2 * OpenConnect (SSL + DTLS) VPN client
4 * Copyright © 2008-2012 Intel Corporation.
6 * Author: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
8 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
9 * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License
10 * version 2.1, as published by the Free Software Foundation.
12 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
13 * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
15 * Lesser General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
18 * License along with this library; if not, write to:
20 * Free Software Foundation, Inc.
21 * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor,
22 * Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA
26 #include <sys/types.h>
27 #include <netinet/in.h>
28 #include <arpa/inet.h>
31 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
32 #include <openssl/err.h>
33 #include <openssl/engine.h>
34 #include <openssl/evp.h>
35 #include <openssl/rand.h>
36 #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
37 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
38 #include <openssl/x509.h>
39 #include <openssl/bio.h>
41 #include "openconnect-internal.h"
43 int openconnect_sha1(unsigned char *result, void *data, int len)
48 EVP_Digest(data, len, result, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
49 EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
54 int openconnect_get_cert_DER(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
55 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, unsigned char **buf)
57 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
61 if (!i2d_X509_bio(bp, cert)) {
66 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &certinfo);
73 memcpy(*buf, certinfo->data, l);
78 int openconnect_random(void *bytes, int len)
80 if (RAND_bytes(bytes, len) != 1)
85 /* Helper functions for reading/writing lines over SSL.
86 We could use cURL for the HTTP stuff, but it's overkill */
88 int openconnect_SSL_write(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
90 size_t orig_len = len;
93 int done = SSL_write(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf, len);
98 int err = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, done);
99 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
100 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
105 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
106 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
107 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
108 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
110 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to write to SSL socket"));
111 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
114 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
115 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
116 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
117 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
119 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
120 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
121 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
122 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL write cancelled\n"));
130 int openconnect_SSL_read(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
134 while ((done = SSL_read(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf, len)) == -1) {
135 int err = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, done);
136 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
137 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
142 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
143 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
144 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
145 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
147 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to read from SSL socket"));
148 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
151 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
152 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
153 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
154 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
156 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
157 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
158 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
159 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL read cancelled\n"));
166 int openconnect_SSL_gets(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, char *buf, size_t len)
175 ret = SSL_read(vpninfo->https_ssl, buf + i, 1);
177 if (buf[i] == '\n') {
179 if (i && buf[i-1] == '\r') {
192 fd_set rd_set, wr_set;
193 int maxfd = vpninfo->ssl_fd;
198 ret = SSL_get_error(vpninfo->https_ssl, ret);
199 if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
200 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &rd_set);
201 else if (ret == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
202 FD_SET(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &wr_set);
204 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to read from SSL socket\n"));
205 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
209 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
210 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
211 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > vpninfo->ssl_fd)
212 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
214 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
215 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
216 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
217 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL read cancelled\n"));
228 /* UI handling. All this just to handle the PIN callback from the TPM ENGINE,
229 and turn it into a call to our ->process_auth_form function */
232 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo;
233 struct oc_form_opt **last_opt;
234 struct oc_auth_form form;
238 struct oc_form_opt opt;
242 /* Ick. But there is no way to pass this sanely through OpenSSL */
243 static struct openconnect_info *ui_vpninfo;
245 static int ui_open(UI *ui)
247 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = ui_vpninfo; /* Ick */
248 struct ui_data *ui_data;
250 if (!vpninfo || !vpninfo->process_auth_form)
253 ui_data = malloc(sizeof(*ui_data));
257 memset(ui_data, 0, sizeof(*ui_data));
258 ui_data->last_opt = &ui_data->form.opts;
259 ui_data->vpninfo = vpninfo;
260 ui_data->form.auth_id = (char *)"openssl_ui";
261 UI_add_user_data(ui, ui_data);
266 static int ui_write(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
268 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
269 struct ui_form_opt *opt;
271 switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
273 ui_data->form.error = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
276 ui_data->form.message = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
279 opt = malloc(sizeof(*opt));
282 memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt));
284 opt->opt.label = opt->opt.name = (char *)UI_get0_output_string(uis);
285 if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO)
286 opt->opt.type = OC_FORM_OPT_TEXT;
288 opt->opt.type = OC_FORM_OPT_PASSWORD;
289 *(ui_data->last_opt) = &opt->opt;
290 ui_data->last_opt = &opt->opt.next;
294 fprintf(stderr, "Unhandled SSL UI request type %d\n",
295 UI_get_string_type(uis));
301 static int ui_flush(UI *ui)
303 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
304 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = ui_data->vpninfo;
305 struct ui_form_opt *opt;
308 ret = vpninfo->process_auth_form(vpninfo->cbdata, &ui_data->form);
312 for (opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)ui_data->form.opts; opt;
313 opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)opt->opt.next) {
314 if (opt->opt.value && opt->uis)
315 UI_set_result(ui, opt->uis, opt->opt.value);
320 static int ui_close(UI *ui)
322 struct ui_data *ui_data = UI_get0_user_data(ui);
323 struct ui_form_opt *opt, *next_opt;
325 opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)ui_data->form.opts;
327 next_opt = (struct ui_form_opt *)opt->opt.next;
329 free(opt->opt.value);
334 UI_add_user_data(ui, NULL);
339 static UI_METHOD *create_openssl_ui(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
341 UI_METHOD *ui_method = UI_create_method((char *)"AnyConnect VPN UI");
343 /* There is a race condition here because of the use of the
344 static ui_vpninfo pointer. This sucks, but it's OpenSSL's
345 fault and in practice it's *never* going to hurt us.
