1 /* import.c - import a key into our key storage.
2 * Copyright (C) 1998-2007, 2010-2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
3 * Copyright (C) 2014 Werner Koch
5 * This file is part of GnuPG.
7 * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
8 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
9 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
10 * (at your option) any later version.
12 * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
13 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
14 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
15 * GNU General Public License for more details.
17 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
18 * along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
39 #include "keyserver-internal.h"
40 #include "call-agent.h"
41 #include "../common/membuf.h"
54 ulong secret_imported;
56 ulong skipped_new_keys;
60 ulong v3keys; /* Number of V3 keys seen. */
64 static int import (ctrl_t ctrl,
65 IOBUF inp, const char* fname, struct stats_s *stats,
66 unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len, unsigned int options,
67 import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg);
68 static int read_block (IOBUF a, PACKET **pending_pkt, kbnode_t *ret_root,
70 static void revocation_present (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock);
71 static int import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
72 const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,struct stats_s *stats,
73 unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len,
74 unsigned int options, int from_sk, int silent,
75 import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg);
76 static int import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
77 struct stats_s *stats, int batch,
78 unsigned int options, int for_migration,
79 import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg);
80 static int import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, kbnode_t node,
81 struct stats_s *stats);
82 static int chk_self_sigs (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
83 PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid, int *non_self );
84 static int delete_inv_parts (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
85 u32 *keyid, unsigned int options );
86 static int merge_blocks (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock_orig,
87 kbnode_t keyblock, u32 *keyid,
88 int *n_uids, int *n_sigs, int *n_subk );
89 static int append_uid (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node, int *n_sigs,
90 const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
91 static int append_key (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node, int *n_sigs,
92 const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
93 static int merge_sigs (kbnode_t dst, kbnode_t src, int *n_sigs,
94 const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
95 static int merge_keysigs (kbnode_t dst, kbnode_t src, int *n_sigs,
96 const char *fname, u32 *keyid );
99 parse_import_options(char *str,unsigned int *options,int noisy)
101 struct parse_options import_opts[]=
103 {"import-local-sigs",IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,
104 N_("import signatures that are marked as local-only")},
106 {"repair-pks-subkey-bug",IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG,NULL,
107 N_("repair damage from the pks keyserver during import")},
109 {"keep-ownertrust", IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST, NULL,
110 N_("do not clear the ownertrust values during import")},
112 {"fast-import",IMPORT_FAST,NULL,
113 N_("do not update the trustdb after import")},
115 {"merge-only",IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY,NULL,
116 N_("only accept updates to existing keys")},
118 {"import-clean",IMPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
119 N_("remove unusable parts from key after import")},
121 {"import-minimal",IMPORT_MINIMAL|IMPORT_CLEAN,NULL,
122 N_("remove as much as possible from key after import")},
124 /* Aliases for backward compatibility */
125 {"allow-local-sigs",IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS,NULL,NULL},
126 {"repair-hkp-subkey-bug",IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG,NULL,NULL},
128 {"import-unusable-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
129 {"import-clean-sigs",0,NULL,NULL},
130 {"import-clean-uids",0,NULL,NULL},
131 {"convert-sk-to-pk",0, NULL,NULL}, /* Not anymore needed due to
136 return parse_options(str,options,import_opts,noisy);
141 import_new_stats_handle (void)
143 return xmalloc_clear ( sizeof (struct stats_s) );
148 import_release_stats_handle (void *p)
155 * Import the public keys from the given filename. Input may be armored.
156 * This function rejects all keys which are not validly self signed on at
157 * least one userid. Only user ids which are self signed will be imported.
158 * Other signatures are not checked.
160 * Actually this function does a merge. It works like this:
163 * - check self-signatures and remove all userids and their signatures
164 * without/invalid self-signatures.
165 * - reject the keyblock, if we have no valid userid.
166 * - See whether we have this key already in one of our pubrings.
