(vpninfo->cbdata, &ui_data->form);
311 for (opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)ui_data->form.opts; opt;
312 opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)opt->opt.next) {
313 if (opt->opt.value && opt->uis)
314 UI_set_result(ui, opt->uis, opt->opt.value);
319 static int ui_close(UI *ui)
321 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
322 struct ui_form_opt *opt, *next_opt;
324 opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)ui_data->form.opts;
326 next_opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)opt->opt.next;
328 free(opt->opt.value);
333 UI_add_user_data(ui, NULL);
338 static UI_METHOD *create_openssl_ui(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
340 UI_METHOD *ui_method = UI_create_method((char *)"AnyConnect VPN UI");
342 /* There is a race condition here because of the use of the
343 static ui_vpninfo pointer. This sucks, but it's OpenSSL's
344 fault and in practice it's *never* going to hurt us.
346 This UI is only used for loading certificates from a TPM; for
347 PKCS#12 and PEM files we hook the passphrase request differently.
348 The ui_vpninfo variable is set here, and is used from ui_open()
349 when the TPM ENGINE decides it needs to ask the user for a PIN.
351 The race condition exists because theoretically, there
352 could be more than one thread using libopenconnect and
353 trying to authenticate to a VPN server, within the *same*
354 process. And if *both* are using certificates from the TPM,
355 and *both* manage to be within that short window of time
356 between setting ui_vpninfo and invoking ui_open() to fetch
357 the PIN, then one connection's ->process_auth_form() could
358 get a PIN request for the *other* connection.
360 However, the only thing that ever does run libopenconnect more
361 than once from the same process is KDE's NetworkManager support,
362 and NetworkManager doesn't *support* having more than one VPN
363 connected anyway, so first that would have to be fixed and then
364 you'd have to connect to two VPNs simultaneously by clicking
365 'connect' on both at *exactly* the same time and then getting
368 Oh, and the KDE support won't be using OpenSSL anyway because of
369 licensing conflicts... so although this sucks, I'm not going to
372 ui_vpninfo = vpninfo;
374 /* Set up a UI method of our own for password/passphrase requests */
375 UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, ui_open);
376 UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ui_write);
377 UI_method_set_flusher(ui_method, ui_flush);
378 UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, ui_close);
383 static int pem_pw_cb(char *buf, int len, int w, void *v)
385 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = v;
389 if (vpninfo->cert_password) {
390 pass = vpninfo->cert_password;
391 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
392 } else if (request_passphrase(vpninfo, &pass,
393 _("Enter PEM pass phrase:")))
399 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
400 _("PEM password too long (%d >= %d)\n"),
406 memcpy(buf, pass, plen+1);
411 static int load_pkcs12_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, PKCS12 *p12)
413 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
419 pass = vpninfo->cert_password;
420 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
422 /* We do this every time round the loop, to work around a bug in
423 OpenSSL < 1.0.0-beta2 -- where the stack at *ca will be freed
424 when PKCS12_parse() returns an error, but *ca is left pointing
425 to the freed memory. */
427 if (!pass && request_passphrase(vpninfo, &pass,
428 _("Enter PKCS#12 pass phrase:")) < 0) {
432 if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, &pkey, &cert, &ca)) {
433 unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
435 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
437 if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PKCS12 &&
438 ERR_GET_FUNC(err) == PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE &&
439 ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE) {
440 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
441 _("Parse PKCS#12 failed (wrong passphrase?)\n"));
447 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
448 _("Parse PKCS#12 failed (see above errors)\n"));
456 vpninfo->cert_x509 = cert;
457 SSL_CTX_use_certificate(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert);
458 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
459 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
460 _("Using client certificate '%s'\n"), buf);
462 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
463 _("PKCS#12 contained no certificate!"));
468 SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(vpninfo->https_ctx, pkey);
471 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
472 _("PKCS#12 contained no private key!"));
476 /* Only include supporting certificates which are actually necessary */
480 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) {
481 X509 *cert2 = sk_X509_value(ca, i);
482 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert) == X509_V_OK) {
487 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert2) == X509_V_OK)
490 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert2),
492 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_DEBUG,
493 _("Extra cert from PKCS#12: '%s'\n"), buf);
494 CRYPTO_add(&cert2->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
495 SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert2);
500 sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
508 static int load_tpm_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
512 UI_METHOD *meth = NULL;
513 ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
515 e = ENGINE_by_id("tpm");
517 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Can't load TPM engine.\n"));
518 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
521 if (!ENGINE_init(e) || !ENGINE_set_default_RSA(e) ||
522 !ENGINE_set_default_RAND(e)) {
523 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to init TPM engine\n"));
524 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
529 if (vpninfo->cert_password) {
530 if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "PIN", strlen(vpninfo->cert_password),
531 vpninfo->cert_password, NULL, 0)) {
532 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
533 _("Failed to set TPM SRK password\n"));
534 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
536 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
537 free(vpninfo->cert_password);
539 /* Provide our own UI method to handle the PIN callback. */
540 meth = create_openssl_ui(vpninfo);