347 This UI is only used for loading certificates from a TPM; for
348 PKCS#12 and PEM files we hook the passphrase request differently.
349 The ui_vpninfo variable is set here, and is used from ui_open()
350 when the TPM ENGINE decides it needs to ask the user for a PIN.
352 The race condition exists because theoretically, there
353 could be more than one thread using libopenconnect and
354 trying to authenticate to a VPN server, within the *same*
355 process. And if *both* are using certificates from the TPM,
356 and *both* manage to be within that short window of time
357 between setting ui_vpninfo and invoking ui_open() to fetch
358 the PIN, then one connection's ->process_auth_form() could
359 get a PIN request for the *other* connection.
361 However, the only thing that ever does run libopenconnect more
362 than once from the same process is KDE's NetworkManager support,
363 and NetworkManager doesn't *support* having more than one VPN
364 connected anyway, so first that would have to be fixed and then
365 you'd have to connect to two VPNs simultaneously by clicking
366 'connect' on both at *exactly* the same time and then getting
369 Oh, and the KDE support won't be using OpenSSL anyway because of
370 licensing conflicts... so although this sucks, I'm not going to
373 ui_vpninfo = vpninfo;
375 /* Set up a UI method of our own for password/passphrase requests */
376 UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, ui_open);
377 UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ui_write);
378 UI_method_set_flusher(ui_method, ui_flush);
379 UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, ui_close);
384 static int pem_pw_cb(char *buf, int len, int w, void *v)
386 struct openconnect_info *vpninfo = v;
390 if (vpninfo->cert_password) {
391 pass = vpninfo->cert_password;
392 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
393 } else if (request_passphrase(vpninfo, "openconnect_pem",
394 &pass, _("Enter PEM pass phrase:")))
400 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
401 _("PEM password too long (%d >= %d)\n"),
407 memcpy(buf, pass, plen+1);
412 static int load_pkcs12_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, PKCS12 *p12)
414 EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
420 pass = vpninfo->cert_password;
421 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
423 /* We do this every time round the loop, to work around a bug in
424 OpenSSL < 1.0.0-beta2 -- where the stack at *ca will be freed
425 when PKCS12_parse() returns an error, but *ca is left pointing
426 to the freed memory. */
428 if (!pass && request_passphrase(vpninfo, "openconnect_pkcs12", &pass,
429 _("Enter PKCS#12 pass phrase:")) < 0) {
433 if (!PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, &pkey, &cert, &ca)) {
434 unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
436 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
438 if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PKCS12 &&
439 ERR_GET_FUNC(err) == PKCS12_F_PKCS12_PARSE &&
440 ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PKCS12_R_MAC_VERIFY_FAILURE) {
441 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
442 _("Parse PKCS#12 failed (wrong passphrase?)\n"));
448 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
449 _("Parse PKCS#12 failed (see above errors)\n"));
457 vpninfo->cert_x509 = cert;
458 SSL_CTX_use_certificate(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert);
459 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
460 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
461 _("Using client certificate '%s'\n"), buf);
463 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
464 _("PKCS#12 contained no certificate!"));
469 SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(vpninfo->https_ctx, pkey);
472 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
473 _("PKCS#12 contained no private key!"));
477 /* Only include supporting certificates which are actually necessary */
481 for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) {
482 X509 *cert2 = sk_X509_value(ca, i);
483 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert) == X509_V_OK) {
488 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert2) == X509_V_OK)
491 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert2),
493 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_DEBUG,
494 _("Extra cert from PKCS#12: '%s'\n"), buf);
495 CRYPTO_add(&cert2->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
496 SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert2);
501 sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
509 static int load_tpm_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
513 UI_METHOD *meth = NULL;
516 ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
518 e = ENGINE_by_id("tpm");
520 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Can't load TPM engine.\n"));