167 * If not, simply add it to the default keyring.
168 * - Compare the key and the self-signatures of the new and the one in
169 * our keyring. If they are different something weird is going on;
171 * - See whether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not
172 * ask the user what to do.
173 * - compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
174 * that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
175 * (consider looking at the timestamp and use the newest?)
176 * - Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
177 * the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
178 * into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
180 * - Proceed with next signature.
182 * Key revocation certificates have special handling.
185 import_keys_internal (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t inp, char **fnames, int nnames,
186 void *stats_handle, unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len,
187 unsigned int options,
188 import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg)
192 struct stats_s *stats = stats_handle;
195 stats = import_new_stats_handle ();
199 rc = import (ctrl, inp, "[stream]", stats, fpr, fpr_len, options,
200 screener, screener_arg);
204 if (!fnames && !nnames)
205 nnames = 1; /* Ohh what a ugly hack to jump into the loop */
207 for (i=0; i < nnames; i++)
209 const char *fname = fnames? fnames[i] : NULL;
210 IOBUF inp2 = iobuf_open(fname);
214 if (inp2 && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp2)))
218 gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
221 log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror (errno));
224 rc = import (ctrl, inp2, fname, stats, fpr, fpr_len, options,
225 screener, screener_arg);
227 /* Must invalidate that ugly cache to actually close it. */
228 iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char*)fname);
230 log_error ("import from '%s' failed: %s\n",
231 fname, gpg_strerror (rc) );
240 import_print_stats (stats);
241 import_release_stats_handle (stats);
244 /* If no fast import and the trustdb is dirty (i.e. we added a key
245 or userID that had something other than a selfsig, a signature
246 that was other than a selfsig, or any revocation), then
247 update/check the trustdb if the user specified by setting
248 interactive or by not setting no-auto-check-trustdb */
250 if (!(options & IMPORT_FAST))
251 check_or_update_trustdb ();
258 import_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, char **fnames, int nnames,
259 void *stats_handle, unsigned int options )
261 import_keys_internal (ctrl, NULL, fnames, nnames, stats_handle,
262 NULL, NULL, options, NULL, NULL);
266 import_keys_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, IOBUF inp, void *stats_handle,
267 unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len, unsigned int options)
269 return import_keys_internal (ctrl, inp, NULL, 0, stats_handle,
270 fpr, fpr_len, options, NULL, NULL);
274 /* Variant of import_keys_stream reading from an estream_t. */
276 import_keys_es_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, void *stats_handle,
277 unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len,
278 unsigned int options,
279 import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg)
284 inp = iobuf_esopen (fp, "r", 1);
287 rc = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
288 log_error ("iobuf_esopen failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc));
292 rc = import_keys_internal (ctrl, inp, NULL, 0, stats_handle,
293 fpr, fpr_len, options,
294 screener, screener_arg);
302 import (ctrl_t ctrl, IOBUF inp, const char* fname,struct stats_s *stats,
303 unsigned char **fpr,size_t *fpr_len, unsigned int options,
304 import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg)
306 PACKET *pending_pkt = NULL;
307 kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; /* Need to initialize because gcc can't
308 grasp the return semantics of
313 getkey_disable_caches ();
315 if (!opt.no_armor) /* Armored reading is not disabled. */
317 armor_filter_context_t *afx;
319 afx = new_armor_context ();
320 afx->only_keyblocks = 1;
321 push_armor_filter (afx, inp);
322 release_armor_context (afx);
325 while (!(rc = read_block (inp, &pending_pkt, &keyblock, &v3keys)))
327 stats->v3keys += v3keys;
328 if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)
