2 * OpenConnect (SSL + DTLS) VPN client
4 * Copyright © 2008-2012 Intel Corporation.
6 * Author: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
8 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
9 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License
10 * version 2.1, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
13 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
15 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
18 * License along with this library; if not, write to:
20 * Free Software Foundation, Inc.
21 * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
22 * Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
26 #include <sys/types.h>
27 #include <netinet/in.h>
28 #include <arpa/inet.h>
31 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
32 #include <openssl/err.h>
33 #include <openssl/engine.h>
34 #include <openssl/evp.h>
35 #include <openssl/rand.h>
36 #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
37 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
38 #include <openssl/x509.h>
39 #include <openssl/bio.h>
41 #include "openconnect-internal.h"
43 int openconnect_sha1(unsigned char *result, void *data, int len)
48 EVP_Digest(data, len, result, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
49 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
54 int openconnect_get_cert_DER(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
55 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, unsigned char **buf)
57 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
61 if (!i2d_X509_bio(bp, cert)) {
66 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &certinfo);
73 memcpy(*buf, certinfo->data, l);
78 int openconnect_random(void *bytes, int len)
80 if (RAND_bytes(bytes, len) != 1)
85 /* Helper functions for reading/writing lines over SSL.
86 We could use cURL for the HTTP stuff, but it's overkill */
88 int openconnect_SSL_write(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
90 size_t orig_len = len;
93 int done = SSL_write(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf, len);
98 int err = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, done);
99 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
100 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
105 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
106 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
107 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
108 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
110 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to write to SSL socket"));
111 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
114 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
115 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
116 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
117 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
119 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
120 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
121 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
122 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL write cancelled\n"));
130 int openconnect_SSL_read(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
134 while ((done = SSL_read(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf, len)) == -1) {
135 int err = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, done);
136 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
137 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
142 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
143 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
144 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
145 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
147 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to read from SSL socket"));
148 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
151 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
152 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
153 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
154 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
156 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
157 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
158 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
159 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL read cancelled\n"));
166 int openconnect_SSL_gets(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
175 ret = SSL_read(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf + i, 1);
177 if (buf[i] == '\n') {
179 if (i && buf[i-1] == '\r') {
192 fd_set rd_set, wr_set;
193 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
198 ret = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, ret);
199 if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
200 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
201 else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
202 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
204 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to read from SSL socket\n"));
205 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
209 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
210 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
211 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
212 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
214 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
215 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
216 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
217 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL read cancelled\n"));
228 /* UI handling. All this just to handle the PIN callback from the TPM ENGINE,
229 and turn it into a call to our ->process_auth_form function */
232 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo;
233 struct oc_form_opt **last_opt;
234 struct oc_auth_form form;
238 struct oc_form_opt opt;
242 /* Ick. But there is no way to pass this sanely through OpenSSL */
243 static struct openconnect_info *ui_vpninfo;
245 static int ui_open(UI *ui)
247 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = ui_vpninfo; /* Ick */
248 struct ui_data *ui_data;
250 if (!vpninfo || !vpninfo->process_auth_form)
253 ui_data = malloc(sizeof(*ui_data));
257 memset(ui_data, 0, sizeof(*ui_data));
258 ui_data->last_opt = &ui_data->form.opts;
259 ui_data->vpninfo = vpninfo;
260 UI_add_user_data(ui, ui_data);
265 static int ui_write(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
267 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
268 struct ui_form_opt *opt;
270 switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
272 ui_data->form.error = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
275 ui_data->form.message = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
278 opt = malloc(sizeof(*opt));
281 memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
283 opt->opt.label = opt->opt.name = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
284 if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO)
285 opt->opt.type = OC_FORM_OPT_TEXT;
287 opt->opt.type = OC_FORM_OPT_PASSWORD;
288 *(ui_data->last_opt) = &opt->opt;
289 ui_data->last_opt = &opt->opt.next;
293 fprintf(stderr, "Unhandled SSL UI request type %d\n",
294 UI_get_string_type(uis));
300 static int ui_flush(UI *ui)
302 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
303 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = ui_data->vpninfo;
304 struct ui_form_opt *opt;
307 ret = vpninfo->process_auth_form(vpninfo->cbdata, &ui_data->form);
311 for (opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)ui_data->form.opts; opt;
312 opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)opt->opt.next) {
313 if (opt->opt.value && opt->uis)
314 UI_set_result(ui, opt->uis, opt->opt.value);
319 static int ui_close(UI *ui)
321 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
322 struct ui_form_opt *opt, *next_opt;
324 opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)ui_data->form.opts;
326 next_opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)opt->opt.next;
328 free(opt->opt.value);
333 UI_add_user_data(ui, NULL);
338 static UI_METHOD *create_openssl_ui(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
340 UI_METHOD *ui_method = UI_create_method((char *)"AnyConnect VPN UI");
342 /* There is a race condition here because of the use of the
343 static ui_vpninfo pointer. This sucks, but it's OpenSSL's
344 fault and in practice it's *never* going to hurt us.
