1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
47 #include <linux/init.h>
48 #include <asm/types.h>
49 #include <linux/atomic.h>
51 #include <linux/namei.h>
53 #include <linux/export.h>
54 #include <linux/slab.h>
55 #include <linux/mount.h>
56 #include <linux/socket.h>
57 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
58 #include <linux/audit.h>
59 #include <linux/personality.h>
60 #include <linux/time.h>
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/compiler.h>
63 #include <asm/unistd.h>
64 #include <linux/security.h>
65 #include <linux/list.h>
66 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
67 #include <linux/highmem.h>
68 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
69 #include <asm/syscall.h>
70 #include <linux/capability.h>
71 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
72 #include <linux/compat.h>
73 #include <linux/ctype.h>
74 #include <linux/string.h>
75 #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
79 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
80 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
81 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
82 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
84 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
85 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
87 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
88 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
90 /* number of audit rules */
93 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
96 struct audit_aux_data {
97 struct audit_aux_data *next;
101 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
103 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
104 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
106 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
107 struct audit_aux_data d;
108 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
109 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
110 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
111 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
112 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
113 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
117 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
118 struct audit_aux_data d;
119 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
120 unsigned int fcap_ver;
121 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
122 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
125 struct audit_tree_refs {
126 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
127 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
130 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
137 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
139 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
140 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
142 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
143 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
145 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
146 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
149 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
150 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
151 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
153 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
154 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
156 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
157 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
161 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
163 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
164 case 4: /* socketcall */
165 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
167 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
173 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
175 struct audit_names *n;
176 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
181 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
182 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
183 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
191 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
192 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
193 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
194 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
195 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
196 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
197 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
200 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
201 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
205 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
209 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
211 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
212 int left = ctx->tree_count;
214 p->c[--left] = chunk;
215 ctx->tree_count = left;
224 ctx->tree_count = 30;
230 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
232 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
233 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
239 p->next = ctx->trees;
241 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
242 ctx->tree_count = 31;
247 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
248 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
250 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
251 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
254 /* we started with empty chain */
255 p = ctx->first_trees;
257 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
262 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
264 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
268 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
269 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
273 ctx->tree_count = count;
277 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
279 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
280 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
286 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
288 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
289 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
294 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
295 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
296 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
301 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
302 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
309 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
310 struct audit_names *name,
311 struct audit_field *f,
312 struct audit_context *ctx)
314 struct audit_names *n;
318 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
324 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
325 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
333 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
334 struct audit_names *name,
335 struct audit_field *f,
336 struct audit_context *ctx)
338 struct audit_names *n;
342 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
348 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
349 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
357 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
358 const struct cred *cred,
359 struct audit_field *f,
360 struct audit_context *ctx,
361 struct audit_names *name)
364 /* process to file object comparisons */
365 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
366 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
367 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
368 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
369 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
370 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
371 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
372 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
373 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
374 return audit_compare_uid(tsk->loginuid, name, f, ctx);
375 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
376 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
377 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
378 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
379 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
380 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
381 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
382 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
383 /* uid comparisons */
384 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
385 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, tsk->loginuid);
386 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
387 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
388 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
389 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
390 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
391 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
392 /* auid comparisons */
393 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
394 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->euid);
395 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
396 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->suid);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
398 return audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
399 /* euid comparisons */
400 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
401 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
402 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
403 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
404 /* suid comparisons */
405 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
406 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
407 /* gid comparisons */
408 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
409 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
410 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
411 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
412 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
413 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
414 /* egid comparisons */
415 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
416 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
417 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
418 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
419 /* sgid comparison */
420 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
421 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
423 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
429 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
430 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
433 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
434 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
435 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
437 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
438 struct audit_krule *rule,
439 struct audit_context *ctx,
440 struct audit_names *name,
441 enum audit_state *state,
444 const struct cred *cred;
448 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
450 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
451 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
452 struct audit_names *n;
458 pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
459 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
464 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
465 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
469 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
472 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
475 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
478 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
481 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
484 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
485 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
487 result = in_group_p(f->gid);
488 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
490 result = !in_group_p(f->gid);
494 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
495 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
497 result = in_egroup_p(f->gid);
498 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
500 result = !in_egroup_p(f->gid);
504 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
507 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
510 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
514 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
518 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
519 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
522 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
524 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
526 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
531 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
532 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
535 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
536 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
537 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
