1 /* mainproc.c - handle packets
2 * Copyright (C) 1998-2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
3 * Copyright (C) 2013-2014 Werner Koch
5 * This file is part of GnuPG.
7 * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
39 #include "keyserver-internal.h"
41 #include "mbox-util.h"
42 #include "call-dirmngr.h"
44 /* Put an upper limit on nested packets. The 32 is an arbitrary
45 value, a much lower should actually be sufficient. */
46 #define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32
49 /* An object to build a list of keyid related info. */
52 struct kidlist_item *next;
60 * Object to hold the processing context.
62 typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
63 struct mainproc_context
66 struct mainproc_context *anchor; /* May be useful in the future. */
67 PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
68 PKT_user_id *last_user_id;
69 md_filter_context_t mfx;
70 int sigs_only; /* Process only signatures and reject all other stuff. */
71 int encrypt_only; /* Process only encryption messages. */
73 /* Name of the file with the complete signature or the file with the
74 detached signature. This is currently only used to deduce the
75 file name of the data file if that has not been given. */
76 const char *sigfilename;
78 /* A structure to describe the signed data in case of a detached
82 /* A file descriptor of the the signed data. Only used if not -1. */
84 /* A list of filenames with the data files or NULL. This is only
85 used if DATA_FD is -1. */
87 /* Flag to indicated that either one of the next previous fields
88 is used. This is only needed for better readability. */
93 int last_was_session_key;
94 kbnode_t list; /* The current list of packets. */
95 iobuf_t iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */
96 int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
98 struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
100 unsigned int sig_seen:1; /* Set to true if a signature packet
102 unsigned int data:1; /* Any data packet seen */
103 unsigned int uncompress_failed:1;
108 /*** Local prototypes. ***/
109 static int do_proc_packets (CTX c, iobuf_t a);
110 static void list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
111 static void proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
112 static int literals_seen;
119 reset_literals_seen(void)
126 release_list( CTX c )
130 proc_tree (c, c->list);
131 release_kbnode (c->list);
132 while (c->pkenc_list)
134 struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
135 xfree (c->pkenc_list);
138 c->pkenc_list = NULL;
141 c->any.uncompress_failed = 0;
142 c->last_was_session_key = 0;
149 add_onepass_sig (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
153 if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
154 add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
155 else /* Insert the first one. */
156 c->list = node = new_kbnode (pkt);
163 add_gpg_control (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
165 if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
167 /* New clear text signature.
168 * Process the last one and reset everything */
172 if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
173 add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
174 else /* Insert the first one. */
175 c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
182 add_user_id (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
186 log_error ("orphaned user ID\n");
189 add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
195 add_subkey (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
199 log_error ("subkey w/o mainkey\n");
202 add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
208 add_ring_trust (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
212 log_error ("ring trust w/o key\n");
215 add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
221 add_signature (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
226 if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list)
228 /* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
229 * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
230 * onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method
231 * of prepending the signature to the data is
232 * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
233 * from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
234 node = new_kbnode (pkt);
239 return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
240 else if (!c->list->pkt)
241 BUG(); /* so nicht */
243 /* Add a new signature node item at the end. */
244 node = new_kbnode (pkt);
245 add_kbnode (c->list, node);
251 symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen)
255 if(slen < 17 || slen > 33)
257 log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
259 return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
262 if (openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1))
264 if (gcry_cipher_setkey ( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ))
266 gcry_cipher_setiv ( hd, NULL, 0 );
267 gcry_cipher_decrypt ( hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0 );
268 gcry_cipher_close ( hd );
270 /* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
271 decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
276 if(dek->keylen > DIM(dek->key))
279 memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
281 /*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
288 proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
292 enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
294 log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
297 int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
298 const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
300 if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
305 log_info (_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
307 log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
311 log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo);
313 if (openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo))
315 log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
316 " algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
320 c->last_was_session_key = 2;
321 if (!s || opt.list_only)
324 if (opt.override_session_key)
326 c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
327 if (get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
335 c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 3, NULL, NULL);
338 c->dek->symmetric = 1;
340 /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key
341 comes before a public key in the message - if the
342 user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is a
343 chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen to
344 be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
345 appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
349 if (symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
350 enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen))
357 c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
369 proc_pubkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
374 /* Check whether the secret key is available and store in this case. */
375 c->last_was_session_key = 1;
376 enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
377 /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
378 /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
379 * function to check it. */
381 log_info (_("public key is %s\n"), keystr (enc->keyid));
383 if (is_status_enabled())
386 /* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo number
387 to the Libgcrypt defined one. This is due a chicken-egg
388 problem: We need to have code in Libgcrypt for a new
389 algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm before the
390 IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP indentifier. */
391 snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
392 (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo);
393 write_status_text (STATUS_ENC_TO, buf);
396 if (!opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key)
398 /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
399 * secure memory because it has already been passed on the
400 * command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */
401 c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
402 result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
409 else if (enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E
410 || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
411 || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
412 || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
413 || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL)
415 /* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption.