346 This UI is only used for loading certificates from a TPM; for
347 PKCS#12 and PEM files we hook the passphrase request differently.
348 The ui_vpninfo variable is set here, and is used from ui_open()
349 when the TPM ENGINE decides it needs to ask the user for a PIN.
351 The race condition exists because theoretically, there
352 could be more than one thread using libopenconnect and
353 trying to authenticate to a VPN server, within the *same*
354 process. And if *both* are using certificates from the TPM,
355 and *both* manage to be within that short window of time
356 between setting ui_vpninfo and invoking ui_open() to fetch
357 the PIN, then one connection's ->process_auth_form() could
358 get a PIN request for the *other* connection.
360 However, the only thing that ever does run libopenconnect more
361 than once from the same process is KDE's NetworkManager support,
362 and NetworkManager doesn't *support* having more than one VPN
363 connected anyway, so first that would have to be fixed and then
364 you'd have to connect to two VPNs simultaneously by clicking
365 'connect' on both at *exactly* the same time and then getting
368 Oh, and the KDE support won't be using OpenSSL anyway because of
369 licensing conflicts... so although this sucks, I'm not going to
372 ui_vpninfo = vpninfo;
374 /* Set up a UI method of our own for password/passphrase requests */
375 UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, ui_open);
376 UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ui_write);
377 UI_method_set_flusher(ui_method, ui_flush);
378 UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, ui_close);
383 static int pem_pw_cb(char *buf, int len, int w, void *v)
385 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = v;
389 if (vpninfo->cert_password) {
390 pass = vpninfo->cert_password;
391 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
392 } else if (request_passphrase(vpninfo, &pass,
393 _("Enter PEM pass phrase:")))
399 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
400 _("PEM password too long (%d >= %d)\n"),
406 memcpy(buf, pass, plen+1);
411 static int load_pkcs12_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, PKCS12 *p12)
413 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
419 pass = vpninfo->cert_password;
420 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
422 /* We do this every time round the loop, to work around a bug in
423 OpenSSL < 1.0.0-beta2 -- where the stack at *ca will be freed
424 when PKCS12_parse() returns an error, but *ca is left pointing
425 to the freed memory. */
427 if (!pass && request_passphrase(vpninfo, &pass,
428 _("Enter PKCS#12 pass phrase:")) < 0) {
432 if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, &pkey, &cert, &ca)) {
433 unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
435 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
437 if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PKCS12 &&
438 ERR_GET_FUNC(err) == PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE &&
439 ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE) {
440 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
441 _("Parse PKCS#12 failed (wrong passphrase?)\n"));
447 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
448 _("Parse PKCS#12 failed (see above errors)\n"));
456 vpninfo->cert_x509 = cert;
457 SSL_CTX_use_certificate(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert);
458 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
459 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
460 _("Using client certificate '%s'\n"), buf);
462 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
463 _("PKCS#12 contained no certificate!"));
468 SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(vpninfo->https_ctx, pkey);
471 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
472 _("PKCS#12 contained no private key!"));
476 /* Only include supporting certificates which are actually necessary */
480 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) {
481 X509 *cert2 = sk_X509_value(ca, i);
482 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert) == X509_V_OK) {
487 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert2) == X509_V_OK)
490 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert2),
492 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_DEBUG,
493 _("Extra cert from PKCS#12: '%s'\n"), buf);
494 CRYPTO_add(&cert2->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
495 SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert2);
500 sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
508 static int load_tpm_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
512 UI_METHOD *meth = NULL;
515 ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
517 e = ENGINE_by_id("tpm");
519 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Can't load TPM engine.\n"));
520 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
523 if (!ENGINE_init(e) || !ENGINE_set_default_RSA(e) ||
524 !ENGINE_set_default_RAND(e)) {
525 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to init TPM engine\n"));
526 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
531 if (vpninfo->cert_password) {
532 if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "PIN", strlen(vpninfo->cert_password),
533 vpninfo->cert_password, NULL, 0)) {
534 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
535 _("Failed to set TPM SRK password\n"));
536 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
538 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
539 free(vpninfo->cert_password);
541 /* Provide our own UI method to handle the PIN callback. */
542 meth = create_openssl_ui(vpninfo);
544 key = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, vpninfo->sslkey, meth, NULL);
546 UI_destroy_method(meth);
548 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
549 _("Failed to load TPM private key\n"));
550 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
554 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(vpninfo->https_ctx, key)) {
555 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Add key from TPM failed\n"));
556 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