546 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
547 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
550 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
551 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
552 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
561 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
563 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
564 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
573 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
575 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
576 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
585 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
587 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
588 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
597 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
601 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
604 result = audit_uid_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->uid);
606 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
607 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
609 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
610 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
611 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
614 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
615 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
616 match for now to avoid losing information that
617 may be wanted. An error message will also be
621 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
624 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
633 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
634 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
635 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
638 /* Find files that match */
640 result = security_audit_rule_match(
641 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
644 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
645 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
653 /* Find ipc objects that match */
654 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
656 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
667 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
669 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
670 /* ignore this field for filtering */
674 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
677 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
679 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
680 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
688 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
690 if (rule->filterkey) {
691 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
692 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
694 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
696 switch (rule->action) {
697 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
698 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
703 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
704 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
705 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
707 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
709 struct audit_entry *e;
710 enum audit_state state;
713 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
714 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
716 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
717 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
723 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
726 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
730 if (val > 0xffffffff)
733 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
734 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
737 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
739 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
742 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
743 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
744 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
745 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
747 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
748 struct audit_context *ctx,
749 struct list_head *list)
751 struct audit_entry *e;
752 enum audit_state state;
754 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
755 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
758 if (!list_empty(list)) {
759 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
760 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
761 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
764 ctx->current_state = state;
770 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
774 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
775 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
777 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
778 struct audit_names *n,
779 struct audit_context *ctx) {
780 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
781 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
782 struct audit_entry *e;
783 enum audit_state state;
785 if (list_empty(list))
788 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
789 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
790 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
791 ctx->current_state = state;
799 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
800 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
801 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
802 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
804 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
806 struct audit_names *n;
808 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
813 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
814 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
820 /* Transfer the audit context pointer to the caller, clearing it in the tsk's struct */
821 static inline struct audit_context *audit_take_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
825 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
829 context->return_valid = return_valid;
832 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
833 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
836 * This is actually a test for:
837 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
838 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
840 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
842 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
843 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
844 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
845 context->return_code = -EINTR;
847 context->return_code = return_code;
849 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
850 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
851 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
854 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
858 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
860 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
861 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
862 context->proctitle.len = 0;
865 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
867 struct audit_names *n, *next;
869 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
876 context->name_count = 0;
877 path_put(&context->pwd);
878 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
879 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
882 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
884 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
886 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
887 context->aux = aux->next;
890 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
891 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
896 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
898 struct audit_context *context;
900 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
903 context->state = state;
904 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
905 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
906 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
911 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
914 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
915 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
916 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
919 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
921 struct audit_context *context;
922 enum audit_state state;
925 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
926 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
928 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
929 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED) {
930 clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
934 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
936 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
939 context->filterkey = key;
941 tsk->audit_context = context;
942 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
946 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
948 audit_free_names(context);
949 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
950 free_tree_refs(context);
951 audit_free_aux(context);
952 kfree(context->filterkey);
953 kfree(context->sockaddr);
954 audit_proctitle_free(context);
958 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
959 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
962 struct audit_buffer *ab;
967 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
971 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
972 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
973 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
975 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
976 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
979 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
980 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
983 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
984 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
991 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
992 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
993 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
995 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
996 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
997 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
998 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
999 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1001 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1002 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1005 const char __user *p,
1008 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1009 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1010 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1011 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
1012 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1013 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1014 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1017 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1018 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1021 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1022 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1023 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1026 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len < 0 || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1027 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1031 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1033 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1034 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1037 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1039 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1040 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1045 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1048 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1049 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1052 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1053 * send half as much in each message
1055 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1058 len_left -= to_send;
1060 } while (len_left > 0);
1064 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1067 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1068 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1071 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1072 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1076 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1077 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1079 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1081 room_left -= to_send;
1082 if (room_left < 0) {
1085 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1091 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1092 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1094 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1095 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
