1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/export.h>
52 #include <linux/slab.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
73 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
74 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
75 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
76 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
78 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
79 * for saving names from getname(). If we get more names we will allocate
80 * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */
83 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
84 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
86 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
87 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
89 /* number of audit rules */
92 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
95 struct audit_cap_data {
96 kernel_cap_t permitted;
97 kernel_cap_t inheritable;
99 unsigned int fE; /* effective bit of a file capability */
100 kernel_cap_t effective; /* effective set of a process */
104 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
105 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
106 * pointers at syscall exit time).
108 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
110 struct list_head list; /* audit_context->names_list */
119 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
120 unsigned int fcap_ver;
121 int name_len; /* number of name's characters to log */
122 bool name_put; /* call __putname() for this name */
124 * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of
125 * names allocated in the task audit context. Thus this name
126 * should be freed on syscall exit
131 struct audit_aux_data {
132 struct audit_aux_data *next;
136 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
138 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
139 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
141 struct audit_aux_data_execve {
142 struct audit_aux_data d;
145 struct mm_struct *mm;
148 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
149 struct audit_aux_data d;
150 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
151 uid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
152 uid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
153 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
154 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
155 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
159 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
160 struct audit_aux_data d;
161 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
162 unsigned int fcap_ver;
163 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
164 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
167 struct audit_aux_data_capset {
168 struct audit_aux_data d;
170 struct audit_cap_data cap;
173 struct audit_tree_refs {
174 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
175 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
178 /* The per-task audit context. */
179 struct audit_context {
180 int dummy; /* must be the first element */
181 int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
182 enum audit_state state, current_state;
183 unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */
184 int major; /* syscall number */
185 struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */
186 unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */
187 long return_code;/* syscall return code */
189 int return_valid; /* return code is valid */
191 * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this
192 * syscall. The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will
193 * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance
194 * reasons. Except during allocation they should never be referenced
195 * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used
196 * by running the names_list.
198 struct audit_names preallocated_names[AUDIT_NAMES];
199 int name_count; /* total records in names_list */
200 struct list_head names_list; /* anchor for struct audit_names->list */
201 char * filterkey; /* key for rule that triggered record */
203 struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */
204 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
205 struct audit_aux_data *aux_pids;
206 struct sockaddr_storage *sockaddr;
208 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
210 uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid;
211 gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid;
212 unsigned long personality;
218 unsigned int target_sessionid;
220 char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
222 struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
223 struct list_head killed_trees;
241 unsigned long qbytes;
245 struct mq_attr mqstat;
254 unsigned int msg_prio;
255 struct timespec abs_timeout;
264 struct audit_cap_data cap;
279 static inline int open_arg(int flags, int mask)
281 int n = ACC_MODE(flags);
282 if (flags & (O_TRUNC | O_CREAT))
283 n |= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE;
287 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
294 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
296 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
297 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
299 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
300 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
302 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
303 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
306 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
307 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
308 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
310 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
311 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
313 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
314 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
318 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
320 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
321 case 4: /* socketcall */
322 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
324 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
330 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
332 struct audit_names *n;
333 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
338 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
339 if ((n->ino != -1) &&
340 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
348 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
349 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
350 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
351 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
352 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
353 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
354 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
357 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
358 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
362 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
366 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
368 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
369 int left = ctx->tree_count;
371 p->c[--left] = chunk;
372 ctx->tree_count = left;
381 ctx->tree_count = 30;
387 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
389 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
390 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
396 p->next = ctx->trees;
398 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
399 ctx->tree_count = 31;
404 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
405 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
407 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
408 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
411 /* we started with empty chain */
412 p = ctx->first_trees;
414 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
419 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
421 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
425 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
426 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
430 ctx->tree_count = count;
434 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
436 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
437 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
443 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
445 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
446 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
451 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
452 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
453 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
458 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
459 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
466 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
467 const struct cred *cred,
468 struct audit_field *f,
469 struct audit_context *ctx,
470 struct audit_names *name)
472 struct audit_names *n;
475 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
477 return audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, name->uid);
479 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
480 if (audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, n->uid))
486 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
492 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
493 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
496 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
497 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
498 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
500 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
501 struct audit_krule *rule,
502 struct audit_context *ctx,
503 struct audit_names *name,
504 enum audit_state *state,
507 const struct cred *cred;
511 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
513 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
514 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
515 struct audit_names *n;
520 result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val);
525 ctx->ppid = sys_getppid();
526 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
530 result = audit_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->val);
533 result = audit_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->val);
536 result = audit_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->val);
539 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->val);
