1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
2 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
3 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
5 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
6 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
7 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
10 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
12 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
13 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
15 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
16 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
17 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
19 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
22 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
23 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
25 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
26 * filesystem information.
28 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
29 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
32 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
34 #include <linux/init.h>
35 #include <asm/types.h>
36 #include <linux/atomic.h>
38 #include <linux/namei.h>
40 #include <linux/export.h>
41 #include <linux/slab.h>
42 #include <linux/mount.h>
43 #include <linux/socket.h>
44 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
45 #include <linux/audit.h>
46 #include <linux/personality.h>
47 #include <linux/time.h>
48 #include <linux/netlink.h>
49 #include <linux/compiler.h>
50 #include <asm/unistd.h>
51 #include <linux/security.h>
52 #include <linux/list.h>
53 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
54 #include <linux/highmem.h>
55 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
56 #include <asm/syscall.h>
57 #include <linux/capability.h>
58 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
59 #include <linux/compat.h>
60 #include <linux/ctype.h>
61 #include <linux/string.h>
62 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
63 #include <linux/fsnotify_backend.h>
64 #include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
65 #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
66 #include <uapi/linux/openat2.h> // struct open_how
70 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
71 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
72 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
73 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
75 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits),
76 * see the note near the top of audit_log_execve_info() about this value */
77 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
79 /* max length to print of cmdline/proctitle value during audit */
80 #define MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN 128
82 /* number of audit rules */
85 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
88 struct audit_aux_data {
89 struct audit_aux_data *next;
93 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
94 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
96 struct audit_aux_data_pids {
97 struct audit_aux_data d;
98 pid_t target_pid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
99 kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
100 kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
101 unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
102 u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS];
103 char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS][TASK_COMM_LEN];
107 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps {
108 struct audit_aux_data d;
109 struct audit_cap_data fcap;
110 unsigned int fcap_ver;
111 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap;
112 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap;
115 struct audit_tree_refs {
116 struct audit_tree_refs *next;
117 struct audit_chunk *c[31];
120 struct audit_nfcfgop_tab {
121 enum audit_nfcfgop op;
125 static const struct audit_nfcfgop_tab audit_nfcfgs[] = {
126 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REGISTER, "xt_register" },
127 { AUDIT_XT_OP_REPLACE, "xt_replace" },
128 { AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER, "xt_unregister" },
129 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_table" },
130 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_table" },
131 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER, "nft_register_chain" },
132 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_chain" },
133 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER, "nft_register_rule" },
134 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_rule" },
135 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER, "nft_register_set" },
136 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_set" },
137 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER, "nft_register_setelem" },
138 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_setelem" },
139 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER, "nft_register_gen" },
140 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER, "nft_register_obj" },
141 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_obj" },
142 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET, "nft_reset_obj" },
143 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER, "nft_register_flowtable" },
144 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER, "nft_unregister_flowtable" },
145 { AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID, "nft_invalid" },
148 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context *ctx, int mask)
156 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx->arch, n)) {
158 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
159 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE, n))
161 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
162 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ, n))
164 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
165 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR, n))
168 case AUDITSC_COMPAT: /* 32bit on biarch */
169 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) &&
170 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32, n))
172 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_READ) &&
173 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32, n))
175 if ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_ATTR) &&
176 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32, n))
180 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[1]);
182 return mask & ACC_MODE(ctx->argv[2]);
183 case AUDITSC_SOCKETCALL:
184 return ((mask & AUDIT_PERM_WRITE) && ctx->argv[0] == SYS_BIND);
186 return mask & AUDIT_PERM_EXEC;
187 case AUDITSC_OPENAT2:
188 return mask & ACC_MODE((u32)ctx->openat2.flags);
194 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context *ctx, int val)
196 struct audit_names *n;
197 umode_t mode = (umode_t)val;
202 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
203 if ((n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET) &&
204 ((n->mode & S_IFMT) == mode))
212 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
213 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
214 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
215 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
216 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
217 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
218 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
221 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context *ctx)
225 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
229 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_chunk *chunk)
231 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
232 int left = ctx->tree_count;
235 p->c[--left] = chunk;
236 ctx->tree_count = left;
245 ctx->tree_count = 30;
251 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
253 struct audit_tree_refs *p = ctx->trees;
255 ctx->trees = kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs), GFP_KERNEL);
261 p->next = ctx->trees;
263 ctx->first_trees = ctx->trees;
264 ctx->tree_count = 31;
268 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx,
269 struct audit_tree_refs *p, int count)
271 struct audit_tree_refs *q;
275 /* we started with empty chain */
276 p = ctx->first_trees;
278 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
283 for (q = p; q != ctx->trees; q = q->next, n = 31) {
285 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
289 while (n-- > ctx->tree_count) {
290 audit_put_chunk(q->c[n]);
294 ctx->tree_count = count;
297 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx)
299 struct audit_tree_refs *p, *q;
301 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p; p = q) {
307 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context *ctx, struct audit_tree *tree)
309 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
315 for (p = ctx->first_trees; p != ctx->trees; p = p->next) {
316 for (n = 0; n < 31; n++)
317 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
322 for (n = ctx->tree_count; n < 31; n++)
323 if (audit_tree_match(p->c[n], tree))
329 static int audit_compare_uid(kuid_t uid,
330 struct audit_names *name,
331 struct audit_field *f,
332 struct audit_context *ctx)
334 struct audit_names *n;
338 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, name->uid);
344 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
345 rc = audit_uid_comparator(uid, f->op, n->uid);
353 static int audit_compare_gid(kgid_t gid,
354 struct audit_names *name,
355 struct audit_field *f,
356 struct audit_context *ctx)
358 struct audit_names *n;
362 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, name->gid);
368 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
369 rc = audit_gid_comparator(gid, f->op, n->gid);
377 static int audit_field_compare(struct task_struct *tsk,
378 const struct cred *cred,
379 struct audit_field *f,
380 struct audit_context *ctx,
381 struct audit_names *name)
384 /* process to file object comparisons */
385 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID:
386 return audit_compare_uid(cred->uid, name, f, ctx);
387 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_OBJ_GID:
388 return audit_compare_gid(cred->gid, name, f, ctx);
389 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
390 return audit_compare_uid(cred->euid, name, f, ctx);
391 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
392 return audit_compare_gid(cred->egid, name, f, ctx);
393 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
394 return audit_compare_uid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), name, f, ctx);
395 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
396 return audit_compare_uid(cred->suid, name, f, ctx);