416 There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a
419 /* FIXME: Store this all in a list and process it later so that
420 we can prioritize what key to use. This gives a better user
421 experience if wildcard keyids are used. */
422 if (!c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
423 || opt.try_all_secrets
424 || have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)))
430 c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
431 if ((result = get_session_key (enc, c->dek)))
433 /* Error: Delete the DEK. */
440 result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
443 result = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
449 /* Store it for later display. */
450 struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc (sizeof *x);
451 x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
452 x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
453 x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
455 x->next = c->pkenc_list;
458 if (!result && opt.verbose > 1)
459 log_info (_("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n"));
467 * Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
471 print_pkenc_list (struct kidlist_item *list, int failed)
473 for (; list; list = list->next)
478 if (failed && !list->reason)
480 if (!failed && list->reason)
483 algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo);
484 pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
488 pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
489 if (!get_pubkey (pk, list->kid))
492 log_info (_("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
493 nbits_from_pk (pk), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
494 strtimestamp (pk->timestamp));
495 p = get_user_id_native (list->kid);
496 log_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"), p);
500 log_info (_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
501 algstr, keystr(list->kid));
503 free_public_key (pk);
505 if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
507 if (is_status_enabled())
510 snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
511 (ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]);
512 write_status_text (STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf);
515 else if (list->reason)
517 log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
518 gpg_strerror (list->reason));
519 write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason);
526 proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
533 log_info (_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"), c->symkeys);
534 else if (c->symkeys == 1)
535 log_info (_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
536 print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 );
537 print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 );
540 /* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */
542 write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION);
544 /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
547 else if (!c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key)
551 STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
554 if (opt.override_session_key)
556 c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
557 result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
566 /* Assume this is old style conventional encrypted data. */
567 algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
569 log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
570 openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
571 else if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA))
573 algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
575 algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
576 log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
577 "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
578 openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
582 algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
583 if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
585 /* If no digest is given we assume SHA-1. */
587 s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
590 log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
593 c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 3, NULL, &canceled);
595 c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
597 result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED);
599 result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE);
603 result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
606 result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
610 else if (!result || (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
611 && opt.ignore_mdc_error))
613 write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY);
615 log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
616 if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result)
617 write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC);
618 else if (!opt.no_mdc_warn)
619 log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
621 else if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
623 glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
624 log_error (_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
625 write_status (STATUS_BADMDC);
626 write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
630 if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
631 && *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
633 log_debug (_("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n"),
634 c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
635 passphrase_clear_cache (NULL, c->dek->s2k_cacheid, 0);
637 glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
638 write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
639 log_error (_("decryption failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (result));
640 /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
641 * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK). */
647 c->last_was_session_key = 0;
648 write_status (STATUS_END_DECRYPTION);
653 proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
655 PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
656 int any, clearsig, rc;
661 if (pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8))
662 log_info (_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
663 else if (opt.verbose)
664 log_info (_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name);
666 free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
667 if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
669 /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
670 * and no armoring - Not yet tested
671 * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
672 * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
673 * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
676 for (n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
678 if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
680 /* The onepass signature case. */
681 if (n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo)
683 gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo);
687 else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
688 && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
690 /* The clearsigned message case. */
691 size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
692 const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
694 /* Check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash. */
696 log_fatal ("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
697 /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
699 clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
700 for (data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++)
701 gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, *data);
703 break; /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not
706 else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
708 /* The SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */
709 gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo );
714 if (!any && !opt.skip_verify)
716 /* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case. It's not legal
717 according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that often.