542 result = audit_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->val);
545 result = audit_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->val);
548 result = audit_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->val);
551 result = audit_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->val);
554 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
558 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
562 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid)
563 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
566 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) {
568 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
570 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
575 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
576 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
579 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
580 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
581 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
590 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
591 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
594 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
595 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
596 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
605 result = (name->ino == f->val);
607 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
608 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
617 result = audit_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->val);
619 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
620 if (audit_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->val)) {
629 result = audit_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->val);
631 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
632 if (audit_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->val)) {
641 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch, name->ino, name->dev);
645 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
650 result = audit_comparator(tsk->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
652 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
653 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
654 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
657 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
658 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
659 match for now to avoid losing information that
660 may be wanted. An error message will also be
664 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
667 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
676 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
677 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
678 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
681 /* Find files that match */
683 result = security_audit_rule_match(
684 name->osid, f->type, f->op,
687 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
688 if (security_audit_rule_match(n->osid, f->type,
696 /* Find ipc objects that match */
697 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
699 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
710 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
712 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
713 /* ignore this field for filtering */
717 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
720 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
722 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
723 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
731 if (rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
733 if (rule->filterkey) {
734 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
735 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
737 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
739 switch (rule->action) {
740 case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break;
741 case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break;
746 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
747 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
748 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
750 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
752 struct audit_entry *e;
753 enum audit_state state;
756 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
757 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
759 if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
760 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
766 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
769 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
770 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
771 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
772 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
774 static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
775 struct audit_context *ctx,
776 struct list_head *list)
778 struct audit_entry *e;
779 enum audit_state state;
781 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
782 return AUDIT_DISABLED;
785 if (!list_empty(list)) {
786 int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
787 int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
789 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
790 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
791 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
794 ctx->current_state = state;
800 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
804 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
805 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
807 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
808 struct audit_names *n,
809 struct audit_context *ctx) {
811 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
812 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
813 struct audit_entry *e;
814 enum audit_state state;
816 word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major);
817 bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major);
819 if (list_empty(list))
822 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
823 if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit &&
824 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
825 ctx->current_state = state;
833 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
834 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
835 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
836 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
838 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
840 struct audit_names *n;
842 if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid)
847 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
848 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
854 static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
858 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
862 context->return_valid = return_valid;
865 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
866 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
869 * This is actually a test for:
870 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
871 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
873 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
875 if (unlikely(return_code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
876 (return_code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
877 (return_code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
878 context->return_code = -EINTR;
880 context->return_code = return_code;
882 if (context->in_syscall && !context->dummy) {
883 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]);
884 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
887 tsk->audit_context = NULL;
891 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
893 struct audit_names *n, *next;
896 if (context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) {
897 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
898 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
899 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
901 context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall,
902 context->name_count, context->put_count,
904 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
905 printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
906 n->name, n->name ?: "(null)");
913 context->put_count = 0;
914 context->ino_count = 0;
917 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
919 if (n->name && n->name_put)
924 context->name_count = 0;
925 path_put(&context->pwd);
926 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
927 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
930 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
932 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
934 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
935 context->aux = aux->next;
938 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
939 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
944 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context,
945 enum audit_state state)
947 memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context));
948 context->state = state;
949 context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
952 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
954 struct audit_context *context;
956 if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL)))
958 audit_zero_context(context, state);
959 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
960 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
965 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
968 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
969 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
970 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
973 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
975 struct audit_context *context;
976 enum audit_state state;
979 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
980 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
982 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
983 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
986 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
988 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
991 context->filterkey = key;
993 tsk->audit_context = context;
994 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT);
998 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
1000 struct audit_context *previous;
1004 previous = context->previous;
1005 if (previous || (count && count < 10)) {