521 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
524 if (!ENGINE_init(e) || !ENGINE_set_default_RSA(e) ||
525 !ENGINE_set_default_RAND(e)) {
526 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Failed to init TPM engine\n"));
527 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
532 if (vpninfo->cert_password) {
533 if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "PIN", strlen(vpninfo->cert_password),
534 vpninfo->cert_password, NULL, 0)) {
535 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
536 _("Failed to set TPM SRK password\n"));
537 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
539 vpninfo->cert_password = NULL;
540 free(vpninfo->cert_password);
542 /* Provide our own UI method to handle the PIN callback. */
543 meth = create_openssl_ui(vpninfo);
545 key = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, vpninfo->sslkey, meth, NULL);
547 UI_destroy_method(meth);
549 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
550 _("Failed to load TPM private key\n"));
551 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
555 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(vpninfo->https_ctx, key)) {
556 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Add key from TPM failed\n"));
557 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
567 static int load_tpm_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
569 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
570 _("This version of OpenConnect was built without TPM support\n"));
575 static int reload_pem_cert(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
577 BIO *b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file_internal());
583 if (BIO_read_filename(b, vpninfo->cert) <= 0) {
586 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
587 _("Failed to reload X509 cert for expiry check\n"));
588 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
591 vpninfo->cert_x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(b, NULL, NULL, NULL);
593 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
596 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(vpninfo->cert_x509), buf, sizeof(buf));
597 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
598 _("Using client certificate '%s'\n"), buf);
603 #ifdef ANDROID_KEYSTORE
604 static BIO *BIO_from_keystore(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, const char *item)
606 char content[KEYSTORE_MESSAGE_SIZE];
609 const char *p = item + 9;
611 /* Skip first two slashes if the user has given it as
612 keystore://foo ... */
617 len = keystore_get(p, strlen(p), content);
619 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
620 _("Failed to lead item '%s' from keystore\n"),
624 if (!(b = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) || BIO_write(b, content, len) != len) {
625 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
626 _("Failed to create BIO for keystore item '%s'\n"),
635 static int is_pem_password_error(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
637 unsigned long err = ERR_peek_error();
639 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
641 #ifndef EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX
642 #define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL
644 /* If the user fat-fingered the passphrase, try again */
645 if (ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_EVP &&
646 ERR_GET_FUNC(err) == EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX &&
647 ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT) {
648 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
649 _("Loading private key failed (wrong passphrase?)\n"));
654 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
655 _("Loading private key failed (see above errors)\n"));
659 static int load_certificate(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
661 if (!strncmp(vpninfo->sslkey, "pkcs11:", 7) ||
662 !strncmp(vpninfo->cert, "pkcs11:", 7)) {
663 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
664 _("This binary built without PKCS#11 support\n"));
668 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
669 _("Using certificate file %s\n"), vpninfo->cert);
671 if (strncmp(vpninfo->cert, "keystore:", 9) &&
672 (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_PKCS12 ||
673 vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)) {
677 f = fopen(vpninfo->cert, "r");
679 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
680 _("Failed to open certificate file %s: %s\n"),
681 vpninfo->cert, strerror(errno));
684 p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(f, NULL);
687 return load_pkcs12_certificate(vpninfo, p12);
690 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_PKCS12) {
691 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("Read PKCS#12 failed\n"));
692 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
