1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/export.h>
52 #include <linux/slab.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
70 #include <linux/compat.h>
74 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
75 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
76 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
77 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
79 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
80 * for saving names from getname(). If we get more names we will allocate
81 * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */
84 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
85 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
87 /* number of audit rules */
90 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
93 struct audit_cap_data {
94 kernel_cap_t permitted;
95 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
97 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
98 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
102 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
103 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
104 * pointers at syscall exit time).
106 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
108 struct list_head list; /* audit_context->names_list */
117 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
118 unsigned int fcap_ver;
119 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
120 unsigned char type; /* record type */
121 bool name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
123 * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of
124 * names allocated in the task audit context. Thus this name
125 * should be freed on syscall exit
130 struct audit_aux_data {
131 struct audit_aux_data *next;
135 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
137 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
138 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
140 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
141 struct audit_aux_data d;
144 struct mm_struct *mm;
147 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
148 struct audit_aux_data d;
149 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
150 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
151 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
152 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
153 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
154 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
158 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
159 struct audit_aux_data d;
160 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
161 unsigned int fcap_ver;
162 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
163 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
166 struct audit_aux_data_capset {
167 struct audit_aux_data d;
169 struct audit_cap_data cap;
172 struct audit_tree_refs {
173 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
174 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
177 /* The per-task audit context. */
178 struct audit_context {
179 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
180 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
181 enum audit_state state, current_state;
182 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
183 int major; /* syscall number */
184 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
185 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
186 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
188 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
190 * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this
191 * syscall. The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will
192 * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance
193 * reasons. Except during allocation they should never be referenced
194 * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used
195 * by running the names_list.
197 struct audit_names preallocated_names[AUDIT_NAMES];
198 int name_count; /* total records in names_list */
199 struct list_head names_list; /* anchor for struct audit_names->list */
200 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
202 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
203 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
204 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
205 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
207 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
209 kuid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
210 kgid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
211 unsigned long personality;
217 unsigned int target_sessionid;
219 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
221 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
222 struct list_head killed_trees;
240 unsigned long qbytes;
244 struct mq_attr mqstat;
253 unsigned int msg_prio;
254 struct timespec abs_timeout;
263 struct audit_cap_data cap;
278 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
280 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
281 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
282 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
286 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
293 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
295 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
296 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
298 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
299 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
301 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
302 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
305 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
306 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
307 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
309 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
310 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
312 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
313 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
317 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
319 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
320 case 4: /* socketcall */
321 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
323 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
329 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
331 struct audit_names *n;
332 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
337 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
338 if ((n->ino != -1) &&
339 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
347 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
348 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
349 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
350 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
351 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
352 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
353 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
356 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
357 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
361 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
365 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
367 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
368 int left = ctx->tree_count;
370 p->c[--left] = chunk;
371 ctx->tree_count = left;
380 ctx->tree_count = 30;
386 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
388 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
389 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
395 p->next = ctx->trees;
397 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
398 ctx->tree_count = 31;
403 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
404 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
406 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
407 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
410 /* we started with empty chain */
411 p = ctx->first_trees;
413 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
418 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
420 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
424 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
425 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
429 ctx->tree_count = count;
433 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
435 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
436 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
442 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
444 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
445 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
450 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
451 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
452 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
457 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
458 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
465 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
466 struct audit_names *name,
467 struct audit_field *f,
468 struct audit_context *ctx)
470 struct audit_names *n;
474 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
480 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
481 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
489 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
490 struct audit_names *name,
491 struct audit_field *f,
492 struct audit_context *ctx)
494 struct audit_names *n;
498 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
504 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
505 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
513 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
514 const struct cred *cred,
515 struct audit_field *f,
516 struct audit_context *ctx,
517 struct audit_names *name)
520 /* process to file object comparisons */
521 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
522 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
523 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
524 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
525 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
526 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
527 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
528 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
529 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
530 return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx);
531 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
532 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
533 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
534 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
535 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
536 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
537 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
538 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
539 /* uid comparisons */
540 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
541 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid);
542 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
543 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
544 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
545 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
546 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
547 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
548 /* auid comparisons */
549 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
550 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid);
551 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
552 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid);
553 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
554 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
555 /* euid comparisons */
556 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
557 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
558 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
559 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
560 /* suid comparisons */
561 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
562 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
563 /* gid comparisons */
564 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
565 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
566 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
567 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
568 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
569 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
570 /* egid comparisons */
571 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
572 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
573 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
574 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
575 /* sgid comparison */
576 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
577 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
579 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
585 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
586 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
589 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
590 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
591 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
593 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
594 struct audit_krule *rule,
595 struct audit_context *ctx,
596 struct audit_names *name,
597 enum audit_state *state,
600 const struct cred *cred;
604 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
606 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
607 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
608 struct audit_names *n;
613 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
618 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
619 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
623 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
626 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
629 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
632 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
635 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
638 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
641 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
644 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
647 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
651 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
655 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
656 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
659 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
661 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
663 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
668 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
669 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
672 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
673 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
674 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
683 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
684 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
687 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
688 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
689 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
698 result = (name->ino == f->val);
700 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