566 static int load_tpm_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
568 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
569 _("This version of OpenConnect was built without TPM support\n"));
574 static int reload_pem_cert(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
576 BIO *b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
582 if (BIO_read_filename(b, vpninfo->cert) <= 0) {
585 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
586 _("Failed to reload X509 cert for expiry check\n"));
587 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
590 vpninfo->cert_x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
591 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
594 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(vpninfo->cert_x509), buf, sizeof(buf));
595 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
596 _("Using client certificate '%s'\n"), buf);
601 static int load_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
603 if (!strncmp(vpninfo->sslkey, "pkcs11:", 7) ||
604 !strncmp(vpninfo->cert, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
605 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
606 _("This binary built without PKCS#11 support\n"));
610 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
611 _("Using certificate file %s\n"), vpninfo->cert);
613 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_PKCS12 ||
614 vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
618 f = fopen(vpninfo->cert, "r");
620 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
621 _("Failed to open certificate file %s: %s\n"),
622 vpninfo->cert, strerror(errno));
625 p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(f, NULL);
628 return load_pkcs12_certificate(vpninfo, p12);
631 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_PKCS12) {
632 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Read PKCS#12 failed\n"));
633 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
636 /* Clear error and fall through to see if it's a PEM file... */
640 /* It's PEM or TPM now, and either way we need to load the plain cert: */
641 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(vpninfo->https_ctx,
643 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
644 _("Loading certificate failed\n"));
645 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
649 /* Ew, we can't get it back from the OpenSSL CTX in any sane fashion */
650 reload_pem_cert(vpninfo);
652 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
653 FILE *f = fopen(vpninfo->sslkey, "r");
657 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
658 _("Failed to open private key file %s: %s\n"),
659 vpninfo->cert, strerror(errno));
664 while (fgets(buf, 255, f)) {
665 if (!strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN TSS KEY BLOB-----\n")) {
666 vpninfo->cert_type = CERT_TYPE_TPM;
668 } else if (!strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n") ||
669 !strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n") ||
670 !strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----\n")) {
671 vpninfo->cert_type = CERT_TYPE_PEM;
676 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
677 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
678 _("Failed to identify private key type in '%s'\n"),
684 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_TPM)
685 return load_tpm_certificate(vpninfo);
687 /* Standard PEM certificate */
688 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(vpninfo->https_ctx, pem_pw_cb);
689 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo);
691 if (!SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo->sslkey,
693 unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
695 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
697 #ifndef EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX
698 #define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL
700 /* If the user fat-fingered the passphrase, try again */
701 if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_EVP &&
702 ERR_GET_FUNC(err) == EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX &&
703 ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT) {
704 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
705 _("Loading private key failed (wrong passphrase?)\n"));
709 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
710 _("Loading private key failed (see above errors)\n"));
716 static int get_cert_fingerprint(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
717 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, const EVP_MD *type,
720 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
723 if (!X509_digest(cert, type, md, &n))
726 for (i=0; i < n; i++)
727 sprintf(&buf[i*2], "%02X", md[i]);
732 int get_cert_md5_fingerprint(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
733 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, char *buf)
735 return get_cert_fingerprint(vpninfo, cert, EVP_md5(), buf);
738 int openconnect_get_cert_sha1(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
739 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, char *buf)
741 return get_cert_fingerprint(vpninfo, cert, EVP_sha1(), buf);
744 static int check_server_cert(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, X509 *cert)
746 char fingerprint[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
749 ret = openconnect_get_cert_sha1(vpninfo, cert, fingerprint);
753 if (strcasecmp(vpninfo->servercert, fingerprint)) {
754 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
755 _("Server SSL certificate didn't match: %s\n"), fingerprint);
761 static int match_hostname_elem(const char *hostname, int helem_len,
762 const char *match, int melem_len)
764 if (!helem_len && !melem_len)
767 if (!helem_len || !melem_len)
771 if (match[0] == '*') {
774 for (i = 1 ; i <= helem_len; i++) {
775 if (!match_hostname_elem(hostname + i, helem_len - i,
776 match + 1, melem_len - 1))
782 /* From the NetBSD (5.1) man page for ctype(3):
783 Values of type char or signed char must first be cast to unsigned char,
784 to ensure that the values are within the correct range. The result
785 should then be cast to int to avoid warnings from some compilers.