542 key = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, vpninfo->sslkey, meth, NULL);
544 UI_destroy_method(meth);
546 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
547 _("Failed to load TPM private key\n"));
548 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
553 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(vpninfo->https_ctx, key)) {
554 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Add key from TPM failed\n"));
555 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
563 static int load_tpm_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
565 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
566 _("This version of OpenConnect was built without TPM support\n"));
571 static int reload_pem_cert(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
573 BIO *b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
579 if (BIO_read_filename(b, vpninfo->cert) <= 0) {
582 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
583 _("Failed to reload X509 cert for expiry check\n"));
584 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
587 vpninfo->cert_x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
588 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
591 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(vpninfo->cert_x509), buf, sizeof(buf));
592 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
593 _("Using client certificate '%s'\n"), buf);
598 static int load_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
600 if (!strncmp(vpninfo->sslkey, "pkcs11:", 7) ||
601 !strncmp(vpninfo->cert, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
602 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
603 _("This binary built without PKCS#11 support\n"));
607 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
608 _("Using certificate file %s\n"), vpninfo->cert);
610 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_PKCS12 ||
611 vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
615 f = fopen(vpninfo->cert, "r");
617 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
618 _("Failed to open certificate file %s: %s\n"),
619 vpninfo->cert, strerror(errno));
622 p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(f, NULL);
625 return load_pkcs12_certificate(vpninfo, p12);
628 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_PKCS12) {
629 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Read PKCS#12 failed\n"));
630 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
633 /* Clear error and fall through to see if it's a PEM file... */
637 /* It's PEM or TPM now, and either way we need to load the plain cert: */
638 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(vpninfo->https_ctx,
640 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
641 _("Loading certificate failed\n"));
642 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
646 /* Ew, we can't get it back from the OpenSSL CTX in any sane fashion */
647 reload_pem_cert(vpninfo);
649 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
650 FILE *f = fopen(vpninfo->sslkey, "r");
654 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
655 _("Failed to open private key file %s: %s\n"),
656 vpninfo->cert, strerror(errno));
661 while (fgets(buf, 255, f)) {
662 if (!strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN TSS KEY BLOB-----\n")) {
663 vpninfo->cert_type = CERT_TYPE_TPM;
665 } else if (!strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n") ||
666 !strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n") ||
667 !strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----\n")) {
668 vpninfo->cert_type = CERT_TYPE_PEM;
673 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
674 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
675 _("Failed to identify private key type in '%s'\n"),
681 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_TPM)
682 return load_tpm_certificate(vpninfo);
684 /* Standard PEM certificate */
685 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(vpninfo->https_ctx, pem_pw_cb);
686 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo);
688 if (!SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo->sslkey,
690 unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
692 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
694 #ifndef EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX
695 #define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL
697 /* If the user fat-fingered the passphrase, try again */
698 if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_EVP &&
699 ERR_GET_FUNC(err) == EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX &&
700 ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT) {
701 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
702 _("Loading private key failed (wrong passphrase?)\n"));
706 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
707 _("Loading private key failed (see above errors)\n"));
713 static int get_cert_fingerprint(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
714 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, const EVP_MD *type,
717 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
720 if (!X509_digest(cert, type, md, &n))
723 for (i=0; i < n; i++)
724 sprintf(&buf[i*2], "%02X", md[i]);
729 int get_cert_md5_fingerprint(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
730 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, char *buf)
732 return get_cert_fingerprint(vpninfo, cert, EVP_md5(), buf);
735 int openconnect_get_cert_sha1(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
736 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, char *buf)
738 return get_cert_fingerprint(vpninfo, cert, EVP_sha1(), buf);
741 static int check_server_cert(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, X509 *cert)
743 char fingerprint[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
746 ret = openconnect_get_cert_sha1(vpninfo, cert, fingerprint);
750 if (strcasecmp(vpninfo->servercert, fingerprint)) {
751 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
752 _("Server SSL certificate didn't match: %s\n"), fingerprint);
758 static int match_hostname_elem(const char *hostname, int helem_len,
759 const char *match, int melem_len)
761 if (!helem_len && !melem_len)
764 if (!helem_len || !melem_len)
768 if (match[0] == '*') {
771 for (i = 1 ; i <= helem_len; i++) {
772 if (!match_hostname_elem(hostname + i, helem_len - i,
773 match + 1, melem_len - 1))
779 /* From the NetBSD (5.1) man page for ctype(3):
780 Values of type char or signed char must first be cast to unsigned char,
781 to ensure that the values are within the correct range. The result
782 should then be cast to int to avoid warnings from some compilers.