1096 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1099 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1100 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1101 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1103 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1104 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1109 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1112 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1114 /* actually log it */
1115 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
1117 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1118 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1120 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1122 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
1125 len_left -= to_send;
1126 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1128 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1130 *len_sent += to_send;
1132 /* include the null we didn't log */
1136 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1137 struct audit_buffer **ab)
1140 size_t len_sent = 0;
1141 const char __user *p;
1144 p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1146 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1149 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1150 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1151 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1152 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1154 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1156 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1160 for (i = 0; i < context->execve.argc; i++) {
1161 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1170 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1172 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1175 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1179 switch (context->type) {
1180 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1181 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1182 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1183 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1184 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1185 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1188 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1190 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1191 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1192 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1197 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1198 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1201 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1202 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1205 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1207 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1208 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1211 audit_log_format(ab,
1212 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1213 context->ipc.qbytes,
1214 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1215 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1216 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1219 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1220 audit_log_format(ab,
1221 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1222 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1223 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1224 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1225 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1226 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1227 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1229 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1230 audit_log_format(ab,
1231 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1232 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1233 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1234 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1235 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1236 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1237 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1239 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1240 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1241 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1242 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1244 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1245 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1246 audit_log_format(ab,
1247 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1249 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1250 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1251 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1253 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1254 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1255 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1256 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1257 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1260 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1261 context->mmap.flags);
1263 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1264 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1270 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1272 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1273 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1276 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1277 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1278 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1282 static void audit_log_proctitle(struct task_struct *tsk,
1283 struct audit_context *context)
1287 char *msg = "(null)";
1288 int len = strlen(msg);
1289 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1291 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1293 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1295 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1298 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1299 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1302 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1303 res = get_cmdline(tsk, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1308 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1313 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1314 context->proctitle.len = res;
1316 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1317 len = context->proctitle.len;
1319 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1323 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1325 int i, call_panic = 0;
1326 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1327 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1328 struct audit_names *n;
1330 /* tsk == current */
1331 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1333 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1335 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1336 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1337 context->arch, context->major);
1338 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1339 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1340 if (context->return_valid)
1341 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1342 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1343 context->return_code);
1345 audit_log_format(ab,
1346 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1351 context->name_count);
1353 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1354 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1357 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1359 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1361 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1363 switch (aux->type) {
1365 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1366 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1367 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1368 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1369 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1370 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1371 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1372 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1373 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1374 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1375 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1376 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1384 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1386 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1387 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1389 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1390 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1395 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1396 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1398 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1399 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1400 context->sockaddr_len);
1405 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1406 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1408 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1409 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1410 axs->target_auid[i],
1412 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1414 axs->target_comm[i]))
1418 if (context->target_pid &&
1419 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1420 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1421 context->target_sessionid,
1422 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1425 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1426 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1428 audit_log_d_path(ab, " cwd=", &context->pwd);
1434 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1437 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1440 audit_log_proctitle(tsk, context);
1442 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1443 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1447 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1451 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1452 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1454 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1456 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1458 struct audit_context *context;
1460 context = audit_take_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1464 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1465 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1466 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1467 * in the context of the idle thread */
1468 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1469 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1470 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1471 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1472 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1474 audit_free_context(context);
1478 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1479 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1480 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1481 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1482 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1483 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1485 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1486 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1487 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1488 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1489 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1490 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1493 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1494 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1496 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1497 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1498 enum audit_state state;
1503 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1508 context->arch = syscall_get_arch();
1509 context->major = major;
1510 context->argv[0] = a1;
1511 context->argv[1] = a2;
1512 context->argv[2] = a3;
1513 context->argv[3] = a4;
1515 state = context->state;
1516 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1517 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1519 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1521 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1524 context->serial = 0;
1525 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1526 context->in_syscall = 1;
1527 context->current_state = state;
1532 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1533 * @success: success value of the syscall
1534 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
1536 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1537 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1538 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
1539 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1540 * free the names stored from getname().
