1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * INET An implementation of the TCP/IP protocol suite for the LINUX
4 * operating system. INET is implemented using the BSD Socket
5 * interface as the means of communication with the user level.
7 * Implementation of the Transmission Control Protocol(TCP).
10 * Fred N. van Kempen, <waltje@uWalt.NL.Mugnet.ORG>
11 * Mark Evans, <evansmp@uhura.aston.ac.uk>
12 * Corey Minyard <wf-rch!minyard@relay.EU.net>
13 * Florian La Roche, <flla@stud.uni-sb.de>
14 * Charles Hedrick, <hedrick@klinzhai.rutgers.edu>
15 * Linus Torvalds, <torvalds@cs.helsinki.fi>
16 * Alan Cox, <gw4pts@gw4pts.ampr.org>
17 * Matthew Dillon, <dillon@apollo.west.oic.com>
18 * Arnt Gulbrandsen, <agulbra@nvg.unit.no>
19 * Jorge Cwik, <jorge@laser.satlink.net>
24 #include <net/busy_poll.h>
26 static bool tcp_in_window(u32 seq, u32 end_seq, u32 s_win, u32 e_win)
30 if (after(end_seq, s_win) && before(seq, e_win))
32 return seq == e_win && seq == end_seq;
35 static enum tcp_tw_status
36 tcp_timewait_check_oow_rate_limit(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw,
37 const struct sk_buff *skb, int mib_idx)
39 struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk((struct sock *)tw);
41 if (!tcp_oow_rate_limited(twsk_net(tw), skb, mib_idx,
42 &tcptw->tw_last_oow_ack_time)) {
43 /* Send ACK. Note, we do not put the bucket,
44 * it will be released by caller.
49 /* We are rate-limiting, so just release the tw sock and drop skb. */
51 return TCP_TW_SUCCESS;
55 * * Main purpose of TIME-WAIT state is to close connection gracefully,
56 * when one of ends sits in LAST-ACK or CLOSING retransmitting FIN
57 * (and, probably, tail of data) and one or more our ACKs are lost.
58 * * What is TIME-WAIT timeout? It is associated with maximal packet
59 * lifetime in the internet, which results in wrong conclusion, that
60 * it is set to catch "old duplicate segments" wandering out of their path.
61 * It is not quite correct. This timeout is calculated so that it exceeds
62 * maximal retransmission timeout enough to allow to lose one (or more)
63 * segments sent by peer and our ACKs. This time may be calculated from RTO.
64 * * When TIME-WAIT socket receives RST, it means that another end
65 * finally closed and we are allowed to kill TIME-WAIT too.
66 * * Second purpose of TIME-WAIT is catching old duplicate segments.
67 * Well, certainly it is pure paranoia, but if we load TIME-WAIT
68 * with this semantics, we MUST NOT kill TIME-WAIT state with RSTs.
69 * * If we invented some more clever way to catch duplicates
70 * (f.e. based on PAWS), we could truncate TIME-WAIT to several RTOs.
72 * The algorithm below is based on FORMAL INTERPRETATION of RFCs.
73 * When you compare it to RFCs, please, read section SEGMENT ARRIVES
74 * from the very beginning.
