1 #include <linux/kernel.h>
2 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
3 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
4 #include <linux/string.h>
5 #include <linux/random.h>
6 #include <linux/module.h>
7 #include <linux/init.h>
8 #include <linux/errno.h>
9 #include <linux/cache.h>
10 #include <linux/bug.h>
11 #include <linux/err.h>
12 #include <linux/kcmp.h>
14 #include <asm/unistd.h>
17 * We don't expose the real in-memory order of objects for security reasons.
18 * But still the comparison results should be suitable for sorting. So we
19 * obfuscate kernel pointers values and compare the production instead.
21 * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with
22 * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space.
23 * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to
24 * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product
25 * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is
26 * relative prime to 2^n).
28 * Note also that the obfuscation itself is invisible to userspace and if needed
29 * it can be changed to an alternate scheme.
31 static unsigned long cookies[KCMP_TYPES][2] __read_mostly;
33 static long kptr_obfuscate(long v, int type)
35 return (v ^ cookies[type][0]) * cookies[type][1];
39 * 0 - equal, i.e. v1 = v2
40 * 1 - less than, i.e. v1 < v2
41 * 2 - greater than, i.e. v1 > v2
42 * 3 - not equal but ordering unavailable (reserved for future)
44 static int kcmp_ptr(void *v1, void *v2, enum kcmp_type type)
48 ret = kptr_obfuscate((long)v1, type) - kptr_obfuscate((long)v2, type);
50 return (ret < 0) | ((ret > 0) << 1);
53 /* The caller must have pinned the task */
55 get_file_raw_ptr(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int idx)
57 struct file *file = NULL;
63 file = fcheck_files(task->files, idx);
71 static void kcmp_unlock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
78 static int kcmp_lock(struct mutex *m1, struct mutex *m2)
85 err = mutex_lock_killable(m1);
86 if (!err && likely(m1 != m2)) {
87 err = mutex_lock_killable_nested(m2, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
95 SYSCALL_DEFINE5(kcmp, pid_t, pid1, pid_t, pid2, int, type,
96 unsigned long, idx1, unsigned long, idx2)
98 struct task_struct *task1, *task2;
104 * Tasks are looked up in caller's PID namespace only.
106 task1 = find_task_by_vpid(pid1);
107 task2 = find_task_by_vpid(pid2);
108 if (!task1 || !task2)
111 get_task_struct(task1);
112 get_task_struct(task2);
117 * One should have enough rights to inspect task details.
119 ret = kcmp_lock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
120 &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
123 if (!ptrace_may_access(task1, PTRACE_MODE_READ) ||
124 !ptrace_may_access(task2, PTRACE_MODE_READ)) {
131 struct file *filp1, *filp2;
133 filp1 = get_file_raw_ptr(task1, idx1);
134 filp2 = get_file_raw_ptr(task2, idx2);
137 ret = kcmp_ptr(filp1, filp2, KCMP_FILE);
143 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->mm, task2->mm, KCMP_VM);
146 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->files, task2->files, KCMP_FILES);
149 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->fs, task2->fs, KCMP_FS);
152 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sighand, task2->sighand, KCMP_SIGHAND);
155 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->io_context, task2->io_context, KCMP_IO);
158 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSVIPC
159 ret = kcmp_ptr(task1->sysvsem.undo_list,
160 task2->sysvsem.undo_list,
172 kcmp_unlock(&task1->signal->cred_guard_mutex,
173 &task2->signal->cred_guard_mutex);
175 put_task_struct(task1);
176 put_task_struct(task2);
185 static __init int kcmp_cookies_init(void)
189 get_random_bytes(cookies, sizeof(cookies));
191 for (i = 0; i < KCMP_TYPES; i++)
192 cookies[i][1] |= (~(~0UL >> 1) | 1);
196 arch_initcall(kcmp_cookies_init);