329 rc = import_one (ctrl, fname, keyblock,
330 stats, fpr, fpr_len, options, 0, 0,
331 screener, screener_arg);
332 else if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
333 rc = import_secret_one (ctrl, fname, keyblock, stats,
334 opt.batch, options, 0,
335 screener, screener_arg);
336 else if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
337 && keyblock->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
338 rc = import_revoke_cert( fname, keyblock, stats );
341 log_info (_("skipping block of type %d\n"), keyblock->pkt->pkttype);
343 release_kbnode (keyblock);
345 /* fixme: we should increment the not imported counter but
346 this does only make sense if we keep on going despite of
347 errors. For now we do this only if the imported key is too
349 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE
350 && gpg_err_source (rc) == GPG_ERR_SOURCE_KEYBOX)
352 stats->not_imported++;
358 if (!(++stats->count % 100) && !opt.quiet)
359 log_info (_("%lu keys processed so far\n"), stats->count );
361 stats->v3keys += v3keys;
364 else if (rc && gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING)
365 log_error (_("error reading '%s': %s\n"), fname, gpg_strerror (rc));
371 /* Helper to migrate secring.gpg to GnuPG 2.1. */
373 import_old_secring (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname)
377 PACKET *pending_pkt = NULL;
378 kbnode_t keyblock = NULL; /* Need to initialize because gcc can't
379 grasp the return semantics of
381 struct stats_s *stats;
384 inp = iobuf_open (fname);
385 if (inp && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (inp)))
389 gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM);
393 err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
394 log_error (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, gpg_strerror (err));
398 getkey_disable_caches();
399 stats = import_new_stats_handle ();
400 while (!(err = read_block (inp, &pending_pkt, &keyblock, &v3keys)))
402 if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
403 err = import_secret_one (ctrl, fname, keyblock, stats, 1, 0, 1,
405 release_kbnode (keyblock);
409 import_release_stats_handle (stats);
412 else if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING)
413 log_error (_("error reading '%s': %s\n"), fname, gpg_strerror (err));
415 log_error ("import from '%s' failed: %s\n", fname, gpg_strerror (err));
418 iobuf_ioctl (NULL, IOBUF_IOCTL_INVALIDATE_CACHE, 0, (char*)fname);
425 import_print_stats (void *hd)
427 struct stats_s *stats = hd;
431 log_info(_("Total number processed: %lu\n"),
432 stats->count + stats->v3keys);
434 log_info(_(" skipped PGP-2 keys: %lu\n"), stats->v3keys);
435 if (stats->skipped_new_keys )
436 log_info(_(" skipped new keys: %lu\n"),
437 stats->skipped_new_keys );
438 if (stats->no_user_id )
439 log_info(_(" w/o user IDs: %lu\n"), stats->no_user_id );
442 log_info(_(" imported: %lu"), stats->imported );
445 if (stats->unchanged )
446 log_info(_(" unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->unchanged );
448 log_info(_(" new user IDs: %lu\n"), stats->n_uids );
450 log_info(_(" new subkeys: %lu\n"), stats->n_subk );
452 log_info(_(" new signatures: %lu\n"), stats->n_sigs );
454 log_info(_(" new key revocations: %lu\n"), stats->n_revoc );
455 if (stats->secret_read )
456 log_info(_(" secret keys read: %lu\n"), stats->secret_read );
457 if (stats->secret_imported )
458 log_info(_(" secret keys imported: %lu\n"), stats->secret_imported );
459 if (stats->secret_dups )
460 log_info(_(" secret keys unchanged: %lu\n"), stats->secret_dups );
461 if (stats->not_imported )
462 log_info(_(" not imported: %lu\n"), stats->not_imported );
463 if (stats->n_sigs_cleaned)
464 log_info(_(" signatures cleaned: %lu\n"),stats->n_sigs_cleaned);
465 if (stats->n_uids_cleaned)
466 log_info(_(" user IDs cleaned: %lu\n"),stats->n_uids_cleaned);
469 if (is_status_enabled ())
473 snprintf (buf, sizeof buf,
474 "%lu %lu %lu 0 %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu %lu",
475 stats->count + stats->v3keys,
484 stats->secret_imported,
486 stats->skipped_new_keys,
489 write_status_text (STATUS_IMPORT_RES, buf);
494 /* Return true if PKTTYPE is valid in a keyblock. */
496 valid_keyblock_packet (int pkttype)
501 case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY:
503 case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY:
516 * Read the next keyblock from stream A.