76 * NOTE. With recycling (and later with fin-wait-2) TW bucket
77 * is _not_ stateless. It means, that strictly speaking we must
78 * spinlock it. I do not want! Well, probability of misbehaviour
79 * is ridiculously low and, seems, we could use some mb() tricks
80 * to avoid misread sequence numbers, states etc. --ANK
82 * We don't need to initialize tmp_out.sack_ok as we don't use the results
85 tcp_timewait_state_process(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw, struct sk_buff *skb,
86 const struct tcphdr *th)
88 struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
89 struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk((struct sock *)tw);
90 bool paws_reject = false;
92 tmp_opt.saw_tstamp = 0;
93 if (th->doff > (sizeof(*th) >> 2) && tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp) {
94 tcp_parse_options(twsk_net(tw), skb, &tmp_opt, 0, NULL);
96 if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp) {
97 if (tmp_opt.rcv_tsecr)
98 tmp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tcptw->tw_ts_offset;
99 tmp_opt.ts_recent = tcptw->tw_ts_recent;
100 tmp_opt.ts_recent_stamp = tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp;
101 paws_reject = tcp_paws_reject(&tmp_opt, th->rst);
105 if (tw->tw_substate == TCP_FIN_WAIT2) {
106 /* Just repeat all the checks of tcp_rcv_state_process() */
108 /* Out of window, send ACK */
110 !tcp_in_window(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq,
112 tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt + tcptw->tw_rcv_wnd))
113 return tcp_timewait_check_oow_rate_limit(
114 tw, skb, LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDFINWAIT2);
119 if (th->syn && !before(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt))
124 !after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq, tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt) ||
125 TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq == TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq) {
127 return TCP_TW_SUCCESS;
130 /* New data or FIN. If new data arrive after half-duplex close,
134 TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq != tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt + 1)
137 /* FIN arrived, enter true time-wait state. */
138 tw->tw_substate = TCP_TIME_WAIT;
139 tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
140 if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp) {
141 tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp = ktime_get_seconds();
142 tcptw->tw_ts_recent = tmp_opt.rcv_tsval;
145 inet_twsk_reschedule(tw, TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN);
150 * Now real TIME-WAIT state.
153 * "When a connection is [...] on TIME-WAIT state [...]
154 * [a TCP] MAY accept a new SYN from the remote TCP to
155 * reopen the connection directly, if it:
157 * (1) assigns its initial sequence number for the new
158 * connection to be larger than the largest sequence
159 * number it used on the previous connection incarnation,
162 * (2) returns to TIME-WAIT state if the SYN turns out
163 * to be an old duplicate".
167 (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt &&
168 (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq || th->rst))) {
169 /* In window segment, it may be only reset or bare ack. */
172 /* This is TIME_WAIT assassination, in two flavors.
173 * Oh well... nobody has a sufficient solution to this
176 if (!READ_ONCE(twsk_net(tw)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_rfc1337)) {
178 inet_twsk_deschedule_put(tw);
179 return TCP_TW_SUCCESS;
182 inet_twsk_reschedule(tw, TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN);
185 if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp) {
186 tcptw->tw_ts_recent = tmp_opt.rcv_tsval;
187 tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp = ktime_get_seconds();
191 return TCP_TW_SUCCESS;
194 /* Out of window segment.
196 All the segments are ACKed immediately.
198 The only exception is new SYN. We accept it, if it is
199 not old duplicate and we are not in danger to be killed
200 by delayed old duplicates. RFC check is that it has
201 newer sequence number works at rates <40Mbit/sec.
202 However, if paws works, it is reliable AND even more,
203 we even may relax silly seq space cutoff.
205 RED-PEN: we violate main RFC requirement, if this SYN will appear
206 old duplicate (i.e. we receive RST in reply to SYN-ACK),
207 we must return socket to time-wait state. It is not good,
211 if (th->syn && !th->rst && !th->ack && !paws_reject &&
212 (after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt) ||
213 (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp &&
214 (s32)(tcptw->tw_ts_recent - tmp_opt.rcv_tsval) < 0))) {
215 u32 isn = tcptw->tw_snd_nxt + 65535 + 2;
218 TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_tw_isn = isn;
223 __NET_INC_STATS(twsk_net(tw), LINUX_MIB_PAWSESTABREJECTED);
226 /* In this case we must reset the TIMEWAIT timer.
228 * If it is ACKless SYN it may be both old duplicate
229 * and new good SYN with random sequence number <rcv_nxt.
230 * Do not reschedule in the last case.
232 if (paws_reject || th->ack)
233 inet_twsk_reschedule(tw, TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN);
235 return tcp_timewait_check_oow_rate_limit(
236 tw, skb, LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDTIMEWAIT);
239 return TCP_TW_SUCCESS;
241 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_timewait_state_process);
244 * Move a socket to time-wait or dead fin-wait-2 state.