397 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
398 return audit_compare_gid(cred->sgid, name, f, ctx);
399 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSUID_TO_OBJ_UID:
400 return audit_compare_uid(cred->fsuid, name, f, ctx);
401 case AUDIT_COMPARE_FSGID_TO_OBJ_GID:
402 return audit_compare_gid(cred->fsgid, name, f, ctx);
403 /* uid comparisons */
404 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_AUID:
405 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op,
406 audit_get_loginuid(tsk));
407 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_EUID:
408 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->euid);
409 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_SUID:
410 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->suid);
411 case AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_FSUID:
412 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
413 /* auid comparisons */
414 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_EUID:
415 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
417 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_SUID:
418 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
420 case AUDIT_COMPARE_AUID_TO_FSUID:
421 return audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk), f->op,
423 /* euid comparisons */
424 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_SUID:
425 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->suid);
426 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EUID_TO_FSUID:
427 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
428 /* suid comparisons */
429 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SUID_TO_FSUID:
430 return audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, cred->fsuid);
431 /* gid comparisons */
432 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_EGID:
433 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->egid);
434 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_SGID:
435 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->sgid);
436 case AUDIT_COMPARE_GID_TO_FSGID:
437 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
438 /* egid comparisons */
439 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_SGID:
440 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->sgid);
441 case AUDIT_COMPARE_EGID_TO_FSGID:
442 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
443 /* sgid comparison */
444 case AUDIT_COMPARE_SGID_TO_FSGID:
445 return audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, cred->fsgid);
447 WARN(1, "Missing AUDIT_COMPARE define. Report as a bug\n");
453 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
454 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
457 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
458 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
459 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
461 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
462 struct audit_krule *rule,
463 struct audit_context *ctx,
464 struct audit_names *name,
465 enum audit_state *state,
468 const struct cred *cred;
471 unsigned int sessionid;
473 if (ctx && rule->prio <= ctx->prio)
476 cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
478 for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
479 struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
480 struct audit_names *n;
486 pid = task_tgid_nr(tsk);
487 result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val);
492 ctx->ppid = task_ppid_nr(tsk);
493 result = audit_comparator(ctx->ppid, f->op, f->val);
497 result = audit_exe_compare(tsk, rule->exe);
498 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
502 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->uid, f->op, f->uid);
505 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->euid, f->op, f->uid);
508 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->suid, f->op, f->uid);
511 result = audit_uid_comparator(cred->fsuid, f->op, f->uid);
514 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->gid, f->op, f->gid);
515 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
517 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
518 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
520 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
524 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->egid, f->op, f->gid);
525 if (f->op == Audit_equal) {
527 result = groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
528 } else if (f->op == Audit_not_equal) {
530 result = !groups_search(cred->group_info, f->gid);
534 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->sgid, f->op, f->gid);
537 result = audit_gid_comparator(cred->fsgid, f->op, f->gid);
539 case AUDIT_SESSIONID:
540 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(tsk);
541 result = audit_comparator(sessionid, f->op, f->val);
544 result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val);
548 result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val);
552 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
553 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val);
556 if (ctx && ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID) {
558 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS);
560 result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE);
565 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
566 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
569 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
570 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
571 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
580 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
581 audit_comparator(MINOR(name->rdev), f->op, f->val))
584 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
585 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n->dev), f->op, f->val) ||
586 audit_comparator(MINOR(n->rdev), f->op, f->val)) {
595 result = audit_comparator(name->ino, f->op, f->val);
597 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
598 if (audit_comparator(n->ino, f->op, f->val)) {
607 result = audit_uid_comparator(name->uid, f->op, f->uid);
609 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
610 if (audit_uid_comparator(n->uid, f->op, f->uid)) {
619 result = audit_gid_comparator(name->gid, f->op, f->gid);
621 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
622 if (audit_gid_comparator(n->gid, f->op, f->gid)) {
631 result = audit_watch_compare(rule->watch,
634 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
640 result = match_tree_refs(ctx, rule->tree);
641 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
646 result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(tsk),
649 case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET:
650 result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(tsk), f->op, f->val);
652 case AUDIT_SADDR_FAM:
653 if (ctx && ctx->sockaddr)
654 result = audit_comparator(ctx->sockaddr->ss_family,
657 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
658 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
659 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
662 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
663 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
664 match for now to avoid losing information that
665 may be wanted. An error message will also be
669 /* @tsk should always be equal to
670 * @current with the exception of
671 * fork()/copy_process() in which case
672 * the new @tsk creds are still a dup
673 * of @current's creds so we can still
674 * use security_current_getsecid_subj()
675 * here even though it always refs
678 security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
681 result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
689 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
690 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
691 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
694 /* Find files that match */
696 result = security_audit_rule_match(
702 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
703 if (security_audit_rule_match(
713 /* Find ipc objects that match */
714 if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
716 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
727 result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val);
729 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
730 /* ignore this field for filtering */
734 result = audit_match_perm(ctx, f->val);
735 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
739 result = audit_match_filetype(ctx, f->val);
740 if (f->op == Audit_not_equal)
743 case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE:
744 result = audit_field_compare(tsk, cred, f, ctx, name);
752 if (rule->filterkey) {
753 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
754 ctx->filterkey = kstrdup(rule->filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
756 ctx->prio = rule->prio;
758 switch (rule->action) {
760 *state = AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED;
763 *state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
769 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
770 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
771 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
773 static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
775 struct audit_entry *e;
776 enum audit_state state;
779 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) {
780 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, NULL,
782 if (state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
783 *key = kstrdup(e->rule.filterkey, GFP_ATOMIC);
789 return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD;
792 static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
796 if (val > 0xffffffff)
799 word = AUDIT_WORD(val);
800 if (word >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE)
803 bit = AUDIT_BIT(val);
805 return rule->mask[word] & bit;
809 * audit_filter_uring - apply filters to an io_uring operation
810 * @tsk: associated task
811 * @ctx: audit context
813 static void audit_filter_uring(struct task_struct *tsk,
814 struct audit_context *ctx)
816 struct audit_entry *e;
817 enum audit_state state;
819 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
823 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_URING_EXIT],
825 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->uring_op) &&
826 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL, &state,
829 ctx->current_state = state;
836 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is
837 * not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not
838 * high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record
839 * (i.e., the state is AUDIT_STATE_BUILD).