517 * PENDING_PKT should be initialzed to NULL
518 * and not changed by the caller.
519 * Return: 0 = okay, -1 no more blocks or another errorcode.
520 * The int at at R_V3KEY counts the number of unsupported v3
524 read_block( IOBUF a, PACKET **pending_pkt, kbnode_t *ret_root, int *r_v3keys)
528 kbnode_t root = NULL;
529 int in_cert, in_v3key;
535 root = new_kbnode( *pending_pkt );
542 pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
545 while ((rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1)
547 if (rc && (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_LEGACY_KEY
548 && (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
549 || pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)))
557 else if (rc ) /* (ignore errors) */
559 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET)
560 ; /* Do not show a diagnostic. */
563 log_error("read_block: read error: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc) );
564 rc = GPG_ERR_INV_KEYRING;
572 if (in_v3key && !(pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
573 || pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY))
581 if (!root && pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
582 && pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 )
584 /* This is a revocation certificate which is handled in a
586 root = new_kbnode( pkt );
591 /* Make a linked list of all packets. */
592 switch (pkt->pkttype)
595 if (check_compress_algo (pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm))
597 rc = GPG_ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
602 compress_filter_context_t *cfx = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *cfx );
603 pkt->pkt.compressed->buf = NULL;
604 push_compress_filter2(a,cfx,pkt->pkt.compressed->algorithm,1);
611 /* Skip those packets. */
618 if (in_cert ) /* Store this packet. */
626 if (in_cert && valid_keyblock_packet (pkt->pkttype))
629 root = new_kbnode (pkt);
631 add_kbnode (root, new_kbnode (pkt));
632 pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt);
640 if (rc == -1 && root )
644 release_kbnode( root );
653 /* Walk through the subkeys on a pk to find if we have the PKS
654 disease: multiple subkeys with their binding sigs stripped, and the
655 sig for the first subkey placed after the last subkey. That is,
656 instead of "pk uid sig sub1 bind1 sub2 bind2 sub3 bind3" we have
657 "pk uid sig sub1 sub2 sub3 bind1". We can't do anything about sub2
658 and sub3, as they are already lost, but we can try and rescue sub1
659 by reordering the keyblock so that it reads "pk uid sig sub1 bind1
660 sub2 sub3". Returns TRUE if the keyblock was modified. */
662 fix_pks_corruption (kbnode_t keyblock)
667 kbnode_t last = NULL;
668 kbnode_t sknode=NULL;
670 /* First determine if we have the problem at all. Look for 2 or
671 more subkeys in a row, followed by a single binding sig. */
672 for (node=keyblock; node; last=node, node=node->next)
674 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
680 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
681 && node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x18
685 /* We might have the problem, as this key has two subkeys in
686 a row without any intervening packets. */
692 /* Temporarily attach node to sknode. */
693 node->next = sknode->next;
697 /* Note we aren't checking whether this binding sig is a
698 selfsig. This is not necessary here as the subkey and
699 binding sig will be rejected later if that is the
701 if (check_key_signature (keyblock,node,NULL))
703 /* Not a match, so undo the changes. */
704 sknode->next = node->next;
711 sknode->flag |= 1; /* Mark it good so we don't need to
725 /* Versions of GnuPG before 1.4.11 and 2.0.16 allowed to import bogus
726 direct key signatures. A side effect of this was that a later
727 import of the same good direct key signatures was not possible
728 because the cmp_signature check in merge_blocks considered them
729 equal. Although direct key signatures are now checked during
730 import, there might still be bogus signatures sitting in a keyring.