246 void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo)
248 const struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
249 const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
250 struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
251 struct inet_timewait_sock *tw;
253 tw = inet_twsk_alloc(sk, &net->ipv4.tcp_death_row, state);
256 struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk((struct sock *)tw);
257 const int rto = (icsk->icsk_rto << 2) - (icsk->icsk_rto >> 1);
258 struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
260 tw->tw_transparent = inet->transparent;
261 tw->tw_mark = sk->sk_mark;
262 tw->tw_priority = sk->sk_priority;
263 tw->tw_rcv_wscale = tp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale;
264 tcptw->tw_rcv_nxt = tp->rcv_nxt;
265 tcptw->tw_snd_nxt = tp->snd_nxt;
266 tcptw->tw_rcv_wnd = tcp_receive_window(tp);
267 tcptw->tw_ts_recent = tp->rx_opt.ts_recent;
268 tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp = tp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp;
269 tcptw->tw_ts_offset = tp->tsoffset;
270 tcptw->tw_last_oow_ack_time = 0;
271 tcptw->tw_tx_delay = tp->tcp_tx_delay;
272 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
273 if (tw->tw_family == PF_INET6) {
274 struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
276 tw->tw_v6_daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
277 tw->tw_v6_rcv_saddr = sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr;
278 tw->tw_tclass = np->tclass;
279 tw->tw_flowlabel = be32_to_cpu(np->flow_label & IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MASK);
280 tw->tw_txhash = sk->sk_txhash;
281 tw->tw_ipv6only = sk->sk_ipv6only;
285 #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
287 * The timewait bucket does not have the key DB from the
288 * sock structure. We just make a quick copy of the
289 * md5 key being used (if indeed we are using one)
290 * so the timewait ack generating code has the key.
293 tcptw->tw_md5_key = NULL;
294 if (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_md5_needed)) {
295 struct tcp_md5sig_key *key;
297 key = tp->af_specific->md5_lookup(sk, sk);
299 tcptw->tw_md5_key = kmemdup(key, sizeof(*key), GFP_ATOMIC);
300 BUG_ON(tcptw->tw_md5_key && !tcp_alloc_md5sig_pool());
306 /* Get the TIME_WAIT timeout firing. */
310 if (state == TCP_TIME_WAIT)
311 timeo = TCP_TIMEWAIT_LEN;
313 /* tw_timer is pinned, so we need to make sure BH are disabled
314 * in following section, otherwise timer handler could run before
315 * we complete the initialization.
318 inet_twsk_schedule(tw, timeo);
320 * Note that access to tw after this point is illegal.
322 inet_twsk_hashdance(tw, sk, net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.hashinfo);
325 /* Sorry, if we're out of memory, just CLOSE this
326 * socket up. We've got bigger problems than
327 * non-graceful socket closings.
329 NET_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_TCPTIMEWAITOVERFLOW);
332 tcp_update_metrics(sk);
335 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_time_wait);
337 void tcp_twsk_destructor(struct sock *sk)
339 #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
340 if (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_md5_needed)) {
341 struct tcp_timewait_sock *twsk = tcp_twsk(sk);
343 if (twsk->tw_md5_key)
344 kfree_rcu(twsk->tw_md5_key, rcu);
348 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_twsk_destructor);
350 void tcp_twsk_purge(struct list_head *net_exit_list, int family)
352 bool purged_once = false;
355 list_for_each_entry(net, net_exit_list, exit_list) {
356 if (net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.hashinfo->pernet) {
357 /* Even if tw_refcount == 1, we must clean up kernel reqsk */
358 inet_twsk_purge(net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.hashinfo, family);
359 } else if (!purged_once) {
360 /* The last refcount is decremented in tcp_sk_exit_batch() */
361 if (refcount_read(&net->ipv4.tcp_death_row.tw_refcount) == 1)
364 inet_twsk_purge(&tcp_hashinfo, family);
369 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_twsk_purge);
371 /* Warning : This function is called without sk_listener being locked.
372 * Be sure to read socket fields once, as their value could change under us.
