2 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Mellanox Technologies. All rights reserved.
3 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Dave Watson <davejwatson@fb.com>. All rights reserved.
4 * Copyright (c) 2016-2017, Lance Chao <lancerchao@fb.com>. All rights reserved.
5 * Copyright (c) 2016, Fridolin Pokorny <fridolin.pokorny@gmail.com>. All rights reserved.
6 * Copyright (c) 2016, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@gnutls.org>. All rights reserved.
7 * Copyright (c) 2018, Covalent IO, Inc. http://covalent.io
9 * This software is available to you under a choice of one of two
10 * licenses. You may choose to be licensed under the terms of the GNU
11 * General Public License (GPL) Version 2, available from the file
12 * COPYING in the main directory of this source tree, or the
13 * OpenIB.org BSD license below:
15 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
16 * without modification, are permitted provided that the following
19 * - Redistributions of source code must retain the above
20 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
23 * - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
24 * copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
25 * disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
26 * provided with the distribution.
28 * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
29 * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
30 * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
31 * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
32 * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
33 * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
34 * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
38 #include <linux/bug.h>
39 #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
40 #include <linux/module.h>
41 #include <linux/splice.h>
42 #include <crypto/aead.h>
44 #include <net/strparser.h>
47 noinline void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err)
49 WARN_ON_ONCE(err >= 0);
50 /* sk->sk_err should contain a positive error code. */
55 static int __skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len,
56 unsigned int recursion_level)
58 int start = skb_headlen(skb);
59 int i, chunk = start - offset;
60 struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
63 if (unlikely(recursion_level >= 24))
76 for (i = 0; i < skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags; i++) {
79 WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
81 end = start + skb_frag_size(&skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[i]);
95 if (unlikely(skb_has_frag_list(skb))) {
96 skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
99 WARN_ON(start > offset + len);
101 end = start + frag_iter->len;
102 chunk = end - offset;
106 ret = __skb_nsg(frag_iter, offset - start, chunk,
107 recursion_level + 1);
108 if (unlikely(ret < 0))
123 /* Return the number of scatterlist elements required to completely map the
124 * skb, or -EMSGSIZE if the recursion depth is exceeded.
126 static int skb_nsg(struct sk_buff *skb, int offset, int len)
128 return __skb_nsg(skb, offset, len, 0);
131 static int padding_length(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
132 struct tls_prot_info *prot, struct sk_buff *skb)
134 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
137 /* Determine zero-padding length */
138 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
139 char content_type = 0;
143 while (content_type == 0) {
144 if (back > rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size)
146 err = skb_copy_bits(skb,
147 rxm->offset + rxm->full_len - back,
156 ctx->control = content_type;
161 static void tls_decrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
163 struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
164 struct scatterlist *sgout = aead_req->dst;
165 struct scatterlist *sgin = aead_req->src;
166 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx;
167 struct tls_context *tls_ctx;
168 struct tls_prot_info *prot;
169 struct scatterlist *sg;
174 skb = (struct sk_buff *)req->data;
175 tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(skb->sk);
176 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
177 prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
179 /* Propagate if there was an err */
182 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(skb->sk),
183 LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR);
184 ctx->async_wait.err = err;
185 tls_err_abort(skb->sk, err);
187 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
190 pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
192 ctx->async_wait.err = pad;
193 tls_err_abort(skb->sk, pad);
195 rxm->full_len -= pad;
196 rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
197 rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
201 /* After using skb->sk to propagate sk through crypto async callback
202 * we need to NULL it again.
207 /* Free the destination pages if skb was not decrypted inplace */
209 /* Skip the first S/G entry as it points to AAD */
210 for_each_sg(sg_next(sgout), sg, UINT_MAX, pages) {
213 put_page(sg_page(sg));
219 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
220 pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
222 if (!pending && ctx->async_notify)
223 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
224 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
227 static int tls_do_decryption(struct sock *sk,
229 struct scatterlist *sgin,
230 struct scatterlist *sgout,
233 struct aead_request *aead_req,
236 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
237 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
238 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
241 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_recv);
242 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size);
243 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, sgin, sgout,
244 data_len + prot->tag_size,
248 /* Using skb->sk to push sk through to crypto async callback
249 * handler. This allows propagating errors up to the socket
250 * if needed. It _must_ be cleared in the async handler
251 * before consume_skb is called. We _know_ skb->sk is NULL
252 * because it is a clone from strparser.
255 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
256 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
257 tls_decrypt_done, skb);
258 atomic_inc(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
260 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req,
261 CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
262 crypto_req_done, &ctx->async_wait);
265 ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req);
266 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) {
270 ret = crypto_wait_req(ret, &ctx->async_wait);
274 atomic_dec(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
279 static void tls_trim_both_msgs(struct sock *sk, int target_size)
281 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
282 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
283 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
284 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
286 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext, target_size);
288 target_size += prot->overhead_size;
289 sk_msg_trim(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted, target_size);
292 static int tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(struct sock *sk, int len)
294 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
295 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
296 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
297 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
299 return sk_msg_alloc(sk, msg_en, len, 0);
302 static int tls_clone_plaintext_msg(struct sock *sk, int required)
304 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
305 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
306 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
307 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
308 struct sk_msg *msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
309 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
312 /* We add page references worth len bytes from encrypted sg
313 * at the end of plaintext sg. It is guaranteed that msg_en
314 * has enough required room (ensured by caller).
316 len = required - msg_pl->sg.size;
318 /* Skip initial bytes in msg_en's data to be able to use
319 * same offset of both plain and encrypted data.
321 skip = prot->prepend_size + msg_pl->sg.size;
323 return sk_msg_clone(sk, msg_pl, msg_en, skip, len);
326 static struct tls_rec *tls_get_rec(struct sock *sk)
328 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
329 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
330 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
331 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
335 mem_size = sizeof(struct tls_rec) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_send);
337 rec = kzalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation);
341 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
342 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
347 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_in, 2);
348 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_in[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size);
349 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_in[1]);
351 sg_init_table(rec->sg_aead_out, 2);
352 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_aead_out[0], rec->aad_space, prot->aad_size);
353 sg_unmark_end(&rec->sg_aead_out[1]);
358 static void tls_free_rec(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *rec)
360 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted);
361 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
365 static void tls_free_open_rec(struct sock *sk)
367 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
368 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
369 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
372 tls_free_rec(sk, rec);
373 ctx->open_rec = NULL;
377 int tls_tx_records(struct sock *sk, int flags)
379 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
380 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
381 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp;
382 struct sk_msg *msg_en;
383 int tx_flags, rc = 0;
385 if (tls_is_partially_sent_record(tls_ctx)) {
386 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
387 struct tls_rec, list);
390 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags;
394 rc = tls_push_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx, tx_flags);
398 /* Full record has been transmitted.