1007 printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
1008 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
1009 context->serial, context->major,
1010 context->name_count, count);
1012 audit_free_names(context);
1013 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1014 free_tree_refs(context);
1015 audit_free_aux(context);
1016 kfree(context->filterkey);
1017 kfree(context->sockaddr);
1022 printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
1025 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
1032 security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
1036 error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
1038 if (error != -EINVAL)
1043 audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
1044 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1048 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
1052 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context);
1054 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
1056 char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
1057 struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
1058 struct vm_area_struct *vma;
1060 /* tsk == current */
1062 get_task_comm(name, tsk);
1063 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
1064 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
1067 down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
1070 if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
1072 audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
1073 &vma->vm_file->f_path);
1078 up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
1080 audit_log_task_context(ab);
1083 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
1084 uid_t auid, uid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
1085 u32 sid, char *comm)
1087 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1092 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
1096 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid, auid,
1098 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
1099 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1102 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1103 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1105 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1106 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1113 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1114 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1115 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1117 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1118 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1119 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1120 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1121 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1123 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context *context,
1124 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1127 const char __user *p,
1130 char arg_num_len_buf[12];
1131 const char __user *tmp_p = p;
1132 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1133 size_t arg_num_len = snprintf(arg_num_len_buf, 12, "%d", arg_num) + 5;
1134 size_t len, len_left, to_send;
1135 size_t max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1136 unsigned int i, has_cntl = 0, too_long = 0;
1139 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1140 len_left = len = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1143 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1144 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1145 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1148 if (unlikely((len == -1) || len > MAX_ARG_STRLEN - 1)) {
1150 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1154 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1156 if (len_left > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN)
1157 to_send = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1160 ret = copy_from_user(buf, tmp_p, to_send);
1162 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1163 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1168 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1171 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1172 has_cntl = audit_string_contains_control(buf, to_send);
1175 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1176 * send half as much in each message
1178 max_execve_audit_len = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN / 2;
1181 len_left -= to_send;
1183 } while (len_left > 0);
1187 if (len > max_execve_audit_len)
1190 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1191 for (i = 0; len_left > 0; i++) {
1194 if (len_left > max_execve_audit_len)
1195 to_send = max_execve_audit_len;
1199 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1200 room_left = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN - arg_num_len - *len_sent;
1202 room_left -= (to_send * 2);
1204 room_left -= to_send;
1205 if (room_left < 0) {
1208 *ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1214 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1215 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1217 if ((i == 0) && (too_long))
1218 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num,
1219 has_cntl ? 2*len : len);
1222 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1223 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1224 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1226 if (len >= max_execve_audit_len)
1227 ret = copy_from_user(buf, p, to_send);
1232 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1235 buf[to_send] = '\0';
1237 /* actually log it */
1238 audit_log_format(*ab, " a%d", arg_num);
1240 audit_log_format(*ab, "[%d]", i);
1241 audit_log_format(*ab, "=");
1243 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, to_send);
1245 audit_log_string(*ab, buf);
1248 len_left -= to_send;
1249 *len_sent += arg_num_len;
1251 *len_sent += to_send * 2;
1253 *len_sent += to_send;
1255 /* include the null we didn't log */
1259 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1260 struct audit_buffer **ab,
1261 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi)
1264 size_t len, len_sent = 0;
1265 const char __user *p;
1268 if (axi->mm != current->mm)
1269 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1271 p = (const char __user *)axi->mm->arg_start;
1273 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", axi->argc);
1276 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1277 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1278 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1279 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1281 buf = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1283 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1287 for (i = 0; i < axi->argc; i++) {
1288 len = audit_log_single_execve_arg(context, ab, i,
1297 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix, kernel_cap_t *cap)
1301 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1302 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
1303 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S-1) - i]);
1307 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1309 kernel_cap_t *perm = &name->fcap.permitted;
1310 kernel_cap_t *inh = &name->fcap.inheritable;
1313 if (!cap_isclear(*perm)) {
1314 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", perm);
1317 if (!cap_isclear(*inh)) {
1318 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", inh);
1323 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver);
1326 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1328 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1331 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1335 switch (context->type) {
1336 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1337 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1338 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1339 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1340 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1341 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1344 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1346 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1347 context->ipc.uid, context->ipc.gid, context->ipc.mode);
1351 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1352 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1355 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1356 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1359 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1361 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1362 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1363 audit_log_format(ab,
1364 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1365 context->ipc.qbytes,
1366 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1367 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1368 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1373 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN: {
1374 audit_log_format(ab,
1375 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1376 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1377 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1378 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1379 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1380 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1381 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1383 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV: {
1384 audit_log_format(ab,
1385 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1386 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1387 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1388 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1389 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1390 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1391 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1393 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY: {
1394 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1395 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1396 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1398 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1399 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1400 audit_log_format(ab,
1401 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1403 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1404 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1405 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1407 case AUDIT_CAPSET: {