731 We need to detect and delete them before doing a merge. This
732 function returns the number of removed sigs. */
734 fix_bad_direct_key_sigs (kbnode_t keyblock, u32 *keyid)
740 for (node = keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
742 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
744 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
745 && IS_KEY_SIG (node->pkt->pkt.signature))
747 err = check_key_signature (keyblock, node, NULL);
748 if (err && gpg_err_code (err) != GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO )
750 /* If we don't know the error, we can't decide; this is
751 not a problem because cmp_signature can't compare the
753 log_info ("key %s: invalid direct key signature removed\n",
755 delete_kbnode (node);
766 print_import_ok (PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int reason)
768 byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *s;
769 char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+30], *p;
772 snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%u ", reason);
773 p = buf + strlen (buf);
775 fingerprint_from_pk (pk, array, &n);
777 for (i=0; i < n ; i++, s++, p += 2)
778 sprintf (p, "%02X", *s);
780 write_status_text (STATUS_IMPORT_OK, buf);
785 print_import_check (PKT_public_key * pk, PKT_user_id * id)
793 buf = xmalloc (17+41+id->len+32);
794 keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
795 sprintf (buf, "%08X%08X ", keyid[0], keyid[1]);
797 fingerprint_from_pk (pk, fpr, &n);
798 for (i = 0; i < n; i++, pos += 2)
799 sprintf (buf+pos, "%02X", fpr[i]);
802 strcat (buf, id->name);
803 write_status_text (STATUS_IMPORT_CHECK, buf);
809 check_prefs_warning(PKT_public_key *pk)
811 log_info(_("WARNING: key %s contains preferences for unavailable\n"
812 "algorithms on these user IDs:\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
817 check_prefs (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
823 merge_keys_and_selfsig(keyblock);
824 pk=keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
826 for(node=keyblock;node;node=node->next)
828 if(node->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
829 && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->created
830 && node->pkt->pkt.user_id->prefs)
832 PKT_user_id *uid = node->pkt->pkt.user_id;
833 prefitem_t *prefs = uid->prefs;
834 char *user = utf8_to_native(uid->name,strlen(uid->name),0);
836 for(;prefs->type;prefs++)
838 char num[10]; /* prefs->value is a byte, so we're over
841 sprintf(num,"%u",prefs->value);
843 if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_SYM)
845 if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs->value))
848 (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (prefs->value)
850 : openpgp_cipher_algo_name (prefs->value));
852 check_prefs_warning(pk);
853 log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for cipher"
854 " algorithm %s\n"), user, algo);
858 else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_HASH)
860 if(openpgp_md_test_algo(prefs->value))
863 (gcry_md_test_algo (prefs->value)
865 : gcry_md_algo_name (prefs->value));
867 check_prefs_warning(pk);
868 log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for digest"
869 " algorithm %s\n"), user, algo);
873 else if(prefs->type==PREFTYPE_ZIP)
875 if(check_compress_algo (prefs->value))
877 const char *algo=compress_algo_to_string(prefs->value);
879 check_prefs_warning(pk);
880 log_info(_(" \"%s\": preference for compression"
881 " algorithm %s\n"),user,algo?algo:num);
893 log_info(_("it is strongly suggested that you update"
894 " your preferences and\n"));
895 log_info(_("re-distribute this key to avoid potential algorithm"
896 " mismatch problems\n"));
901 strlist_t locusr = NULL;
903 byte fpr[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
904 char username[(MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2)+1];
907 p = fingerprint_from_pk (pk,fpr,&fprlen);
908 for(i=0;i<fprlen;i++,p++)
909 sprintf(username+2*i,"%02X",*p);
910 add_to_strlist(&locusr,username);
912 append_to_strlist(&sl,"updpref");
913 append_to_strlist(&sl,"save");
915 keyedit_menu (ctrl, username, locusr, sl, 1, 1 );
917 free_strlist(locusr);
920 log_info(_("you can update your preferences with:"
921 " gpg --edit-key %s updpref save\n"),keystr_from_pk(pk));
927 * Try to import one keyblock. Return an error only in serious cases,
928 * but never for an invalid keyblock. It uses log_error to increase
929 * the internal errorcount, so that invalid input can be detected by
930 * programs which called gpg. If SILENT is no messages are printed -
931 * even most error messages are suppressed.