841 static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
842 struct audit_context *ctx)
844 struct audit_entry *e;
845 enum audit_state state;
847 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
851 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT], list) {
852 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
853 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
856 ctx->current_state = state;
865 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
866 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
868 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct *tsk,
869 struct audit_names *n,
870 struct audit_context *ctx) {
871 int h = audit_hash_ino((u32)n->ino);
872 struct list_head *list = &audit_inode_hash[h];
873 struct audit_entry *e;
874 enum audit_state state;
876 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
877 if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
878 audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, n, &state, false)) {
879 ctx->current_state = state;
886 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
887 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
888 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
889 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
891 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk, struct audit_context *ctx)
893 struct audit_names *n;
895 if (auditd_test_task(tsk))
900 list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
901 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk, n, ctx))
907 static inline void audit_proctitle_free(struct audit_context *context)
909 kfree(context->proctitle.value);
910 context->proctitle.value = NULL;
911 context->proctitle.len = 0;
914 static inline void audit_free_module(struct audit_context *context)
916 if (context->type == AUDIT_KERN_MODULE) {
917 kfree(context->module.name);
918 context->module.name = NULL;
921 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
923 struct audit_names *n, *next;
925 list_for_each_entry_safe(n, next, &context->names_list, list) {
932 context->name_count = 0;
933 path_put(&context->pwd);
934 context->pwd.dentry = NULL;
935 context->pwd.mnt = NULL;
938 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
940 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
942 while ((aux = context->aux)) {
943 context->aux = aux->next;
947 while ((aux = context->aux_pids)) {
948 context->aux_pids = aux->next;
951 context->aux_pids = NULL;
955 * audit_reset_context - reset a audit_context structure
956 * @ctx: the audit_context to reset
958 * All fields in the audit_context will be reset to an initial state, all
959 * references held by fields will be dropped, and private memory will be
960 * released. When this function returns the audit_context will be suitable
961 * for reuse, so long as the passed context is not NULL or a dummy context.
963 static void audit_reset_context(struct audit_context *ctx)
968 /* if ctx is non-null, reset the "ctx->state" regardless */
969 ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED;
974 * NOTE: It shouldn't matter in what order we release the fields, so
975 * release them in the order in which they appear in the struct;
976 * this gives us some hope of quickly making sure we are
977 * resetting the audit_context properly.
979 * Other things worth mentioning:
980 * - we don't reset "dummy"
981 * - we don't reset "state", we do reset "current_state"
982 * - we preserve "filterkey" if "state" is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD
983 * - much of this is likely overkill, but play it safe for now
984 * - we really need to work on improving the audit_context struct
987 ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
991 ctx->ctime = (struct timespec64){ .tv_sec = 0, .tv_nsec = 0 };
992 memset(ctx->argv, 0, sizeof(ctx->argv));
993 ctx->return_code = 0;
994 ctx->prio = (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0);
995 ctx->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
996 audit_free_names(ctx);
997 if (ctx->state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD) {
998 kfree(ctx->filterkey);
999 ctx->filterkey = NULL;
1001 audit_free_aux(ctx);
1002 kfree(ctx->sockaddr);
1003 ctx->sockaddr = NULL;
1004 ctx->sockaddr_len = 0;
1005 ctx->pid = ctx->ppid = 0;
1006 ctx->uid = ctx->euid = ctx->suid = ctx->fsuid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
1007 ctx->gid = ctx->egid = ctx->sgid = ctx->fsgid = KGIDT_INIT(0);
1008 ctx->personality = 0;
1010 ctx->target_pid = 0;
1011 ctx->target_auid = ctx->target_uid = KUIDT_INIT(0);
1012 ctx->target_sessionid = 0;
1013 ctx->target_sid = 0;
1014 ctx->target_comm[0] = '\0';
1015 unroll_tree_refs(ctx, NULL, 0);
1016 WARN_ON(!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees));
1018 audit_free_module(ctx);
1020 audit_proctitle_free(ctx);
1023 static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
1025 struct audit_context *context;
1027 context = kzalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL);
1030 context->context = AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED;
1031 context->state = state;
1032 context->prio = state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD ? ~0ULL : 0;
1033 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
1034 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
1035 context->fds[0] = -1;
1036 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
1041 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
1044 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
1045 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
1046 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
1049 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)
1051 struct audit_context *context;
1052 enum audit_state state;
1055 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled))
1058 state = audit_filter_task(tsk, &key);
1059 if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED) {
1060 clear_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
1064 if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) {
1066 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
1069 context->filterkey = key;
1071 audit_set_context(tsk, context);
1072 set_task_syscall_work(tsk, SYSCALL_AUDIT);
1077 * audit_alloc_kernel - allocate an audit_context for a kernel task
1078 * @tsk: the kernel task
1080 * Similar to the audit_alloc() function, but intended for kernel private
1081 * threads. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
1083 int audit_alloc_kernel(struct task_struct *tsk)
1086 * At the moment we are just going to call into audit_alloc() to
1087 * simplify the code, but there two things to keep in mind with this
1090 * 1. Filtering internal kernel tasks is a bit laughable in almost all
1091 * cases, but there is at least one case where there is a benefit:
1092 * the '-a task,never' case allows the admin to effectively disable
1093 * task auditing at runtime.
1095 * 2. The {set,clear}_task_syscall_work() ops likely have zero effect
1096 * on these internal kernel tasks, but they probably don't hurt either.
1098 return audit_alloc(tsk);
1101 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
1103 /* resetting is extra work, but it is likely just noise */
1104 audit_reset_context(context);
1105 free_tree_refs(context);
1106 kfree(context->filterkey);
1110 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,
1111 kuid_t auid, kuid_t uid, unsigned int sessionid,
1112 u32 sid, char *comm)
1114 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1119 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_OBJ_PID);
1123 audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid,
1124 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
1125 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);
1127 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
1128 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=(none)");
1131 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1132 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1135 audit_log_format(ab, " ocomm=");
1136 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, comm);
1142 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context *context,
1143 struct audit_buffer **ab)
1157 const char __user *p = (const char __user *)current->mm->arg_start;
1159 /* NOTE: this buffer needs to be large enough to hold all the non-arg
1160 * data we put in the audit record for this argument (see the
1161 * code below) ... at this point in time 96 is plenty */
1164 /* NOTE: we set MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN to a rather arbitrary limit, the
1165 * current value of 7500 is not as important as the fact that it
1166 * is less than 8k, a setting of 7500 gives us plenty of wiggle
1167 * room if we go over a little bit in the logging below */
1168 WARN_ON_ONCE(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN > 7500);
1169 len_max = MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN;
1171 /* scratch buffer to hold the userspace args */
1172 buf_head = kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
1174 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string");
1179 audit_log_format(*ab, "argc=%d", context->execve.argc);
1184 require_data = true;
1189 /* NOTE: we don't ever want to trust this value for anything
1190 * serious, but the audit record format insists we
1191 * provide an argument length for really long arguments,
1192 * e.g. > MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN, so we have no choice but
1193 * to use strncpy_from_user() to obtain this value for
1194 * recording in the log, although we don't use it
1195 * anywhere here to avoid a double-fetch problem */
1197 len_full = strnlen_user(p, MAX_ARG_STRLEN) - 1;
1199 /* read more data from userspace */
1201 /* can we make more room in the buffer? */
1202 if (buf != buf_head) {
1203 memmove(buf_head, buf, len_buf);
1207 /* fetch as much as we can of the argument */
1208 len_tmp = strncpy_from_user(&buf_head[len_buf], p,
1210 if (len_tmp == -EFAULT) {
1211 /* unable to copy from userspace */
1212 send_sig(SIGKILL, current, 0);
1214 } else if (len_tmp == (len_max - len_buf)) {
1215 /* buffer is not large enough */
1216 require_data = true;
1217 /* NOTE: if we are going to span multiple
1218 * buffers force the encoding so we stand
1219 * a chance at a sane len_full value and
1220 * consistent record encoding */
1222 len_full = len_full * 2;
1225 require_data = false;
1227 encode = audit_string_contains_control(
1229 /* try to use a trusted value for len_full */
1230 if (len_full < len_max)
1231 len_full = (encode ?