783 We do indeed get warning "array subscript has type 'char'" without
785 if (toupper((int)(unsigned char)hostname[0]) ==
786 toupper((int)(unsigned char)match[0]))
787 return match_hostname_elem(hostname + 1, helem_len - 1,
788 match + 1, melem_len - 1);
793 static int match_hostname(const char *hostname, const char *match)
796 const char *h_dot, *m_dot;
797 int helem_len, melem_len;
799 h_dot = strchr(hostname, '.');
800 m_dot = strchr(match, '.');
802 if (h_dot && m_dot) {
803 helem_len = h_dot - hostname + 1;
804 melem_len = m_dot - match + 1;
805 } else if (!h_dot && !m_dot) {
806 helem_len = strlen(hostname);
807 melem_len = strlen(match);
812 if (match_hostname_elem(hostname, helem_len,
816 hostname += helem_len;
825 /* cf. RFC2818 and RFC2459 */
826 static int match_cert_hostname(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, X509 *peer_cert)
828 STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
830 ASN1_STRING *subjasn1;
831 char *subjstr = NULL;
834 char addrbuf[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
837 /* Allow GEN_IP in the certificate only if we actually connected
838 by IP address rather than by name. */
839 if (inet_pton(AF_INET, vpninfo->hostname, addrbuf) > 0)
841 else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, vpninfo->hostname, addrbuf) > 0)
843 else if (vpninfo->hostname[0] == '[' &&
844 vpninfo->hostname[strlen(vpninfo->hostname)-1] == ']') {
845 char *p = &vpninfo->hostname[strlen(vpninfo->hostname)-1];
847 if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, vpninfo->hostname + 1, addrbuf) > 0)
852 altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(peer_cert, NID_subject_alt_name,
854 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames); i++) {
855 const GENERAL_NAME *this = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
857 if (this->type == GEN_DNS) {
860 int len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&str, this->d.ia5);
866 /* We don't like names with embedded NUL */
867 if (strlen(str) != len)
870 if (!match_hostname(vpninfo->hostname, str)) {
871 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
872 _("Matched DNS altname '%s'\n"),
874 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
878 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
879 _("No match for altname '%s'\n"),
883 } else if (this->type == GEN_IPADD && addrlen) {
887 if (this->d.ip->length == 4) {
889 } else if (this->d.ip->length == 16) {
892 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
893 _("Certificate has GEN_IPADD altname with bogus length %d\n"),
898 /* We only do this for the debug messages */
899 inet_ntop(family, this->d.ip->data, host, sizeof(host));
901 if (this->d.ip->length == addrlen &&
902 !memcmp(addrbuf, this->d.ip->data, addrlen)) {
903 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
904 _("Matched %s address '%s'\n"),
905 (family == AF_INET6)?"IPv6":"IPv4",
907 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
910 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
911 _("No match for %s address '%s'\n"),
912 (family == AF_INET6)?"IPv6":"IPv4",
915 } else if (this->type == GEN_URI) {
917 char *url_proto, *url_host, *url_path, *url_host2;
919 int len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&str, this->d.ia5);
924 /* We don't like names with embedded NUL */
925 if (strlen(str) != len)
928 if (internal_parse_url(str, &url_proto, &url_host, &url_port, &url_path, 0)) {
933 if (!url_proto || strcasecmp(url_proto, "https"))
936 if (url_port != vpninfo->port)
939 /* Leave url_host as it was so that it can be freed */
940 url_host2 = url_host;
941 if (addrlen == 16 && vpninfo->hostname[0] != '[' &&
942 url_host[0] == '[' && url_host[strlen(url_host)-1] == ']') {
943 /* Cope with https://[IPv6]/ when the hostname is bare IPv6 */
944 url_host[strlen(url_host)-1] = 0;
948 if (strcasecmp(vpninfo->hostname, url_host2))
952 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
953 _("URI '%s' has non-empty path; ignoring\n"),
955 goto no_uri_match_silent;
957 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
958 _("Matched URI '%s'\n"),
964 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
968 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
969 _("No match for URI '%s'\n"),
978 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
980 /* According to RFC2818, we don't use the legacy subject name if
981 there was an altname with DNS type. */
983 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
984 _("No altname in peer cert matched '%s'\n"),
989 subjname = X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert);
991 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
992 _("No subject name in peer cert!\n"));