934 import_one (ctrl_t ctrl,
935 const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock, struct stats_s *stats,
936 unsigned char **fpr, size_t *fpr_len, unsigned int options,
937 int from_sk, int silent,
938 import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg)
941 PKT_public_key *pk_orig;
942 kbnode_t node, uidnode;
943 kbnode_t keyblock_orig = NULL;
944 byte fpr2[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
953 char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
955 /* Get the key and print some info about it. */
956 node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
960 pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
962 fingerprint_from_pk (pk, fpr2, &fpr2len);
963 for (an = fpr2len; an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN; an++)
965 keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
966 uidnode = find_next_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_USER_ID );
968 if (opt.verbose && !opt.interactive && !silent)
970 log_info( "pub %s/%s %s ",
971 pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
972 keystr_from_pk(pk), datestr_from_pk(pk) );
974 print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream (),
975 uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
976 uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len );
984 log_error( _("key %s: no user ID\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
988 if (screener && screener (keyblock, screener_arg))
990 log_error (_("key %s: %s\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk),
991 _("rejected by import screener"));
995 if (opt.interactive && !silent)
997 if (is_status_enabled())
998 print_import_check (pk, uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id);
999 merge_keys_and_selfsig (keyblock);
1001 show_basic_key_info (keyblock);
1003 if (!cpr_get_answer_is_yes ("import.okay",
1004 "Do you want to import this key? (y/N) "))
1008 collapse_uids(&keyblock);
1010 /* Clean the key that we're about to import, to cut down on things
1011 that we have to clean later. This has no practical impact on the
1012 end result, but does result in less logging which might confuse
1014 if (options&IMPORT_CLEAN)
1015 clean_key (keyblock,opt.verbose,options&IMPORT_MINIMAL,NULL,NULL);
1017 clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
1019 if ((options&IMPORT_REPAIR_PKS_SUBKEY_BUG) && fix_pks_corruption(keyblock)
1021 log_info (_("key %s: PKS subkey corruption repaired\n"),
1022 keystr_from_pk(pk));
1024 rc = chk_self_sigs( fname, keyblock , pk, keyid, &non_self );
1026 return rc== -1? 0:rc;
1028 /* If we allow such a thing, mark unsigned uids as valid */
1029 if (opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid)
1031 for (node=keyblock; node; node = node->next )
1032 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && !(node->flag & 1) )
1034 char *user=utf8_to_native(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
1035 node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
1037 log_info( _("key %s: accepted non self-signed user ID \"%s\"\n"),
1038 keystr_from_pk(pk),user);
1043 if (!delete_inv_parts( fname, keyblock, keyid, options ) )
1047 log_error( _("key %s: no valid user IDs\n"), keystr_from_pk(pk));
1049 log_info(_("this may be caused by a missing self-signature\n"));
1051 stats->no_user_id++;
1055 /* Do we have this key already in one of our pubrings ? */
1056 pk_orig = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk_orig );
1057 rc = get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (pk_orig, fpr2, fpr2len);
1058 if (rc && gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
1059 && gpg_err_code (rc) != GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY )
1062 log_error (_("key %s: public key not found: %s\n"),
1063 keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