399 * Remove the head of tx_list
401 list_del(&rec->list);
402 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
406 /* Tx all ready records */
407 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) {
408 if (READ_ONCE(rec->tx_ready)) {
410 tx_flags = rec->tx_flags;
414 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
415 rc = tls_push_sg(sk, tls_ctx,
416 &msg_en->sg.data[msg_en->sg.curr],
421 list_del(&rec->list);
422 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
430 if (rc < 0 && rc != -EAGAIN)
431 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
436 static void tls_encrypt_done(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
438 struct aead_request *aead_req = (struct aead_request *)req;
439 struct sock *sk = req->data;
440 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
441 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
442 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
443 struct scatterlist *sge;
444 struct sk_msg *msg_en;
449 rec = container_of(aead_req, struct tls_rec, aead_req);
450 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
452 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, msg_en->sg.curr);
453 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
454 sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
456 /* Check if error is previously set on socket */
457 if (err || sk->sk_err) {
460 /* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */
462 ctx->async_wait.err = -sk->sk_err;
464 ctx->async_wait.err = err;
465 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
470 struct tls_rec *first_rec;
472 /* Mark the record as ready for transmission */
473 smp_store_mb(rec->tx_ready, true);
475 /* If received record is at head of tx_list, schedule tx */
476 first_rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
477 struct tls_rec, list);
478 if (rec == first_rec)
482 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
483 pending = atomic_dec_return(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
485 if (!pending && ctx->async_notify)
486 complete(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
487 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
492 /* Schedule the transmission */
493 if (!test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
494 schedule_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work, 1);
497 static int tls_do_encryption(struct sock *sk,
498 struct tls_context *tls_ctx,
499 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx,
500 struct aead_request *aead_req,
501 size_t data_len, u32 start)
503 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
504 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
505 struct sk_msg *msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
506 struct scatterlist *sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_en, start);
507 int rc, iv_offset = 0;
509 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of IV is a constant */
510 if (prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128) {
511 rec->iv_data[0] = TLS_AES_CCM_IV_B0_BYTE;
515 memcpy(&rec->iv_data[iv_offset], tls_ctx->tx.iv,
516 prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size);
518 xor_iv_with_seq(prot, rec->iv_data + iv_offset, tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq);
520 sge->offset += prot->prepend_size;
521 sge->length -= prot->prepend_size;
523 msg_en->sg.curr = start;
525 aead_request_set_tfm(aead_req, ctx->aead_send);
526 aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, prot->aad_size);
527 aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, rec->sg_aead_in,
529 data_len, rec->iv_data);
531 aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
532 tls_encrypt_done, sk);
534 /* Add the record in tx_list */
535 list_add_tail((struct list_head *)&rec->list, &ctx->tx_list);
536 atomic_inc(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
538 rc = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req);
539 if (!rc || rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
540 atomic_dec(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
541 sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
542 sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
546 WRITE_ONCE(rec->tx_ready, true);
547 } else if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
548 list_del(&rec->list);
552 /* Unhook the record from context if encryption is not failure */
553 ctx->open_rec = NULL;
554 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->tx);
558 static int tls_split_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *from,
559 struct tls_rec **to, struct sk_msg *msg_opl,
560 struct sk_msg *msg_oen, u32 split_point,
561 u32 tx_overhead_size, u32 *orig_end)
563 u32 i, j, bytes = 0, apply = msg_opl->apply_bytes;
564 struct scatterlist *sge, *osge, *nsge;
565 u32 orig_size = msg_opl->sg.size;
566 struct scatterlist tmp = { };
567 struct sk_msg *msg_npl;
571 new = tls_get_rec(sk);
574 ret = sk_msg_alloc(sk, &new->msg_encrypted, msg_opl->sg.size +
575 tx_overhead_size, 0);
577 tls_free_rec(sk, new);
581 *orig_end = msg_opl->sg.end;
582 i = msg_opl->sg.start;
583 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
584 while (apply && sge->length) {
585 if (sge->length > apply) {
586 u32 len = sge->length - apply;
588 get_page(sg_page(sge));
589 sg_set_page(&tmp, sg_page(sge), len,
590 sge->offset + apply);
595 apply -= sge->length;
596 bytes += sge->length;
599 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
600 if (i == msg_opl->sg.end)
602 sge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
606 msg_opl->sg.curr = i;
607 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
608 msg_opl->apply_bytes = 0;
609 msg_opl->sg.size = bytes;
611 msg_npl = &new->msg_plaintext;
612 msg_npl->apply_bytes = apply;
613 msg_npl->sg.size = orig_size - bytes;
615 j = msg_npl->sg.start;
616 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
618 memcpy(nsge, &tmp, sizeof(*nsge));
619 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
620 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
623 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
624 while (osge->length) {
625 memcpy(nsge, osge, sizeof(*nsge));
627 sk_msg_iter_var_next(i);
628 sk_msg_iter_var_next(j);
631 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
632 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
636 msg_npl->sg.curr = j;
637 msg_npl->sg.copybreak = 0;
643 static void tls_merge_open_record(struct sock *sk, struct tls_rec *to,
644 struct tls_rec *from, u32 orig_end)
646 struct sk_msg *msg_npl = &from->msg_plaintext;
647 struct sk_msg *msg_opl = &to->msg_plaintext;
648 struct scatterlist *osge, *nsge;
652 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
653 j = msg_npl->sg.start;
655 osge = sk_msg_elem(msg_opl, i);
656 nsge = sk_msg_elem(msg_npl, j);
658 if (sg_page(osge) == sg_page(nsge) &&
659 osge->offset + osge->length == nsge->offset) {
660 osge->length += nsge->length;
661 put_page(sg_page(nsge));
664 msg_opl->sg.end = orig_end;
665 msg_opl->sg.curr = orig_end;
666 msg_opl->sg.copybreak = 0;
667 msg_opl->apply_bytes = msg_opl->sg.size + msg_npl->sg.size;
668 msg_opl->sg.size += msg_npl->sg.size;
670 sk_msg_free(sk, &to->msg_encrypted);
671 sk_msg_xfer_full(&to->msg_encrypted, &from->msg_encrypted);
676 static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,
677 unsigned char record_type)
679 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
680 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
681 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
682 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec, *tmp = NULL;
683 u32 i, split_point, orig_end;
684 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
685 struct aead_request *req;
692 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
693 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
695 split_point = msg_pl->apply_bytes;
696 split = split_point && split_point < msg_pl->sg.size;
697 if (unlikely((!split &&
699 prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size) ||
702 prot->overhead_size > msg_en->sg.size))) {
704 split_point = msg_en->sg.size;
707 rc = tls_split_open_record(sk, rec, &tmp, msg_pl, msg_en,
708 split_point, prot->overhead_size,
712 /* This can happen if above tls_split_open_record allocates
713 * a single large encryption buffer instead of two smaller
714 * ones. In this case adjust pointers and continue without
717 if (!msg_pl->sg.size) {
718 tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