786 We do indeed get warning "array subscript has type 'char'" without
788 if (toupper((int)(unsigned char)hostname[0]) ==
789 toupper((int)(unsigned char)match[0]))
790 return match_hostname_elem(hostname + 1, helem_len - 1,
791 match + 1, melem_len - 1);
796 static int match_hostname(const char *hostname, const char *match)
799 const char *h_dot, *m_dot;
800 int helem_len, melem_len;
802 h_dot = strchr(hostname, '.');
803 m_dot = strchr(match, '.');
805 if (h_dot && m_dot) {
806 helem_len = h_dot - hostname + 1;
807 melem_len = m_dot - match + 1;
808 } else if (!h_dot && !m_dot) {
809 helem_len = strlen(hostname);
810 melem_len = strlen(match);
815 if (match_hostname_elem(hostname, helem_len,
819 hostname += helem_len;
828 /* cf. RFC2818 and RFC2459 */
829 static int match_cert_hostname(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, X509 *peer_cert)
831 STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
833 ASN1_STRING *subjasn1;
834 char *subjstr = NULL;
837 char addrbuf[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
840 /* Allow GEN_IP in the certificate only if we actually connected
841 by IP address rather than by name. */
842 if (inet_pton(AF_INET, vpninfo->hostname, addrbuf) > 0)
844 else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, vpninfo->hostname, addrbuf) > 0)
846 else if (vpninfo->hostname[0] == '[' &&
847 vpninfo->hostname[strlen(vpninfo->hostname)-1] == ']') {
848 char *p = &vpninfo->hostname[strlen(vpninfo->hostname)-1];
850 if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, vpninfo->hostname + 1, addrbuf) > 0)
855 altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(peer_cert, NID_subject_alt_name,
857 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames); i++) {
858 const GENERAL_NAME *this = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
860 if (this->type == GEN_DNS) {
863 int len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&str, this->d.ia5);
869 /* We don't like names with embedded NUL */
870 if (strlen(str) != len)
873 if (!match_hostname(vpninfo->hostname, str)) {
874 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
875 _("Matched DNS altname '%s'\n"),
877 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
881 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
882 _("No match for altname '%s'\n"),
886 } else if (this->type == GEN_IPADD && addrlen) {
890 if (this->d.ip->length == 4) {
892 } else if (this->d.ip->length == 16) {
895 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
896 _("Certificate has GEN_IPADD altname with bogus length %d\n"),
901 /* We only do this for the debug messages */
902 inet_ntop(family, this->d.ip->data, host, sizeof(host));
904 if (this->d.ip->length == addrlen &&
905 !memcmp(addrbuf, this->d.ip->data, addrlen)) {
906 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
907 _("Matched %s address '%s'\n"),
908 (family == AF_INET6)?"IPv6":"IPv4",
910 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
913 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
914 _("No match for %s address '%s'\n"),
915 (family == AF_INET6)?"IPv6":"IPv4",
918 } else if (this->type == GEN_URI) {
920 char *url_proto, *url_host, *url_path, *url_host2;
922 int len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&str, this->d.ia5);
927 /* We don't like names with embedded NUL */
928 if (strlen(str) != len)
931 if (internal_parse_url(str, &url_proto, &url_host, &url_port, &url_path, 0)) {
936 if (!url_proto || strcasecmp(url_proto, "https"))
939 if (url_port != vpninfo->port)
942 /* Leave url_host as it was so that it can be freed */
943 url_host2 = url_host;
944 if (addrlen == 16 && vpninfo->hostname[0] != '[' &&
945 url_host[0] == '[' && url_host[strlen(url_host)-1] == ']') {
946 /* Cope with https://[IPv6]/ when the hostname is bare IPv6 */
947 url_host[strlen(url_host)-1] = 0;
951 if (strcasecmp(vpninfo->hostname, url_host2))
955 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
956 _("URI '%s' has non-empty path; ignoring\n"),
958 goto no_uri_match_silent;
960 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
961 _("Matched URI '%s'\n"),
967 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
971 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
972 _("No match for URI '%s'\n"),
981 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
983 /* According to RFC2818, we don't use the legacy subject name if
984 there was an altname with DNS type. */
986 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
987 _("No altname in peer cert matched '%s'\n"),
992 subjname = X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert);
994 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
995 _("No subject name in peer cert!\n"));