1065 else if ( rc && (opt.import_options&IMPORT_MERGE_ONLY) )
1067 if (opt.verbose && !silent )
1068 log_info( _("key %s: new key - skipped\n"), keystr(keyid));
1070 stats->skipped_new_keys++;
1072 else if (rc ) /* Insert this key. */
1074 KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new ();
1076 rc = keydb_locate_writable (hd, NULL);
1079 log_error (_("no writable keyring found: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc));
1081 return GPG_ERR_GENERAL;
1083 if (opt.verbose > 1 )
1084 log_info (_("writing to '%s'\n"), keydb_get_resource_name (hd) );
1086 rc = keydb_insert_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
1088 log_error (_("error writing keyring '%s': %s\n"),
1089 keydb_get_resource_name (hd), gpg_strerror (rc));
1090 else if (!(opt.import_options & IMPORT_KEEP_OWNERTTRUST))
1092 /* This should not be possible since we delete the
1093 ownertrust when a key is deleted, but it can happen if
1094 the keyring and trustdb are out of sync. It can also
1095 be made to happen with the trusted-key command and by
1096 importing and locally exported key. */
1098 clear_ownertrusts (pk);
1100 revalidation_mark ();
1105 if (!opt.quiet && !silent)
1107 char *p = get_user_id_byfpr_native (fpr2);
1108 log_info (_("key %s: public key \"%s\" imported\n"),
1112 if (is_status_enabled())
1114 char *us = get_long_user_id_string( keyid );
1115 write_status_text( STATUS_IMPORTED, us );
1117 print_import_ok (pk, 1);
1125 int n_uids, n_sigs, n_subk, n_sigs_cleaned, n_uids_cleaned;
1127 /* Compare the original against the new key; just to be sure nothing
1128 * weird is going on */
1129 if (cmp_public_keys( pk_orig, pk ) )
1132 log_error( _("key %s: doesn't match our copy\n"),keystr(keyid));
1136 /* Now read the original keyblock again so that we can use
1137 that handle for updating the keyblock. */
1139 keydb_disable_caching (hd);
1140 rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, fpr2);
1143 log_error (_("key %s: can't locate original keyblock: %s\n"),
1144 keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
1148 rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock_orig);
1151 log_error (_("key %s: can't read original keyblock: %s\n"),
1152 keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
1157 /* Make sure the original direct key sigs are all sane. */
1158 n_sigs_cleaned = fix_bad_direct_key_sigs (keyblock_orig, keyid);
1160 commit_kbnode (&keyblock_orig);
1162 /* and try to merge the block */
1163 clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock_orig );
1164 clear_kbnode_flags( keyblock );
1165 n_uids = n_sigs = n_subk = n_uids_cleaned = 0;
1166 rc = merge_blocks( fname, keyblock_orig, keyblock,
1167 keyid, &n_uids, &n_sigs, &n_subk );
1174 if ((options & IMPORT_CLEAN))
1175 clean_key (keyblock_orig,opt.verbose,options&IMPORT_MINIMAL,
1176 &n_uids_cleaned,&n_sigs_cleaned);
1178 if (n_uids || n_sigs || n_subk || n_sigs_cleaned || n_uids_cleaned)
1181 /* KEYBLOCK_ORIG has been updated; write */
1182 rc = keydb_update_keyblock (hd, keyblock_orig);
1184 log_error (_("error writing keyring '%s': %s\n"),
1185 keydb_get_resource_name (hd), gpg_strerror (rc) );
1187 revalidation_mark ();
1190 if (!opt.quiet && !silent)
1192 char *p = get_user_id_byfpr_native (fpr2);
1194 log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new user ID\n"),
1197 log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new user IDs\n"),
1198 keystr(keyid),p,n_uids);
1200 log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new signature\n"),
1203 log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new signatures\n"),
1204 keystr(keyid), p, n_sigs );
1206 log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" 1 new subkey\n"),
1209 log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" %d new subkeys\n"),
1210 keystr(keyid), p, n_subk );