718 There is no good way to specify what algorithms to use in
719 that case, so these there are the historical answer. */
720 gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160);
721 gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1);
725 gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
727 gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
732 if (literals_seen > 1)
734 log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
736 if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages)
738 write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
739 log_inc_errorcount ();
740 rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
746 rc = handle_plaintext (pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig);
747 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only)
749 /* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the
751 rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
756 log_error ("handle plaintext failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
759 c->last_was_session_key = 0;
761 /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
762 * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. */
763 n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
765 add_kbnode (c->list, n);
772 proc_compressed_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info)
774 if ( ((CTX)info)->signed_data.used
775 && ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
776 return proc_signature_packets_by_fd (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
777 ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd);
779 return proc_signature_packets (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
780 ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_names,
781 ((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
786 proc_encrypt_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info )
789 return proc_encryption_packets (c->ctrl, info, a );
794 proc_compressed (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
796 PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
799 /*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/
801 rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c);
802 else if( c->encrypt_only )
803 rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c);
805 rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, NULL, NULL);
807 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA)
809 if (!c->any.uncompress_failed)
813 for (cc=c; cc; cc = cc->anchor)
814 cc->any.uncompress_failed = 1;
815 log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
819 log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
822 c->last_was_session_key = 0;
828 * check the signature
829 * Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code
832 do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, int *is_selfsig,
833 int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey)
836 gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
837 gcry_md_hd_t md2 = NULL;
840 assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
843 sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
845 algo = sig->digest_algo;
846 rc = openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
850 if (sig->sig_class == 0x00)
854 if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
857 else /* detached signature */
859 /* signature_check() will enable the md. */
860 if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
864 else if (sig->sig_class == 0x01)
866 /* How do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
867 in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
870 if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
872 if (c->mfx.md2 && gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2))
875 else /* detached signature */
877 log_debug ("Do we really need this here?");
878 /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
879 if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
881 if (gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 ))
885 else if ((sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
886 || sig->sig_class == 0x18
887 || sig->sig_class == 0x1f
888 || sig->sig_class == 0x20
889 || sig->sig_class == 0x28
890 || sig->sig_class == 0x30)
892 if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
893 || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
895 return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig );
897 else if (sig->sig_class == 0x20)
899 log_error (_("standalone revocation - "
900 "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
901 return GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
905 log_error ("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", sig->sig_class);
906 return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
910 return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
912 rc = signature_check2 (sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL);
913 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2)
914 rc = signature_check2 (sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL);
924 print_userid (PACKET *pkt)
929 if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
931 es_printf ("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
936 if (pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
938 pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
939 pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
941 es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
942 pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL);
945 print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
946 pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
951 * List the keyblock in a user friendly way
954 list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
957 char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
961 else if ((mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY))
962 || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
964 PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
970 keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
972 c->trustletter = (opt.fast_list_mode?
973 0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL));
974 es_printf ("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" );
976 es_putc (c->trustletter, es_stdout);
977 es_printf (":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
980 (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
981 colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
982 colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
983 if (mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode)
984 es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (pk), es_stdout);
985 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
988 es_printf ("%s %s/%s %s",
989 mainkey? "pub":"sub",
990 pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
992 datestr_from_pk (pk));
994 if (pk->flags.revoked)
997 es_printf (_("revoked: %s"), revokestr_from_pk (pk));
1000 else if( pk->expiredate && !opt.with_colons)
1003 es_printf (_("expires: %s"), expirestr_from_pk (pk));
1007 es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
1009 if ((mainkey && opt.fingerprint) || opt.fingerprint > 1)
1010 print_fingerprint (NULL, pk, 0);
1012 if (opt.with_colons)
1014 if (node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
1015 es_printf ("rtv:1:%u:\n",
1016 node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval);
1021 /* Now list all userids with their signatures. */
1022 for (node = node->next; node; node = node->next)
1024 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
1026 list_node (c, node );
1028 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
1030 if (opt.with_colons)
1031 es_printf ("%s:::::::::",
1032 node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
1034 es_printf ("uid%*s",
1035 (int)keystrlen ()+(opt.legacy_list_mode? 9:11),
1037 print_userid (node->pkt);
1038 if (opt.with_colons)
1039 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1040 es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
1043 && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST)
1045 es_printf ("rtv:2:%u:\n",
1046 node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust?