996 /* Find the _last_ (most specific) commonName */
999 int j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subjname, NID_commonName, i);
1006 subjasn1 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(subjname, i));
1008 i = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&subjstr, subjasn1);
1010 if (!subjstr || strlen(subjstr) != i) {
1011 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1012 _("Failed to parse subject name in peer cert\n"));
1017 if (match_hostname(vpninfo->hostname, subjstr)) {
1018 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1019 _("Peer cert subject mismatch ('%s' != '%s')\n"),
1020 subjstr, vpninfo->hostname);
1023 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1024 _("Matched peer certificate subject name '%s'\n"),
1028 OPENSSL_free(subjstr);
1032 static int verify_peer(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, SSL *https_ssl)
1037 peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(https_ssl);
1039 if (vpninfo->servercert) {
1040 /* If given a cert fingerprint on the command line, that's
1042 ret = check_server_cert(vpninfo, peer_cert);
1044 int vfy = SSL_get_verify_result(https_ssl);
1045 const char *err_string = NULL;
1047 if (vfy != X509_V_OK)
1048 err_string = X509_verify_cert_error_string(vfy);
1049 else if (match_cert_hostname(vpninfo, peer_cert))
1050 err_string = _("certificate does not match hostname");
1053 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
1054 _("Server certificate verify failed: %s\n"),
1057 if (vpninfo->validate_peer_cert)
1058 ret = vpninfo->validate_peer_cert(vpninfo->cbdata,
1067 X509_free(peer_cert);
1072 static void workaround_openssl_certchain_bug(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1075 /* OpenSSL has problems with certificate chains -- if there are
1076 multiple certs with the same name, it doesn't necessarily
1077 choose the _right_ one. (RT#1942)
1078 Pick the right ones for ourselves and add them manually. */
1079 X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
1081 X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1084 if (!cert || !store)
1087 /* If we already have 'supporting' certs, don't add them again */
1088 if (vpninfo->https_ctx->extra_certs)
1091 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, NULL, NULL))
1094 while (ctx.get_issuer(&cert2, &ctx, cert) == 1) {
1098 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert2) == X509_V_OK)
1101 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
1103 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_DEBUG,
1104 _("Extra cert from cafile: '%s'\n"), buf);
1105 SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert);
1107 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1110 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000
1111 static int ssl_app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
1113 /* We've seen certificates in the wild which don't have the
1114 purpose fields filled in correctly */
1115 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, X509_PURPOSE_ANY);
1116 return X509_verify_cert(ctx);
1120 static int check_certificate_expiry(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
1122 ASN1_TIME *notAfter;
1123 const char *reason = NULL;
1127 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
1131 notAfter = X509_get_notAfter(vpninfo->cert_x509);
1132 i = X509_cmp_time(notAfter, &t);
1134 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1135 _("Error in client cert notAfter field\n"));
1138 reason = _("Client certificate has expired at");
1140 t += vpninfo->cert_expire_warning;
1141 i = X509_cmp_time(notAfter, &t);
1143 reason = _("Client certificate expires soon at");
1147 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1149 const char *expiry = _("<error>");
1153 ASN1_TIME_print(bp, notAfter);
1154 BIO_write(bp, &zero, 1);
1155 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &bm);
1158 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, "%s: %s\n", reason, expiry);
1164 int openconnect_open_https(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
1166 method_const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_method;
1172 if (vpninfo->https_ssl)
1175 if (vpninfo->peer_cert) {
1176 X509_free(vpninfo->peer_cert);
1177 vpninfo->peer_cert = NULL;
1180 ssl_sock = connect_https_socket(vpninfo);
1184 ssl3_method = TLSv1_client_method();
1185 if (!vpninfo->https_ctx) {
1186 vpninfo->https_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(ssl3_method);
1188 /* Some servers (or their firewalls) really don't like seeing
1190 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
1191 SSL_CTX_set_options (vpninfo->https_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