695 /* Clear error and fall through to see if it's a PEM file... */
699 /* It's PEM or TPM now, and either way we need to load the plain cert: */
700 #ifdef ANDROID_KEYSTORE
701 if (!strncmp(vpninfo->cert, "keystore:", 9)) {
702 BIO *b = BIO_from_keystore(vpninfo, vpninfo->cert);
705 vpninfo->cert_x509 = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(b, NULL, pem_pw_cb, vpninfo);
707 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509) {
708 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
709 _("Failed to load X509 certificate from keystore\n"));
710 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
714 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo->cert_x509)) {
715 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
716 _("Failed to use X509 certificate from keystore\n"));
717 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
718 X509_free(vpninfo->cert_x509);
719 vpninfo->cert_x509 = NULL;
723 #endif /* ANDROID_KEYSTORE */
725 if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(vpninfo->https_ctx,
727 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
728 _("Loading certificate failed\n"));
729 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
733 /* Ew, we can't get it back from the OpenSSL CTX in any sane fashion */
734 reload_pem_cert(vpninfo);
737 #ifdef ANDROID_KEYSTORE
738 if (!strncmp(vpninfo->sslkey, "keystore:", 9)) {
743 b = BIO_from_keystore(vpninfo, vpninfo->sslkey);
746 key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(b, NULL, pem_pw_cb, vpninfo);
749 if (is_pem_password_error(vpninfo))
753 if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(vpninfo->https_ctx, key)) {
754 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
755 _("Failed to use private key from keystore\n"));
757 X509_free(vpninfo->cert_x509);
758 vpninfo->cert_x509 = NULL;
765 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
766 FILE *f = fopen(vpninfo->sslkey, "r");
770 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
771 _("Failed to open private key file %s: %s\n"),
772 vpninfo->cert, strerror(errno));
777 while (fgets(buf, 255, f)) {
778 if (!strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN TSS KEY BLOB-----\n")) {
779 vpninfo->cert_type = CERT_TYPE_TPM;
781 } else if (!strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n") ||
782 !strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n") ||
783 !strcmp(buf, "-----BEGIN ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY-----\n")) {
784 vpninfo->cert_type = CERT_TYPE_PEM;
789 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
790 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
791 _("Failed to identify private key type in '%s'\n"),
797 if (vpninfo->cert_type == CERT_TYPE_TPM)
798 return load_tpm_certificate(vpninfo);
800 /* Standard PEM certificate */
801 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(vpninfo->https_ctx, pem_pw_cb);
802 SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo);
804 if (!SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo->sslkey,
806 if (is_pem_password_error(vpninfo))
813 static int get_cert_fingerprint(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
814 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, const EVP_MD *type,
817 unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
820 if (!X509_digest(cert, type, md, &n))
823 for (i=0; i < n; i++)
824 sprintf(&buf[i*2], "%02X", md[i]);
829 int get_cert_md5_fingerprint(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
830 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, char *buf)
832 return get_cert_fingerprint(vpninfo, cert, EVP_md5(), buf);
835 int openconnect_get_cert_sha1(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
836 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert, char *buf)
838 return get_cert_fingerprint(vpninfo, cert, EVP_sha1(), buf);
841 static int check_server_cert(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, X509 *cert)
843 char fingerprint[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2 + 1];
846 ret = openconnect_get_cert_sha1(vpninfo, cert, fingerprint);
850 if (strcasecmp(vpninfo->servercert, fingerprint)) {
851 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
852 _("Server SSL certificate didn't match: %s\n"), fingerprint);
858 static int match_hostname_elem(const char *hostname, int helem_len,
859 const char *match, int melem_len)
861 if (!helem_len && !melem_len)
864 if (!helem_len || !melem_len)
868 if (match[0] == '*') {
871 for (i = 1 ; i <= helem_len; i++) {
872 if (!match_hostname_elem(hostname + i, helem_len - i,
873 match + 1, melem_len - 1))
879 /* From the NetBSD (5.1) man page for ctype(3):
880 Values of type char or signed char must first be cast to unsigned char,
881 to ensure that the values are within the correct range. The result
882 should then be cast to int to avoid warnings from some compilers.
