1 /* mainproc.c - handle packets
2 * Copyright (C) 1998-2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
3 * Copyright (C) 2013-2014 Werner Koch
5 * This file is part of GnuPG.
7 * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
28 #include "../common/util.h"
30 #include "../common/iobuf.h"
35 #include "../common/status.h"
36 #include "../common/i18n.h"
38 #include "keyserver-internal.h"
40 #include "../common/mbox-util.h"
41 #include "call-dirmngr.h"
42 #include "../common/compliance.h"
44 /* Put an upper limit on nested packets. The 32 is an arbitrary
45 value, a much lower should actually be sufficient. */
46 #define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32
49 /* An object to build a list of keyid related info. */
52 struct kidlist_item *next;
60 * Object to hold the processing context.
62 typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX;
63 struct mainproc_context
66 struct mainproc_context *anchor; /* May be useful in the future. */
67 PKT_public_key *last_pubkey;
68 PKT_user_id *last_user_id;
69 md_filter_context_t mfx;
70 int sigs_only; /* Process only signatures and reject all other stuff. */
71 int encrypt_only; /* Process only encryption messages. */
73 /* Name of the file with the complete signature or the file with the
74 detached signature. This is currently only used to deduce the
75 file name of the data file if that has not been given. */
76 const char *sigfilename;
78 /* A structure to describe the signed data in case of a detached
82 /* A file descriptor of the signed data. Only used if not -1. */
84 /* A list of filenames with the data files or NULL. This is only
85 used if DATA_FD is -1. */
87 /* Flag to indicated that either one of the next previous fields
88 is used. This is only needed for better readability. */
93 int last_was_session_key;
94 kbnode_t list; /* The current list of packets. */
95 iobuf_t iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */
96 int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */
97 ulong symkeys; /* Number of symmetrically encrypted session keys. */
98 struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */
100 unsigned int sig_seen:1; /* Set to true if a signature packet
102 unsigned int data:1; /* Any data packet seen */
103 unsigned int uncompress_failed:1;
108 /* Counter with the number of literal data packets seen. Note that
109 * this is also bumped at the end of an encryption. This counter is
110 * used for a basic consistency check of a received PGP message. */
111 static int literals_seen;
114 /*** Local prototypes. ***/
115 static int do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a);
116 static void list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
117 static void proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node);
122 /* Reset the literal data counter. This is required to setup a new
123 * decryption or verification context. */
125 reset_literals_seen(void)
132 release_list( CTX c )
134 proc_tree (c, c->list);
135 release_kbnode (c->list);
136 while (c->pkenc_list)
138 struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next;
139 xfree (c->pkenc_list);
142 c->pkenc_list = NULL;
145 c->any.uncompress_failed = 0;
146 c->last_was_session_key = 0;
153 add_onepass_sig (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
157 if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
158 add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
159 else /* Insert the first one. */
160 c->list = node = new_kbnode (pkt);
167 add_gpg_control (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
169 if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
171 /* New clear text signature.
172 * Process the last one and reset everything */
176 if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */
177 add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
178 else /* Insert the first one. */
179 c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
186 add_user_id (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
190 log_error ("orphaned user ID\n");
193 add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
199 add_subkey (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
203 log_error ("subkey w/o mainkey\n");
206 add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
212 add_ring_trust (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
216 log_error ("ring trust w/o key\n");
219 add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt));
225 add_signature (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
230 if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list)
232 /* This is the first signature for the following datafile.
233 * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses
234 * onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method
235 * of prepending the signature to the data is
236 * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read
237 * from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */
238 node = new_kbnode (pkt);
243 return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/
244 else if (!c->list->pkt)
245 BUG(); /* so nicht */
247 /* Add a new signature node item at the end. */
248 node = new_kbnode (pkt);
249 add_kbnode (c->list, node);
255 symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen)
259 if(slen < 17 || slen > 33)
261 log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"),
263 return GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY;
266 if (openpgp_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1))
268 if (gcry_cipher_setkey ( hd, dek->key, dek->keylen ))
270 gcry_cipher_setiv ( hd, NULL, 0 );
271 gcry_cipher_decrypt ( hd, seskey, slen, NULL, 0 );
272 gcry_cipher_close ( hd );
274 /* Here we can only test whether the algo given in decrypted
275 * session key is a valid OpenPGP algo. With 11 defined
276 * symmetric algorithms we will miss 4.3% of wrong passphrases
277 * here. The actual checking is done later during bulk
278 * decryption; we can't bring this check forward easily. */
279 if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (seskey[0]))
280 return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY);
282 /* Now we replace the dek components with the real session key to
283 decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */
288 if(dek->keylen > DIM(dek->key))
291 memcpy(dek->key, seskey + 1, dek->keylen);
293 /*log_hexdump( "thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen );*/
300 proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
304 enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc;
306 log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n");
309 int algo = enc->cipher_algo;
310 const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo);
312 if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo))
317 log_info (_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s );
319 log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), s );
323 log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo);
325 if (openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo))
327 log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest"
328 " algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo);
332 c->last_was_session_key = 2;
333 if (!s || opt.list_only)
336 if (opt.override_session_key)
338 c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
339 if (get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
347 c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, &enc->s2k, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
350 c->dek->symmetric = 1;
352 /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key
353 comes before a public key in the message - if the
354 user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is a
355 chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen to
356 be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
357 appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
361 if (symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek,
362 enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen))
364 if (c->dek->s2k_cacheid[0])
367 log_debug ("cleared passphrase cached with ID:"
368 " %s\n", c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
369 passphrase_clear_cache (c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
376 c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
383 free_packet (pkt, NULL);
388 proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
393 /* Check whether the secret key is available and store in this case. */
394 c->last_was_session_key = 1;
395 enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc;
396 /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/
397 /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is
398 * function to check it. */
400 log_info (_("public key is %s\n"), keystr (enc->keyid));
402 if (is_status_enabled())
405 /* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo number
406 to the Libgcrypt defined one. This is due a chicken-egg
407 problem: We need to have code in Libgcrypt for a new
408 algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm before the
409 IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP identifier. */
410 snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0",
411 (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo);
412 write_status_text (STATUS_ENC_TO, buf);
415 if (!opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key)
417 /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in
418 * secure memory because it has already been passed on the
419 * command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */
420 c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
421 result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
428 else if (enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E
429 || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH
430 || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA
431 || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA_E
432 || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL)
434 /* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption.