1408 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1409 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1410 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1411 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1414 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1415 context->mmap.flags);
1421 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1422 int record_num, int *call_panic)
1424 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1425 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1427 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1429 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1432 switch (n->name_len) {
1433 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1434 /* log the full path */
1435 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1436 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name);
1439 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1440 * directory component is the cwd */
1441 audit_log_d_path(ab, "name=", &context->pwd);
1444 /* log the name's directory component */
1445 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1446 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name,
1450 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1452 if (n->ino != (unsigned long)-1) {
1453 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu"
1454 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
1455 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1468 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1469 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1470 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1473 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1474 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1478 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1483 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
1485 const struct cred *cred;
1486 int i, call_panic = 0;
1487 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1488 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1490 struct audit_names *n;
1492 /* tsk == current */
1493 context->pid = tsk->pid;
1495 context->ppid = sys_getppid();
1496 cred = current_cred();
1497 context->uid = cred->uid;
1498 context->gid = cred->gid;
1499 context->euid = cred->euid;
1500 context->suid = cred->suid;
1501 context->fsuid = cred->fsuid;
1502 context->egid = cred->egid;
1503 context->sgid = cred->sgid;
1504 context->fsgid = cred->fsgid;
1505 context->personality = tsk->personality;
1507 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1509 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1510 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1511 context->arch, context->major);
1512 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1513 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1514 if (context->return_valid)
1515 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1516 (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
1517 context->return_code);
1519 spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1520 if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
1521 tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
1524 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
1526 audit_log_format(ab,
1527 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1528 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1529 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1530 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1535 context->name_count,
1541 context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
1542 context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty,
1546 audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
1547 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1550 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1552 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1554 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1556 switch (aux->type) {
1558 case AUDIT_EXECVE: {
1559 struct audit_aux_data_execve *axi = (void *)aux;
1560 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab, axi);
1563 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1564 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1565 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1566 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1567 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1568 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1569 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1570 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1571 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1572 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1573 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1574 audit_log_cap(ab, "new_pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1582 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1584 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1585 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1587 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1588 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1593 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1594 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1596 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1597 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1598 context->sockaddr_len);
1603 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1604 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1606 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1607 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1608 axs->target_auid[i],
1610 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1612 axs->target_comm[i]))
1616 if (context->target_pid &&
1617 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1618 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1619 context->target_sessionid,
1620 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1623 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1624 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1626 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1632 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
1633 audit_log_name(context, n, i++, &call_panic);
1635 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1636 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1640 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1644 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1645 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1647 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1649 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1651 struct audit_context *context;
1653 context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
1657 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1658 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1659 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1660 * in the context of the idle thread */
1661 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1662 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1663 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1664 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1665 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1667 audit_free_context(context);
1671 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1672 * @arch: architecture type
1673 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1674 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1675 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1676 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1677 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1679 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1680 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1681 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1682 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1683 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1684 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1687 void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
1688 unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1689 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1691 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1692 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1693 enum audit_state state;
1699 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1700 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1701 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1702 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1703 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1707 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1709 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1710 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1712 if (context->in_syscall) {
1713 struct audit_context *newctx;
1717 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1718 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1719 context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major);
1721 newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state);
1723 newctx->previous = context;
1725 tsk->audit_context = newctx;
1727 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1728 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1729 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1730 * to abandon auditing. */
1731 audit_zero_context(context, context->state);
1734 BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count);
1739 context->arch = arch;
1740 context->major = major;
1741 context->argv[0] = a1;
1742 context->argv[1] = a2;
1743 context->argv[2] = a3;
1744 context->argv[3] = a4;
1746 state = context->state;
1747 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1748 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) {
1750 state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]);
1752 if (state == AUDIT_DISABLED)
1755 context->serial = 0;
1756 context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME;
1757 context->in_syscall = 1;
1758 context->current_state = state;
1763 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1764 * @pt_regs: syscall registers
1766 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1767 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1768 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1769 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1770 * free the names stored from getname().