883 We do indeed get warning "array subscript has type 'char'" without
885 if (toupper((int)(unsigned char)hostname[0]) ==
886 toupper((int)(unsigned char)match[0]))
887 return match_hostname_elem(hostname + 1, helem_len - 1,
888 match + 1, melem_len - 1);
893 static int match_hostname(const char *hostname, const char *match)
896 const char *h_dot, *m_dot;
897 int helem_len, melem_len;
899 h_dot = strchr(hostname, '.');
900 m_dot = strchr(match, '.');
902 if (h_dot && m_dot) {
903 helem_len = h_dot - hostname + 1;
904 melem_len = m_dot - match + 1;
905 } else if (!h_dot && !m_dot) {
906 helem_len = strlen(hostname);
907 melem_len = strlen(match);
912 if (match_hostname_elem(hostname, helem_len,
916 hostname += helem_len;
925 /* cf. RFC2818 and RFC2459 */
926 static int match_cert_hostname(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, X509 *peer_cert)
928 STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
930 ASN1_STRING *subjasn1;
931 char *subjstr = NULL;
934 char addrbuf[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
937 /* Allow GEN_IP in the certificate only if we actually connected
938 by IP address rather than by name. */
939 if (inet_pton(AF_INET, vpninfo->hostname, addrbuf) > 0)
941 else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, vpninfo->hostname, addrbuf) > 0)
943 else if (vpninfo->hostname[0] == '[' &&
944 vpninfo->hostname[strlen(vpninfo->hostname)-1] == ']') {
945 char *p = &vpninfo->hostname[strlen(vpninfo->hostname)-1];
947 if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, vpninfo->hostname + 1, addrbuf) > 0)
952 altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(peer_cert, NID_subject_alt_name,
954 for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames); i++) {
955 const GENERAL_NAME *this = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
957 if (this->type == GEN_DNS) {
960 int len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&str, this->d.ia5);
966 /* We don't like names with embedded NUL */
967 if (strlen(str) != len)
970 if (!match_hostname(vpninfo->hostname, str)) {
971 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
972 _("Matched DNS altname '%s'\n"),
974 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
978 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
979 _("No match for altname '%s'\n"),
983 } else if (this->type == GEN_IPADD && addrlen) {
987 if (this->d.ip->length == 4) {
989 } else if (this->d.ip->length == 16) {
992 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
993 _("Certificate has GEN_IPADD altname with bogus length %d\n"),
998 /* We only do this for the debug messages */
999 inet_ntop(family, this->d.ip->data, host, sizeof(host));
1001 if (this->d.ip->length == addrlen &&
1002 !memcmp(addrbuf, this->d.ip->data, addrlen)) {
1003 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1004 _("Matched %s address '%s'\n"),
1005 (family == AF_INET6)?"IPv6":"IPv4",
1007 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
1010 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1011 _("No match for %s address '%s'\n"),
1012 (family == AF_INET6)?"IPv6":"IPv4",
1015 } else if (this->type == GEN_URI) {
1017 char *url_proto, *url_host, *url_path, *url_host2;
1019 int len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&str, this->d.ia5);
1024 /* We don't like names with embedded NUL */
1025 if (strlen(str) != len)
1028 if (internal_parse_url(str, &url_proto, &url_host, &url_port, &url_path, 0)) {
1033 if (!url_proto || strcasecmp(url_proto, "https"))
1036 if (url_port != vpninfo->port)
1039 /* Leave url_host as it was so that it can be freed */
1040 url_host2 = url_host;
1041 if (addrlen == 16 && vpninfo->hostname[0] != '[' &&
1042 url_host[0] == '[' && url_host[strlen(url_host)-1] == ']') {
1043 /* Cope with https://[IPv6]/ when the hostname is bare IPv6 */
1044 url_host[strlen(url_host)-1] = 0;
1048 if (strcasecmp(vpninfo->hostname, url_host2))
1052 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1053 _("URI '%s' has non-empty path; ignoring\n"),
1055 goto no_uri_match_silent;
1057 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1058 _("Matched URI '%s'\n"),
1064 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
1068 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1069 _("No match for URI '%s'\n"),
1071 no_uri_match_silent:
1078 GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
1080 /* According to RFC2818, we don't use the legacy subject name if
1081 there was an altname with DNS type. */
1083 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1084 _("No altname in peer cert matched '%s'\n"),
1089 subjname = X509_get_subject_name(peer_cert);