435 There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a
438 /* FIXME: Store this all in a list and process it later so that
439 we can prioritize what key to use. This gives a better user
440 experience if wildcard keyids are used. */
441 if (!c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1])
442 || opt.try_all_secrets
443 || have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)))
446 result = GPG_ERR_MISSING_ACTION; /* fixme: Use better error code. */
449 c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
450 if ((result = get_session_key (ctrl, enc, c->dek)))
452 /* Error: Delete the DEK. */
459 result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
462 result = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
466 /* Store it for later display. */
467 struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc (sizeof *x);
468 x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
469 x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
470 x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
472 x->next = c->pkenc_list;
475 if (!result && opt.verbose > 1)
476 log_info (_("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n"));
479 free_packet(pkt, NULL);
484 * Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could
488 print_pkenc_list (ctrl_t ctrl, struct kidlist_item *list, int failed)
490 for (; list; list = list->next)
495 if (failed && !list->reason)
497 if (!failed && list->reason)
500 algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo);
501 pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk);
505 pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo;
506 if (!get_pubkey (ctrl, pk, list->kid))
509 log_info (_("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"),
510 nbits_from_pk (pk), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk),
511 strtimestamp (pk->timestamp));
512 p = get_user_id_native (ctrl, list->kid);
513 log_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"), p);
517 log_info (_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"),
518 algstr, keystr(list->kid));
520 free_public_key (pk);
522 if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY)
524 if (is_status_enabled())
527 snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX",
528 (ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]);
529 write_status_text (STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf);
532 else if (gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_MISSING_ACTION)
534 /* Not tested for secret key due to --list-only mode. */
536 else if (list->reason)
538 log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"),
539 gpg_strerror (list->reason));
540 write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason);
547 proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
550 int early_plaintext = literals_seen;
554 log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
555 write_status_errcode ("decryption.early_plaintext", GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
556 /* We fail only later so that we can print some more info first. */
562 log_info (_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"), c->symkeys);
563 else if (c->symkeys == 1)
564 log_info (_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n"));
565 print_pkenc_list (c->ctrl, c->pkenc_list, 1 );
566 print_pkenc_list (c->ctrl, c->pkenc_list, 0 );
569 /* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */
571 write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION);
573 /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/
576 else if (!c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key)
580 STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL;
583 if (opt.override_session_key)
585 c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek);
586 result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
595 /* Assume this is old style conventional encrypted data. */
596 algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
598 log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
599 openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
600 else if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA))
602 algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
604 algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
605 log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
606 "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
607 openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo));
611 algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
612 if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
614 /* If no digest is given we assume SHA-1. */
616 s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1;
619 log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
622 c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (algo, s2k, 0, 0, NULL, &canceled);
624 c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
626 result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CANCELED);
628 result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PASSPHRASE);
632 result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY;
634 /* Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS. */
635 if (!result && is_status_enabled ()
636 /* Symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption voids compliance. */
637 && (c->symkeys != !!c->pkenc_list )
638 /* Overriding session key voids compliance. */
639 && !opt.override_session_key
640 /* Check symmetric cipher. */
641 && gnupg_cipher_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, c->dek->algo,
642 GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB))
644 struct kidlist_item *i;
646 PKT_public_key *pk = xmalloc (sizeof *pk);
648 if ( !(c->pkenc_list || c->symkeys) )
649 log_debug ("%s: where else did the session key come from?\n", __func__);
651 /* Now check that every key used to encrypt the session key is
653 for (i = c->pkenc_list; i && compliant; i = i->next)
655 memset (pk, 0, sizeof *pk);
656 pk->pubkey_algo = i->pubkey_algo;
657 if (get_pubkey (c->ctrl, pk, i->kid) != 0
658 || ! gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, pk->pubkey_algo, pk->pkey,
659 nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL))
661 release_public_key_parts (pk);
667 write_status_strings (STATUS_DECRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE,
668 gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS),
675 result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
677 /* Trigger the deferred error. */
678 if (!result && early_plaintext)
679 result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA);
684 && !opt.ignore_mdc_error
685 && !pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method)
687 /* The message has been decrypted but does not carry an MDC.
