1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/export.h>
52 #include <linux/slab.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
70 #include <linux/compat.h>
74 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
75 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
76 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
77 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
79 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
80 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
82 /* number of audit rules */
85 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
88 struct audit_aux_data {
89 struct audit_aux_data *next;
93 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
95 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
96 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
98 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
99 struct audit_aux_data d;
101 struct mm_struct *mm;
104 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
105 struct audit_aux_data d;
106 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
107 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
108 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
109 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
110 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
111 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
115 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
116 struct audit_aux_data d;
117 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
118 unsigned int fcap_ver;
119 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
120 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
123 struct audit_tree_refs {
124 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
125 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
128 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
130 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
131 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
132 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
136 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
143 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
145 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
146 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
148 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
149 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
151 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
152 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
155 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
156 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
157 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
159 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
160 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
162 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
163 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
167 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
169 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
170 case 4: /* socketcall */
171 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
173 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
179 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
181 struct audit_names *n;
182 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
187 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
188 if ((n->ino != -1) &&
189 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
197 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
198 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
199 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
200 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
201 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
202 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
203 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
206 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
207 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
211 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
215 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
217 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
218 int left = ctx->tree_count;
220 p->c[--left] = chunk;
221 ctx->tree_count = left;
230 ctx->tree_count = 30;
236 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
238 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
239 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
245 p->next = ctx->trees;
247 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
248 ctx->tree_count = 31;
253 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
254 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
256 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
257 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
260 /* we started with empty chain */
261 p = ctx->first_trees;
263 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
268 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
270 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
274 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
275 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
279 ctx->tree_count = count;
283 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
285 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
286 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
292 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
294 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
295 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
300 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
301 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
302 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
307 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
308 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
315 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
316 struct audit_names *name,
317 struct audit_field *f,
318 struct audit_context *ctx)
320 struct audit_names *n;
324 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
330 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
331 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
339 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
340 struct audit_names *name,
341 struct audit_field *f,
342 struct audit_context *ctx)
344 struct audit_names *n;
348 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
354 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
355 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
363 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
364 const struct cred *cred,
365 struct audit_field *f,
366 struct audit_context *ctx,
367 struct audit_names *name)
370 /* process to file object comparisons */
371 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
372 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
373 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
374 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
375 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
376 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
377 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
378 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
379 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
380 return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx);
381 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
382 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
383 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
384 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
385 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
386 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
387 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
388 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
389 /* uid comparisons */
390 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
391 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid);
392 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
393 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
394 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
395 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
396 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
397 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
398 /* auid comparisons */
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
400 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid);
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
402 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid);
403 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
404 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
405 /* euid comparisons */
406 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
407 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
408 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
409 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
410 /* suid comparisons */
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
412 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
413 /* gid comparisons */
414 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
415 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
416 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
417 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
418 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
419 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
420 /* egid comparisons */
421 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
422 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
423 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
424 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
425 /* sgid comparison */
426 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
427 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
429 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
435 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
436 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
439 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
440 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
441 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
443 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
444 struct audit_krule *rule,
445 struct audit_context *ctx,
446 struct audit_names *name,
447 enum audit_state *state,
450 const struct cred *cred;
454 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
456 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
457 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
458 struct audit_names *n;
463 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
468 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
469 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
473 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
476 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
479 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
482 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
485 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
486 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
488 result = in_group_p(f->gid);
489 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
491 result = !in_group_p(f->gid);
495 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
496 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
498 result = in_egroup_p(f->gid);
499 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
501 result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid);
505 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
508 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
511 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
515 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
519 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
520 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
523 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
525 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
527 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
532 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
533 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
536 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
537 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
538 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
547 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
548 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
551 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
552 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
553 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
562 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
564 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
565 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
574 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
576 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
577 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
586 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
588 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
589 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
598 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
602 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
607 result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
609 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
610 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
612 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
613 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
614 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
617 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
618 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
619 match for now to avoid losing information that
620 may be wanted. An error message will also be
624 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
627 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
636 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
637 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
638 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
641 /* Find files that match */
643 result = security_audit_rule_match(
644 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
647 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
648 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
656 /* Find ipc objects that match */
657 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
659 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
670 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
672 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
673 /* ignore this field for filtering */
677 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
680 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
682 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
683 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
691 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
693 if (rule->filterkey) {
694 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
695 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
697 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
699 switch (rule->action) {
700 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
701 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
706 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
707 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
708 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
710 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
712 struct audit_entry *e;
713 enum audit_state state;
716 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
717 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
719 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
720 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
726 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
729 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
730 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
731 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
732 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
734 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
735 struct audit_context *ctx,
736 struct list_head *list)
738 struct audit_entry *e;
739 enum audit_state state;
741 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
742 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
745 if (!list_empty(list)) {
746 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
747 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
749 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
750 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
751 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
754 ctx->current_state = state;
760 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
764 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
765 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
767 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
768 struct audit_names *n,
769 struct audit_context *ctx) {
771 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
772 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
773 struct audit_entry *e;
774 enum audit_state state;
776 word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
777 bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
779 if (list_empty(list))
782 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
783 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
784 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
785 ctx->current_state = state;
793 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
794 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
795 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
796 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
798 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
800 struct audit_names *n;
802 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
807 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
808 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
814 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
818 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
822 context->return_valid = return_valid;
825 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
826 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
829 * This is actually a test for:
830 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
831 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
833 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
835 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
836 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
837 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
838 context->return_code = -EINTR;
840 context->return_code = return_code;