701 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
710 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
712 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
713 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
722 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
724 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
725 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
734 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
738 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
743 result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
745 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
746 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
747 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
750 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
751 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
752 match for now to avoid losing information that
753 may be wanted. An error message will also be
757 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
760 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
769 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
770 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
771 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
774 /* Find files that match */
776 result = security_audit_rule_match(
777 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
780 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
781 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
789 /* Find ipc objects that match */
790 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
792 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
803 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
805 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
806 /* ignore this field for filtering */
810 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
813 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
815 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
816 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
824 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
826 if (rule->filterkey) {
827 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
828 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
830 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
832 switch (rule->action) {
833 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
834 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
839 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
840 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
841 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
843 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
845 struct audit_entry *e;
846 enum audit_state state;
849 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
850 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
852 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
853 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
859 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
862 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
863 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
864 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
865 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
867 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
868 struct audit_context *ctx,
869 struct list_head *list)
871 struct audit_entry *e;
872 enum audit_state state;
874 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
875 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
878 if (!list_empty(list)) {
879 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
880 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
882 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
883 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
884 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
887 ctx->current_state = state;
893 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
897 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
898 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
900 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
901 struct audit_names *n,
902 struct audit_context *ctx) {
904 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
905 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
906 struct audit_entry *e;
907 enum audit_state state;
909 word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
910 bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
912 if (list_empty(list))
915 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
916 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
917 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
918 ctx->current_state = state;
926 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
927 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
928 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
929 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
931 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
933 struct audit_names *n;
935 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
940 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
941 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
947 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
951 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
955 context->return_valid = return_valid;
958 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
959 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
962 * This is actually a test for:
963 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
964 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
966 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
968 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
969 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
970 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
971 context->return_code = -EINTR;
973 context->return_code = return_code;
975 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
976 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
977 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
980 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
984 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
986 struct audit_names *n, *next;
989 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
990 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
991 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
992 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
994 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
995 context->name_count, context->put_count,
997 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
998 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
999 n->name, n->name ?: "(null)");
1006 context->put_count = 0;
1007 context->ino_count = 0;
1010 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
1012 if (n->name && n->name_put)
1017 context->name_count = 0;
1018 path_put(&context->pwd);
1019 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
1020 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
1023 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
1025 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1027 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
1028 context->aux = aux->next;
1031 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
1032 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
1037 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
1038 enum audit_state state)
1040 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
1041 context->state = state;
1042 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1045 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
1047 struct audit_context *context;
1049 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
1051 audit_zero_context(context, state);
1052 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
1053 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
1058 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
1061 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
1062 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
1063 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
1066 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
1068 struct audit_context *context;
1069 enum audit_state state;
1072 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
1073 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
1075 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
1076 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1079 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
1081 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
1084 context->filterkey = key;
1086 tsk->audit_context = context;
1087 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
1091 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
1093 struct audit_context *previous;
1097 previous = context->previous;
1098 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
1100 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
1101 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
1102 context->serial, context->major,
1103 context->name_count, count);
1105 audit_free_names(context);
1106 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1107 free_tree_refs(context);
1108 audit_free_aux(context);
1109 kfree(context->filterkey);
1110 kfree(context->sockaddr);
1115 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
1118 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
1125 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
1129 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
1131 if (error != -EINVAL)
1136 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
1137 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1141 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
1145 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
1147 void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
1149 const struct cred *cred;
1150 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
1151 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
1157 /* tsk == current */
1158 cred = current_cred();
1160 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1161 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1162 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1165 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1168 audit_log_format(ab,
1169 " ppid=%ld pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1170 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1171 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u ses=%u tty=%s",
1174 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, tsk->loginuid),
1175 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
1176 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
1177 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
1178 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
1179 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid),
1180 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
1181 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
1182 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid),
1183 tsk->sessionid, tty);
1185 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
1186 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
1187 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
1190 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
1192 audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &mm->exe_file->f_path);
1193 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
1195 audit_log_task_context(ab);
1198 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_info);
1200 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
1201 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
1202 u32 sid, char *comm)
1204 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1209 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
1213 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
1214 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
1215 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
1216 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
1217 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1220 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1221 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1223 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1224 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1231 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1232 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1233 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1235 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1236 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1237 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1238 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1239 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1241 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1242 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1245 const char __user *p,
1248 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1249 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1250 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1251 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
1252 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1253 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1254 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1257 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1258 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1261 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1262 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1263 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1266 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1268 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1272 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1274 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1275 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1278 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1280 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1281 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1286 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1289 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1290 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1293 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1294 * send half as much in each message
1296 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1299 len_left -= to_send;
1301 } while (len_left > 0);
1305 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1308 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1309 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1312 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1313 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1317 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1318 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1320 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1322 room_left -= to_send;
1323 if (room_left < 0) {
1326 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1332 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1333 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1335 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1336 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