688 * The option --ignore-mdc-error has also not been used. To
689 * avoid attacks changing an MDC message to a non-MDC message,
691 log_error (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
692 if (!pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method
693 && (openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen (c->dek->algo) == 8
694 || c->dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH))
696 /* Before 2.2.8 we did not fail hard for a missing MDC if
697 * one of the old ciphers where used. Although these cases
698 * are rare in practice we print a hint on how to decrypt
702 _("Hint: If this message was created before the year 2003 it is\n"
703 "likely that this message is legitimate. This is because back\n"
704 "then integrity protection was not widely used.\n"));
705 log_info (_("Use the option '%s' to decrypt anyway.\n"),
706 "--ignore-mdc-error");
707 write_status_errcode ("nomdc_with_legacy_cipher",
708 GPG_ERR_DECRYPT_FAILED);
710 log_info (_("decryption forced to fail!\n"));
711 write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
713 else if (!result || (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE
714 && opt.ignore_mdc_error))
716 write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY);
718 log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
719 if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result)
720 write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC);
722 log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
724 else if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
726 glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
727 log_error (_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
728 write_status (STATUS_BADMDC);
729 write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
733 if ((gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY
734 || gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO)
735 && *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0')
738 log_debug ("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n",
739 c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
740 passphrase_clear_cache (c->dek->s2k_cacheid);
742 glo_ctrl.lasterr = result;
743 write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED);
744 log_error (_("decryption failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (result));
745 /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
746 * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK). */
751 free_packet (pkt, NULL);
752 c->last_was_session_key = 0;
753 write_status (STATUS_END_DECRYPTION);
755 /* Bump the counter even if we have not seen a literal data packet
756 * inside an encryption container. This acts as a sentinel in case
757 * a misplace extra literal data packets follows after this
758 * encrypted packet. */
764 proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
766 PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext;
767 int any, clearsig, rc;
770 /* This is a literal data packet. Bumb a counter for later checks. */
773 if (pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8))
774 log_info (_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n"));
775 else if (opt.verbose)
777 /* We don't use print_utf8_buffer because that would require a
778 * string change which we don't want in 2.2. It is also not
779 * clear whether the filename is always utf-8 encoded. */
780 char *tmp = make_printable_string (pt->name, pt->namelen, 0);
781 log_info (_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), (int)strlen (tmp), tmp);
785 free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
786 if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0))
788 /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1
789 * and no armoring - Not yet tested
790 * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1
791 * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1??
792 * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09
795 for (n=c->list; n; n = n->next )
797 if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
799 /* The onepass signature case. */
800 if (n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo)
802 if (!opt.skip_verify)
803 gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md,
804 n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo);
809 else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
810 && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
812 /* The clearsigned message case. */
813 size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen;
814 const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data;
816 /* Check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash. */
818 log_fatal ("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n");
819 /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped
821 clearsig = (*data == 0x01);
822 for (data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++)
823 if (!opt.skip_verify)
824 gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, *data);
826 break; /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not
829 else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
831 /* The SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */
832 if (!opt.skip_verify)
833 gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
838 if (!any && !opt.skip_verify)
840 /* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case. It's not legal
841 according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that often.
842 There is no good way to specify what algorithms to use in
843 that case, so these there are the historical answer. */
844 gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160);
845 gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1);
849 gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
851 gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
856 if (literals_seen > 1)
858 log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n"));
860 if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages)
862 write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA");
863 log_inc_errorcount ();
864 rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED);
870 /* It we are in --verify mode, we do not want to output the
871 * signed text. However, if --output is also used we do what
872 * has been requested and write out the signed data. */
873 rc = handle_plaintext (pt, &c->mfx,
874 (opt.outfp || opt.outfile)? 0 : c->sigs_only,
876 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only)
878 /* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the
880 rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig );
885 log_error ("handle plaintext failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
887 free_packet (pkt, NULL);
888 c->last_was_session_key = 0;
890 /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet.
891 * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. */
892 n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0));
894 add_kbnode (c->list, n);
901 proc_compressed_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info)
903 if ( ((CTX)info)->signed_data.used
904 && ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
905 return proc_signature_packets_by_fd (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
906 ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd);
908 return proc_signature_packets (((CTX)info)->ctrl, info, a,
909 ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_names,
910 ((CTX)info)->sigfilename );
915 proc_encrypt_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info )
918 return proc_encryption_packets (c->ctrl, info, a );
923 proc_compressed (CTX c, PACKET *pkt)
925 PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed;
928 /*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/
930 rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c);
931 else if( c->encrypt_only )
932 rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c);
934 rc = handle_compressed (c->ctrl, c, zd, NULL, NULL);
936 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA)
938 if (!c->any.uncompress_failed)
942 for (cc=c; cc; cc = cc->anchor)
943 cc->any.uncompress_failed = 1;
944 log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
948 log_error ("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
950 free_packet (pkt, NULL);
951 c->last_was_session_key = 0;
957 * Check the signature. If R_PK is not NULL a copy of the public key
958 * used to verify the signature will be stored there, or NULL if not
959 * found. Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code
962 do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, int *is_selfsig,
963 int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey, PKT_public_key **r_pk)
966 gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL;
967 gcry_md_hd_t md2 = NULL;
968 gcry_md_hd_t md_good = NULL;
974 log_assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE);
977 sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
979 algo = sig->digest_algo;
980 rc = openpgp_md_test_algo (algo);
984 if (sig->sig_class == 0x00)
988 if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
991 else /* detached signature */
993 /* check_signature() will enable the md. */
994 if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
998 else if (sig->sig_class == 0x01)
1000 /* How do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text
1001 in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */
1004 if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md ))