374 void tcp_openreq_init_rwin(struct request_sock *req,
375 const struct sock *sk_listener,
376 const struct dst_entry *dst)
378 struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
379 const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk_listener);
380 int full_space = tcp_full_space(sk_listener);
386 mss = tcp_mss_clamp(tp, dst_metric_advmss(dst));
387 window_clamp = READ_ONCE(tp->window_clamp);
388 /* Set this up on the first call only */
389 req->rsk_window_clamp = window_clamp ? : dst_metric(dst, RTAX_WINDOW);
391 /* limit the window selection if the user enforce a smaller rx buffer */
392 if (sk_listener->sk_userlocks & SOCK_RCVBUF_LOCK &&
393 (req->rsk_window_clamp > full_space || req->rsk_window_clamp == 0))
394 req->rsk_window_clamp = full_space;
396 rcv_wnd = tcp_rwnd_init_bpf((struct sock *)req);
398 rcv_wnd = dst_metric(dst, RTAX_INITRWND);
399 else if (full_space < rcv_wnd * mss)
400 full_space = rcv_wnd * mss;
402 /* tcp_full_space because it is guaranteed to be the first packet */
403 tcp_select_initial_window(sk_listener, full_space,
404 mss - (ireq->tstamp_ok ? TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED : 0),
406 &req->rsk_window_clamp,
410 ireq->rcv_wscale = rcv_wscale;
412 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_openreq_init_rwin);
414 static void tcp_ecn_openreq_child(struct tcp_sock *tp,
415 const struct request_sock *req)
417 tp->ecn_flags = inet_rsk(req)->ecn_ok ? TCP_ECN_OK : 0;
420 void tcp_ca_openreq_child(struct sock *sk, const struct dst_entry *dst)
422 struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
423 u32 ca_key = dst_metric(dst, RTAX_CC_ALGO);
424 bool ca_got_dst = false;
426 if (ca_key != TCP_CA_UNSPEC) {
427 const struct tcp_congestion_ops *ca;
430 ca = tcp_ca_find_key(ca_key);
431 if (likely(ca && bpf_try_module_get(ca, ca->owner))) {
432 icsk->icsk_ca_dst_locked = tcp_ca_dst_locked(dst);
433 icsk->icsk_ca_ops = ca;
439 /* If no valid choice made yet, assign current system default ca. */
441 (!icsk->icsk_ca_setsockopt ||
442 !bpf_try_module_get(icsk->icsk_ca_ops, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->owner)))
443 tcp_assign_congestion_control(sk);
445 tcp_set_ca_state(sk, TCP_CA_Open);
447 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tcp_ca_openreq_child);
449 static void smc_check_reset_syn_req(struct tcp_sock *oldtp,
450 struct request_sock *req,
451 struct tcp_sock *newtp)
453 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMC)
454 struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
456 if (static_branch_unlikely(&tcp_have_smc)) {
457 ireq = inet_rsk(req);
458 if (oldtp->syn_smc && !ireq->smc_ok)
464 /* This is not only more efficient than what we used to do, it eliminates
465 * a lot of code duplication between IPv4/IPv6 SYN recv processing. -DaveM
467 * Actually, we could lots of memory writes here. tp of listening
468 * socket contains all necessary default parameters.
470 struct sock *tcp_create_openreq_child(const struct sock *sk,
471 struct request_sock *req,
474 struct sock *newsk = inet_csk_clone_lock(sk, req, GFP_ATOMIC);
475 const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
476 struct tcp_request_sock *treq = tcp_rsk(req);
477 struct inet_connection_sock *newicsk;
478 struct tcp_sock *oldtp, *newtp;
484 newicsk = inet_csk(newsk);
485 newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
488 smc_check_reset_syn_req(oldtp, req, newtp);
490 /* Now setup tcp_sock */
491 newtp->pred_flags = 0;
493 seq = treq->rcv_isn + 1;
494 newtp->rcv_wup = seq;
495 WRITE_ONCE(newtp->copied_seq, seq);
496 WRITE_ONCE(newtp->rcv_nxt, seq);
499 seq = treq->snt_isn + 1;
500 newtp->snd_sml = newtp->snd_una = seq;
501 WRITE_ONCE(newtp->snd_nxt, seq);
504 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&newtp->tsq_node);
505 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&newtp->tsorted_sent_queue);
507 tcp_init_wl(newtp, treq->rcv_isn);
509 minmax_reset(&newtp->rtt_min, tcp_jiffies32, ~0U);
510 newicsk->icsk_ack.lrcvtime = tcp_jiffies32;