1091 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1092 _("No subject name in peer cert!\n"));
1096 /* Find the _last_ (most specific) commonName */
1099 int j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(subjname, NID_commonName, i);
1106 subjasn1 = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(subjname, i));
1108 i = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((void *)&subjstr, subjasn1);
1110 if (!subjstr || strlen(subjstr) != i) {
1111 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1112 _("Failed to parse subject name in peer cert\n"));
1117 if (match_hostname(vpninfo->hostname, subjstr)) {
1118 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1119 _("Peer cert subject mismatch ('%s' != '%s')\n"),
1120 subjstr, vpninfo->hostname);
1123 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_TRACE,
1124 _("Matched peer certificate subject name '%s'\n"),
1128 OPENSSL_free(subjstr);
1132 static int verify_peer(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, SSL *https_ssl)
1137 peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(https_ssl);
1139 if (vpninfo->servercert) {
1140 /* If given a cert fingerprint on the command line, that's
1142 ret = check_server_cert(vpninfo, peer_cert);
1144 int vfy = SSL_get_verify_result(https_ssl);
1145 const char *err_string = NULL;
1147 if (vfy != X509_V_OK)
1148 err_string = X509_verify_cert_error_string(vfy);
1149 else if (match_cert_hostname(vpninfo, peer_cert))
1150 err_string = _("certificate does not match hostname");
1153 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO,
1154 _("Server certificate verify failed: %s\n"),
1157 if (vpninfo->validate_peer_cert)
1158 ret = vpninfo->validate_peer_cert(vpninfo->cbdata,
1167 X509_free(peer_cert);
1172 static void workaround_openssl_certchain_bug(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1175 /* OpenSSL has problems with certificate chains -- if there are
1176 multiple certs with the same name, it doesn't necessarily
1177 choose the _right_ one. (RT#1942)
1178 Pick the right ones for ourselves and add them manually. */
1179 X509 *cert = SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
1181 X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1184 if (!cert || !store)
1187 /* If we already have 'supporting' certs, don't add them again */
1188 if (vpninfo->https_ctx->extra_certs)
1191 if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&ctx, store, NULL, NULL))
1194 while (ctx.get_issuer(&cert2, &ctx, cert) == 1) {
1198 if (X509_check_issued(cert2, cert2) == X509_V_OK)
1201 X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert),
1203 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_DEBUG,
1204 _("Extra cert from cafile: '%s'\n"), buf);
1205 SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(vpninfo->https_ctx, cert);
1207 X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
1210 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000
1211 static int ssl_app_verify_callback(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
1213 /* We've seen certificates in the wild which don't have the
1214 purpose fields filled in correctly */
1215 X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(ctx->param, X509_PURPOSE_ANY);
1216 return X509_verify_cert(ctx);
1220 static int check_certificate_expiry(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
1222 ASN1_TIME *notAfter;
1223 const char *reason = NULL;
1227 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
1231 notAfter = X509_get_notAfter(vpninfo->cert_x509);
1232 i = X509_cmp_time(notAfter, &t);
1234 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1235 _("Error in client cert notAfter field\n"));
1238 reason = _("Client certificate has expired at");
1240 t += vpninfo->cert_expire_warning;
1241 i = X509_cmp_time(notAfter, &t);
1243 reason = _("Client certificate expires soon at");
1247 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1249 const char *expiry = _("<error>");
1253 ASN1_TIME_print(bp, notAfter);
1254 BIO_write(bp, &zero, 1);
1255 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &bm);
1258 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, "%s: %s\n", reason, expiry);
1264 int openconnect_open_https(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
1266 method_const SSL_METHOD *ssl3_method;
1272 if (vpninfo->https_ssl)
1275 if (vpninfo->peer_cert) {
1276 X509_free(vpninfo->peer_cert);
1277 vpninfo->peer_cert = NULL;
1280 ssl_sock = connect_https_socket(vpninfo);
1284 ssl3_method = TLSv1_client_method();
1285 if (!vpninfo->https_ctx) {
1286 vpninfo->https_ctx = SSL_CTX_new(ssl3_method);
1288 /* Some servers (or their firewalls) really don't like seeing