1047 node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval : 0);
1050 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
1052 list_node(c, node );
1057 else if ((mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) )
1058 || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
1061 log_debug ("FIXME: No way to print secret key packets here\n");
1062 /* fixme: We may use a fucntion to turn a secret key packet into
1063 a public key one and use that here. */
1065 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
1067 PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
1077 if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30)
1078 es_fputs ("rev", es_stdout);
1080 es_fputs ("sig", es_stdout);
1084 rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL);
1085 switch (gpg_err_code (rc2))
1087 case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
1088 case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: sigrc = '-'; break;
1089 case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
1090 case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
1091 default: sigrc = '%'; break;
1094 else /* Check whether this is a self signature. */
1098 if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
1099 || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
1101 keyid_from_pk (c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
1103 if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
1108 if (opt.with_colons)
1110 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1112 es_putc (sigrc, es_stdout);
1113 es_printf ("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
1114 (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
1115 colon_datestr_from_sig (sig),
1116 colon_expirestr_from_sig (sig));
1118 if (sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
1119 es_printf ("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
1120 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1122 if (sig->trust_regexp)
1123 es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sig->trust_regexp,
1124 strlen (sig->trust_regexp), ":", NULL);
1125 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1128 es_printf ("%c %s %s ",
1129 sigrc, keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
1131 es_printf ("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc2) );
1132 else if (sigrc == '?')
1134 else if (is_selfsig)
1136 if (opt.with_colons)
1137 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1138 es_fputs (sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", es_stdout);
1139 if (opt.with_colons)
1140 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1142 else if (!opt.fast_list_mode)
1144 p = get_user_id (sig->keyid, &n);
1145 es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, p, n,
1146 opt.with_colons?":":NULL, NULL );
1149 if (opt.with_colons)
1150 es_printf (":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
1151 es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
1154 log_error ("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
1159 proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
1162 CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
1166 rc = do_proc_packets (c, a);
1174 proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a,
1175 strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
1177 CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
1184 c->signed_data.data_fd = -1;
1185 c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles;
1186 c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles;
1188 c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
1189 rc = do_proc_packets ( c, a );
1191 /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
1192 messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
1193 Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
1194 error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
1196 if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
1198 write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
1199 log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
1200 rc = GPG_ERR_NO_DATA;
1203 /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
1204 so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
1205 if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
1206 c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
1214 proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl,
1215 void *anchor, iobuf_t a, int signed_data_fd )
1220 c = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *c);
1222 return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
1228 c->signed_data.data_fd = signed_data_fd;
1229 c->signed_data.data_names = NULL;
1230 c->signed_data.used = (signed_data_fd != -1);
1232 rc = do_proc_packets ( c, a );
1234 /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
1235 messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
1236 Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
1237 error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
1239 if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
1241 write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
1242 log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
1243 rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
1246 /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
1247 so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
1248 if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
1249 c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
1257 proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
1259 CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
1264 c->encrypt_only = 1;
1265 rc = do_proc_packets (c, a);
1272 check_nesting (CTX c)
1276 for (level=0; c; c = c->anchor)
1279 if (level > MAX_NESTING_DEPTH)
1281 log_error ("input data with too deeply nested packets\n");
1282 write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "1");
1283 return GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
1291 do_proc_packets (CTX c, iobuf_t a)
1298 rc = check_nesting (c);
1302 pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
1305 while ((rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1)
1311 /* Stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
1312 * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */
1313 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
1314 && opt.list_packets != 2 )
1319 if (opt.list_packets)
1321 switch (pkt->pkttype)
1323 case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
1324 case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
1326 case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
1327 case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
1328 default: newpkt = 0; break;
1331 else if (c->sigs_only)
1333 switch (pkt->pkttype)
1335 case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
1336 case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
1338 case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
1339 case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
1341 case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
1342 write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
1343 rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
1346 case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
1347 case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
1348 case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
1349 case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
1350 case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
1351 default: newpkt = 0; break;
1354 else if (c->encrypt_only)
1356 switch (pkt->pkttype)
1358 case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
1359 case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
1361 write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0");
1362 rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
1365 case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
1366 case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
1367 case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
1369 case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
1370 case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
1371 case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
1372 case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
1373 case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
1374 default: newpkt = 0; break;
1379 switch (pkt->pkttype)
1381 case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
1382 case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
1384 c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
1387 case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
1388 case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
1389 newpkt = add_subkey (c, pkt);
1391 case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id (c, pkt); break;