842 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
843 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
844 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
847 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
851 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
853 struct audit_names *n, *next;
856 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
859 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
860 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
861 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
863 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
864 context->name_count, context->put_count,
866 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
867 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++,
868 n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)");
875 context->put_count = 0;
876 context->ino_count = 0;
879 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
881 if (n->name && n->name_put)
882 final_putname(n->name);
886 context->name_count = 0;
887 path_put(&context->pwd);
888 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
889 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
892 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
894 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
896 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
897 context->aux = aux->next;
900 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
901 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
906 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
908 struct audit_context *context;
910 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
913 context->state = state;
914 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
915 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
916 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
921 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
924 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
925 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
926 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
929 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
931 struct audit_context *context;
932 enum audit_state state;
935 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
936 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
938 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
939 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
940 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
944 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
946 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
949 context->filterkey = key;
951 tsk->audit_context = context;
952 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
956 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
958 audit_free_names(context);
959 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
960 free_tree_refs(context);
961 audit_free_aux(context);
962 kfree(context->filterkey);
963 kfree(context->sockaddr);
967 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
968 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
971 struct audit_buffer *ab;
976 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
980 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
981 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
982 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
984 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
985 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
988 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
989 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
992 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
993 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1000 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1001 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1002 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1004 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1005 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1006 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1007 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1008 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1010 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1011 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1014 const char __user *p,
1017 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1018 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1019 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1020 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
1021 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1022 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1023 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1026 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1027 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1030 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1031 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1032 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1035 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1037 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1041 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1043 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1044 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1047 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1049 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1050 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1055 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1058 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1059 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1062 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1063 * send half as much in each message
1065 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1068 len_left -= to_send;
1070 } while (len_left > 0);
1074 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1077 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1078 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1081 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1082 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1086 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1087 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1089 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1091 room_left -= to_send;
1092 if (room_left < 0) {
1095 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1101 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1102 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1104 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1105 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
1106 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1109 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1110 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1111 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1113 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1114 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1119 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1122 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1124 /* actually log it */
1125 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
1127 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1128 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1130 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1132 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
1135 len_left -= to_send;
1136 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1138 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1140 *len_sent += to_send;
1142 /* include the null we didn't log */
1146 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1147 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1148 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1151 size_t len_sent = 0;
1152 const char __user *p;
1155 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1156 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1158 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1160 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc);
1163 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1164 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1165 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1166 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1168 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1170 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1174 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1175 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1184 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1186 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1189 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1193 switch (context->type) {
1194 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1195 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1196 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1197 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1198 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1199 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1202 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1204 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1205 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1206 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1211 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1212 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1215 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1216 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1219 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1221 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1222 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1225 audit_log_format(ab,
1226 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1227 context->ipc.qbytes,
1228 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1229 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1230 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1233 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1234 audit_log_format(ab,
1235 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1236 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1237 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1238 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1239 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1240 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1241 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1243 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1244 audit_log_format(ab,
1245 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1246 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1247 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1248 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1249 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1250 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1251 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1253 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1254 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1255 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1256 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1258 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1259 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1260 audit_log_format(ab,
1261 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1263 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1264 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1265 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1267 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1268 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1269 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1270 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1271 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1274 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1275 context->mmap.flags);
1281 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1283 int i, call_panic = 0;
1284 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1285 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1286 struct audit_names *n;
1288 /* tsk == current */
1289 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1291 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1293 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1294 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1295 context->arch, context->major);
1296 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1297 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1298 if (context->return_valid)
1299 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1300 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1301 context->return_code);
1303 audit_log_format(ab,
1304 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1309 context->name_count);
1311 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1312 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1315 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1317 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1319 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1321 switch (aux->type) {
1323 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1324 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1325 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1328 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1329 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1330 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1331 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1332 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1333 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1334 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1335 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1336 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1337 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1338 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1339 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1347 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1349 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1350 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1352 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1353 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1358 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1359 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1361 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1362 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1363 context->sockaddr_len);
1368 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1369 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1371 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1372 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1373 axs->target_auid[i],
1375 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1377 axs->target_comm[i]))
1381 if (context->target_pid &&
1382 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1383 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1384 context->target_sessionid,
1385 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1388 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1389 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1391 audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd);
1397 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1400 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1403 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1404 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1408 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1412 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1413 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1415 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1417 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1419 struct audit_context *context;
1421 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1425 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1426 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1427 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1428 * in the context of the idle thread */
1429 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1430 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1431 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1432 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1433 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1435 audit_free_context(context);
1439 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1440 * @arch: architecture type
1441 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1442 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1443 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1444 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1445 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1447 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1448 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1449 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1450 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1451 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1452 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1455 void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1456 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1457 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1459 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1460 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1461 enum audit_state state;
1466 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1471 context->arch = arch;
1472 context->major = major;
1473 context->argv[0] = a1;
1474 context->argv[1] = a2;
1475 context->argv[2] = a3;
1476 context->argv[3] = a4;
1478 state = context->state;
1479 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1480 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1482 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1484 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1487 context->serial = 0;
1488 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1489 context->in_syscall = 1;
1490 context->current_state = state;
1495 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1496 * @success: success value of the syscall
1497 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1499 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1500 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1501 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1502 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1503 * free the names stored from getname().