1006 if (c->mfx.md2 && gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2))
1009 else /* detached signature */
1011 log_debug ("Do we really need this here?");
1012 /* check_signature() will enable the md*/
1013 if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ))
1015 if (gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 ))
1019 else if ((sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
1020 || sig->sig_class == 0x18
1021 || sig->sig_class == 0x1f
1022 || sig->sig_class == 0x20
1023 || sig->sig_class == 0x28
1024 || sig->sig_class == 0x30)
1026 if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
1027 || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
1029 return check_key_signature (c->ctrl, c->list, node, is_selfsig);
1031 else if (sig->sig_class == 0x20)
1033 log_error (_("standalone revocation - "
1034 "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n"));
1035 return GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED;
1039 log_error ("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", sig->sig_class);
1040 return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
1044 return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS;
1046 /* We only get here if we are checking the signature of a binary
1047 (0x00) or text document (0x01). */
1048 rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, r_pk);
1051 else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2)
1053 PKT_public_key *pk2;
1055 rc = check_signature2 (c->ctrl, sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey,
1062 free_public_key (*r_pk);
1070 unsigned char *buffer = gcry_md_read (md_good, sig->digest_algo);
1071 sig->digest_len = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (map_md_openpgp_to_gcry (algo));
1072 memcpy (sig->digest, buffer, sig->digest_len);
1076 gcry_md_close (md2);
1083 print_userid (PACKET *pkt)
1088 if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
1090 es_printf ("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype );
1093 if (opt.with_colons)
1095 if (pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
1097 pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
1098 pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len);
1100 es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
1101 pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL);
1104 print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
1105 pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
1110 * List the keyblock in a user friendly way
1113 list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
1117 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
1118 || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
1120 PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
1122 if (opt.with_colons)
1126 keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
1127 if (pk->flags.primary)
1128 c->trustletter = (opt.fast_list_mode
1132 node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
1135 es_printf ("%s:", pk->flags.primary? "pub":"sub" );
1137 es_putc (c->trustletter, es_stdout);
1138 es_printf (":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s::",
1139 nbits_from_pk( pk ),
1141 (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
1142 colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ),
1143 colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) );
1144 if (pk->flags.primary && !opt.fast_list_mode)
1145 es_putc (get_ownertrust_info (c->ctrl, pk, 1), es_stdout);
1146 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1147 es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
1151 print_key_line (c->ctrl, es_stdout, pk, 0);
1154 if (opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE && !opt.with_colons)
1155 ; /* Already printed. */
1156 else if ((pk->flags.primary && opt.fingerprint) || opt.fingerprint > 1)
1157 print_fingerprint (c->ctrl, NULL, pk, 0);
1159 if (pk->flags.primary)
1161 int kl = opt.keyid_format == KF_NONE? 0 : keystrlen ();
1163 /* Now list all userids with their signatures. */
1164 for (node = node->next; node; node = node->next)
1166 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
1168 list_node (c, node );
1170 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
1172 if (opt.with_colons)
1173 es_printf ("%s:::::::::",
1174 node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid");
1176 es_printf ("uid%*s",
1177 kl + (opt.legacy_list_mode? 9:11),
1179 print_userid (node->pkt);
1180 if (opt.with_colons)
1181 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1182 es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
1184 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
1186 list_node(c, node );
1191 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
1192 || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
1195 log_debug ("FIXME: No way to print secret key packets here\n");
1196 /* fixme: We may use a function to turn a secret key packet into
1197 a public key one and use that here. */
1199 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
1201 PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
1211 if (sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30)
1212 es_fputs ("rev", es_stdout);
1214 es_fputs ("sig", es_stdout);
1218 rc2 = do_check_sig (c, node, &is_selfsig, NULL, NULL, NULL);
1219 switch (gpg_err_code (rc2))
1221 case 0: sigrc = '!'; break;
1222 case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: sigrc = '-'; break;
1223 case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY:
1224 case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break;
1225 default: sigrc = '%'; break;
1228 else /* Check whether this is a self signature. */
1232 if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
1233 || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
1235 keyid_from_pk (c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid);
1237 if (keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1])
1242 if (opt.with_colons)
1244 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1246 es_putc (sigrc, es_stdout);
1247 es_printf ("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo,
1248 (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
1249 colon_datestr_from_sig (sig),
1250 colon_expirestr_from_sig (sig));
1252 if (sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value)
1253 es_printf ("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value);
1254 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1256 if (sig->trust_regexp)
1257 es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, sig->trust_regexp,
1258 strlen (sig->trust_regexp), ":", NULL);
1259 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1262 es_printf ("%c %s %s ",
1263 sigrc, keystr (sig->keyid), datestr_from_sig(sig));
1265 es_printf ("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc2) );
1266 else if (sigrc == '?')
1268 else if (is_selfsig)
1270 if (opt.with_colons)
1271 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1272 es_fputs (sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", es_stdout);
1273 if (opt.with_colons)
1274 es_putc (':', es_stdout);
1276 else if (!opt.fast_list_mode)
1278 p = get_user_id (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, &n, NULL);
1279 es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, p, n,
1280 opt.with_colons?":":NULL, NULL );
1283 if (opt.with_colons)
1284 es_printf (":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l');
1285 es_putc ('\n', es_stdout);
1288 log_error ("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype);
1293 proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
1296 CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
1300 rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
1308 proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a,
1309 strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfilename )
1311 CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
1318 c->signed_data.data_fd = -1;
1319 c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles;
1320 c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles;
1322 c->sigfilename = sigfilename;
1323 rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
1325 /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
1326 messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
1327 Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
1328 error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
1330 if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
1332 write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
1333 log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
1334 rc = GPG_ERR_NO_DATA;
1337 /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
1338 so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
1339 if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
1340 c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
1348 proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl,
1349 void *anchor, iobuf_t a, int signed_data_fd )
1354 c = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *c);
1356 return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
1362 c->signed_data.data_fd = signed_data_fd;
1363 c->signed_data.data_names = NULL;
1364 c->signed_data.used = (signed_data_fd != -1);
1366 rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
1368 /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error
1369 messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code.