1194 if (vpninfo->cert) {
1195 err = load_certificate(vpninfo);
1197 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1198 _("Loading certificate failed. Aborting.\n"));
1201 check_certificate_expiry(vpninfo);
1204 /* We just want to do:
1205 SSL_CTX_set_purpose(vpninfo->https_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_ANY);
1206 ... but it doesn't work with OpenSSL < 0.9.8k because of
1207 problems with inheritance (fixed in v1.1.4.6 of
1208 crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c) so we have to play silly buggers
1209 instead. This trick doesn't work _either_ in < 0.9.7 but
1210 I don't know of _any_ workaround which will, and can't
1211 be bothered to find out either. */
1212 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000
1213 SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(vpninfo->https_ctx,
1214 ssl_app_verify_callback, NULL);
1216 SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1218 if (vpninfo->cafile) {
1219 if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo->cafile, NULL)) {
1220 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1221 _("Failed to open CA file '%s'\n"),
1223 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
1230 https_ssl = SSL_new(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1231 workaround_openssl_certchain_bug(vpninfo, https_ssl);
1233 https_bio = BIO_new_socket(ssl_sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
1234 BIO_set_nbio(https_bio, 1);
1235 SSL_set_bio(https_ssl, https_bio, https_bio);
1237 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO, _("SSL negotiation with %s\n"),
1240 while ((err = SSL_connect(https_ssl)) <= 0) {
1241 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
1242 int maxfd = ssl_sock;
1247 err = SSL_get_error(https_ssl, err);
1248 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
1249 FD_SET(ssl_sock, &rd_set);
1250 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
1251 FD_SET(ssl_sock, &wr_set);
1253 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL connection failure\n"));
1254 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
1255 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1260 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
1261 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
1262 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > ssl_sock)
1263 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
1265 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
1266 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
1267 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
1268 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL connection cancelled\n"));
1269 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1275 if (verify_peer(vpninfo, https_ssl)) {
1276 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1281 vpninfo->ssl_fd = ssl_sock;
1282 vpninfo->https_ssl = https_ssl;
1284 /* Stash this now, because it might not be available later if the
1285 server has disconnected. */
1286 vpninfo->peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(vpninfo->https_ssl);
1288 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO, _("Connected to HTTPS on %s\n"),
1294 void openconnect_close_https(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, int final)
1296 if (vpninfo->peer_cert) {
1297 X509_free(vpninfo->peer_cert);
1298 vpninfo->peer_cert = NULL;
1300 if (vpninfo->https_ssl) {
1301 SSL_free(vpninfo->https_ssl);
1302 vpninfo->https_ssl = NULL;
1304 if (vpninfo->ssl_fd != -1) {
1305 close(vpninfo->ssl_fd);
1306 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_rfds);
1307 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_wfds);
1308 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_efds);
1309 vpninfo->ssl_fd = -1;
1311 if (final && vpninfo->https_ctx) {
1312 SSL_CTX_free(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1313 vpninfo->https_ctx = NULL;
1317 void openconnect_init_ssl(void)
1319 SSL_library_init ();
1321 SSL_load_error_strings ();
1322 OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms ();
1325 char *openconnect_get_cert_details(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1326 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert)
1328 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1333 X509_print_ex(bp, cert, 0, 0);
1334 BIO_write(bp, &zero, 1);
1335 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &certinfo);
1337 ret = strdup(certinfo->data);
1343 int openconnect_local_cert_md5(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1348 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
1351 if (get_cert_md5_fingerprint(vpninfo, vpninfo->cert_x509, buf))