512 newtp->lsndtime = tcp_jiffies32;
513 newsk->sk_txhash = treq->txhash;
514 newtp->total_retrans = req->num_retrans;
516 tcp_init_xmit_timers(newsk);
517 WRITE_ONCE(newtp->write_seq, newtp->pushed_seq = treq->snt_isn + 1);
519 if (sock_flag(newsk, SOCK_KEEPOPEN))
520 inet_csk_reset_keepalive_timer(newsk,
521 keepalive_time_when(newtp));
523 newtp->rx_opt.tstamp_ok = ireq->tstamp_ok;
524 newtp->rx_opt.sack_ok = ireq->sack_ok;
525 newtp->window_clamp = req->rsk_window_clamp;
526 newtp->rcv_ssthresh = req->rsk_rcv_wnd;
527 newtp->rcv_wnd = req->rsk_rcv_wnd;
528 newtp->rx_opt.wscale_ok = ireq->wscale_ok;
529 if (newtp->rx_opt.wscale_ok) {
530 newtp->rx_opt.snd_wscale = ireq->snd_wscale;
531 newtp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale = ireq->rcv_wscale;
533 newtp->rx_opt.snd_wscale = newtp->rx_opt.rcv_wscale = 0;
534 newtp->window_clamp = min(newtp->window_clamp, 65535U);
536 newtp->snd_wnd = ntohs(tcp_hdr(skb)->window) << newtp->rx_opt.snd_wscale;
537 newtp->max_window = newtp->snd_wnd;
539 if (newtp->rx_opt.tstamp_ok) {
540 newtp->rx_opt.ts_recent = req->ts_recent;
541 newtp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = ktime_get_seconds();
542 newtp->tcp_header_len = sizeof(struct tcphdr) + TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED;
544 newtp->rx_opt.ts_recent_stamp = 0;
545 newtp->tcp_header_len = sizeof(struct tcphdr);
547 if (req->num_timeout) {
548 newtp->undo_marker = treq->snt_isn;
549 newtp->retrans_stamp = div_u64(treq->snt_synack,
550 USEC_PER_SEC / TCP_TS_HZ);
552 newtp->tsoffset = treq->ts_off;
553 #ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
554 newtp->md5sig_info = NULL; /*XXX*/
555 if (treq->af_specific->req_md5_lookup(sk, req_to_sk(req)))
556 newtp->tcp_header_len += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED;
558 if (skb->len >= TCP_MSS_DEFAULT + newtp->tcp_header_len)
559 newicsk->icsk_ack.last_seg_size = skb->len - newtp->tcp_header_len;
560 newtp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = req->mss;
561 tcp_ecn_openreq_child(newtp, req);
562 newtp->fastopen_req = NULL;
563 RCU_INIT_POINTER(newtp->fastopen_rsk, NULL);
565 newtp->bpf_chg_cc_inprogress = 0;
566 tcp_bpf_clone(sk, newsk);
568 __TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_PASSIVEOPENS);
572 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_create_openreq_child);
575 * Process an incoming packet for SYN_RECV sockets represented as a
576 * request_sock. Normally sk is the listener socket but for TFO it
577 * points to the child socket.
579 * XXX (TFO) - The current impl contains a special check for ack
580 * validation and inside tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack(). Can we do better?
582 * We don't need to initialize tmp_opt.sack_ok as we don't use the results
585 struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
586 struct request_sock *req,
587 bool fastopen, bool *req_stolen)
589 struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
591 const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
592 __be32 flg = tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_RST|TCP_FLAG_SYN|TCP_FLAG_ACK);
593 bool paws_reject = false;
596 tmp_opt.saw_tstamp = 0;
597 if (th->doff > (sizeof(struct tcphdr)>>2)) {
598 tcp_parse_options(sock_net(sk), skb, &tmp_opt, 0, NULL);
600 if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp) {
601 tmp_opt.ts_recent = req->ts_recent;
602 if (tmp_opt.rcv_tsecr)
603 tmp_opt.rcv_tsecr -= tcp_rsk(req)->ts_off;
604 /* We do not store true stamp, but it is not required,
605 * it can be estimated (approximately)
608 tmp_opt.ts_recent_stamp = ktime_get_seconds() - reqsk_timeout(req, TCP_RTO_MAX) / HZ;
609 paws_reject = tcp_paws_reject(&tmp_opt, th->rst);
613 /* Check for pure retransmitted SYN. */
614 if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn &&
615 flg == TCP_FLAG_SYN &&
618 * RFC793 draws (Incorrectly! It was fixed in RFC1122)
619 * this case on figure 6 and figure 8, but formal
620 * protocol description says NOTHING.