1290 #ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
1291 SSL_CTX_set_options (vpninfo->https_ctx, SSL_OP_NO_TICKET);
1294 if (vpninfo->cert) {
1295 err = load_certificate(vpninfo);
1297 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1298 _("Loading certificate failed. Aborting.\n"));
1301 check_certificate_expiry(vpninfo);
1304 /* We just want to do:
1305 SSL_CTX_set_purpose(vpninfo->https_ctx, X509_PURPOSE_ANY);
1306 ... but it doesn't work with OpenSSL < 0.9.8k because of
1307 problems with inheritance (fixed in v1.1.4.6 of
1308 crypto/x509/x509_vpm.c) so we have to play silly buggers
1309 instead. This trick doesn't work _either_ in < 0.9.7 but
1310 I don't know of _any_ workaround which will, and can't
1311 be bothered to find out either. */
1312 #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000
1313 SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(vpninfo->https_ctx,
1314 ssl_app_verify_callback, NULL);
1316 SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1318 if (vpninfo->cafile) {
1319 if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(vpninfo->https_ctx, vpninfo->cafile, NULL)) {
1320 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR,
1321 _("Failed to open CA file '%s'\n"),
1323 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
1330 https_ssl = SSL_new(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1331 workaround_openssl_certchain_bug(vpninfo, https_ssl);
1333 https_bio = BIO_new_socket(ssl_sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
1334 BIO_set_nbio(https_bio, 1);
1335 SSL_set_bio(https_ssl, https_bio, https_bio);
1337 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO, _("SSL negotiation with %s\n"),
1340 while ((err = SSL_connect(https_ssl)) <= 0) {
1341 fd_set wr_set, rd_set;
1342 int maxfd = ssl_sock;
1347 err = SSL_get_error(https_ssl, err);
1348 if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ)
1349 FD_SET(ssl_sock, &rd_set);
1350 else if (err == SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE)
1351 FD_SET(ssl_sock, &wr_set);
1353 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL connection failure\n"));
1354 openconnect_report_ssl_errors(vpninfo);
1355 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1360 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1) {
1361 FD_SET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set);
1362 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd > ssl_sock)
1363 maxfd = vpninfo->cancel_fd;
1365 select(maxfd + 1, &rd_set, &wr_set, NULL, NULL);
1366 if (vpninfo->cancel_fd != -1 &&
1367 FD_ISSET(vpninfo->cancel_fd, &rd_set)) {
1368 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_ERR, _("SSL connection cancelled\n"));
1369 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1375 if (verify_peer(vpninfo, https_ssl)) {
1376 SSL_free(https_ssl);
1381 vpninfo->ssl_fd = ssl_sock;
1382 vpninfo->https_ssl = https_ssl;
1384 /* Stash this now, because it might not be available later if the
1385 server has disconnected. */
1386 vpninfo->peer_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(vpninfo->https_ssl);
1388 vpn_progress(vpninfo, PRG_INFO, _("Connected to HTTPS on %s\n"),
1394 void openconnect_close_https(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo, int final)
1396 if (vpninfo->peer_cert) {
1397 X509_free(vpninfo->peer_cert);
1398 vpninfo->peer_cert = NULL;
1400 if (vpninfo->https_ssl) {
1401 SSL_free(vpninfo->https_ssl);
1402 vpninfo->https_ssl = NULL;
1404 if (vpninfo->ssl_fd != -1) {
1405 close(vpninfo->ssl_fd);
1406 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_rfds);
1407 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_wfds);
1408 FD_CLR(vpninfo->ssl_fd, &vpninfo->select_efds);
1409 vpninfo->ssl_fd = -1;
1412 if (vpninfo->https_ctx) {
1413 SSL_CTX_free(vpninfo->https_ctx);
1414 vpninfo->https_ctx = NULL;
1416 if (vpninfo->cert_x509) {
1417 X509_free(vpninfo->cert_x509);
1418 vpninfo->cert_x509 = NULL;
1423 void openconnect_init_ssl(void)
1425 SSL_library_init ();
1427 SSL_load_error_strings ();
1428 OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms ();
1431 char *openconnect_get_cert_details(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1432 OPENCONNECT_X509 *cert)
1434 BIO *bp = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
1439 X509_print_ex(bp, cert, 0, 0);
1440 BIO_write(bp, &zero, 1);
1441 BIO_get_mem_ptr(bp, &certinfo);
1443 ret = strdup(certinfo->data);
1449 int openconnect_local_cert_md5(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo,
1454 if (!vpninfo->cert_x509)
1457 if (get_cert_md5_fingerprint(vpninfo, vpninfo->cert_x509, buf))