1370 Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check
1371 error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process
1373 if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen)
1375 write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4");
1376 log_error (_("no signature found\n"));
1377 rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NO_DATA);
1380 /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success
1381 so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */
1382 if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen)
1383 c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1;
1391 proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a )
1393 CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c);
1398 c->encrypt_only = 1;
1399 rc = do_proc_packets (ctrl, c, a);
1406 check_nesting (CTX c)
1410 for (level=0; c; c = c->anchor)
1413 if (level > MAX_NESTING_DEPTH)
1415 log_error ("input data with too deeply nested packets\n");
1416 write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "1");
1417 return GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA;
1425 do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a)
1428 struct parse_packet_ctx_s parsectx;
1433 rc = check_nesting (c);
1437 pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt );
1440 init_parse_packet (&parsectx, a);
1441 while ((rc=parse_packet (&parsectx, pkt)) != -1)
1446 free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
1447 /* Stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered
1448 * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */
1449 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET
1450 && opt.list_packets == 0)
1455 if (opt.list_packets)
1457 switch (pkt->pkttype)
1459 case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
1460 case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
1462 case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
1463 case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
1464 default: newpkt = 0; break;
1467 else if (c->sigs_only)
1469 switch (pkt->pkttype)
1471 case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
1472 case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
1474 case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC:
1475 case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
1477 case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC:
1478 write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" );
1479 rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
1482 case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
1483 case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
1484 case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
1485 case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
1486 case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
1487 default: newpkt = 0; break;
1490 else if (c->encrypt_only)
1492 switch (pkt->pkttype)
1494 case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
1495 case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
1497 write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0");
1498 rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED;
1501 case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
1502 case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
1503 case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
1505 case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
1506 case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
1507 case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
1508 case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
1509 case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break;
1510 default: newpkt = 0; break;
1515 switch (pkt->pkttype)
1517 case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
1518 case PKT_SECRET_KEY:
1520 c->list = new_kbnode (pkt);
1523 case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
1524 case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
1525 newpkt = add_subkey (c, pkt);
1527 case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id (c, pkt); break;
1528 case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break;
1529 case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break;
1530 case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break;
1532 case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break;
1533 case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break;
1534 case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break;
1535 case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break;
1536 case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break;
1537 case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust (c, pkt); break;
1538 default: newpkt = 0; break;
1545 /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why
1546 * I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack.
1547 * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted
1548 * packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right
1549 * when there is a compression packet between which adds just
1551 * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here??
1553 if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC)
1554 c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT);
1560 pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
1564 free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
1567 if (rc == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET)
1568 write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "3");
1573 write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "2");
1579 free_packet (pkt, &parsectx);
1580 deinit_parse_packet (&parsectx);
1582 free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
1587 /* Helper for pka_uri_from_sig to parse the to-be-verified address out
1588 of the notation data. */
1590 get_pka_address (PKT_signature *sig)
1592 pka_info_t *pka = NULL;
1593 struct notation *nd,*notation;
1595 notation=sig_to_notation(sig);
1597 for(nd=notation;nd;nd=nd->next)
1599 if(strcmp(nd->name,"pka-address@gnupg.org")!=0)
1600 continue; /* Not the notation we want. */
1602 /* For now we only use the first valid PKA notation. In future
1603 we might want to keep additional PKA notations in a linked
1605 if (is_valid_mailbox (nd->value))
1607 pka = xmalloc (sizeof *pka + strlen(nd->value));
1611 strcpy (pka->email, nd->value);
1616 free_notation(notation);
1622 /* Return the URI from a DNS PKA record. If this record has already
1623 be retrieved for the signature we merely return it; if not we go
1624 out and try to get that DNS record. */
1626 pka_uri_from_sig (CTX c, PKT_signature *sig)
1628 if (!sig->flags.pka_tried)
1630 log_assert (!sig->pka_info);
1631 sig->flags.pka_tried = 1;
1632 sig->pka_info = get_pka_address (sig);
1639 if (!gpg_dirmngr_get_pka (c->ctrl, sig->pka_info->email,
1640 &fpr, &fprlen, &url))
1642 if (fpr && fprlen == sizeof sig->pka_info->fpr)
1644 memcpy (sig->pka_info->fpr, fpr, fprlen);
1647 sig->pka_info->valid = 1;
1651 sig->pka_info->uri = url;
1660 return sig->pka_info? sig->pka_info->uri : NULL;
1664 /* Return true if the AKL has the WKD method specified. */
1666 akl_has_wkd_method (void)
1670 for (akl = opt.auto_key_locate; akl; akl = akl->next)
1671 if (akl->type == AKL_WKD)
1677 /* Return the ISSUER fingerprint buffer and its lenbgth at R_LEN.
1678 * Returns NULL if not available. The returned buffer is valid as
1679 * long as SIG is not modified. */
1681 issuer_fpr_raw (PKT_signature *sig, size_t *r_len)
1686 p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER_FPR, &n);
1687 if (p && n == 21 && p[0] == 4)
1697 /* Return the ISSUER fingerprint string in human readable format if
1698 * available. Caller must release the string. */
1699 /* FIXME: Move to another file. */
1701 issuer_fpr_string (PKT_signature *sig)
1706 p = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &n);
1707 return p? bin2hex (p, n, NULL) : NULL;
1712 print_good_bad_signature (int statno, const char *keyid_str, kbnode_t un,
1713 PKT_signature *sig, int rc)
1717 write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str,
1718 un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]",
1719 un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3,
1723 p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
1724 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
1726 p = xstrdup ("[?]");
1729 log_info (_("BAD signature from \"%s\""), p);
1730 else if (sig->flags.expired)
1731 log_info (_("Expired signature from \"%s\""), p);
1733 log_info (_("Good signature from \"%s\""), p);
1740 check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
1742 PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
1747 char *issuer_fpr = NULL;
1748 PKT_public_key *pk = NULL; /* The public key for the signature or NULL. */
1749 int tried_ks_by_fpr;
1751 if (opt.skip_verify)
1753 log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n"));
1757 /* Check that the message composition is valid.
1759 * Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed:
1761 * S{1,n} -- detached signature.
1762 * S{1,n} P -- old style PGP2 signature
1763 * O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature.
1764 * C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature.
1767 * O = One-Pass Signature packet.
1768 * S = Signature packet.
1769 * P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal)
1770 * (Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows
1771 * for a signed message but that does not work as it
1772 * introduces ambiguities.)
1773 * We keep track of these packages using the marker packet
1774 * CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK.
1775 * C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures.