1505 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1507 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1508 struct audit_context *context;
1511 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1513 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1515 context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code);
1519 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1520 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1522 context->in_syscall = 0;
1523 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1525 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1526 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1528 audit_free_names(context);
1529 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1530 audit_free_aux(context);
1531 context->aux = NULL;
1532 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1533 context->target_pid = 0;
1534 context->target_sid = 0;
1535 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1537 context->fds[0] = -1;
1538 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1539 kfree(context->filterkey);
1540 context->filterkey = NULL;
1542 tsk->audit_context = context;
1545 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1547 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1548 struct audit_context *context;
1549 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1550 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1552 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1554 context = current->audit_context;
1556 count = context->tree_count;
1558 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1562 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1564 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1565 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1566 audit_set_auditable(context);
1567 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1568 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1571 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1575 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1577 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1578 struct audit_context *context;
1579 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1580 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1581 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1585 context = current->audit_context;
1587 count = context->tree_count;
1592 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1594 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1595 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1596 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1597 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1599 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1605 parent = d->d_parent;
1610 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1613 /* just a race with rename */
1614 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1617 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1618 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1619 /* OK, got more space */
1620 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1625 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1626 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1627 audit_set_auditable(context);
1634 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1637 struct audit_names *aname;
1639 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1640 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1641 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1643 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1646 aname->should_free = true;
1649 aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1651 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1653 context->name_count++;
1655 context->ino_count++;
1661 * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1662 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1664 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1665 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1666 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1669 __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1671 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1672 struct audit_names *n;
1674 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1677 if (n->name->uptr == uptr)
1684 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1685 * @name: name to add
1687 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1688 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1690 void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1692 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1693 struct audit_names *n;
1695 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1696 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1697 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1698 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1705 /* The filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
1706 BUG_ON(!name->name);
1709 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1714 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1718 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1719 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1722 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1723 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1725 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1726 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1727 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1729 void audit_putname(struct filename *name)
1731 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1734 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1735 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1736 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): final_putname(%p)\n",
1737 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1738 if (context->name_count) {
1739 struct audit_names *n;
1742 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
1743 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i++,
1744 n->name, n->name->name ?: "(null)");
1747 final_putname(name);
1751 ++context->put_count;
1752 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1753 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1754 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1757 context->serial, context->major,
1758 context->in_syscall, name->name,
1759 context->name_count, context->put_count);
1767 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1768 * @name: name being audited
1769 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1770 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1772 void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1775 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1776 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1777 struct audit_names *n;
1778 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1780 if (!context->in_syscall)
1787 /* The struct filename _must_ have a populated ->name */
1788 BUG_ON(!name->name);
1791 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1792 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1797 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1798 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1801 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1806 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1807 /* does the name pointer match? */
1808 if (!n->name || n->name->name != name->name)
1811 /* match the correct record type */
1813 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1814 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1817 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1823 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname(). Allocate a new
1826 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL);
1831 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1832 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
1833 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
1836 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1837 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
1839 handle_path(dentry);
1840 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
1844 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1845 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1846 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1847 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
1849 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1850 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1851 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1852 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1853 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1854 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1855 * unsuccessful attempts.