1232 len_tmp * 2 : len_tmp);
1236 buf_head[len_buf] = '\0';
1238 /* length of the buffer in the audit record? */
1239 len_abuf = (encode ? len_buf * 2 : len_buf + 2);
1242 /* write as much as we can to the audit log */
1244 /* NOTE: some magic numbers here - basically if we
1245 * can't fit a reasonable amount of data into the
1246 * existing audit buffer, flush it and start with
1248 if ((sizeof(abuf) + 8) > len_rem) {
1251 *ab = audit_log_start(context,
1252 GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EXECVE);
1257 /* create the non-arg portion of the arg record */
1259 if (require_data || (iter > 0) ||
1260 ((len_abuf + sizeof(abuf)) > len_rem)) {
1262 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1263 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1267 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1268 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1269 " a%d[%d]=", arg, iter++);
1271 len_tmp += snprintf(&abuf[len_tmp],
1272 sizeof(abuf) - len_tmp,
1274 WARN_ON(len_tmp >= sizeof(abuf));
1275 abuf[sizeof(abuf) - 1] = '\0';
1277 /* log the arg in the audit record */
1278 audit_log_format(*ab, "%s", abuf);
1282 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1283 len_tmp = len_rem / 2; /* encoding */
1284 audit_log_n_hex(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1285 len_rem -= len_tmp * 2;
1286 len_abuf -= len_tmp * 2;
1288 if (len_abuf > len_rem)
1289 len_tmp = len_rem - 2; /* quotes */
1290 audit_log_n_string(*ab, buf, len_tmp);
1291 len_rem -= len_tmp + 2;
1292 /* don't subtract the "2" because we still need
1293 * to add quotes to the remaining string */
1294 len_abuf -= len_tmp;
1300 /* ready to move to the next argument? */
1301 if ((len_buf == 0) && !require_data) {
1305 require_data = true;
1308 } while (arg < context->execve.argc);
1310 /* NOTE: the caller handles the final audit_log_end() call */
1316 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *prefix,
1321 if (cap_isclear(*cap)) {
1322 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=0", prefix);
1325 audit_log_format(ab, " %s=", prefix);
1327 audit_log_format(ab, "%08x", cap->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - i]);
1330 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)
1332 if (name->fcap_ver == -1) {
1333 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=? cap_fver=? cap_fp=? cap_fi=?");
1336 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fp", &name->fcap.permitted);
1337 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_fi", &name->fcap.inheritable);
1338 audit_log_format(ab, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x cap_frootid=%d",
1339 name->fcap.fE, name->fcap_ver,
1340 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, name->fcap.rootid));
1343 static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)
1345 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1348 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, context->type);
1352 switch (context->type) {
1353 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
1354 int nargs = context->socketcall.nargs;
1356 audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", nargs);
1357 for (i = 0; i < nargs; i++)
1358 audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i,
1359 context->socketcall.args[i]);
1362 u32 osid = context->ipc.osid;
1364 audit_log_format(ab, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1365 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.uid),
1366 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid),
1372 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1373 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", osid);
1376 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1377 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1380 if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
1382 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL,
1383 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM);
1386 audit_log_format(ab,
1387 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1388 context->ipc.qbytes,
1389 context->ipc.perm_uid,
1390 context->ipc.perm_gid,
1391 context->ipc.perm_mode);
1395 audit_log_format(ab,
1396 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1397 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1398 context->mq_open.oflag, context->mq_open.mode,
1399 context->mq_open.attr.mq_flags,
1400 context->mq_open.attr.mq_maxmsg,
1401 context->mq_open.attr.mq_msgsize,
1402 context->mq_open.attr.mq_curmsgs);
1404 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV:
1405 audit_log_format(ab,
1406 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1407 "abs_timeout_sec=%lld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1408 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes,
1409 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len,
1410 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio,
1411 (long long) context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_sec,
1412 context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout.tv_nsec);
1414 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY:
1415 audit_log_format(ab, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1416 context->mq_notify.mqdes,
1417 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo);
1419 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR: {
1420 struct mq_attr *attr = &context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat;
1422 audit_log_format(ab,
1423 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1425 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes,
1426 attr->mq_flags, attr->mq_maxmsg,
1427 attr->mq_msgsize, attr->mq_curmsgs);
1430 audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d", context->capset.pid);
1431 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pi", &context->capset.cap.inheritable);
1432 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pp", &context->capset.cap.permitted);
1433 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pe", &context->capset.cap.effective);
1434 audit_log_cap(ab, "cap_pa", &context->capset.cap.ambient);
1437 audit_log_format(ab, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context->mmap.fd,
1438 context->mmap.flags);
1441 audit_log_format(ab, "oflag=0%llo mode=0%llo resolve=0x%llx",
1442 context->openat2.flags,
1443 context->openat2.mode,
1444 context->openat2.resolve);
1447 audit_log_execve_info(context, &ab);
1449 case AUDIT_KERN_MODULE:
1450 audit_log_format(ab, "name=");
1451 if (context->module.name) {
1452 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->module.name);
1454 audit_log_format(ab, "(null)");
1461 static inline int audit_proctitle_rtrim(char *proctitle, int len)
1463 char *end = proctitle + len - 1;
1465 while (end > proctitle && !isprint(*end))
1468 /* catch the case where proctitle is only 1 non-print character */
1469 len = end - proctitle + 1;
1470 len -= isprint(proctitle[len-1]) == 0;
1475 * audit_log_name - produce AUDIT_PATH record from struct audit_names
1476 * @context: audit_context for the task
1477 * @n: audit_names structure with reportable details
1478 * @path: optional path to report instead of audit_names->name
1479 * @record_num: record number to report when handling a list of names
1480 * @call_panic: optional pointer to int that will be updated if secid fails
1482 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
1483 const struct path *path, int record_num, int *call_panic)
1485 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1487 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
1491 audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", record_num);
1494 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", path);
1496 switch (n->name_len) {
1497 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL:
1498 /* log the full path */
1499 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1500 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name);
1503 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1504 * directory component is the cwd
1506 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt)
1507 audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
1509 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1512 /* log the name's directory component */
1513 audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
1514 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
1518 audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
1520 if (n->ino != AUDIT_INO_UNSET)
1521 audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1526 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, n->uid),
1527 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, n->gid),
1534 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1535 n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
1536 audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
1540 audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
1541 security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
1545 /* log the audit_names record type */
1547 case AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL:
1548 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=NORMAL");
1550 case AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT:
1551 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=PARENT");
1553 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE:
1554 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=DELETE");
1556 case AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE:
1557 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=CREATE");
1560 audit_log_format(ab, " nametype=UNKNOWN");
1564 audit_log_fcaps(ab, n);
1568 static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
1572 char *msg = "(null)";
1573 int len = strlen(msg);
1574 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1575 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1577 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
1579 return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
1581 audit_log_format(ab, "proctitle=");
1584 if (!context->proctitle.value) {
1585 buf = kmalloc(MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN, GFP_KERNEL);
1588 /* Historically called this from procfs naming */
1589 res = get_cmdline(current, buf, MAX_PROCTITLE_AUDIT_LEN);
1594 res = audit_proctitle_rtrim(buf, res);
1599 context->proctitle.value = buf;
1600 context->proctitle.len = res;
1602 msg = context->proctitle.value;
1603 len = context->proctitle.len;
1605 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, msg, len);
1610 * audit_log_uring - generate a AUDIT_URINGOP record
1611 * @ctx: the audit context
1613 static void audit_log_uring(struct audit_context *ctx)
1615 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1616 const struct cred *cred;
1618 ab = audit_log_start(ctx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_URINGOP);
1621 cred = current_cred();
1622 audit_log_format(ab, "uring_op=%d", ctx->uring_op);
1623 if (ctx->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
1624 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1625 (ctx->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS ?