1777 * We reject all other messages.
1779 * Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of
1780 * each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently
1781 * introduce a bug here.
1785 int n_onepass, n_sig;
1787 /* log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */
1788 /* dump_kbnode (c->list); */
1792 if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
1794 /* This is either "S{1,n}" case (detached signature) or
1795 "S{1,n} P" (old style PGP2 signature). */
1796 for (n = n->next; n; n = n->next)
1797 if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
1800 ; /* Okay, this is a detached signature. */
1801 else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
1802 && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
1803 == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK) )
1806 goto ambiguous; /* We only allow one P packet. */
1811 else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
1813 /* This is the "O{1,n} P S{1,n}" case (standard signature). */
1814 for (n_onepass=1, n = n->next;
1815 n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; n = n->next)
1817 if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
1818 && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
1819 == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
1821 for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
1822 n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
1827 /* If we wanted to disallow multiple sig verification, we'd do
1828 something like this:
1830 if (n && !opt.allow_multisig_verification)
1833 However, now that we have --allow-multiple-messages, this
1834 can stay allowable as we can't get here unless multiple
1835 messages (i.e. multiple literals) are allowed. */
1837 if (n_onepass != n_sig)
1839 log_info ("number of one-pass packets does not match "
1840 "number of signature packets\n");
1844 else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
1845 && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START )
1847 /* This is the "C P S{1,n}" case (clear text signature). */
1849 if (!n || !(n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
1850 && (n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control
1851 == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)))
1853 for (n_sig=0, n = n->next;
1854 n && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE; n = n->next)
1862 log_error(_("can't handle this ambiguous signature data\n"));
1867 if (sig->signers_uid)
1868 write_status_buffer (STATUS_NEWSIG,
1869 sig->signers_uid, strlen (sig->signers_uid), 0);
1871 write_status_text (STATUS_NEWSIG, NULL);
1873 astr = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( sig->pubkey_algo );
1874 issuer_fpr = issuer_fpr_string (sig);
1878 log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
1879 log_info (_(" using %s key %s\n"),
1880 astr? astr: "?", issuer_fpr);
1883 else if (!keystrlen () || keystrlen () > 8)
1885 log_info (_("Signature made %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->timestamp));
1886 log_info (_(" using %s key %s\n"),
1887 astr? astr: "?", keystr(sig->keyid));
1889 else /* Legacy format. */
1890 log_info (_("Signature made %s using %s key ID %s\n"),
1891 asctimestamp(sig->timestamp), astr? astr: "?",
1892 keystr(sig->keyid));
1894 /* In verbose mode print the signers UID. */
1895 if (sig->signers_uid)
1896 log_info (_(" issuer \"%s\"\n"), sig->signers_uid);
1898 rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
1900 /* If the key isn't found, check for a preferred keyserver. */
1901 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks)
1907 while ((p=enum_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL)))
1909 /* According to my favorite copy editor, in English grammar,
1910 you say "at" if the key is located on a web page, but
1911 "from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm not going to
1912 even try to make two strings here :) */
1913 log_info(_("Key available at: ") );
1914 print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream(), p, n);
1917 if (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE
1918 && opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_HONOR_KEYSERVER_URL)
1920 struct keyserver_spec *spec;
1922 spec = parse_preferred_keyserver (sig);
1927 free_public_key (pk);
1929 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
1930 res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid,spec, 1);
1931 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
1933 rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL,
1934 &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
1935 free_keyserver_spec (spec);
1944 /* If the avove methods didn't work, our next try is to use the URI
1945 * from a DNS PKA record. */
1946 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
1947 && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
1948 && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_HONOR_PKA_RECORD))
1950 const char *uri = pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig);
1954 /* FIXME: We might want to locate the key using the
1955 fingerprint instead of the keyid. */
1957 struct keyserver_spec *spec;
1959 spec = parse_keyserver_uri (uri, 1);
1962 free_public_key (pk);
1964 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
1965 res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, spec, 1);
1966 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
1967 free_keyserver_spec (spec);
1969 rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
1974 /* If the above methods didn't work, our next try is to locate
1975 * the key via its fingerprint from a keyserver. This requires
1976 * that the signers fingerprint is encoded in the signature. We
1977 * favor this over the WKD method (to be tried next), because an
1978 * arbitrary keyserver is less subject to web bug like monitoring. */
1979 tried_ks_by_fpr = 0;
1980 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
1981 && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
1982 && keyserver_any_configured (c->ctrl))
1988 p = issuer_fpr_raw (sig, &n);
1991 /* v4 packet with a SHA-1 fingerprint. */
1992 free_public_key (pk);
1994 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
1995 res = keyserver_import_fprint (c->ctrl, p, n, opt.keyserver, 1);
1996 tried_ks_by_fpr = 1;
1997 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
1999 rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
2003 /* If the above methods didn't work, our next try is to retrieve the
2004 * key from the WKD. */
2005 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
2006 && (opt.keyserver_options.options & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
2007 && !opt.flags.disable_signer_uid
2008 && akl_has_wkd_method ()
2009 && sig->signers_uid)
2013 free_public_key (pk);
2015 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
2016 res = keyserver_import_wkd (c->ctrl, sig->signers_uid, 1, NULL, NULL);
2017 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
2018 /* Fixme: If the fingerprint is embedded in the signature,
2019 * compare it to the fingerprint of the returned key. */
2021 rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
2024 /* If the above methods did't work, our next try is to use a
2026 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
2027 && (opt.keyserver_options.options&KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE)
2029 && keyserver_any_configured (c->ctrl))
2033 free_public_key (pk);
2035 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve++;
2036 res = keyserver_import_keyid (c->ctrl, sig->keyid, opt.keyserver, 1);
2037 glo_ctrl.in_auto_key_retrieve--;
2039 rc = do_check_sig (c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey, &pk);
2042 if (!rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE)
2044 kbnode_t un, keyblock;
2048 PKT_public_key *mainpk = NULL;
2051 statno = STATUS_BADSIG;
2052 else if (sig->flags.expired)
2053 statno = STATUS_EXPSIG;
2055 statno = STATUS_EXPKEYSIG;