1542 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1544 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1545 struct audit_context *context;
1548 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1550 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1552 context = audit_take_context(tsk, success, return_code);
1556 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1557 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1559 context->in_syscall = 0;
1560 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1562 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1563 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1565 audit_free_names(context);
1566 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1567 audit_free_aux(context);
1568 context->aux = NULL;
1569 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1570 context->target_pid = 0;
1571 context->target_sid = 0;
1572 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1574 context->fds[0] = -1;
1575 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1576 kfree(context->filterkey);
1577 context->filterkey = NULL;
1579 tsk->audit_context = context;
1582 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1584 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1585 struct audit_context *context;
1586 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1587 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1589 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1591 context = current->audit_context;
1593 count = context->tree_count;
1595 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1599 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1601 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1602 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1603 audit_set_auditable(context);
1604 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1605 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1608 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1612 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1614 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1615 struct audit_context *context;
1616 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1617 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1618 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1622 context = current->audit_context;
1624 count = context->tree_count;
1629 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1631 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
1632 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1633 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1634 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1636 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1642 parent = d->d_parent;
1647 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1650 /* just a race with rename */
1651 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1654 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1655 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1656 /* OK, got more space */
1657 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1661 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1662 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1663 audit_set_auditable(context);
1670 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
1673 struct audit_names *aname;
1675 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1676 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1677 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1679 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1682 aname->should_free = true;
1685 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
1687 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1689 context->name_count++;
1694 * audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
1695 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
1697 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
1698 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
1699 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
1702 __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
1704 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1705 struct audit_names *n;
1707 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1710 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
1719 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1720 * @name: name to add
1722 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1723 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1725 void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
1727 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1728 struct audit_names *n;
1730 if (!context->in_syscall)
1733 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1738 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1742 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1743 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1747 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
1748 * @name: name being audited
1749 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1750 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
1752 void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
1755 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1756 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1757 struct audit_names *n;
1758 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
1760 if (!context->in_syscall)
1767 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
1768 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
1773 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1774 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1777 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1782 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1784 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
1785 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
1786 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
1788 } else if (n->name) {
1789 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
1790 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
1793 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
1796 /* match the correct record type */
1798 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
1799 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1802 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
1808 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
1809 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
1819 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1820 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
1821 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
1824 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1825 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
1827 handle_path(dentry);
1828 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
1831 void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
1833 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
1837 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
1838 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
1839 * @dentry: dentry being audited
1840 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
1842 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
1843 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
1844 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
1845 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
1846 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
1847 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
1848 * unsuccessful attempts.
1850 void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
1851 const struct dentry *dentry,
1852 const unsigned char type)
1854 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1855 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1856 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
1857 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
1859 if (!context->in_syscall)
1865 /* look for a parent entry first */
1866 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1868 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
1869 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
1872 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
1873 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
1874 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
1875 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1876 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
1882 /* is there a matching child entry? */
1883 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1884 /* can only match entries that have a name */
1886 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
1889 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name->name) ||
1890 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
1892 found_parent->name_len :
1894 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
1901 if (!found_parent) {
1902 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
1903 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
1906 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
1910 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
1914 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
1915 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
1916 * audit_free_names() */
1918 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
1919 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1920 found_child->name->refcnt++;
1925 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
1927 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
1929 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
1932 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
1933 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
1934 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
1935 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
1937 * Also sets the context as auditable.