1392 case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
1393 case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
1394 case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
1396 case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
1397 case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
1398 case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
1399 case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
1400 case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
1401 case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust (c, pkt); break;
1402 default: newpkt = 0; break;
1409 /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
1410 * I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
1411 * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
1412 * packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
1413 * when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just
1415 * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
1417 if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC)
1418 c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT);
1424 pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
1431 if (rc == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET)
1432 write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "3");
1437 write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "2");
1445 free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
1450 /* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out
1451 of the notation data. */
1453 get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig)
1455 pka_info_t *pka = NULL;
1456 struct notation *nd,*notation;
1458 notation=sig_to_notation(sig);
1460 for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next)
1462 if(strcmp(nd->name,"pka-address@gnupg.org")!=0)
1463 continue; /* Not the notation we want. */
1465 /* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In future
1466 we might want to keep additional PKA notations in a linked
1468 if (is_valid_mailbox (nd->value))
1470 pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + strlen(nd->value));
1474 strcpy (pka->email, nd->value);
1479 free_notation(notation);
1485 /* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record. If this record has already
1486 be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go
1487 out and try to get that DNS record. */
1489 pka_uri_from_sig (CTX c, PKT_signature *sig)
1491 if (!sig->flags.pka_tried)
1493 assert (!sig->pka_info);
1494 sig->flags.pka_tried = 1;
1495 sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig);
1502 if (!gpg_dirmngr_get_pka (c->ctrl, sig->pka_info->email,
1503 &fpr, &fprlen, &url))
1505 if (fpr && fprlen == sizeof sig->pka_info->fpr)
1507 memcpy (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, fprlen);
1510 sig->pka_info->valid = 1;
1514 sig->pka_info->uri = url;
1523 return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL;
1528 print_good_bad_signature (int statno, const char *keyid_str, kbnode_t un,
1529 PKT_signature *sig, int rc)
1533 write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
1534 un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
1535 un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
1539 p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
1540 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
1542 p = xstrdup ("[?]");
1545 log_info (_("BAD signature from \"%s\""), p);
1546 else if (sig->flags.expired)
1547 log_info (_("Expired signature from \"%s\""), p);
1549 log_info (_("Good signature from \"%s\""), p);
1556 check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
1558 PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
1563 char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
1567 if (opt.skip_verify)
1569 log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
1573 /* Check that the message composition is valid.
1575 Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed:
1577 S{1,n} -- detached signature.
1578 S{1,n} P -- old style PGP2 signature
1579 O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature.
1580 C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature.
1583 O = One-Pass Signature packet.
1584 S = Signature packet.
1585 P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal)
1586 (Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows
1587 for a signed message but that does not work as it
1588 introduces ambiguities.)
1589 We keep track of these packages using the marker packet
1590 CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK.
1591 C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
1593 We reject all other messages.
1595 Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
1596 each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
1597 introduce a bug here.
1601 int n_onepass, n_sig;
1603 /* log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */
1604 /* dump_kbnode (c->list); */
1608 if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
1610 /* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or
1611 "S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */
1612 for (n = n->next; n; n = n->next)
1613 if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
1616 ; /* Okay, this is a detached signature. */
1617 else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
1618 && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
1619 == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK) )
1622 goto ambiguous; /* We only allow one P packet. */
1627 else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
1629 /* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */
1630 for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next;
1631 n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; n = n->next)
1633 if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
1634 && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
1635 == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
1637 for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
1638 n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
1643 /* If we wanted to disallow multiple sig verification, we'd do
1644 something like this:
1646 if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
1649 However, now that we have --allow-multiple-messages, this
1650 can stay allowable as we can't get here unless multiple
1651 messages (i.e. multiple literals) are allowed. */
1653 if (n_onepass != n_sig)
1655 log_info ("number of one-pass packets does not match "
1656 "number of signature packets\n");
1660 else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
1661 && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
1663 /* This is the "C P S{1,n}" case (clear text signature). */
1665 if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
1666 && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
1667 == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
1669 for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
1670 n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
1678 log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
1683 write_status_text (STATUS_NEWSIG, NULL);
1685 astr = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( sig->pubkey_algo );
1686 if (keystrlen () > 8)
1688 log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
1689 log_info (_(" using %s key %s\n"),
1690 astr? astr: "?",keystr(sig->keyid));
1693 log_info (_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
1694 asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
1695 keystr(sig->keyid));
1697 rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
1699 /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver */
1701 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
1707 while ((p=enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
1709 /* According to my favorite copy editor, in English grammar,
1710 you say "at" if the key is located on a web page, but
1711 "from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm not going to
1712 even try to make two strings here :) */
1713 log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
1714 print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream(), p, n);
1717 if (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
1718 && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
1720 struct keyserver_spec *spec;
1722 spec = parse_preferred_keyserver (sig);
1727 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
1728 res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid,spec);
1729 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
1731 rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
1732 free_keyserver_spec (spec);
1741 /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work, our second
1742 try is to use the URI from a DNS PKA record. */