1628 audit_log_format(ab,
1630 " ppid=%d pid=%d uid=%u gid=%u euid=%u suid=%u"
1631 " fsuid=%u egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u",
1633 task_ppid_nr(current), task_tgid_nr(current),
1634 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->uid),
1635 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->gid),
1636 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->euid),
1637 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->suid),
1638 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsuid),
1639 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->egid),
1640 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->sgid),
1641 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, cred->fsgid));
1642 audit_log_task_context(ab);
1643 audit_log_key(ab, ctx->filterkey);
1647 static void audit_log_exit(void)
1649 int i, call_panic = 0;
1650 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1651 struct audit_buffer *ab;
1652 struct audit_aux_data *aux;
1653 struct audit_names *n;
1655 context->personality = current->personality;
1657 switch (context->context) {
1658 case AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL:
1659 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
1662 audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1663 context->arch, context->major);
1664 if (context->personality != PER_LINUX)
1665 audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality);
1666 if (context->return_valid != AUDITSC_INVALID)
1667 audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1668 (context->return_valid == AUDITSC_SUCCESS ?
1670 context->return_code);
1671 audit_log_format(ab,
1672 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d",
1677 context->name_count);
1678 audit_log_task_info(ab);
1679 audit_log_key(ab, context->filterkey);
1682 case AUDIT_CTX_URING:
1683 audit_log_uring(context);
1690 for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1692 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
1694 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1696 switch (aux->type) {
1698 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS: {
1699 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *axs = (void *)aux;
1701 audit_log_format(ab, "fver=%x", axs->fcap_ver);
1702 audit_log_cap(ab, "fp", &axs->fcap.permitted);
1703 audit_log_cap(ab, "fi", &axs->fcap.inheritable);
1704 audit_log_format(ab, " fe=%d", axs->fcap.fE);
1705 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pp", &axs->old_pcap.permitted);
1706 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pi", &axs->old_pcap.inheritable);
1707 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pe", &axs->old_pcap.effective);
1708 audit_log_cap(ab, "old_pa", &axs->old_pcap.ambient);
1709 audit_log_cap(ab, "pp", &axs->new_pcap.permitted);
1710 audit_log_cap(ab, "pi", &axs->new_pcap.inheritable);
1711 audit_log_cap(ab, "pe", &axs->new_pcap.effective);
1712 audit_log_cap(ab, "pa", &axs->new_pcap.ambient);
1713 audit_log_format(ab, " frootid=%d",
1714 from_kuid(&init_user_ns,
1723 show_special(context, &call_panic);
1725 if (context->fds[0] >= 0) {
1726 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FD_PAIR);
1728 audit_log_format(ab, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1729 context->fds[0], context->fds[1]);
1734 if (context->sockaddr_len) {
1735 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SOCKADDR);
1737 audit_log_format(ab, "saddr=");
1738 audit_log_n_hex(ab, (void *)context->sockaddr,
1739 context->sockaddr_len);
1744 for (aux = context->aux_pids; aux; aux = aux->next) {
1745 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axs = (void *)aux;
1747 for (i = 0; i < axs->pid_count; i++)
1748 if (audit_log_pid_context(context, axs->target_pid[i],
1749 axs->target_auid[i],
1751 axs->target_sessionid[i],
1753 axs->target_comm[i]))
1757 if (context->target_pid &&
1758 audit_log_pid_context(context, context->target_pid,
1759 context->target_auid, context->target_uid,
1760 context->target_sessionid,
1761 context->target_sid, context->target_comm))
1764 if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
1765 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
1767 audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", &context->pwd);
1773 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
1776 audit_log_name(context, n, NULL, i++, &call_panic);
1779 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
1780 audit_log_proctitle();
1782 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1783 ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_EOE);
1787 audit_panic("error in audit_log_exit()");
1791 * __audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1792 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1794 * Called from copy_process, do_exit, and the io_uring code
1796 void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
1798 struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
1803 /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
1804 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
1805 audit_kill_trees(context);
1807 /* We are called either by do_exit() or the fork() error handling code;
1808 * in the former case tsk == current and in the latter tsk is a
1809 * random task_struct that doesn't doesn't have any meaningful data we
1810 * need to log via audit_log_exit().
1812 if (tsk == current && !context->dummy) {
1813 context->return_valid = AUDITSC_INVALID;
1814 context->return_code = 0;
1815 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) {
1816 audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context);
1817 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1818 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1820 } else if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_URING) {
1821 /* TODO: verify this case is real and valid */
1822 audit_filter_uring(tsk, context);
1823 audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
1824 if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1825 audit_log_uring(context);
1829 audit_set_context(tsk, NULL);
1830 audit_free_context(context);
1834 * audit_return_fixup - fixup the return codes in the audit_context
1835 * @ctx: the audit_context
1836 * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not
1837 * @code: operation return code
1839 * We need to fixup the return code in the audit logs if the actual return
1840 * codes are later going to be fixed by the arch specific signal handlers.