719 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
720 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
723 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size +
724 prot->overhead_size);
727 rec->tx_flags = flags;
728 req = &rec->aead_req;
731 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
733 rec->content_type = record_type;
734 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
735 /* Add content type to end of message. No padding added */
736 sg_set_buf(&rec->sg_content_type, &rec->content_type, 1);
737 sg_mark_end(&rec->sg_content_type);
738 sg_chain(msg_pl->sg.data, msg_pl->sg.end + 1,
739 &rec->sg_content_type);
741 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_pl, i));
744 if (msg_pl->sg.end < msg_pl->sg.start) {
745 sg_chain(&msg_pl->sg.data[msg_pl->sg.start],
746 MAX_SKB_FRAGS - msg_pl->sg.start + 1,
750 i = msg_pl->sg.start;
751 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_in, 2, &msg_pl->sg.data[i]);
754 sk_msg_iter_var_prev(i);
755 sg_mark_end(sk_msg_elem(msg_en, i));
757 i = msg_en->sg.start;
758 sg_chain(rec->sg_aead_out, 2, &msg_en->sg.data[i]);
760 tls_make_aad(rec->aad_space, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size,
761 tls_ctx->tx.rec_seq, record_type, prot);
763 tls_fill_prepend(tls_ctx,
764 page_address(sg_page(&msg_en->sg.data[i])) +
765 msg_en->sg.data[i].offset,
766 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size,
769 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = false;
771 rc = tls_do_encryption(sk, tls_ctx, ctx, req,
772 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->tail_size, i);
774 if (rc != -EINPROGRESS) {
775 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
777 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
778 tls_merge_open_record(sk, rec, tmp, orig_end);
781 ctx->async_capable = 1;
784 msg_pl = &tmp->msg_plaintext;
785 msg_en = &tmp->msg_encrypted;
786 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en, msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
787 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
791 return tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
794 static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
795 bool full_record, u8 record_type,
796 ssize_t *copied, int flags)
798 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
799 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
800 struct sk_msg msg_redir = { };
801 struct sk_psock *psock;
802 struct sock *sk_redir;
804 bool enospc, policy, redir_ingress;
808 policy = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY);
809 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
810 if (!psock || !policy) {
811 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
812 if (err && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
813 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
814 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
818 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
822 enospc = sk_msg_full(msg);
823 if (psock->eval == __SK_NONE) {
824 delta = msg->sg.size;
825 psock->eval = sk_psock_msg_verdict(sk, psock, msg);
826 delta -= msg->sg.size;
828 if (msg->cork_bytes && msg->cork_bytes > msg->sg.size &&
829 !enospc && !full_record) {
835 if (msg->apply_bytes && msg->apply_bytes < send)
836 send = msg->apply_bytes;
838 switch (psock->eval) {
840 err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
841 if (err && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
842 *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
843 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
849 redir_ingress = psock->redir_ingress;
850 sk_redir = psock->sk_redir;
851 memcpy(&msg_redir, msg, sizeof(*msg));
852 if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
853 msg->apply_bytes = 0;
855 msg->apply_bytes -= send;
856 sk_msg_return_zero(sk, msg, send);
857 msg->sg.size -= send;
859 err = tcp_bpf_sendmsg_redir(sk_redir, redir_ingress,
860 &msg_redir, send, flags);
863 *copied -= sk_msg_free_nocharge(sk, &msg_redir);
866 if (msg->sg.size == 0)
867 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
871 sk_msg_free_partial(sk, msg, send);
872 if (msg->apply_bytes < send)
873 msg->apply_bytes = 0;
875 msg->apply_bytes -= send;
876 if (msg->sg.size == 0)
877 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
878 *copied -= (send + delta);
883 bool reset_eval = !ctx->open_rec;
887 msg = &rec->msg_plaintext;
888 if (!msg->apply_bytes)
892 psock->eval = __SK_NONE;
893 if (psock->sk_redir) {
894 sock_put(psock->sk_redir);
895 psock->sk_redir = NULL;
902 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
906 static int tls_sw_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)
908 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
909 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
910 struct tls_rec *rec = ctx->open_rec;
911 struct sk_msg *msg_pl;
917 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
918 copied = msg_pl->sg.size;
922 return bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, true, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,
926 int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)
928 long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
929 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
930 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
931 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
932 bool async_capable = ctx->async_capable;
933 unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
934 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter);
935 bool eor = !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_MORE);
938 struct sk_msg *msg_pl, *msg_en;
949 if (msg->msg_flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
953 mutex_lock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
956 if (unlikely(msg->msg_controllen)) {
957 ret = tls_proccess_cmsg(sk, msg, &record_type);
959 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
961 else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
966 while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
975 rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk);
981 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
982 msg_en = &rec->msg_encrypted;
984 orig_size = msg_pl->sg.size;
986 try_to_copy = msg_data_left(msg);
987 record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - msg_pl->sg.size;
988 if (try_to_copy >= record_room) {
989 try_to_copy = record_room;
993 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy +
996 if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
997 goto wait_for_sndbuf;
1000 ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size);
1003 goto wait_for_memory;
1005 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
1006 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1007 * to max sg elements limit
1009 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_en->sg.size;
1013 if (!is_kvec && (full_record || eor) && !async_capable) {
1014 u32 first = msg_pl->sg.end;
1016 ret = sk_msg_zerocopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
1017 msg_pl, try_to_copy);
1019 goto fallback_to_reg_send;
1022 copied += try_to_copy;
1024 sk_msg_sg_copy_set(msg_pl, first);
1025 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1026 record_type, &copied,
1029 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1031 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1032 goto wait_for_memory;
1033 else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC)
1035 else if (ret != -EAGAIN)
1040 copied -= try_to_copy;
1041 sk_msg_sg_copy_clear(msg_pl, first);
1042 iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter,
1043 msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size);
1044 fallback_to_reg_send:
1045 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_pl, orig_size);
1048 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + try_to_copy;
1050 ret = tls_clone_plaintext_msg(sk, required_size);
1055 /* Adjust try_to_copy according to the amount that was
1056 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1057 * to max sg elements limit
1059 try_to_copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size;
1061 sk_msg_trim(sk, msg_en,
1062 msg_pl->sg.size + prot->overhead_size);
1066 ret = sk_msg_memcopy_from_iter(sk, &msg->msg_iter,
1067 msg_pl, try_to_copy);
1072 /* Open records defined only if successfully copied, otherwise
1073 * we would trim the sg but not reset the open record frags.