1743 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
1744 && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
1745 && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD))
1747 const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig);
1751 /* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
1752 fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
1754 struct keyserver_spec *spec;
1756 spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1);
1759 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
1760 res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, spec);
1761 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
1762 free_keyserver_spec (spec);
1764 rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
1769 /* If the preferred keyserver thing above didn't work and we got
1770 no information from the DNS PKA, this is a third try. */
1772 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
1774 && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE))
1778 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
1779 res=keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, opt.keyserver );
1780 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
1782 rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey );
1785 if (!rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
1787 kbnode_t un, keyblock;
1791 PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
1794 statno = STATUS_BADSIG;
1795 else if (sig->flags.expired)
1796 statno = STATUS_EXPSIG;
1798 statno = STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
1800 statno = STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
1802 statno = STATUS_GOODSIG;
1804 keyblock = get_pubkeyblock (sig->keyid);
1806 snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
1807 (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
1809 /* Find and print the primary user ID. */
1810 for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
1814 if (un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
1816 pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
1819 if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
1821 if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created)
1823 if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
1825 if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
1827 if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary)
1829 /* We want the textual primary user ID here */
1830 if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
1835 /* Get it before we print anything to avoid interrupting the
1836 output with the "please do a --check-trustdb" line. */
1837 valid = get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
1839 keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
1841 print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
1843 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
1844 log_printf (" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
1848 pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf);
1852 if (!count) /* Just in case that we have no valid textual userid */
1854 /* Try for an invalid textual userid */
1855 for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
1857 if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
1858 && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
1862 /* Try for any userid at all */
1865 for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
1867 if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
1872 if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
1873 keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
1875 print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
1877 if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS && un)
1878 log_printf (" %s",_("[uncertain]") );
1882 /* If we have a good signature and already printed
1883 * the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
1886 && !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY))
1889 for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
1891 if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
1893 if ((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked
1894 || un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
1895 && !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
1897 /* Only skip textual primaries */
1898 if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary
1899 && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
1902 if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
1904 dump_attribs (un->pkt->pkt.user_id, pk);
1906 if (opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
1907 show_photos (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
1908 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
1909 pk ,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
1912 p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
1913 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
1914 log_info (_(" aka \"%s\""), p);
1917 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
1921 if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked)
1922 valid = _("revoked");
1923 else if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired)
1924 valid = _("expired");
1926 valid = (trust_value_to_string
1927 (get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id)));
1928 log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid);
1934 release_kbnode( keyblock );
1938 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
1939 show_policy_url (sig, 0, 1);
1941 show_policy_url (sig, 0, 2);
1943 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
1944 show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 1);
1946 show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 2);
1948 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
1951 (((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)
1952 + ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0)));
1954 show_notation (sig, 0, 2, 0);
1957 if (!rc && is_status_enabled ())
1959 /* Print a status response with the fingerprint. */
1960 PKT_public_key *vpk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *vpk);
1962 if (!get_pubkey (vpk, sig->keyid))
1964 byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
1965 char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*4+90], *bufp;
1969 fingerprint_from_pk (vpk, array, &n);
1971 for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
1972 sprintf (bufp, "%02X", *p );
1973 /* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below
1974 with bits for status flags (policy url, notation,
1975 etc.). Remember to make the buffer larger to match! */
1976 sprintf (bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ",
1977 strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ),
1978 (ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate,
1979 sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo,
1981 bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp);
1982 if (!vpk->flags.primary)
1986 akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0];
1987 akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1];
1988 free_public_key (vpk);
1989 vpk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *vpk);
1990 if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid))
1992 /* Impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */
1993 n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20;
1994 memset (array, 0, n);
1997 fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n );
2000 for (i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2)
2001 sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p );
2002 write_status_text (STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf);
2004 free_public_key (vpk);
2009 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS))
2010 pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
2011 rc = check_signatures_trust (sig);
2014 if (sig->flags.expired)
2016 log_info (_("Signature expired %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
2017 rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Need a better error here? */
2019 else if (sig->expiredate)
2020 log_info (_("Signature expires %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
2023 log_info (_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s%s%s\n"),
2024 sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
2025 sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
2026 gcry_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo),
2027 *pkstrbuf?_(", key algorithm "):"",
2030 if (!rc && !c->signed_data.used)
2032 /* Signature is basically good but we test whether the
2034 gpg --verify FILE.sig
2036 gpg --verify FILE.sig FILE
2037 to verify a detached signature. If we figure out that a
2038 data file with a matching name exists, we print a warning.