1337 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1340 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1341 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1342 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1344 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1345 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1350 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1353 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1355 /* actually log it */
1356 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
1358 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1359 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1361 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1363 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
1366 len_left -= to_send;
1367 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1369 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1371 *len_sent += to_send;
1373 /* include the null we didn't log */
1377 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1378 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1379 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1382 size_t len_sent = 0;
1383 const char __user *p;
1386 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1387 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1389 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1391 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc);
1394 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1395 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1396 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1397 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1399 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1401 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1405 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1406 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1415 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1419 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1420 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1421 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1425 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1427 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1428 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1431 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1432 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1435 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1436 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1441 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1444 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1446 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1449 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1453 switch (context->type) {
1454 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1455 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1456 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1457 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1458 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1459 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1462 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1464 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1465 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1466 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1471 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1472 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1475 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1476 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1479 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1481 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1482 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1483 audit_log_format(ab,
1484 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1485 context->ipc.qbytes,
1486 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1487 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1488 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1493 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1494 audit_log_format(ab,
1495 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1496 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1497 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1498 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1499 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1500 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1501 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1503 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1504 audit_log_format(ab,
1505 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1506 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1507 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1508 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1509 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1510 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1511 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1513 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1514 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1515 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1516 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1518 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1519 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1520 audit_log_format(ab,
1521 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1523 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1524 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1525 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1527 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1528 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1529 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1530 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1531 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1534 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1535 context->mmap.flags);
1541 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1542 int record_num, int *call_panic)
1544 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1545 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1547 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1549 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1552 switch (n->name_len) {
1553 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1554 /* log the full path */
1555 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1556 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1559 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1560 * directory component is the cwd */
1561 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1564 /* log the name's directory component */
1565 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1566 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1570 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1572 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1573 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1574 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
1575 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1580 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
1581 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
1588 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1589 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1590 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1593 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1594 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1598 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1603 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1605 int i, call_panic = 0;
1606 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1607 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1608 struct audit_names *n;
1610 /* tsk == current */
1611 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1613 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1615 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1616 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1617 context->arch, context->major);
1618 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1619 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1620 if (context->return_valid)
1621 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1622 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1623 context->return_code);
1625 audit_log_format(ab,
1626 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1631 context->name_count);
1633 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1634 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1637 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1639 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1641 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1643 switch (aux->type) {
1645 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1646 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1647 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1650 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1651 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1652 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1653 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1654 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1655 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1656 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1657 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1658 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1659 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1660 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1661 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1669 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1671 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1672 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1674 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1675 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1680 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1681 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1683 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1684 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1685 context->sockaddr_len);
1690 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1691 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1693 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1694 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1695 axs->target_auid[i],
1697 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1699 axs->target_comm[i]))
1703 if (context->target_pid &&
1704 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1705 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1706 context->target_sessionid,
1707 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1710 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1711 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1713 audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd);
1719 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
1720 audit_log_name(context, n, i++, &call_panic);
1722 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1723 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1727 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1731 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1732 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1734 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1736 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1738 struct audit_context *context;
1740 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1744 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1745 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1746 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1747 * in the context of the idle thread */
1748 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1749 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1750 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1751 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1752 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1754 audit_free_context(context);
1758 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1759 * @arch: architecture type
1760 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1761 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1762 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1763 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1764 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1766 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1767 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1768 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1769 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1770 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1771 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1774 void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1775 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1776 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1778 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1779 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1780 enum audit_state state;
1786 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1787 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1788 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1789 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1790 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1794 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1796 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1797 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1799 if (context->in_syscall) {
1800 struct audit_context *newctx;
1804 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1805 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1806 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1808 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1810 newctx->previous = context;
1812 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1814 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1815 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1816 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1817 * to abandon auditing. */
1818 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1821 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1826 context->arch = arch;
1827 context->major = major;
1828 context->argv[0] = a1;
1829 context->argv[1] = a2;
1830 context->argv[2] = a3;
1831 context->argv[3] = a4;
1833 state = context->state;
1834 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1835 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1837 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1839 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1842 context->serial = 0;
1843 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1844 context->in_syscall = 1;
1845 context->current_state = state;
1850 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1851 * @success: success value of the syscall
1852 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1854 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1855 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1856 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1857 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1858 * free the names stored from getname().