1939 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
1940 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
1942 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
1945 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
1946 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
1947 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
1948 *serial = ctx->serial;
1951 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
1956 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
1957 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
1959 static int audit_set_loginuid_perm(kuid_t loginuid)
1961 /* if we are unset, we don't need privs */
1962 if (!audit_loginuid_set(current))
1964 /* if AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE means never ever allow a change*/
1965 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE))
1967 /* it is set, you need permission */
1968 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
1970 /* reject if this is not an unset and we don't allow that */
1971 if (is_audit_feature_set(AUDIT_FEATURE_ONLY_UNSET_LOGINUID) && uid_valid(loginuid))
1976 static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,
1977 unsigned int oldsessionid, unsigned int sessionid,
1980 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1981 uid_t uid, oldloginuid, loginuid;
1982 struct tty_struct *tty;
1987 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
1991 uid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, task_uid(current));
1992 oldloginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, koldloginuid);
1993 loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, kloginuid),
1994 tty = audit_get_tty(current);
1996 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u", task_pid_nr(current), uid);
1997 audit_log_task_context(ab);
1998 audit_log_format(ab, " old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d",
1999 oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ? tty_name(tty) : "(none)",
2000 oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);
2006 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2007 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2011 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2013 int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)
2015 struct task_struct *task = current;
2016 unsigned int oldsessionid, sessionid = (unsigned int)-1;
2020 oldloginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2021 oldsessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2023 rc = audit_set_loginuid_perm(loginuid);
2027 /* are we setting or clearing? */
2028 if (uid_valid(loginuid))
2029 sessionid = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2031 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2032 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2034 audit_log_set_loginuid(oldloginuid, loginuid, oldsessionid, sessionid, rc);
2039 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2042 * @attr: queue attributes
2045 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2047 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2050 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2052 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2054 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2055 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2057 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2061 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2062 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2063 * @msg_len: Message length
2064 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2065 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2068 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2069 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2071 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2072 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2075 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2077 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2079 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2080 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2081 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2083 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2087 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2088 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2089 * @notification: Notification event
2093 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2095 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2098 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2100 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2102 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2103 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2107 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2108 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2112 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2114 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2115 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2116 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2117 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2121 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2122 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2125 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2127 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2128 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2129 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2130 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2131 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2132 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2133 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2137 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2138 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2139 * @uid: msgq user id
2140 * @gid: msgq group id
2141 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2143 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2145 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2147 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2149 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2150 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2151 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2152 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2153 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2156 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2158 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2160 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2161 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2166 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2167 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2171 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2173 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2175 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2177 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2178 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2179 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2184 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2185 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2186 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2189 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2191 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2192 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2193 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2197 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2198 * @len: data length in user space
2199 * @a: data address in kernel space
2201 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2203 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2205 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2207 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2208 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2211 context->sockaddr = p;
2214 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2215 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2219 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2221 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2223 context->target_pid = task_pid_nr(t);
2224 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2225 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2226 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2227 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2228 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2232 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2233 * @sig: signal value
2234 * @t: task being signaled
2236 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2237 * and uid that is doing that.
2239 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2241 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2242 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2243 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2244 kuid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2246 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2247 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2248 audit_sig_pid = task_pid_nr(tsk);
2249 if (uid_valid(tsk->loginuid))
2250 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2252 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2253 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2255 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2259 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2260 * in audit_context */
2261 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2262 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2263 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2264 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2265 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2266 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2267 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2271 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2272 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2273 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2277 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2278 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2279 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2281 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2283 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2284 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2285 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2286 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2287 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2288 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2295 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2296 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2297 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2298 * @old: the old credentials
2300 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2301 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2305 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2306 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2308 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2309 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2310 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2312 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2316 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2317 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2318 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2320 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2322 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2323 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2324 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2325 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2327 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2328 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2329 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2331 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2332 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2333 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2338 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2339 * @new: the new credentials
2340 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2342 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2343 * audit system if applicable
2345 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2347 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2348 context->capset.pid = task_pid_nr(current);
2349 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2350 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2351 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2352 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2355 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2357 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2358 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2359 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2360 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2363 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2367 unsigned int sessionid;
2368 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2370 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2371 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2372 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2374 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2375 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2376 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2377 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2379 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2380 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_pid_nr(current));
2381 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2382 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2386 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2387 * @signr: signal value
2389 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2390 * should record the event for investigation.
2392 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2394 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2399 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2402 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2406 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2410 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2412 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2414 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2418 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2419 signr, syscall_get_arch(), syscall,
2420 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2424 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2426 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2427 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2429 return &ctx->killed_trees;