1075 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
1076 copied += try_to_copy;
1077 if (full_record || eor) {
1078 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1079 record_type, &copied,
1082 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1084 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1085 goto wait_for_memory;
1086 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
1097 set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
1099 ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
1103 tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, orig_size);
1107 if (ctx->open_rec && msg_en->sg.size < required_size)
1108 goto alloc_encrypted;
1113 } else if (num_zc) {
1114 /* Wait for pending encryptions to get completed */
1115 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
1116 ctx->async_notify = true;
1118 pending = atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
1119 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
1121 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
1123 reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
1125 /* There can be no concurrent accesses, since we have no
1126 * pending encrypt operations
1128 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->async_notify, false);
1130 if (ctx->async_wait.err) {
1131 ret = ctx->async_wait.err;
1136 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
1137 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
1138 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work);
1139 tls_tx_records(sk, msg->msg_flags);
1143 ret = sk_stream_error(sk, msg->msg_flags, ret);
1146 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1147 return copied > 0 ? copied : ret;
1150 static int tls_sw_do_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1151 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1153 long timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
1154 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1155 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
1156 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1157 unsigned char record_type = TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA;
1158 struct sk_msg *msg_pl;
1159 struct tls_rec *rec;
1167 eor = !(flags & MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST);
1168 sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_NOSPACE, sk);
1170 /* Call the sk_stream functions to manage the sndbuf mem. */
1172 size_t copy, required_size;
1180 rec = ctx->open_rec;
1182 rec = ctx->open_rec = tls_get_rec(sk);
1188 msg_pl = &rec->msg_plaintext;
1190 full_record = false;
1191 record_room = TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE - msg_pl->sg.size;
1193 if (copy >= record_room) {
1198 required_size = msg_pl->sg.size + copy + prot->overhead_size;
1200 if (!sk_stream_memory_free(sk))
1201 goto wait_for_sndbuf;
1203 ret = tls_alloc_encrypted_msg(sk, required_size);
1206 goto wait_for_memory;
1208 /* Adjust copy according to the amount that was
1209 * actually allocated. The difference is due
1210 * to max sg elements limit
1212 copy -= required_size - msg_pl->sg.size;
1216 sk_msg_page_add(msg_pl, page, copy, offset);
1217 sk_mem_charge(sk, copy);
1223 tls_ctx->pending_open_record_frags = true;
1224 if (full_record || eor || sk_msg_full(msg_pl)) {
1225 ret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, full_record,
1226 record_type, &copied, flags);
1228 if (ret == -EINPROGRESS)
1230 else if (ret == -ENOMEM)
1231 goto wait_for_memory;
1232 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) {
1241 set_bit(SOCK_NOSPACE, &sk->sk_socket->flags);
1243 ret = sk_stream_wait_memory(sk, &timeo);
1246 tls_trim_both_msgs(sk, msg_pl->sg.size);
1255 /* Transmit if any encryptions have completed */
1256 if (test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask)) {
1257 cancel_delayed_work(&ctx->tx_work.work);
1258 tls_tx_records(sk, flags);
1262 ret = sk_stream_error(sk, flags, ret);
1263 return copied > 0 ? copied : ret;
1266 int tls_sw_sendpage_locked(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1267 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1269 if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
1270 MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY |
1271 MSG_NO_SHARED_FRAGS))
1274 return tls_sw_do_sendpage(sk, page, offset, size, flags);
1277 int tls_sw_sendpage(struct sock *sk, struct page *page,
1278 int offset, size_t size, int flags)
1280 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1283 if (flags & ~(MSG_MORE | MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_NOSIGNAL |
1284 MSG_SENDPAGE_NOTLAST | MSG_SENDPAGE_NOPOLICY))
1287 mutex_lock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1289 ret = tls_sw_do_sendpage(sk, page, offset, size, flags);
1291 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
1295 static struct sk_buff *tls_wait_data(struct sock *sk, struct sk_psock *psock,
1296 bool nonblock, long timeo, int *err)
1298 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1299 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1300 struct sk_buff *skb;
1301 DEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);
1303 while (!(skb = ctx->recv_pkt) && sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) {
1305 *err = sock_error(sk);
1309 if (!skb_queue_empty(&sk->sk_receive_queue)) {
1310 __strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
1312 return ctx->recv_pkt;
1315 if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
1318 if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))
1321 if (nonblock || !timeo) {
1326 add_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
1327 sk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
1328 sk_wait_event(sk, &timeo,
1329 ctx->recv_pkt != skb ||
1330 !sk_psock_queue_empty(psock),
1332 sk_clear_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);
1333 remove_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
1335 /* Handle signals */
1336 if (signal_pending(current)) {
1337 *err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
1345 static int tls_setup_from_iter(struct sock *sk, struct iov_iter *from,
1346 int length, int *pages_used,
1347 unsigned int *size_used,
1348 struct scatterlist *to,
1351 int rc = 0, i = 0, num_elem = *pages_used, maxpages;
1352 struct page *pages[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
1353 unsigned int size = *size_used;
1354 ssize_t copied, use;
1357 while (length > 0) {
1359 maxpages = to_max_pages - num_elem;
1360 if (maxpages == 0) {
1364 copied = iov_iter_get_pages(from, pages,
1372 iov_iter_advance(from, copied);
1377 use = min_t(int, copied, PAGE_SIZE - offset);
1379 sg_set_page(&to[num_elem],
1380 pages[i], use, offset);
1381 sg_unmark_end(&to[num_elem]);
1382 /* We do not uncharge memory from this API */
1391 /* Mark the end in the last sg entry if newly added */
1392 if (num_elem > *pages_used)
1393 sg_mark_end(&to[num_elem - 1]);
1396 iov_iter_revert(from, size - *size_used);
1398 *pages_used = num_elem;
1403 /* This function decrypts the input skb into either out_iov or in out_sg
1404 * or in skb buffers itself. The input parameter 'zc' indicates if
1405 * zero-copy mode needs to be tried or not. With zero-copy mode, either
1406 * out_iov or out_sg must be non-NULL. In case both out_iov and out_sg are
1407 * NULL, then the decryption happens inside skb buffers itself, i.e.