1842 static void audit_return_fixup(struct audit_context *ctx,
1843 int success, long code)
1846 * This is actually a test for:
1847 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
1848 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
1850 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
1852 if (unlikely(code <= -ERESTARTSYS) &&
1853 (code >= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK) &&
1854 (code != -ENOIOCTLCMD))
1855 ctx->return_code = -EINTR;
1857 ctx->return_code = code;
1858 ctx->return_valid = (success ? AUDITSC_SUCCESS : AUDITSC_FAILURE);
1862 * __audit_uring_entry - prepare the kernel task's audit context for io_uring
1863 * @op: the io_uring opcode
1865 * This is similar to audit_syscall_entry() but is intended for use by io_uring
1866 * operations. This function should only ever be called from
1867 * audit_uring_entry() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that
1870 void __audit_uring_entry(u8 op)
1872 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
1874 if (ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
1878 * NOTE: It's possible that we can be called from the process' context
1879 * before it returns to userspace, and before audit_syscall_exit()
1880 * is called. In this case there is not much to do, just record
1881 * the io_uring details and return.
1884 if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
1887 ctx->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1888 if (!ctx->dummy && ctx->state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD)
1891 ctx->context = AUDIT_CTX_URING;
1892 ctx->current_state = ctx->state;
1893 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&ctx->ctime);
1897 * __audit_uring_exit - wrap up the kernel task's audit context after io_uring
1898 * @success: true/false value to indicate if the operation succeeded or not
1899 * @code: operation return code
1901 * This is similar to audit_syscall_exit() but is intended for use by io_uring
1902 * operations. This function should only ever be called from
1903 * audit_uring_exit() as we rely on the audit context checking present in that
1906 void __audit_uring_exit(int success, long code)
1908 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
1910 if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL) {
1912 * NOTE: See the note in __audit_uring_entry() about the case
1913 * where we may be called from process context before we
1914 * return to userspace via audit_syscall_exit(). In this
1915 * case we simply emit a URINGOP record and bail, the
1916 * normal syscall exit handling will take care of
1918 * It is also worth mentioning that when we are called,
1919 * the current process creds may differ from the creds
1920 * used during the normal syscall processing; keep that
1921 * in mind if/when we move the record generation code.
1925 * We need to filter on the syscall info here to decide if we
1926 * should emit a URINGOP record. I know it seems odd but this
1927 * solves the problem where users have a filter to block *all*
1928 * syscall records in the "exit" filter; we want to preserve
1929 * the behavior here.
1931 audit_filter_syscall(current, ctx);
1932 if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1933 audit_filter_uring(current, ctx);
1934 audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx);
1935 if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1938 audit_log_uring(ctx);
1942 /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
1943 if (!list_empty(&ctx->killed_trees))
1944 audit_kill_trees(ctx);
1946 /* run through both filters to ensure we set the filterkey properly */
1947 audit_filter_uring(current, ctx);
1948 audit_filter_inodes(current, ctx);
1949 if (ctx->current_state != AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
1951 audit_return_fixup(ctx, success, code);
1955 audit_reset_context(ctx);
1959 * __audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1960 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1961 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1962 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1963 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1964 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1966 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1967 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1968 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1969 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_STATE_RECORD,
1970 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1971 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1974 void __audit_syscall_entry(int major, unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
1975 unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
1977 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
1978 enum audit_state state;
1980 if (!audit_enabled || !context)
1983 WARN_ON(context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED);
1984 WARN_ON(context->name_count);
1985 if (context->context != AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED || context->name_count) {
1986 audit_panic("unrecoverable error in audit_syscall_entry()");
1990 state = context->state;
1991 if (state == AUDIT_STATE_DISABLED)
1994 context->dummy = !audit_n_rules;
1995 if (!context->dummy && state == AUDIT_STATE_BUILD) {
1997 if (auditd_test_task(current))
2001 context->arch = syscall_get_arch(current);
2002 context->major = major;
2003 context->argv[0] = a1;
2004 context->argv[1] = a2;
2005 context->argv[2] = a3;
2006 context->argv[3] = a4;
2007 context->context = AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL;
2008 context->current_state = state;
2009 ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64(&context->ctime);
2013 * __audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
2014 * @success: success value of the syscall
2015 * @return_code: return value of the syscall
2017 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
2018 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_STATE_RECORD state from
2019 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel wrote an audit
2020 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
2021 * free the names stored from getname().
2023 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
2025 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2027 if (!context || context->dummy ||
2028 context->context != AUDIT_CTX_SYSCALL)
2031 /* this may generate CONFIG_CHANGE records */
2032 if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
2033 audit_kill_trees(context);
2035 /* run through both filters to ensure we set the filterkey properly */
2036 audit_filter_syscall(current, context);
2037 audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
2038 if (context->current_state < AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
2041 audit_return_fixup(context, success, return_code);
2045 audit_reset_context(context);
2048 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode *inode)
2050 struct audit_context *context;
2051 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
2052 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
2055 if (likely(!inode->i_fsnotify_marks))
2057 context = audit_context();
2059 count = context->tree_count;
2061 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
2065 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context, chunk)))
2067 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context))) {
2068 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
2069 audit_set_auditable(context);
2070 audit_put_chunk(chunk);
2071 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
2074 put_tree_ref(context, chunk);
2077 static void handle_path(const struct dentry *dentry)
2079 struct audit_context *context;
2080 struct audit_tree_refs *p;
2081 const struct dentry *d, *parent;
2082 struct audit_chunk *drop;
2086 context = audit_context();
2088 count = context->tree_count;
2093 seq = read_seqbegin(&rename_lock);
2095 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(d);
2097 if (inode && unlikely(inode->i_fsnotify_marks)) {
2098 struct audit_chunk *chunk;
2100 chunk = audit_tree_lookup(inode);
2102 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context, chunk))) {
2108 parent = d->d_parent;
2113 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock, seq) || drop)) { /* in this order */
2116 /* just a race with rename */
2117 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
2120 audit_put_chunk(drop);
2121 if (grow_tree_refs(context)) {
2122 /* OK, got more space */
2123 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
2127 pr_warn("out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
2128 unroll_tree_refs(context, p, count);
2129 audit_set_auditable(context);
2135 static struct audit_names *audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context *context,
2138 struct audit_names *aname;
2140 if (context->name_count < AUDIT_NAMES) {
2141 aname = &context->preallocated_names[context->name_count];
2142 memset(aname, 0, sizeof(*aname));
2144 aname = kzalloc(sizeof(*aname), GFP_NOFS);
2147 aname->should_free = true;
2150 aname->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2152 list_add_tail(&aname->list, &context->names_list);
2154 context->name_count++;
2155 if (!context->pwd.dentry)
2156 get_fs_pwd(current->fs, &context->pwd);
2161 * __audit_reusename - fill out filename with info from existing entry
2162 * @uptr: userland ptr to pathname
2164 * Search the audit_names list for the current audit context. If there is an
2165 * existing entry with a matching "uptr" then return the filename
2166 * associated with that audit_name. If not, return NULL.