999 /* Find the _last_ (most specific) commonName */
1002 int j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subjname, NID_commonName, i);
1009 subjasn1 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(subjname, i));
1011 i = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&subjstr, subjasn1);
1013 if (!subjstr || strlen(subjstr) != i) {
1014 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1015 _("Failed to parse subject name in peer cert\n"));
1020 if (match_hostname(vpninfo->hostname, subjstr)) {
1021 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1022 _("Peer cert subject mismatch ('%s' != '%s')\n"),
1023 subjstr, vpninfo->hostname);
1026 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1027 _("Matched peer certificate subject name '%s'\n"),
1031 OPENSSL_free(subjstr);
1035 static int verify_peer(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, SSL *https_ssl)
1040 peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(https_ssl);
1042 if (vpninfo->servercert) {
1043 /* If given a cert fingerprint on the command line, that's
1045 ret = check_server_cert(vpninfo, peer_cert);
1047 int vfy = SSL_get_verify_result(https_ssl);
1048 const char *err_string = NULL;
1050 if (vfy != X509_V_OK)
1051 err_string = X509_verify_cert_error_string(vfy);
1052 else if (match_cert_hostname(vpninfo, peer_cert))
1053 err_string = _("certificate does not match hostname");
1056 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
1057 _("Server certificate verify failed: %s\n"),
1060 if (vpninfo->validate_peer_cert)
1061 ret = vpninfo->validate_peer_cert(vpninfo->cbdata,
1070 X509_free(peer_cert);
1075 static void workaround_openssl_certchain_bug(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1078 /* OpenSSL has problems with certificate chains -- if there are
1079 multiple certs with the same name, it doesn't necessarily
1080 choose the _right_ one. (RT#1942)
1081 Pick the right ones for ourselves and add them manually. */
1082 X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
1084 X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1087 if (!cert || !store)
1090 /* If we already have 'supporting' certs, don't add them again */
1091 if (vpninfo->https_ctx->extra_certs)
1094 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, NULL, NULL))
1097 while (ctx.get_issuer(&cert2, &ctx, cert) == 1) {
1101 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert2) == X509_V_OK)
1104 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
1106 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_DEBUG,
1107 _("Extra cert from cafile: '%s'\n"), buf);
1108 SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert);
1110 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1113 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000
1114 static int ssl_app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
1116 /* We've seen certificates in the wild which don't have the
1117 purpose fields filled in correctly */
1118 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, X509_PURPOSE_ANY);
1119 return X509_verify_cert(ctx);
1123 static int check_certificate_expiry(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
1125 ASN1_TIME *notAfter;
1126 const char *reason = NULL;
1130 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
1134 notAfter = X509_get_notAfter(vpninfo->cert_x509);
1135 i = X509_cmp_time(notAfter, &t);
1137 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1138 _("Error in client cert notAfter field\n"));
1141 reason = _("Client certificate has expired at");
1143 t += vpninfo->cert_expire_warning;
1144 i = X509_cmp_time(notAfter, &t);
1146 reason = _("Client certificate expires soon at");
1150 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1152 const char *expiry = _("<error>");
1156 ASN1_TIME_print(bp, notAfter);
1157 BIO_write(bp, &zero, 1);
1158 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &bm);
1161 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, "%s: %s\n", reason, expiry);
1167 int openconnect_open_https(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
1169 method_const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_method;
1175 if (vpninfo->https_ssl)
1178 if (vpninfo->peer_cert) {
1179 X509_free(vpninfo->peer_cert);
1180 vpninfo->peer_cert = NULL;
1183 ssl_sock = connect_https_socket(vpninfo);
1187 ssl3_method = TLSv1_client_method();
1188 if (!vpninfo->https_ctx) {
1189 vpninfo->https_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(ssl3_method);
1191 /* Some servers (or their firewalls) really don't like seeing
1193 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
1194 SSL_CTX_set_options (vpninfo->https_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