2057 statno = STATUS_REVKEYSIG;
2059 statno = STATUS_GOODSIG;
2061 /* FIXME: We should have the public key in PK and thus the
2062 * keyblock has already been fetched. Thus we could use the
2063 * fingerprint or PK itself to lookup the entire keyblock. That
2064 * would best be done with a cache. */
2065 keyblock = get_pubkeyblock_for_sig (c->ctrl, sig);
2067 snprintf (keyid_str, sizeof keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ",
2068 (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
2070 /* Find and print the primary user ID along with the
2071 "Good|Expired|Bad signature" line. */
2072 for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
2076 if (un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
2078 mainpk = un->pkt->pkt.public_key;
2081 if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
2083 if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created)
2085 if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked)
2087 if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
2089 if (!un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary)
2091 /* We want the textual primary user ID here */
2092 if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
2095 log_assert (mainpk);
2097 /* Since this is just informational, don't actually ask the
2098 user to update any trust information. (Note: we register
2099 the signature later.) Because print_good_bad_signature
2100 does not print a LF we need to compute the validity
2101 before calling that function. */
2102 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
2103 valid = get_validity (c->ctrl, keyblock, mainpk,
2104 un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0);
2106 valid = 0; /* Not used. */
2108 keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
2110 print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
2112 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
2113 log_printf (" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid));
2120 log_assert (mainpk);
2122 /* In case we did not found a valid textual userid above
2123 we print the first user id packet or a "[?]" instead along
2124 with the "Good|Expired|Bad signature" line. */
2127 /* Try for an invalid textual userid */
2128 for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
2130 if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
2131 && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
2135 /* Try for any userid at all */
2138 for (un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
2140 if (un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
2145 if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un)
2146 keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */
2148 print_good_bad_signature (statno, keyid_str, un, sig, rc);
2150 if (opt.trust_model != TM_ALWAYS && un)
2151 log_printf (" %s",_("[uncertain]") );
2155 /* If we have a good signature and already printed
2156 * the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */
2159 && !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_PRIMARY_UID_ONLY))
2162 for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next)
2164 if (un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID)
2166 if ((un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked
2167 || un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
2168 && !(opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UNUSABLE_UIDS))
2170 /* Skip textual primary user ids which we printed above. */
2171 if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.primary
2172 && !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data )
2175 /* If this user id has attribute data, print that. */
2176 if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
2178 dump_attribs (un->pkt->pkt.user_id, mainpk);
2180 if (opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS)
2181 show_photos (c->ctrl,
2182 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs,
2183 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,
2184 mainpk ,un->pkt->pkt.user_id);
2187 p = utf8_to_native (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
2188 un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, 0);
2189 log_info (_(" aka \"%s\""), p);
2192 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY))
2196 if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.revoked)
2197 valid = _("revoked");
2198 else if (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->flags.expired)
2199 valid = _("expired");
2201 /* Since this is just informational, don't
2202 actually ask the user to update any trust
2204 valid = (trust_value_to_string
2205 (get_validity (c->ctrl, keyblock, mainpk,
2206 un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0)));
2207 log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid);
2214 /* For good signatures print notation data. */
2217 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY_URLS))
2218 show_policy_url (sig, 0, 1);
2220 show_policy_url (sig, 0, 2);
2222 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER_URLS))
2223 show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 1);
2225 show_keyserver_url (sig, 0, 2);
2227 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATIONS))
2230 (((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_STD_NOTATIONS)?1:0)
2231 + ((opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_USER_NOTATIONS)?2:0)));
2233 show_notation (sig, 0, 2, 0);
2236 /* For good signatures print the VALIDSIG status line. */
2237 if (!rc && is_status_enabled () && pk)
2239 char pkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
2240 char mainpkhex[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
2242 hexfingerprint (pk, pkhex, sizeof pkhex);
2243 hexfingerprint (mainpk, mainpkhex, sizeof mainpkhex);
2245 /* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below with
2246 bits for status flags (policy url, notation, etc.). */
2247 write_status_printf (STATUS_VALIDSIG,
2248 "%s %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X %s",
2250 strtimestamp (sig->timestamp),
2251 (ulong)sig->timestamp,
2252 (ulong)sig->expiredate,
2253 sig->version, sig->pubkey_algo,
2259 /* Print compliance warning for Good signatures. */
2260 if (!rc && pk && !opt.quiet
2261 && !gnupg_pk_is_compliant (opt.compliance, pk->pubkey_algo,
2262 pk->pkey, nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL))
2264 log_info (_("WARNING: This key is not suitable for signing"
2266 gnupg_compliance_option_string (opt.compliance));
2269 /* For good signatures compute and print the trust information.
2270 Note that in the Tofu trust model this may ask the user on
2271 how to resolve a conflict. */
2274 if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS))
2275 pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */
2276 rc = check_signatures_trust (c->ctrl, sig);
2279 /* Print extra information about the signature. */
2280 if (sig->flags.expired)
2282 log_info (_("Signature expired %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
2283 rc = GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* Need a better error here? */
2285 else if (sig->expiredate)
2286 log_info (_("Signature expires %s\n"), asctimestamp(sig->expiredate));
2290 char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
2293 pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf);
2297 log_info (_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s%s%s\n"),
2298 sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"):
2299 sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"),
2300 gcry_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo),
2301 *pkstrbuf?_(", key algorithm "):"", pkstrbuf);
2304 /* Print final warnings. */
2305 if (!rc && !c->signed_data.used)
2307 /* Signature is basically good but we test whether the
2309 gpg --verify FILE.sig
2311 gpg --verify FILE.sig FILE
2312 to verify a detached signature. If we figure out that a
2313 data file with a matching name exists, we print a warning.