2040 The problem is that the first form would also verify a
2041 standard signature. This behavior could be used to
2042 create a made up .sig file for a tarball by creating a
2043 standard signature from a valid detached signature packet
2044 (for example from a signed git tag). Then replace the
2045 sig file on the FTP server along with a changed tarball.
2046 Using the first form the verify command would correctly
2047 verify the signature but don't even consider the tarball. */
2051 dfile = get_matching_datafile (c->sigfilename);
2054 for (n = c->list; n; n = n->next)
2055 if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
2059 /* Not only signature packets in the tree thus this
2060 is not a detached signature. */
2061 log_info (_("WARNING: not a detached signature; "
2062 "file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"), dfile);
2069 g10_errors_seen = 1;
2070 if (opt.batch && rc)
2077 snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d",
2078 (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
2079 sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
2080 sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc);
2081 write_status_text (STATUS_ERRSIG, buf);
2082 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
2085 write_status_text (STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf);
2087 if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED)
2088 log_error (_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
2096 * Process the tree which starts at node
2099 proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
2104 if (opt.list_packets || opt.list_only)
2107 /* We must skip our special plaintext marker packets here because
2108 they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in
2109 addional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter. */
2111 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
2112 && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)
2119 c->trustletter = ' ';
2120 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
2121 || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
2123 merge_keys_and_selfsig (node);
2124 list_node (c, node);
2126 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
2128 merge_keys_and_selfsig (node);
2129 list_node (c, node);
2131 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
2133 /* Check all signatures. */
2136 int use_textmode = 0;
2138 free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
2139 /* Prepare to create all requested message digests. */
2140 rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0);
2144 /* Fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the
2146 for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
2147 gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
2149 if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01)
2152 /* Ask for file and hash it. */
2155 if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
2156 rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL,
2157 c->signed_data.data_fd,
2160 rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL,
2161 c->signed_data.data_names,
2167 rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
2168 iobuf_get_real_fname (c->iobuf),
2175 log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
2179 else if (c->signed_data.used)
2181 log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
2185 for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
2186 check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
2189 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
2190 && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
2192 /* Clear text signed message. */
2195 log_error ("cleartext signature without data\n");
2198 else if (c->signed_data.used)
2200 log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
2204 for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
2205 check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
2208 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
2210 PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
2211 int multiple_ok = 1;
2213 n1 = find_next_kbnode (node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
2216 byte class = sig->sig_class;
2217 byte hash = sig->digest_algo;
2219 for (; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
2221 /* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
2222 different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have
2223 to run a different hash context for each), but if
2224 they are all the same, make an exception. */
2225 if (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class != class
2226 || n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo != hash)
2229 log_info (_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. "
2230 "Only the first will be checked.\n"));
2236 if (sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01)
2238 log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), sig->sig_class);
2240 else if (!c->any.data)
2242 /* Detached signature */
2243 free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
2244 rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0);
2246 goto detached_hash_err;
2248 if (RFC2440 || RFC4880)
2249 ; /* Strict RFC mode. */
2250 else if (sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
2251 && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
2252 && sig->sig_class == 0x01)
2254 /* Enable a workaround for a pgp5 bug when the detached
2255 * signature has been created in textmode. */
2256 rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, sig->digest_algo, 0);
2258 goto detached_hash_err;
2261 /* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp
2262 * 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached
2263 * signatures; this would let the first signature check
2264 * (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an
2265 * extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash.
2266 * This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in
2267 * some cases (and break others).
2268 * c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01)
2273 gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
2275 gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
2280 if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
2281 rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
2282 c->signed_data.data_fd,
2283 (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
2285 rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
2286 c->signed_data.data_names,
2288 (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
2292 rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
2293 iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
2294 (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
2300 log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
2304 else if (c->signed_data.used)
2306 log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
2309 else if (!opt.quiet)
2310 log_info (_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
2314 for (n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
2315 check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
2318 check_sig_and_print (c, node);
2323 dump_kbnode (c->list);
2324 log_error ("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n");