621 * To be more exact, it says that we should send ACK,
622 * because this segment (at least, if it has no data)
625 * CONCLUSION: RFC793 (even with RFC1122) DOES NOT
626 * describe SYN-RECV state. All the description
627 * is wrong, we cannot believe to it and should
628 * rely only on common sense and implementation
631 * Enforce "SYN-ACK" according to figure 8, figure 6
632 * of RFC793, fixed by RFC1122.
634 * Note that even if there is new data in the SYN packet
635 * they will be thrown away too.
637 * Reset timer after retransmitting SYNACK, similar to
638 * the idea of fast retransmit in recovery.
640 if (!tcp_oow_rate_limited(sock_net(sk), skb,
641 LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDSYNRECV,
642 &tcp_rsk(req)->last_oow_ack_time) &&
644 !inet_rtx_syn_ack(sk, req)) {
645 unsigned long expires = jiffies;
647 expires += reqsk_timeout(req, TCP_RTO_MAX);
649 mod_timer_pending(&req->rsk_timer, expires);
651 req->rsk_timer.expires = expires;
656 /* Further reproduces section "SEGMENT ARRIVES"
657 for state SYN-RECEIVED of RFC793.
658 It is broken, however, it does not work only
659 when SYNs are crossed.
661 You would think that SYN crossing is impossible here, since
662 we should have a SYN_SENT socket (from connect()) on our end,
663 but this is not true if the crossed SYNs were sent to both
664 ends by a malicious third party. We must defend against this,
665 and to do that we first verify the ACK (as per RFC793, page
666 36) and reset if it is invalid. Is this a true full defense?
667 To convince ourselves, let us consider a way in which the ACK
668 test can still pass in this 'malicious crossed SYNs' case.
669 Malicious sender sends identical SYNs (and thus identical sequence
670 numbers) to both A and B:
675 By our good fortune, both A and B select the same initial
676 send sequence number of seven :-)
678 A: sends SYN|ACK, seq=7, ack_seq=8
679 B: sends SYN|ACK, seq=7, ack_seq=8
681 So we are now A eating this SYN|ACK, ACK test passes. So
682 does sequence test, SYN is truncated, and thus we consider
685 If icsk->icsk_accept_queue.rskq_defer_accept, we silently drop this
686 bare ACK. Otherwise, we create an established connection. Both
687 ends (listening sockets) accept the new incoming connection and try
688 to talk to each other. 8-)
690 Note: This case is both harmless, and rare. Possibility is about the
691 same as us discovering intelligent life on another plant tomorrow.
693 But generally, we should (RFC lies!) to accept ACK
694 from SYNACK both here and in tcp_rcv_state_process().
695 tcp_rcv_state_process() does not, hence, we do not too.
697 Note that the case is absolutely generic:
698 we cannot optimize anything here without
699 violating protocol. All the checks must be made
700 before attempt to create socket.
703 /* RFC793 page 36: "If the connection is in any non-synchronized state ...
704 * and the incoming segment acknowledges something not yet
705 * sent (the segment carries an unacceptable ACK) ...
708 * Invalid ACK: reset will be sent by listening socket.
709 * Note that the ACK validity check for a Fast Open socket is done
710 * elsewhere and is checked directly against the child socket rather
711 * than req because user data may have been sent out.
713 if ((flg & TCP_FLAG_ACK) && !fastopen &&
714 (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq !=
715 tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1))
718 /* Also, it would be not so bad idea to check rcv_tsecr, which
719 * is essentially ACK extension and too early or too late values
720 * should cause reset in unsynchronized states.