2315 The problem is that the first form would also verify a
2316 standard signature. This behavior could be used to
2317 create a made up .sig file for a tarball by creating a
2318 standard signature from a valid detached signature packet
2319 (for example from a signed git tag). Then replace the
2320 sig file on the FTP server along with a changed tarball.
2321 Using the first form the verify command would correctly
2322 verify the signature but don't even consider the tarball. */
2326 dfile = get_matching_datafile (c->sigfilename);
2329 for (n = c->list; n; n = n->next)
2330 if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE)
2334 /* Not only signature packets in the tree thus this
2335 is not a detached signature. */
2336 log_info (_("WARNING: not a detached signature; "
2337 "file '%s' was NOT verified!\n"), dfile);
2343 /* Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS. */
2344 if (pk && is_status_enabled ()
2345 && gnupg_pk_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, pk->pubkey_algo, pk->pkey,
2346 nbits_from_pk (pk), NULL)
2347 && gnupg_digest_is_compliant (CO_DE_VS, sig->digest_algo))
2348 write_status_strings (STATUS_VERIFICATION_COMPLIANCE_MODE,
2349 gnupg_status_compliance_flag (CO_DE_VS),
2352 free_public_key (pk);
2354 release_kbnode( keyblock );
2356 g10_errors_seen = 1;
2357 if (opt.batch && rc)
2362 write_status_printf (STATUS_ERRSIG, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d %s",
2363 (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1],
2364 sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo,
2365 sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp,
2367 issuer_fpr? issuer_fpr:"-");
2368 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY)
2370 write_status_printf (STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, "%08lX%08lX",
2371 (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]);
2373 if (gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED)
2374 log_error (_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
2377 free_public_key (pk);
2384 * Process the tree which starts at node
2387 proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
2392 if (opt.list_packets || opt.list_only)
2395 /* We must skip our special plaintext marker packets here because
2396 they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in
2397 additional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter. */
2399 && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
2400 && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)
2407 c->trustletter = ' ';
2408 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
2409 || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
2411 merge_keys_and_selfsig (c->ctrl, node);
2412 list_node (c, node);
2414 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
2416 merge_keys_and_selfsig (c->ctrl, node);
2417 list_node (c, node);
2419 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG)
2421 /* Check all signatures. */
2424 int use_textmode = 0;
2426 free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
2427 /* Prepare to create all requested message digests. */
2428 rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0);
2432 /* Fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the
2434 for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
2435 gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo);
2437 if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01)
2440 /* Ask for file and hash it. */
2443 if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
2444 rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL,
2445 c->signed_data.data_fd,
2448 rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL,
2449 c->signed_data.data_names,
2455 rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
2456 iobuf_get_real_fname (c->iobuf),
2463 log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
2467 else if (c->signed_data.used)
2469 log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
2473 for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
2474 check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
2477 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
2478 && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START)
2480 /* Clear text signed message. */
2483 log_error ("cleartext signature without data\n");
2486 else if (c->signed_data.used)
2488 log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
2492 for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));)
2493 check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
2496 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE)
2498 PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
2499 int multiple_ok = 1;
2501 n1 = find_next_kbnode (node, PKT_SIGNATURE);
2504 byte class = sig->sig_class;
2505 byte hash = sig->digest_algo;
2507 for (; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
2509 /* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of
2510 * different classes (we'd pretty much have to run a
2511 * different hash context for each), but if they are all
2512 * the same and it is detached signature, we make an
2513 * exception. Note that the old code also disallowed
2514 * multiple signatures if the digest algorithms are
2515 * different. We softened this restriction only for
2516 * detached signatures, to be on the safe side. */
2517 if (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class != class
2519 && n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo != hash))
2522 log_info (_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. "
2523 "Only the first will be checked.\n"));
2529 if (sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01)
2531 log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), sig->sig_class);
2533 else if (!c->any.data)
2535 /* Detached signature */
2536 free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx);
2537 rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0);
2539 goto detached_hash_err;
2543 /* If we have and want to handle multiple signatures we
2544 * need to enable all hash algorithms for the context. */
2545 for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)); )
2546 if (!openpgp_md_test_algo (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo))
2547 gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md,
2548 map_md_openpgp_to_gcry
2549 (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo));
2552 if (RFC2440 || RFC4880)
2553 ; /* Strict RFC mode. */
2554 else if (sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1
2555 && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
2556 && sig->sig_class == 0x01)
2558 /* Enable a workaround for a pgp5 bug when the detached
2559 * signature has been created in textmode. Note that we
2560 * do not implement this for multiple signatures with
2561 * different hash algorithms. */
2562 rc = gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, sig->digest_algo, 0);
2564 goto detached_hash_err;
2567 /* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp
2568 * 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached
2569 * signatures; this would let the first signature check
2570 * (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an
2571 * extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash.
2572 * This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in
2573 * some cases (and break others).
2574 * c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01)
2579 gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify");
2581 gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2");
2586 if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1)
2587 rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
2588 c->signed_data.data_fd,
2589 (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
2591 rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
2592 c->signed_data.data_names,
2594 (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
2598 rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2,
2599 iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf),
2600 (sig->sig_class == 0x01));
2606 log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
2610 else if (c->signed_data.used)
2612 log_error (_("not a detached signature\n"));
2615 else if (!opt.quiet)
2616 log_info (_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n"));
2620 for (n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE)))
2621 check_sig_and_print (c, n1);
2624 check_sig_and_print (c, node);
2629 dump_kbnode (c->list);
2630 log_error ("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n");