1857 void __audit_inode_child(const struct inode *parent,
1858 const struct dentry *dentry,
1859 const unsigned char type)
1861 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1862 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1863 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
1864 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1866 if (!context->in_syscall)
1872 /* look for a parent entry first */
1873 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1874 if (!n->name || n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1877 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
1878 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
1884 /* is there a matching child entry? */
1885 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1886 /* can only match entries that have a name */
1887 if (!n->name || n->type != type)
1890 /* if we found a parent, make sure this one is a child of it */
1891 if (found_parent && (n->name != found_parent->name))
1894 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) ||
1895 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
1897 found_parent->name_len :
1904 if (!found_parent) {
1905 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
1906 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
1909 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
1913 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
1917 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1918 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1919 * audit_free_names() */
1921 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
1922 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1923 /* don't call __putname() */
1924 found_child->name_put = false;
1928 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
1930 found_child->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1932 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
1935 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1936 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1937 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1938 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1940 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1942 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1943 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1945 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
1948 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1949 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1950 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1951 *serial = ctx->serial;
1954 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
1959 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1960 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1962 static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
1964 /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
1965 if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
1967 /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
1968 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE))
1970 /* it is set, you need permission */
1971 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
1973 /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
1974 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid))
1979 static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
1980 unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid,
1983 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1984 uid_t uid, ologinuid, nloginuid;
1986 uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
1987 ologinuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
1988 nloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
1990 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1993 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u old auid=%u new auid=%u old "
1994 "ses=%u new ses=%u res=%d", current->pid, uid, ologinuid,
1995 nloginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
2000 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2001 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2005 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2007 int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
2009 struct task_struct *task = current;
2010 unsigned int sessionid = -1;
2011 kuid_t oldloginuid, oldsessionid;
2014 oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2015 oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2017 rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid);
2021 /* are we setting or clearing? */
2022 if (uid_valid(loginuid))
2023 sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2025 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2026 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2028 audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
2033 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2036 * @attr: queue attributes
2039 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2041 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2044 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2046 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2048 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2049 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2051 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2055 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2056 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2057 * @msg_len: Message length
2058 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2059 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2062 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2063 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2065 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2066 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2069 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2071 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2073 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2074 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2075 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2077 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2081 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2082 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2083 * @notification: Notification event
2087 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2089 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2092 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2094 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2096 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2097 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2101 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2102 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2106 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2108 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2109 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2110 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2111 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2115 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2116 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2119 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2121 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2122 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2123 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2124 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2125 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2126 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2127 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2131 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2132 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2133 * @uid: msgq user id
2134 * @gid: msgq group id
2135 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2137 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2139 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2141 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2143 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2144 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2145 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2146 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2147 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2150 int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2152 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2153 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2155 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2159 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2161 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2162 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2163 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2169 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2170 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2174 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2176 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2178 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2180 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2181 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2182 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2187 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2188 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2189 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2192 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2194 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2195 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2196 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2200 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2201 * @len: data length in user space
2202 * @a: data address in kernel space
2204 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2206 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2208 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2210 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2211 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2214 context->sockaddr = p;
2217 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2218 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2222 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2224 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2226 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2227 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2228 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2229 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2230 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2231 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2235 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2236 * @sig: signal value
2237 * @t: task being signaled
2239 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2240 * and uid that is doing that.
2242 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2244 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2245 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2246 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2247 kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2249 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2250 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2251 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2252 if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid))
2253 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2255 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2256 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2258 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2262 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2263 * in audit_context */
2264 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2265 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2266 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2267 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2268 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2269 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2270 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2274 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2275 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2276 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2280 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2281 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2282 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2284 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2286 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2287 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2288 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2289 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2290 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2291 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2298 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2299 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2300 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2301 * @old: the old credentials
2303 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2304 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2308 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2309 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2311 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2312 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2313 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2314 struct dentry *dentry;
2316 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2320 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2321 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2322 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2324 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2325 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2328 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2329 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2330 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2331 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2333 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2334 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2335 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2337 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2338 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2339 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2344 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2345 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2346 * @new: the new credentials
2347 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2349 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2350 * audit system if applicable
2352 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
2353 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2355 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2356 context->capset.pid = pid;
2357 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2358 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2359 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2360 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2363 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2365 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2366 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2367 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2368 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2371 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2375 unsigned int sessionid;
2377 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2378 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2379 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2381 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2382 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2383 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2384 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2386 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2387 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2388 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2391 static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr)
2394 audit_log_format(ab, " reason=");
2395 audit_log_string(ab, reason);
2396 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2399 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2400 * @signr: signal value
2402 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2403 * should record the event for investigation.
2405 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2407 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2412 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2415 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2418 audit_log_abend(ab, "memory violation", signr);
2422 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2424 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2426 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2430 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2431 audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
2432 audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
2433 audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current));
2434 audit_log_format(ab, " code=0x%x", code);
2438 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2440 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2441 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2443 return &ctx->killed_trees;