1408 * zero-copy gets disabled and 'zc' is updated.
1411 static int decrypt_internal(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1412 struct iov_iter *out_iov,
1413 struct scatterlist *out_sg,
1414 int *chunk, bool *zc, bool async)
1416 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1417 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1418 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1419 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1420 int n_sgin, n_sgout, nsg, mem_size, aead_size, err, pages = 0;
1421 struct aead_request *aead_req;
1422 struct sk_buff *unused;
1423 u8 *aad, *iv, *mem = NULL;
1424 struct scatterlist *sgin = NULL;
1425 struct scatterlist *sgout = NULL;
1426 const int data_len = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size +
1430 if (*zc && (out_iov || out_sg)) {
1432 n_sgout = iov_iter_npages(out_iov, INT_MAX) + 1;
1434 n_sgout = sg_nents(out_sg);
1435 n_sgin = skb_nsg(skb, rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size,
1436 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size);
1440 n_sgin = skb_cow_data(skb, 0, &unused);
1446 /* Increment to accommodate AAD */
1447 n_sgin = n_sgin + 1;
1449 nsg = n_sgin + n_sgout;
1451 aead_size = sizeof(*aead_req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(ctx->aead_recv);
1452 mem_size = aead_size + (nsg * sizeof(struct scatterlist));
1453 mem_size = mem_size + prot->aad_size;
1454 mem_size = mem_size + crypto_aead_ivsize(ctx->aead_recv);
1456 /* Allocate a single block of memory which contains
1457 * aead_req || sgin[] || sgout[] || aad || iv.
1458 * This order achieves correct alignment for aead_req, sgin, sgout.
1460 mem = kmalloc(mem_size, sk->sk_allocation);
1464 /* Segment the allocated memory */
1465 aead_req = (struct aead_request *)mem;
1466 sgin = (struct scatterlist *)(mem + aead_size);
1467 sgout = sgin + n_sgin;
1468 aad = (u8 *)(sgout + n_sgout);
1469 iv = aad + prot->aad_size;
1471 /* For CCM based ciphers, first byte of nonce+iv is always '2' */
1472 if (prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128) {
1478 err = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
1479 iv + iv_offset + prot->salt_size,
1485 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION ||
1486 prot->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
1487 memcpy(iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.iv,
1488 prot->iv_size + prot->salt_size);
1490 memcpy(iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.iv, prot->salt_size);
1492 xor_iv_with_seq(prot, iv + iv_offset, tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq);
1495 tls_make_aad(aad, rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size +
1497 tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq, ctx->control, prot);
1500 sg_init_table(sgin, n_sgin);
1501 sg_set_buf(&sgin[0], aad, prot->aad_size);
1502 err = skb_to_sgvec(skb, &sgin[1],
1503 rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size,
1504 rxm->full_len - prot->prepend_size);
1512 sg_init_table(sgout, n_sgout);
1513 sg_set_buf(&sgout[0], aad, prot->aad_size);
1516 err = tls_setup_from_iter(sk, out_iov, data_len,
1517 &pages, chunk, &sgout[1],
1520 goto fallback_to_reg_recv;
1521 } else if (out_sg) {
1522 memcpy(sgout, out_sg, n_sgout * sizeof(*sgout));
1524 goto fallback_to_reg_recv;
1527 fallback_to_reg_recv:
1534 /* Prepare and submit AEAD request */
1535 err = tls_do_decryption(sk, skb, sgin, sgout, iv,
1536 data_len, aead_req, async);
1537 if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
1540 /* Release the pages in case iov was mapped to pages */
1541 for (; pages > 0; pages--)
1542 put_page(sg_page(&sgout[pages]));
1548 static int decrypt_skb_update(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1549 struct iov_iter *dest, int *chunk, bool *zc,
1552 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1553 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1554 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1555 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1558 if (!ctx->decrypted) {
1559 if (tls_ctx->rx_conf == TLS_HW) {
1560 err = tls_device_decrypted(sk, tls_ctx, skb, rxm);
1565 /* Still not decrypted after tls_device */
1566 if (!ctx->decrypted) {
1567 err = decrypt_internal(sk, skb, dest, NULL, chunk, zc,
1570 if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
1571 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot,
1573 else if (err == -EBADMSG)
1574 TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk),
1575 LINUX_MIB_TLSDECRYPTERROR);
1582 pad = padding_length(ctx, prot, skb);
1586 rxm->full_len -= pad;
1587 rxm->offset += prot->prepend_size;
1588 rxm->full_len -= prot->overhead_size;
1589 tls_advance_record_sn(sk, prot, &tls_ctx->rx);
1591 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
1599 int decrypt_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1600 struct scatterlist *sgout)
1605 return decrypt_internal(sk, skb, NULL, sgout, &chunk, &zc, false);
1608 static bool tls_sw_advance_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
1611 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1612 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1615 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1617 if (len < rxm->full_len) {
1619 rxm->full_len -= len;
1625 /* Finished with message */
1626 ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
1627 __strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
1632 /* This function traverses the rx_list in tls receive context to copies the
1633 * decrypted records into the buffer provided by caller zero copy is not
1634 * true. Further, the records are removed from the rx_list if it is not a peek
1635 * case and the record has been consumed completely.
