patch-5.10.100-rt62.patch
[platform/kernel/linux-rpi.git] / kernel / stackleak.c
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
2 /*
3  * This code fills the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value
4  * before returning to userspace. It's part of the STACKLEAK feature
5  * ported from grsecurity/PaX.
6  *
7  * Author: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
8  *
9  * STACKLEAK reduces the information which kernel stack leak bugs can
10  * reveal and blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks.
11  */
12
13 #include <linux/stackleak.h>
14 #include <linux/kprobes.h>
15
16 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
17 #include <linux/jump_label.h>
18 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
19
20 static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(stack_erasing_bypass);
21
22 int stack_erasing_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
23                         void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
24 {
25         int ret = 0;
26         int state = !static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass);
27         int prev_state = state;
28
29         table->data = &state;
30         table->maxlen = sizeof(int);
31         ret = proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
32         state = !!state;
33         if (ret || !write || state == prev_state)
34                 return ret;
35
36         if (state)
37                 static_branch_disable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
38         else
39                 static_branch_enable(&stack_erasing_bypass);
40
41         pr_warn("stackleak: kernel stack erasing is %s\n",
42                                         state ? "enabled" : "disabled");
43         return ret;
44 }
45
46 #define skip_erasing()  static_branch_unlikely(&stack_erasing_bypass)
47 #else
48 #define skip_erasing()  false
49 #endif /* CONFIG_STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE */
50
51 asmlinkage void notrace stackleak_erase(void)
52 {
53         /* It would be nice not to have 'kstack_ptr' and 'boundary' on stack */
54         unsigned long kstack_ptr = current->lowest_stack;
55         unsigned long boundary = (unsigned long)end_of_stack(current);
56         unsigned int poison_count = 0;
57         const unsigned int depth = STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH / sizeof(unsigned long);
58
59         if (skip_erasing())
60                 return;
61
62         /* Check that 'lowest_stack' value is sane */
63         if (unlikely(kstack_ptr - boundary >= THREAD_SIZE))
64                 kstack_ptr = boundary;
65
66         /* Search for the poison value in the kernel stack */
67         while (kstack_ptr > boundary && poison_count <= depth) {
68                 if (*(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr == STACKLEAK_POISON)
69                         poison_count++;
70                 else
71                         poison_count = 0;
72
73                 kstack_ptr -= sizeof(unsigned long);
74         }
75
76         /*
77          * One 'long int' at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and
78          * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK=y).
79          */
80         if (kstack_ptr == boundary)
81                 kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
82
83 #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
84         current->prev_lowest_stack = kstack_ptr;
85 #endif
86
87         /*
88          * Now write the poison value to the kernel stack. Start from
89          * 'kstack_ptr' and move up till the new 'boundary'. We assume that
90          * the stack pointer doesn't change when we write poison.
91          */
92         if (on_thread_stack())
93                 boundary = current_stack_pointer;
94         else
95                 boundary = current_top_of_stack();
96
97         while (kstack_ptr < boundary) {
98                 *(unsigned long *)kstack_ptr = STACKLEAK_POISON;
99                 kstack_ptr += sizeof(unsigned long);
100         }
101
102         /* Reset the 'lowest_stack' value for the next syscall */
103         current->lowest_stack = current_top_of_stack() - THREAD_SIZE/64;
104 }
105 NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(stackleak_erase);
106
107 void __used __no_caller_saved_registers notrace stackleak_track_stack(void)
108 {
109         unsigned long sp = current_stack_pointer;
110
111         /*
112          * Having CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE larger than
113          * STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH makes the poison search in
114          * stackleak_erase() unreliable. Let's prevent that.
115          */
116         BUILD_BUG_ON(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE > STACKLEAK_SEARCH_DEPTH);
117
118         /* 'lowest_stack' should be aligned on the register width boundary */
119         sp = ALIGN(sp, sizeof(unsigned long));
120         if (sp < current->lowest_stack &&
121             sp >= (unsigned long)task_stack_page(current) +
122                                                 sizeof(unsigned long)) {
123                 current->lowest_stack = sp;
124         }
125 }
126 EXPORT_SYMBOL(stackleak_track_stack);