1772 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
1774 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
1775 struct audit_context *context;
1778 success = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
1780 success = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
1782 context = audit_get_context(tsk, success, return_code);
1786 if (context->in_syscall && context->current_state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT)
1787 audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
1789 context->in_syscall = 0;
1790 context->prio = context->state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
1792 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1793 audit_kill_trees(&context->killed_trees);
1795 if (context->previous) {
1796 struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous;
1797 context->previous = NULL;
1798 audit_free_context(context);
1799 tsk->audit_context = new_context;
1801 audit_free_names(context);
1802 unroll_tree_refs(context, NULL, 0);
1803 audit_free_aux(context);
1804 context->aux = NULL;
1805 context->aux_pids = NULL;
1806 context->target_pid = 0;
1807 context->target_sid = 0;
1808 context->sockaddr_len = 0;
1810 context->fds[0] = -1;
1811 if (context->state != AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) {
1812 kfree(context->filterkey);
1813 context->filterkey = NULL;
1815 tsk->audit_context = context;
1819 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
1821 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1822 struct audit_context *context;
1823 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1824 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1826 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks)))
1828 context = current->audit_context;
1830 count = context->tree_count;
1832 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1836 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
1838 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
1839 printk(KERN_WARNING "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1840 audit_set_auditable(context);
1841 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
1842 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1845 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
1849 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
1851 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1852 struct audit_context *context;
1853 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
1854 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
1855 struct audit_chunk *drop;
1859 context = current->audit_context;
1861 count = context->tree_count;
1866 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
1868 struct inode *inode = d->d_inode;
1869 if (inode && unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode->i_fsnotify_marks))) {
1870 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
1871 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
1873 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
1879 parent = d->d_parent;
1884 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
1887 /* just a race with rename */
1888 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1891 audit_put_chunk(drop);
1892 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
1893 /* OK, got more space */
1894 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1899 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1900 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
1901 audit_set_auditable(context);
1908 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context)
1910 struct audit_names *aname;
1912 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
1913 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
1914 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
1916 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
1919 aname->should_free = true;
1922 aname->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
1923 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
1925 context->name_count++;
1927 context->ino_count++;
1933 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1934 * @name: name to add
1936 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1937 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1939 void __audit_getname(const char *name)
1941 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1942 struct audit_names *n;
1944 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1945 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1946 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1947 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1953 n = audit_alloc_name(context);
1958 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
1961 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
1962 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
1965 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1966 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1968 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1969 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1970 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1972 void audit_putname(const char *name)
1974 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
1977 if (!context->in_syscall) {
1978 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1979 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1980 __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name);
1981 if (context->name_count) {
1982 struct audit_names *n;
1985 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list)
1986 printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i,
1987 n->name, n->name ?: "(null)");
1994 ++context->put_count;
1995 if (context->put_count > context->name_count) {
1996 printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1997 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
2000 context->serial, context->major,
2001 context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count,
2002 context->put_count);
2009 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
2011 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
2017 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &caps);
2021 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
2022 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
2023 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2024 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2030 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
2031 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
2032 const struct inode *inode)
2034 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
2035 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
2036 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
2037 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
2038 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
2039 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
2040 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
2041 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
2045 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
2046 * @name: name being audited
2047 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2049 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
2051 void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct dentry *dentry)
2053 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2054 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2055 struct audit_names *n;
2057 if (!context->in_syscall)
2060 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2061 if (n->name && (n->name == name))
2065 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname() */
2066 n = audit_alloc_name(context);
2070 handle_path(dentry);
2071 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode);
2075 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2076 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2077 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2079 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2080 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2081 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2082 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2083 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2084 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2085 * unsuccessful attempts.