2169 __audit_reusename(const __user char *uptr)
2171 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2172 struct audit_names *n;
2174 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2177 if (n->name->uptr == uptr) {
2186 * __audit_getname - add a name to the list
2187 * @name: name to add
2189 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
2190 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
2192 void __audit_getname(struct filename *name)
2194 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2195 struct audit_names *n;
2197 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
2200 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2205 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2210 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names *name,
2211 const struct dentry *dentry)
2213 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps;
2219 rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns, dentry, &caps);
2223 name->fcap.permitted = caps.permitted;
2224 name->fcap.inheritable = caps.inheritable;
2225 name->fcap.fE = !!(caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2226 name->fcap.rootid = caps.rootid;
2227 name->fcap_ver = (caps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >>
2228 VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2233 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
2234 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,
2235 const struct dentry *dentry,
2236 struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags)
2238 name->ino = inode->i_ino;
2239 name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
2240 name->mode = inode->i_mode;
2241 name->uid = inode->i_uid;
2242 name->gid = inode->i_gid;
2243 name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
2244 security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
2245 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL) {
2246 name->fcap_ver = -1;
2249 audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
2253 * __audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
2254 * @name: name being audited
2255 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2256 * @flags: attributes for this particular entry
2258 void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
2261 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2262 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2263 struct audit_names *n;
2264 bool parent = flags & AUDIT_INODE_PARENT;
2265 struct audit_entry *e;
2266 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2269 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
2273 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2274 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2275 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2277 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2278 && audit_comparator(inode->i_sb->s_magic,
2280 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2292 * If we have a pointer to an audit_names entry already, then we can
2293 * just use it directly if the type is correct.
2298 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2299 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2302 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2307 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2309 /* valid inode number, use that for the comparison */
2310 if (n->ino != inode->i_ino ||
2311 n->dev != inode->i_sb->s_dev)
2313 } else if (n->name) {
2314 /* inode number has not been set, check the name */
2315 if (strcmp(n->name->name, name->name))
2318 /* no inode and no name (?!) ... this is odd ... */
2321 /* match the correct record type */
2323 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT ||
2324 n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2327 if (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT)
2333 /* unable to find an entry with both a matching name and type */
2334 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN);
2344 n->name_len = n->name ? parent_len(n->name->name) : AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2345 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2346 if (flags & AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN)
2349 n->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2350 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_NORMAL;
2352 handle_path(dentry);
2353 audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
2356 void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
2358 __audit_inode(NULL, file->f_path.dentry, 0);
2362 * __audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2363 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2364 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2365 * @type: AUDIT_TYPE_* value that we're looking for
2367 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2368 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2369 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2370 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2371 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2372 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2373 * unsuccessful attempts.
2375 void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
2376 const struct dentry *dentry,
2377 const unsigned char type)
2379 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2380 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2381 const struct qstr *dname = &dentry->d_name;
2382 struct audit_names *n, *found_parent = NULL, *found_child = NULL;
2383 struct audit_entry *e;
2384 struct list_head *list = &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_FS];
2387 if (context->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
2391 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) {
2392 for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
2393 struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
2395 if (f->type == AUDIT_FSTYPE
2396 && audit_comparator(parent->i_sb->s_magic,
2398 && e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER) {
2409 /* look for a parent entry first */
2410 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2412 (n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT &&
2413 n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2416 if (n->ino == parent->i_ino && n->dev == parent->i_sb->s_dev &&
2417 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname,
2418 n->name->name, n->name_len)) {
2419 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2420 n->type = AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT;
2426 /* is there a matching child entry? */
2427 list_for_each_entry(n, &context->names_list, list) {
2428 /* can only match entries that have a name */
2430 (n->type != type && n->type != AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN))
2433 if (!strcmp(dname->name, n->name->name) ||
2434 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname, n->name->name,
2436 found_parent->name_len :
2438 if (n->type == AUDIT_TYPE_UNKNOWN)
2445 if (!found_parent) {
2446 /* create a new, "anonymous" parent record */
2447 n = audit_alloc_name(context, AUDIT_TYPE_PARENT);
2450 audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent, 0);
2454 found_child = audit_alloc_name(context, type);
2458 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2459 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2460 * audit_free_names() */
2462 found_child->name = found_parent->name;
2463 found_child->name_len = AUDIT_NAME_FULL;
2464 found_child->name->refcnt++;
2469 audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
2471 found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
2473 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
2476 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2477 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2478 * @t: timespec64 to store time recorded in the audit_context
2479 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2481 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2483 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
2484 struct timespec64 *t, unsigned int *serial)
2486 if (ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED)
2489 ctx->serial = audit_serial();
2490 t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec;
2491 t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec;
2492 *serial = ctx->serial;
2495 ctx->current_state = AUDIT_STATE_RECORD;
2501 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2504 * @attr: queue attributes
2507 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag, umode_t mode, struct mq_attr *attr)
2509 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2512 memcpy(&context->mq_open.attr, attr, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2514 memset(&context->mq_open.attr, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr));
2516 context->mq_open.oflag = oflag;
2517 context->mq_open.mode = mode;
2519 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_OPEN;
2523 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2524 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2525 * @msg_len: Message length
2526 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2527 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2530 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes, size_t msg_len, unsigned int msg_prio,
2531 const struct timespec64 *abs_timeout)
2533 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2534 struct timespec64 *p = &context->mq_sendrecv.abs_timeout;
2537 memcpy(p, abs_timeout, sizeof(*p));
2539 memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
2541 context->mq_sendrecv.mqdes = mqdes;
2542 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_len = msg_len;
2543 context->mq_sendrecv.msg_prio = msg_prio;
2545 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV;
2549 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2550 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2551 * @notification: Notification event
2555 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes, const struct sigevent *notification)
2557 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2560 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = notification->sigev_signo;
2562 context->mq_notify.sigev_signo = 0;
2564 context->mq_notify.mqdes = mqdes;
2565 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY;
2569 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2570 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2574 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)
2576 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2578 context->mq_getsetattr.mqdes = mqdes;
2579 context->mq_getsetattr.mqstat = *mqstat;
2580 context->type = AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR;
2584 * __audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2585 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2588 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
2590 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2592 context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid;
2593 context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid;
2594 context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode;
2595 context->ipc.has_perm = 0;
2596 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &context->ipc.osid);
2597 context->type = AUDIT_IPC;
2601 * __audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2602 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2603 * @uid: msgq user id
2604 * @gid: msgq group id
2605 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2607 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2609 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, umode_t mode)
2611 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2613 context->ipc.qbytes = qbytes;
2614 context->ipc.perm_uid = uid;
2615 context->ipc.perm_gid = gid;
2616 context->ipc.perm_mode = mode;
2617 context->ipc.has_perm = 1;
2620 void __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2622 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2624 context->type = AUDIT_EXECVE;
2625 context->execve.argc = bprm->argc;
2630 * __audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2631 * @nargs: number of args, which should not be more than AUDITSC_ARGS.