1637 static int process_rx_list(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx,
1646 struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&ctx->rx_list);
1649 struct tls_msg *tlm;
1652 /* Set the record type in 'control' if caller didn't pass it */
1655 ctrl = tlm->control;
1658 while (skip && skb) {
1659 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1662 /* Cannot process a record of different type */
1663 if (ctrl != tlm->control)
1666 if (skip < rxm->full_len)
1669 skip = skip - rxm->full_len;
1670 skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1673 while (len && skb) {
1674 struct sk_buff *next_skb;
1675 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1676 int chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len - skip, len);
1680 /* Cannot process a record of different type */
1681 if (ctrl != tlm->control)
1684 /* Set record type if not already done. For a non-data record,
1685 * do not proceed if record type could not be copied.
1688 int cerr = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE,
1689 sizeof(ctrl), &ctrl);
1691 if (ctrl != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
1692 if (cerr || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC)
1699 if (!zc || (rxm->full_len - skip) > len) {
1700 int err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset + skip,
1707 copied = copied + chunk;
1709 /* Consume the data from record if it is non-peek case*/
1711 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
1712 rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
1714 /* Return if there is unconsumed data in the record */
1715 if (rxm->full_len - skip)
1719 /* The remaining skip-bytes must lie in 1st record in rx_list.
1720 * So from the 2nd record, 'skip' should be 0.
1725 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
1727 next_skb = skb_peek_next(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1730 skb_unlink(skb, &ctx->rx_list);
1741 int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
1748 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
1749 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1750 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
1751 struct sk_psock *psock;
1752 unsigned char control = 0;
1753 ssize_t decrypted = 0;
1754 struct strp_msg *rxm;
1755 struct tls_msg *tlm;
1756 struct sk_buff *skb;
1759 int target, err = 0;
1761 bool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(&msg->msg_iter);
1762 bool is_peek = flags & MSG_PEEK;
1763 bool bpf_strp_enabled;
1769 if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE))
1770 return sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR);
1772 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
1774 bpf_strp_enabled = sk_psock_strp_enabled(psock);
1776 /* Process pending decrypted records. It must be non-zero-copy */
1777 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, 0, len, false,
1780 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
1789 target = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags & MSG_WAITALL, len);
1791 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
1793 while (len && (decrypted + copied < target || ctx->recv_pkt)) {
1794 bool retain_skb = false;
1801 skb = tls_wait_data(sk, psock, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, timeo, &err);
1804 int ret = sk_msg_recvmsg(sk, psock, msg, len,
1816 if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
1819 tlm->control = ctx->control;
1822 rxm = strp_msg(skb);
1824 to_decrypt = rxm->full_len - prot->overhead_size;
1826 if (to_decrypt <= len && !is_kvec && !is_peek &&
1827 ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA &&
1828 prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
1832 /* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */
1833 if (ctx->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA && !bpf_strp_enabled)
1834 async_capable = ctx->async_capable;
1836 async_capable = false;
1838 err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, &msg->msg_iter,
1839 &chunk, &zc, async_capable);
1840 if (err < 0 && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
1841 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
1845 if (err == -EINPROGRESS) {
1848 } else if (prot->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
1849 tlm->control = ctx->control;
1852 /* If the type of records being processed is not known yet,
1853 * set it to record type just dequeued. If it is already known,
1854 * but does not match the record type just dequeued, go to end.
1855 * We always get record type here since for tls1.2, record type
1856 * is known just after record is dequeued from stream parser.
1857 * For tls1.3, we disable async.
1861 control = tlm->control;
1862 else if (control != tlm->control)
1868 cerr = put_cmsg(msg, SOL_TLS, TLS_GET_RECORD_TYPE,
1869 sizeof(control), &control);
1871 if (control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
1872 if (cerr || msg->msg_flags & MSG_CTRUNC) {
1880 goto pick_next_record;
1883 if (bpf_strp_enabled) {
1884 err = sk_psock_tls_strp_read(psock, skb);
1885 if (err != __SK_PASS) {
1886 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + rxm->full_len;
1888 if (err == __SK_DROP)
1890 ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
1891 __strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
1896 if (rxm->full_len > len) {
1900 chunk = rxm->full_len;
1903 err = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm->offset,
1909 rxm->offset = rxm->offset + chunk;
1910 rxm->full_len = rxm->full_len - chunk;
1921 /* For async or peek case, queue the current skb */
1922 if (async || is_peek || retain_skb) {
1923 skb_queue_tail(&ctx->rx_list, skb);
1927 if (tls_sw_advance_skb(sk, skb, chunk)) {
1928 /* Return full control message to
1929 * userspace before trying to parse
1930 * another message type
1932 msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
1933 if (control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
1942 /* Wait for all previously submitted records to be decrypted */
1943 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
1944 ctx->async_notify = true;
1945 pending = atomic_read(&ctx->decrypt_pending);
1946 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->decrypt_compl_lock);
1948 err = crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
1950 /* one of async decrypt failed */
1951 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
1957 reinit_completion(&ctx->async_wait.completion);
1960 /* There can be no concurrent accesses, since we have no
1961 * pending decrypt operations
1963 WRITE_ONCE(ctx->async_notify, false);
1965 /* Drain records from the rx_list & copy if required */
1966 if (is_peek || is_kvec)
1967 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, copied,
1968 decrypted, false, is_peek);
1970 err = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, &control, &cmsg, 0,
1971 decrypted, true, is_peek);
1973 tls_err_abort(sk, err);
1979 copied += decrypted;
1984 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
1985 return copied ? : err;
1988 ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,
1989 struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
1990 size_t len, unsigned int flags)
1992 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sock->sk);
1993 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
1994 struct strp_msg *rxm = NULL;
1995 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
1996 struct sk_buff *skb;
2006 timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK);
2008 from_queue = !skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list);
2010 skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list);