1860 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1862 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1863 struct audit_context *context;
1866 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1868 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1870 context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code);
1874 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1875 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1877 context->in_syscall = 0;
1878 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1880 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1881 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1883 if (context->previous) {
1884 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1885 context->previous = NULL;
1886 audit_free_context(context);
1887 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1889 audit_free_names(context);
1890 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1891 audit_free_aux(context);
1892 context->aux = NULL;
1893 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1894 context->target_pid = 0;
1895 context->target_sid = 0;
1896 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1898 context->fds[0] = -1;
1899 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1900 kfree(context->filterkey);
1901 context->filterkey = NULL;
1903 tsk->audit_context = context;
1907 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1909 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1910 struct audit_context *context;
1911 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1912 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1914 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1916 context = current->audit_context;
1918 count = context->tree_count;
1920 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1924 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1926 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1927 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1928 audit_set_auditable(context);
1929 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1930 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1933 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1937 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1939 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1940 struct audit_context *context;
1941 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1942 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1943 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1947 context = current->audit_context;
1949 count = context->tree_count;
1954 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1956 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1957 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1958 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1959 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1961 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1967 parent = d->d_parent;
1972 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1975 /* just a race with rename */
1976 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1979 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1980 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1981 /* OK, got more space */
1982 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1987 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1988 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1989 audit_set_auditable(context);
1996 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1999 struct audit_names *aname;
2001 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
2002 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
2003 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
2005 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
2008 aname->should_free = true;
2011 aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2013 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
2015 context->name_count++;
2017 context->ino_count++;
2023 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
2024 * @name: name to add
2026 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
2027 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
2029 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
2031 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2032 struct audit_names *n;
2034 if (!context->in_syscall) {
2035 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
2036 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
2037 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
2043 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2048 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2051 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
2052 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
2055 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
2056 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
2058 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
2059 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
2060 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
2062 void audit_putname(const char *name)
2064 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2067 if (!context->in_syscall) {
2068 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
2069 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
2070 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
2071 if (context->name_count) {
2072 struct audit_names *n;
2075 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
2076 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
2077 n->name, n->name ?: "(null)");
2084 ++context->put_count;
2085 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
2086 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
2087 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
2090 context->serial, context->major,
2091 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
2092 context->put_count);
2099 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
2101 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
2107 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
2111 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
2112 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
2113 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2114 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2120 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
2121 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
2122 const struct inode *inode)
2124 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
2125 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
2126 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
2127 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
2128 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
2129 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
2130 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
2131 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
2135 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
2136 * @name: name being audited
2137 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2138 * @parent: does this dentry represent the parent?
2140 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
2141 unsigned int parent)
2143 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2144 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2145 struct audit_names *n;
2147 if (!context->in_syscall)
2153 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2154 /* does the name pointer match? */
2155 if (n->name != name)
2158 /* match the correct record type */
2160 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2161 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2164 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2170 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname(). Allocate a new
2173 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL);
2178 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2179 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2181 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2182 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2184 handle_path(dentry);
2185 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
2189 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2190 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2191 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2193 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2194 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2195 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2196 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2197 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2198 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2199 * unsuccessful attempts.