2635 int __audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args)
2637 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2639 if (nargs <= 0 || nargs > AUDITSC_ARGS || !args)
2641 context->type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL;
2642 context->socketcall.nargs = nargs;
2643 memcpy(context->socketcall.args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long));
2648 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2649 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2650 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2653 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1, int fd2)
2655 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2657 context->fds[0] = fd1;
2658 context->fds[1] = fd2;
2662 * __audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2663 * @len: data length in user space
2664 * @a: data address in kernel space
2666 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2668 int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
2670 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2672 if (!context->sockaddr) {
2673 void *p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage), GFP_KERNEL);
2677 context->sockaddr = p;
2680 context->sockaddr_len = len;
2681 memcpy(context->sockaddr, a, len);
2685 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
2687 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2689 context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2690 context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2691 context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
2692 context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2693 security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
2694 memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2698 * audit_signal_info_syscall - record signal info for syscalls
2699 * @t: task being signaled
2701 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2702 * and uid that is doing that.
2704 int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
2706 struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
2707 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2708 kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
2710 if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
2713 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2714 * in audit_context */
2715 if (!ctx->target_pid) {
2716 ctx->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
2717 ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2718 ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
2719 ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2720 security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
2721 memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2725 axp = (void *)ctx->aux_pids;
2726 if (!axp || axp->pid_count == AUDIT_AUX_PIDS) {
2727 axp = kzalloc(sizeof(*axp), GFP_ATOMIC);
2731 axp->d.type = AUDIT_OBJ_PID;
2732 axp->d.next = ctx->aux_pids;
2733 ctx->aux_pids = (void *)axp;
2735 BUG_ON(axp->pid_count >= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
2737 axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = task_tgid_nr(t);
2738 axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
2739 axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
2740 axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
2741 security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
2742 memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
2749 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2750 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2751 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2752 * @old: the old credentials
2754 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2755 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2759 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2760 const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2762 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps *ax;
2763 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2764 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
2766 ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_KERNEL);
2770 ax->d.type = AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS;
2771 ax->d.next = context->aux;
2772 context->aux = (void *)ax;
2774 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(&init_user_ns,
2775 bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
2777 ax->fcap.permitted = vcaps.permitted;
2778 ax->fcap.inheritable = vcaps.inheritable;
2779 ax->fcap.fE = !!(vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE);
2780 ax->fcap.rootid = vcaps.rootid;
2781 ax->fcap_ver = (vcaps.magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT;
2783 ax->old_pcap.permitted = old->cap_permitted;
2784 ax->old_pcap.inheritable = old->cap_inheritable;
2785 ax->old_pcap.effective = old->cap_effective;
2786 ax->old_pcap.ambient = old->cap_ambient;
2788 ax->new_pcap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2789 ax->new_pcap.inheritable = new->cap_inheritable;
2790 ax->new_pcap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2791 ax->new_pcap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2796 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2797 * @new: the new credentials
2798 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2800 * Record the arguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2801 * audit system if applicable
2803 void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
2805 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2807 context->capset.pid = task_tgid_nr(current);
2808 context->capset.cap.effective = new->cap_effective;
2809 context->capset.cap.inheritable = new->cap_effective;
2810 context->capset.cap.permitted = new->cap_permitted;
2811 context->capset.cap.ambient = new->cap_ambient;
2812 context->type = AUDIT_CAPSET;
2815 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
2817 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2819 context->mmap.fd = fd;
2820 context->mmap.flags = flags;
2821 context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
2824 void __audit_openat2_how(struct open_how *how)
2826 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2828 context->openat2.flags = how->flags;
2829 context->openat2.mode = how->mode;
2830 context->openat2.resolve = how->resolve;
2831 context->type = AUDIT_OPENAT2;
2834 void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
2836 struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
2838 context->module.name = kstrdup(name, GFP_KERNEL);
2839 if (!context->module.name)
2840 audit_log_lost("out of memory in __audit_log_kern_module");
2841 context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
2844 void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
2846 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2847 AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
2850 void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset)
2852 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET,
2853 "sec=%lli nsec=%li",
2854 (long long)offset.tv_sec, offset.tv_nsec);
2857 static void audit_log_ntp_val(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad,
2858 const char *op, enum audit_ntp_type type)
2860 const struct audit_ntp_val *val = &ad->vals[type];
2862 if (val->newval == val->oldval)
2865 audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL,
2866 "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", op, val->oldval, val->newval);
2869 void __audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)
2871 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "offset", AUDIT_NTP_OFFSET);
2872 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "freq", AUDIT_NTP_FREQ);
2873 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "status", AUDIT_NTP_STATUS);
2874 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tai", AUDIT_NTP_TAI);
2875 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "tick", AUDIT_NTP_TICK);
2876 audit_log_ntp_val(ad, "adjust", AUDIT_NTP_ADJUST);
2879 void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries,
2880 enum audit_nfcfgop op, gfp_t gfp)
2882 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2883 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2885 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), gfp, AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG);
2888 audit_log_format(ab, "table=%s family=%u entries=%u op=%s",
2889 name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s);
2891 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%u", task_pid_nr(current));
2892 audit_log_task_context(ab); /* subj= */
2893 audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
2894 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2897 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_log_nfcfg);
2899 static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
2903 unsigned int sessionid;
2904 char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
2906 auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
2907 sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
2908 current_uid_gid(&uid, &gid);
2910 audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2911 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, auid),
2912 from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid),
2913 from_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid),
2915 audit_log_task_context(ab);
2916 audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", task_tgid_nr(current));
2917 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, get_task_comm(comm, current));
2918 audit_log_d_path_exe(ab, current->mm);
2922 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2923 * @signr: signal value
2925 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2926 * should record the event for investigation.
2928 void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
2930 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2935 if (signr == SIGQUIT) /* don't care for those */
2938 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
2942 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld res=1", signr);
2947 * audit_seccomp - record information about a seccomp action
2948 * @syscall: syscall number
2949 * @signr: signal value
2950 * @code: the seccomp action
2952 * Record the information associated with a seccomp action. Event filtering for
2953 * seccomp actions that are not to be logged is done in seccomp_log().
2954 * Therefore, this function forces auditing independent of the audit_enabled
2955 * and dummy context state because seccomp actions should be logged even when
2956 * audit is not in use.
2958 void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
2960 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2962 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
2966 audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld arch=%x syscall=%ld compat=%d ip=0x%lx code=0x%x",
2967 signr, syscall_get_arch(current), syscall,
2968 in_compat_syscall(), KSTK_EIP(current), code);
2972 void audit_seccomp_actions_logged(const char *names, const char *old_names,
2975 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2980 ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL,
2981 AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE);
2985 audit_log_format(ab,
2986 "op=seccomp-logging actions=%s old-actions=%s res=%d",
2987 names, old_names, res);
2991 struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void)
2993 struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
2994 if (likely(!ctx || ctx->context == AUDIT_CTX_UNUSED))
2996 return &ctx->killed_trees;