2012 skb = tls_wait_data(sk, NULL, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK, timeo,
2015 goto splice_read_end;
2017 err = decrypt_skb_update(sk, skb, NULL, &chunk, &zc, false);
2019 tls_err_abort(sk, -EBADMSG);
2020 goto splice_read_end;
2024 /* splice does not support reading control messages */
2025 if (ctx->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
2027 goto splice_read_end;
2030 rxm = strp_msg(skb);
2032 chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len);
2033 copied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm->offset, pipe, chunk, flags);
2035 goto splice_read_end;
2038 ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
2039 __strp_unpause(&ctx->strp);
2041 if (chunk < rxm->full_len) {
2042 __skb_queue_head(&ctx->rx_list, skb);
2044 rxm->full_len -= len;
2051 return copied ? : err;
2054 bool tls_sw_sock_is_readable(struct sock *sk)
2056 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2057 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2058 bool ingress_empty = true;
2059 struct sk_psock *psock;
2062 psock = sk_psock(sk);
2064 ingress_empty = list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg);
2067 return !ingress_empty || ctx->recv_pkt ||
2068 !skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list);
2071 static int tls_read_size(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
2073 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
2074 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2075 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
2076 char header[TLS_HEADER_SIZE + MAX_IV_SIZE];
2077 struct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);
2078 size_t cipher_overhead;
2079 size_t data_len = 0;
2082 /* Verify that we have a full TLS header, or wait for more data */
2083 if (rxm->offset + prot->prepend_size > skb->len)
2086 /* Sanity-check size of on-stack buffer. */
2087 if (WARN_ON(prot->prepend_size > sizeof(header))) {
2092 /* Linearize header to local buffer */
2093 ret = skb_copy_bits(skb, rxm->offset, header, prot->prepend_size);
2098 ctx->control = header[0];
2100 data_len = ((header[4] & 0xFF) | (header[3] << 8));
2102 cipher_overhead = prot->tag_size;
2103 if (prot->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
2104 prot->cipher_type != TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305)
2105 cipher_overhead += prot->iv_size;
2107 if (data_len > TLS_MAX_PAYLOAD_SIZE + cipher_overhead +
2112 if (data_len < cipher_overhead) {
2117 /* Note that both TLS1.3 and TLS1.2 use TLS_1_2 version here */
2118 if (header[1] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MINOR ||
2119 header[2] != TLS_1_2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
2124 tls_device_rx_resync_new_rec(strp->sk, data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE,
2125 TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + rxm->offset);
2126 return data_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE;
2129 tls_err_abort(strp->sk, ret);
2134 static void tls_queue(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)
2136 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(strp->sk);
2137 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2141 ctx->recv_pkt = skb;
2144 ctx->saved_data_ready(strp->sk);
2147 static void tls_data_ready(struct sock *sk)
2149 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2150 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2151 struct sk_psock *psock;
2153 strp_data_ready(&ctx->strp);
2155 psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
2157 if (!list_empty(&psock->ingress_msg))
2158 ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
2159 sk_psock_put(sk, psock);
2163 void tls_sw_cancel_work_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2165 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2167 set_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask);
2168 set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask);
2169 cancel_delayed_work_sync(&ctx->tx_work.work);
2172 void tls_sw_release_resources_tx(struct sock *sk)
2174 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2175 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2176 struct tls_rec *rec, *tmp;
2179 /* Wait for any pending async encryptions to complete */
2180 spin_lock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
2181 ctx->async_notify = true;
2182 pending = atomic_read(&ctx->encrypt_pending);
2183 spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->encrypt_compl_lock);
2186 crypto_wait_req(-EINPROGRESS, &ctx->async_wait);
2188 tls_tx_records(sk, -1);
2190 /* Free up un-sent records in tx_list. First, free
2191 * the partially sent record if any at head of tx_list.
2193 if (tls_ctx->partially_sent_record) {
2194 tls_free_partial_record(sk, tls_ctx);
2195 rec = list_first_entry(&ctx->tx_list,
2196 struct tls_rec, list);
2197 list_del(&rec->list);
2198 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
2202 list_for_each_entry_safe(rec, tmp, &ctx->tx_list, list) {
2203 list_del(&rec->list);
2204 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_encrypted);
2205 sk_msg_free(sk, &rec->msg_plaintext);
2209 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_send);
2210 tls_free_open_rec(sk);
2213 void tls_sw_free_ctx_tx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2215 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2220 void tls_sw_release_resources_rx(struct sock *sk)
2222 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2223 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2225 kfree(tls_ctx->rx.rec_seq);
2226 kfree(tls_ctx->rx.iv);
2228 if (ctx->aead_recv) {
2229 kfree_skb(ctx->recv_pkt);
2230 ctx->recv_pkt = NULL;
2231 skb_queue_purge(&ctx->rx_list);
2232 crypto_free_aead(ctx->aead_recv);
2233 strp_stop(&ctx->strp);
2234 /* If tls_sw_strparser_arm() was not called (cleanup paths)
2235 * we still want to strp_stop(), but sk->sk_data_ready was
2238 if (ctx->saved_data_ready) {
2239 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2240 sk->sk_data_ready = ctx->saved_data_ready;
2241 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2246 void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2248 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2250 strp_done(&ctx->strp);
2253 void tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2255 struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2260 void tls_sw_free_resources_rx(struct sock *sk)
2262 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2264 tls_sw_release_resources_rx(sk);
2265 tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2268 /* The work handler to transmitt the encrypted records in tx_list */
2269 static void tx_work_handler(struct work_struct *work)
2271 struct delayed_work *delayed_work = to_delayed_work(work);
2272 struct tx_work *tx_work = container_of(delayed_work,
2273 struct tx_work, work);
2274 struct sock *sk = tx_work->sk;
2275 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2276 struct tls_sw_context_tx *ctx;
2278 if (unlikely(!tls_ctx))
2281 ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(tls_ctx);
2282 if (test_bit(BIT_TX_CLOSING, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
2285 if (!test_and_clear_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &ctx->tx_bitmask))
2287 mutex_lock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
2289 tls_tx_records(sk, -1);
2291 mutex_unlock(&tls_ctx->tx_lock);
2294 void tls_sw_write_space(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
2296 struct tls_sw_context_tx *tx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx);
2298 /* Schedule the transmission if tx list is ready */
2299 if (is_tx_ready(tx_ctx) &&
2300 !test_and_set_bit(BIT_TX_SCHEDULED, &tx_ctx->tx_bitmask))