1197 if (vpninfo->cert) {
1198 err = load_certificate(vpninfo);
1200 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1201 _("Loading certificate failed. Aborting.\n"));
1204 check_certificate_expiry(vpninfo);
1207 /* We just want to do:
1208 SSL_CTX_set_purpose(vpninfo->https_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_ANY);
1209 ... but it doesn't work with OpenSSL < 0.9.8k because of
1210 problems with inheritance (fixed in v1.1.4.6 of
1211 crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c) so we have to play silly buggers
1212 instead. This trick doesn't work _either_ in < 0.9.7 but
1213 I don't know of _any_ workaround which will, and can't
1214 be bothered to find out either. */
1215 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000
1216 SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(vpninfo->https_ctx,
1217 ssl_app_verify_callback, NULL);
1219 SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1221 if (vpninfo->cafile) {
1222 if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo->cafile, NULL)) {
1223 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1224 _("Failed to open CA file '%s'\n"),
1226 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
1233 https_ssl = SSL_new(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1234 workaround_openssl_certchain_bug(vpninfo, https_ssl);
1236 https_bio = BIO_new_socket(ssl_sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
1237 BIO_set_nbio(https_bio, 1);
1238 SSL_set_bio(https_ssl, https_bio, https_bio);
1240 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO, _("SSL negotiation with %s\n"),
1243 while ((err = SSL_connect(https_ssl)) <= 0) {
1244 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
1245 int maxfd = ssl_sock;
1250 err = SSL_get_error(https_ssl, err);
1251 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
1252 FD_SET(ssl_sock, &rd_set);
1253 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
1254 FD_SET(ssl_sock, &wr_set);
1256 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL connection failure\n"));
1257 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
1258 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1263 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
1264 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
1265 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > ssl_sock)
1266 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
1268 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
1269 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
1270 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
1271 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL connection cancelled\n"));
1272 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1278 if (verify_peer(vpninfo, https_ssl)) {
1279 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1284 vpninfo->ssl_fd = ssl_sock;
1285 vpninfo->https_ssl = https_ssl;
1287 /* Stash this now, because it might not be available later if the
1288 server has disconnected. */
1289 vpninfo->peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(vpninfo->https_ssl);
1291 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO, _("Connected to HTTPS on %s\n"),
1297 void openconnect_close_https(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, int final)
1299 if (vpninfo->peer_cert) {
1300 X509_free(vpninfo->peer_cert);
1301 vpninfo->peer_cert = NULL;
1303 if (vpninfo->https_ssl) {
1304 SSL_free(vpninfo->https_ssl);
1305 vpninfo->https_ssl = NULL;
1307 if (vpninfo->ssl_fd != -1) {
1308 close(vpninfo->ssl_fd);
1309 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_rfds);
1310 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_wfds);
1311 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_efds);
1312 vpninfo->ssl_fd = -1;
1314 if (final && vpninfo->https_ctx) {
1315 SSL_CTX_free(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1316 vpninfo->https_ctx = NULL;
1320 void openconnect_init_ssl(void)
1322 SSL_library_init ();
1324 SSL_load_error_strings ();
1325 OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms ();
1328 char *openconnect_get_cert_details(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1329 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert)
1331 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1336 X509_print_ex(bp, cert, 0, 0);
1337 BIO_write(bp, &zero, 1);
1338 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &certinfo);
1340 ret = strdup(certinfo->data);
1346 int openconnect_local_cert_md5(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1351 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
1354 if (get_cert_md5_fingerprint(vpninfo, vpninfo->cert_x509, buf))