2087 void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry *dentry,
2088 const struct inode *parent)
2090 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2091 const char *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2092 const struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2093 const char *dname = dentry->d_name.name;
2094 struct audit_names *n;
2097 if (!context->in_syscall)
2103 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2104 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2108 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino &&
2109 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2110 n->name_len = dirlen; /* update parent data in place */
2111 found_parent = n->name;
2116 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2117 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2121 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2122 if (!strcmp(dname, n->name) ||
2123 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name, &dirlen)) {
2125 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
2127 n->ino = (unsigned long)-1;
2128 found_child = n->name;
2134 if (!found_parent) {
2135 n = audit_alloc_name(context);
2138 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
2142 n = audit_alloc_name(context);
2146 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2147 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2148 * audit_free_names() */
2150 n->name = found_parent;
2151 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2152 /* don't call __putname() */
2153 n->name_put = false;
2157 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, inode);
2160 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2163 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2164 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2165 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2166 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2168 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2170 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2171 struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial)
2173 if (!ctx->in_syscall)
2176 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2177 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2178 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2179 *serial = ctx->serial;
2182 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT;
2187 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2188 static atomic_t session_id = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2191 * audit_set_loginuid - set current task's audit_context loginuid
2192 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2196 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2198 int audit_set_loginuid(uid_t loginuid)
2200 struct task_struct *task = current;
2201 struct audit_context *context = task->audit_context;
2202 unsigned int sessionid;
2204 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE
2205 if (task->loginuid != -1)
2207 #else /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
2208 if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
2210 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE */
2212 sessionid = atomic_inc_return(&session_id);
2213 if (context && context->in_syscall) {
2214 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2216 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN);
2218 audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2219 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2220 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2221 task->pid, task_uid(task),
2222 task->loginuid, loginuid,
2223 task->sessionid, sessionid);
2227 task->sessionid = sessionid;
2228 task->loginuid = loginuid;
2233 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2236 * @attr: queue attributes
2239 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2241 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2244 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2246 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2248 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2249 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2251 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2255 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2256 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2257 * @msg_len: Message length
2258 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2259 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2262 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2263 const struct timespec *abs_timeout)
2265 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2266 struct timespec *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2269 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(struct timespec));
2271 memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct timespec));
2273 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2274 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2275 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2277 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2281 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2282 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2283 * @notification: Notification event
2287 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2289 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2292 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2294 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2296 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2297 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2301 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2302 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2306 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2308 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2309 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2310 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2311 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2315 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2316 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2319 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2321 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2322 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2323 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2324 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2325 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2326 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2327 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2331 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2332 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2333 * @uid: msgq user id
2334 * @gid: msgq group id
2335 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2337 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2339 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2341 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2343 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2344 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2345 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2346 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2347 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2350 int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2352 struct audit_aux_data_execve *ax;
2353 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2355 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2359 ax->argc = bprm->argc;
2360 ax->envc = bprm->envc;
2362 ax->d.type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2363 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2364 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2370 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2371 * @nargs: number of args
2375 void __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2377 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2379 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2380 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2381 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2385 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2386 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2387 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2390 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2392 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2393 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2394 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2398 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2399 * @len: data length in user space
2400 * @a: data address in kernel space
2402 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2404 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2406 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2408 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2409 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2412 context->sockaddr = p;
2415 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2416 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2420 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2422 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2424 context->target_pid = t->pid;
2425 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2426 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2427 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2428 security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
2429 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2433 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2434 * @sig: signal value
2435 * @t: task being signaled
2437 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2438 * and uid that is doing that.
2440 int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
2442 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2443 struct task_struct *tsk = current;
2444 struct audit_context *ctx = tsk->audit_context;
2445 uid_t uid = current_uid(), t_uid = task_uid(t);
2447 if (audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid) {
2448 if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP || sig == SIGUSR1 || sig == SIGUSR2) {
2449 audit_sig_pid = tsk->pid;
2450 if (tsk->loginuid != -1)
2451 audit_sig_uid = tsk->loginuid;
2453 audit_sig_uid = uid;
2454 security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
2456 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2460 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2461 * in audit_context */
2462 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2463 ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
2464 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2465 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2466 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2467 security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2468 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2472 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2473 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2474 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2478 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2479 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2480 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2482 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2484 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
2485 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2486 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2487 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2488 security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2489 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2496 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2497 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2498 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2499 * @old: the old credentials
2501 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2502 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2506 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2507 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2509 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2510 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2511 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2512 struct dentry *dentry;
2514 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2518 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2519 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2520 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2522 dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry);
2523 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps);
2526 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2527 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2528 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2529 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2531 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2532 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2533 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2535 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2536 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2537 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2542 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2543 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2544 * @new: the new credentials
2545 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2547 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2548 * audit system if applicable
2550 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid,
2551 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2553 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2554 context->capset.pid = pid;
2555 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2556 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2557 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2558 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2561 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2563 struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
2564 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2565 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2566 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2569 static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr)
2573 unsigned int sessionid;
2575 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2576 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2577 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2579 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2580 auid, uid, gid, sessionid);
2581 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2582 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
2583 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
2584 audit_log_format(ab, " reason=");
2585 audit_log_string(ab, reason);
2586 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
2589 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2590 * @signr: signal value
2592 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2593 * should record the event for investigation.
2595 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2597 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2602 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2605 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2606 audit_log_abend(ab, "memory violation", signr);
2610 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall)
2612 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2614 ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2615 audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", SIGKILL);
2616 audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
2620 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2622 struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context;
2623 if (likely(!ctx || !ctx->in_syscall))
2625 return &ctx->killed_trees;