2301 schedule_delayed_work(&tx_ctx->tx_work.work, 0);
2304 void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
2306 struct tls_sw_context_rx *rx_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
2308 write_lock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2309 rx_ctx->saved_data_ready = sk->sk_data_ready;
2310 sk->sk_data_ready = tls_data_ready;
2311 write_unlock_bh(&sk->sk_callback_lock);
2313 strp_check_rcv(&rx_ctx->strp);
2316 int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx, int tx)
2318 struct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
2319 struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
2320 struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
2321 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *gcm_128_info;
2322 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *gcm_256_info;
2323 struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *ccm_128_info;
2324 struct tls12_crypto_info_chacha20_poly1305 *chacha20_poly1305_info;
2325 struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx_tx = NULL;
2326 struct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx_rx = NULL;
2327 struct cipher_context *cctx;
2328 struct crypto_aead **aead;
2329 struct strp_callbacks cb;
2330 u16 nonce_size, tag_size, iv_size, rec_seq_size, salt_size;
2331 struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
2332 char *iv, *rec_seq, *key, *salt, *cipher_name;
2342 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_tx) {
2343 sw_ctx_tx = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_ctx_tx), GFP_KERNEL);
2348 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = sw_ctx_tx;
2351 (struct tls_sw_context_tx *)ctx->priv_ctx_tx;
2354 if (!ctx->priv_ctx_rx) {
2355 sw_ctx_rx = kzalloc(sizeof(*sw_ctx_rx), GFP_KERNEL);
2360 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = sw_ctx_rx;
2363 (struct tls_sw_context_rx *)ctx->priv_ctx_rx;
2368 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_tx->async_wait);
2369 spin_lock_init(&sw_ctx_tx->encrypt_compl_lock);
2370 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info;
2372 aead = &sw_ctx_tx->aead_send;
2373 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_list);
2374 INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.work, tx_work_handler);
2375 sw_ctx_tx->tx_work.sk = sk;
2377 crypto_init_wait(&sw_ctx_rx->async_wait);
2378 spin_lock_init(&sw_ctx_rx->decrypt_compl_lock);
2379 crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_recv.info;
2381 skb_queue_head_init(&sw_ctx_rx->rx_list);
2382 aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv;
2385 switch (crypto_info->cipher_type) {
2386 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128: {
2387 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2388 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
2389 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2390 iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info)->iv;
2391 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2393 ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
2395 (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)crypto_info;
2396 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
2397 key = gcm_128_info->key;
2398 salt = gcm_128_info->salt;
2399 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
2400 cipher_name = "gcm(aes)";
2403 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256: {
2404 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
2405 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_TAG_SIZE;
2406 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_IV_SIZE;
2407 iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info)->iv;
2408 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2410 ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
2412 (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_256 *)crypto_info;
2413 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_KEY_SIZE;
2414 key = gcm_256_info->key;
2415 salt = gcm_256_info->salt;
2416 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_SALT_SIZE;
2417 cipher_name = "gcm(aes)";
2420 case TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128: {
2421 nonce_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2422 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_TAG_SIZE;
2423 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_IV_SIZE;
2424 iv = ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info)->iv;
2425 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2427 ((struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info)->rec_seq;
2429 (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_ccm_128 *)crypto_info;
2430 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_KEY_SIZE;
2431 key = ccm_128_info->key;
2432 salt = ccm_128_info->salt;
2433 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_SALT_SIZE;
2434 cipher_name = "ccm(aes)";
2437 case TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305: {
2438 chacha20_poly1305_info = (void *)crypto_info;
2440 tag_size = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_TAG_SIZE;
2441 iv_size = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_IV_SIZE;
2442 iv = chacha20_poly1305_info->iv;
2443 rec_seq_size = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_REC_SEQ_SIZE;
2444 rec_seq = chacha20_poly1305_info->rec_seq;
2445 keysize = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_KEY_SIZE;
2446 key = chacha20_poly1305_info->key;
2447 salt = chacha20_poly1305_info->salt;
2448 salt_size = TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SALT_SIZE;
2449 cipher_name = "rfc7539(chacha20,poly1305)";
2457 /* Sanity-check the sizes for stack allocations. */
2458 if (iv_size > MAX_IV_SIZE || nonce_size > MAX_IV_SIZE ||
2459 rec_seq_size > TLS_MAX_REC_SEQ_SIZE) {
2464 if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
2466 prot->aad_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE;
2467 prot->tail_size = 1;
2469 prot->aad_size = TLS_AAD_SPACE_SIZE;
2470 prot->tail_size = 0;
2473 prot->version = crypto_info->version;
2474 prot->cipher_type = crypto_info->cipher_type;
2475 prot->prepend_size = TLS_HEADER_SIZE + nonce_size;
2476 prot->tag_size = tag_size;
2477 prot->overhead_size = prot->prepend_size +
2478 prot->tag_size + prot->tail_size;
2479 prot->iv_size = iv_size;
2480 prot->salt_size = salt_size;
2481 cctx->iv = kmalloc(iv_size + salt_size, GFP_KERNEL);
2486 /* Note: 128 & 256 bit salt are the same size */
2487 prot->rec_seq_size = rec_seq_size;
2488 memcpy(cctx->iv, salt, salt_size);
2489 memcpy(cctx->iv + salt_size, iv, iv_size);
2490 cctx->rec_seq = kmemdup(rec_seq, rec_seq_size, GFP_KERNEL);
2491 if (!cctx->rec_seq) {
2497 *aead = crypto_alloc_aead(cipher_name, 0, 0);
2498 if (IS_ERR(*aead)) {
2499 rc = PTR_ERR(*aead);
2505 ctx->push_pending_record = tls_sw_push_pending_record;
2507 rc = crypto_aead_setkey(*aead, key, keysize);
2512 rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(*aead, prot->tag_size);
2517 tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv);
2519 if (crypto_info->version == TLS_1_3_VERSION)
2520 sw_ctx_rx->async_capable = 0;
2522 sw_ctx_rx->async_capable =
2523 !!(tfm->__crt_alg->cra_flags &
2526 /* Set up strparser */
2527 memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb));
2528 cb.rcv_msg = tls_queue;
2529 cb.parse_msg = tls_read_size;
2531 strp_init(&sw_ctx_rx->strp, sk, &cb);
2537 crypto_free_aead(*aead);
2540 kfree(cctx->rec_seq);
2541 cctx->rec_seq = NULL;
2547 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_tx);
2548 ctx->priv_ctx_tx = NULL;
2550 kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_rx);
2551 ctx->priv_ctx_rx = NULL;