723 /* RFC793: "first check sequence number". */
725 if (paws_reject || !tcp_in_window(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq,
726 tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt, tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt + req->rsk_rcv_wnd)) {
727 /* Out of window: send ACK and drop. */
728 if (!(flg & TCP_FLAG_RST) &&
729 !tcp_oow_rate_limited(sock_net(sk), skb,
730 LINUX_MIB_TCPACKSKIPPEDSYNRECV,
731 &tcp_rsk(req)->last_oow_ack_time))
732 req->rsk_ops->send_ack(sk, skb, req);
734 __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_PAWSESTABREJECTED);
738 /* In sequence, PAWS is OK. */
740 if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp && !after(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq, tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_nxt))
741 req->ts_recent = tmp_opt.rcv_tsval;
743 if (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq == tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn) {
744 /* Truncate SYN, it is out of window starting
745 at tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn + 1. */
746 flg &= ~TCP_FLAG_SYN;
749 /* RFC793: "second check the RST bit" and
750 * "fourth, check the SYN bit"
752 if (flg & (TCP_FLAG_RST|TCP_FLAG_SYN)) {
753 __TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_ATTEMPTFAILS);
754 goto embryonic_reset;
757 /* ACK sequence verified above, just make sure ACK is
758 * set. If ACK not set, just silently drop the packet.
760 * XXX (TFO) - if we ever allow "data after SYN", the
761 * following check needs to be removed.
763 if (!(flg & TCP_FLAG_ACK))
766 /* For Fast Open no more processing is needed (sk is the
772 /* While TCP_DEFER_ACCEPT is active, drop bare ACK. */
773 if (req->num_timeout < inet_csk(sk)->icsk_accept_queue.rskq_defer_accept &&
774 TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq == tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn + 1) {
775 inet_rsk(req)->acked = 1;
776 __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPDEFERACCEPTDROP);
780 /* OK, ACK is valid, create big socket and
781 * feed this segment to it. It will repeat all
782 * the tests. THIS SEGMENT MUST MOVE SOCKET TO
783 * ESTABLISHED STATE. If it will be dropped after
784 * socket is created, wait for troubles.
786 child = inet_csk(sk)->icsk_af_ops->syn_recv_sock(sk, skb, req, NULL,
789 goto listen_overflow;
791 if (own_req && rsk_drop_req(req)) {
792 reqsk_queue_removed(&inet_csk(req->rsk_listener)->icsk_accept_queue, req);
793 inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop_and_put(req->rsk_listener, req);
797 sock_rps_save_rxhash(child, skb);
798 tcp_synack_rtt_meas(child, req);
799 *req_stolen = !own_req;
800 return inet_csk_complete_hashdance(sk, child, req, own_req);
803 if (sk != req->rsk_listener)
804 __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TCPMIGRATEREQFAILURE);
806 if (!READ_ONCE(sock_net(sk)->ipv4.sysctl_tcp_abort_on_overflow)) {
807 inet_rsk(req)->acked = 1;
812 if (!(flg & TCP_FLAG_RST)) {
813 /* Received a bad SYN pkt - for TFO We try not to reset
814 * the local connection unless it's really necessary to
815 * avoid becoming vulnerable to outside attack aiming at
816 * resetting legit local connections.
818 req->rsk_ops->send_reset(sk, skb);
819 } else if (fastopen) { /* received a valid RST pkt */
820 reqsk_fastopen_remove(sk, req, true);
824 bool unlinked = inet_csk_reqsk_queue_drop(sk, req);
827 __NET_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_EMBRYONICRSTS);
828 *req_stolen = !unlinked;
832 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_check_req);
835 * Queue segment on the new socket if the new socket is active,
836 * otherwise we just shortcircuit this and continue with
839 * For the vast majority of cases child->sk_state will be TCP_SYN_RECV
840 * when entering. But other states are possible due to a race condition
841 * where after __inet_lookup_established() fails but before the listener
842 * locked is obtained, other packets cause the same connection to
846 int tcp_child_process(struct sock *parent, struct sock *child,
848 __releases(&((child)->sk_lock.slock))
851 int state = child->sk_state;
853 /* record sk_napi_id and sk_rx_queue_mapping of child. */
854 sk_mark_napi_id_set(child, skb);
856 tcp_segs_in(tcp_sk(child), skb);
857 if (!sock_owned_by_user(child)) {
858 ret = tcp_rcv_state_process(child, skb);
859 /* Wakeup parent, send SIGIO */
860 if (state == TCP_SYN_RECV && child->sk_state != state)
861 parent->sk_data_ready(parent);
863 /* Alas, it is possible again, because we do lookup
864 * in main socket hash table and lock on listening
865 * socket does not protect us more.
867 __sk_add_backlog(child, skb);
870 bh_unlock_sock(child);
874 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_child_process);