2201 void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
2202 const struct dentry *dentry)
2204 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2205 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2206 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2207 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
2208 struct audit_names *n;
2210 if (!context->in_syscall)
2216 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2217 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2221 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
2222 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, n->name_len)) {
2223 found_parent = n->name;
2228 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2229 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2233 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2234 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2235 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name,
2238 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
2240 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2241 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2242 found_child = n->name;
2248 if (!found_parent) {
2249 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL);
2252 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
2256 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL);
2260 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2261 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2262 * audit_free_names() */
2264 n->name = found_parent;
2265 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2266 /* don't call __putname() */
2267 n->name_put = false;
2271 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
2274 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2277 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2278 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2279 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2280 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2282 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2284 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2285 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2287 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2290 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2291 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2292 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2293 *serial = ctx->serial;
2296 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2301 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2302 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2305 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2306 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2310 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2312 int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
2314 struct task_struct *task = current;
2315 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
2316 unsigned int sessionid;
2318 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
2319 if (uid_valid(task->loginuid))
2321 #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
2322 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
2324 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
2326 sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2327 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2328 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2330 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2332 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2333 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2334 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2336 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(task)),
2337 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task->loginuid),
2338 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, loginuid),
2339 task->sessionid, sessionid);
2343 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2344 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2349 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2352 * @attr: queue attributes
2355 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2357 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2360 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2362 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2364 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2365 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2367 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2371 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2372 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2373 * @msg_len: Message length
2374 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2375 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2378 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2379 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2381 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2382 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2385 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2387 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2389 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2390 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2391 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2393 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2397 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2398 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2399 * @notification: Notification event
2403 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2405 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2408 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2410 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2412 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2413 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2417 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2418 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2422 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2424 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2425 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2426 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2427 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2431 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2432 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2435 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2437 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2438 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2439 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2440 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2441 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2442 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2443 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2447 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2448 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2449 * @uid: msgq user id
2450 * @gid: msgq group id
2451 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2453 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2455 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2457 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2459 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2460 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2461 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2462 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2463 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2466 int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2468 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2469 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2471 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2475 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2476 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2478 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2479 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2480 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2486 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2487 * @nargs: number of args
2491 void __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2493 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2495 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2496 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2497 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2501 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2502 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2503 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2506 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2508 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2509 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2510 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2514 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2515 * @len: data length in user space
2516 * @a: data address in kernel space
2518 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2520 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2522 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2524 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2525 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2528 context->sockaddr = p;
2531 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2532 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2536 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2538 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2540 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2541 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2542 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2543 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2544 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2545 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2549 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2550 * @sig: signal value
2551 * @t: task being signaled
2553 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2554 * and uid that is doing that.
2556 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2558 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2559 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2560 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2561 kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2563 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2564 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2565 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2566 if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid))
2567 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2569 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2570 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2572 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2576 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2577 * in audit_context */
2578 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2579 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2580 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2581 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2582 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2583 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2584 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2588 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2589 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2590 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2594 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2595 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2596 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2598 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2600 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2601 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2602 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2603 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2604 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2605 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2612 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2613 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2614 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2615 * @old: the old credentials
2617 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2618 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2622 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2623 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2625 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2626 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2627 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2628 struct dentry *dentry;
2630 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2634 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2635 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2636 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2638 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2639 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2642 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2643 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2644 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2645 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2647 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2648 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2649 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2651 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2652 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2653 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2658 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2659 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2660 * @new: the new credentials
2661 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2663 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2664 * audit system if applicable
2666 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
2667 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2669 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2670 context->capset.pid = pid;
2671 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2672 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2673 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2674 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2677 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2679 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2680 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2681 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2682 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2685 static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr)
2689 unsigned int sessionid;
2691 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2692 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2693 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2695 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2696 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2697 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2698 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2700 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2701 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2702 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2703 audit_log_format(ab, " reason=");
2704 audit_log_string(ab, reason);
2705 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2708 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2709 * @signr: signal value
2711 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2712 * should record the event for investigation.
2714 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2716 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2721 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2724 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2725 audit_log_abend(ab, "memory violation", signr);
2729 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2731 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2733 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2734 audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", signr);
2735 audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
2736 audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
2737 audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current));
2738 audit_log_format(ab, " code=0x%x", code);
2742 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2744 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2745 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2747 return &ctx->killed_trees;