1211 if (n_sigs_cleaned==1)
1212 log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d signature cleaned\n"),
1213 keystr(keyid),p,n_sigs_cleaned);
1214 else if (n_sigs_cleaned)
1215 log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d signatures cleaned\n"),
1216 keystr(keyid),p,n_sigs_cleaned);
1217 if (n_uids_cleaned==1)
1218 log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d user ID cleaned\n"),
1219 keystr(keyid),p,n_uids_cleaned);
1220 else if (n_uids_cleaned)
1221 log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" %d user IDs cleaned\n"),
1222 keystr(keyid),p,n_uids_cleaned);
1226 stats->n_uids +=n_uids;
1227 stats->n_sigs +=n_sigs;
1228 stats->n_subk +=n_subk;
1229 stats->n_sigs_cleaned +=n_sigs_cleaned;
1230 stats->n_uids_cleaned +=n_uids_cleaned;
1232 if (is_status_enabled () && !silent)
1233 print_import_ok (pk, ((n_uids?2:0)|(n_sigs?4:0)|(n_subk?8:0)));
1238 if (is_status_enabled ())
1239 print_import_ok (pk, 0);
1241 if (!opt.quiet && !silent)
1243 char *p = get_user_id_byfpr_native (fpr2);
1244 log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" not changed\n"),keystr(keyid),p);
1251 keydb_release (hd); hd = NULL;
1255 if (mod_key || new_key || same_key)
1257 /* A little explanation for this: we fill in the fingerprint
1258 when importing keys as it can be useful to know the
1259 fingerprint in certain keyserver-related cases (a keyserver
1260 asked for a particular name, but the key doesn't have that
1261 name). However, in cases where we're importing more than
1262 one key at a time, we cannot know which key to fingerprint.
1263 In these cases, rather than guessing, we do not
1264 fingerprinting at all, and we must hope the user ID on the
1265 keys are useful. Note that we need to do this for new
1266 keys, merged keys and even for unchanged keys. This is
1267 required because for example the --auto-key-locate feature
1268 may import an already imported key and needs to know the
1269 fingerprint of the key in all cases. */
1273 /* Note that we need to compare against 0 here because
1274 COUNT gets only incremented after returning form this
1277 *fpr = fingerprint_from_pk (pk, NULL, fpr_len);
1283 /* Now that the key is definitely incorporated into the keydb, we
1284 need to check if a designated revocation is present or if the
1285 prefs are not rational so we can warn the user. */
1289 revocation_present (ctrl, keyblock_orig);
1290 if (!from_sk && have_secret_key_with_kid (keyid))
1291 check_prefs (ctrl, keyblock_orig);
1295 revocation_present (ctrl, keyblock);
1296 if (!from_sk && have_secret_key_with_kid (keyid))
1297 check_prefs (ctrl, keyblock);
1300 release_kbnode( keyblock_orig );
1301 free_public_key( pk_orig );
1307 /* Transfer all the secret keys in SEC_KEYBLOCK to the gpg-agent. The
1308 function prints diagnostics and returns an error code. If BATCH is
1309 true the secret keys are stored by gpg-agent in the transfer format
1310 (i.e. no re-protection and aksing for passphrases). */
1312 transfer_secret_keys (ctrl_t ctrl, struct stats_s *stats, kbnode_t sec_keyblock,
1315 gpg_error_t err = 0;
1318 kbnode_t ctx = NULL;
1320 PKT_public_key *main_pk, *pk;
1321 struct seckey_info *ski;
1325 void *format_args[2*PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
1326 gcry_sexp_t skey, prot, tmpsexp;
1327 gcry_sexp_t curve = NULL;
1328 unsigned char *transferkey = NULL;
1329 size_t transferkeylen;
1330 gcry_cipher_hd_t cipherhd = NULL;
1331 unsigned char *wrappedkey = NULL;
1332 size_t wrappedkeylen;
1333 char *cache_nonce = NULL;
1335 /* Get the current KEK. */
1336 err = agent_keywrap_key (ctrl, 0, &kek, &keklen);
1339 log_error ("error getting the KEK: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
1343 /* Prepare a cipher context. */
1344 err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipherhd, GCRY_CIPHER_AES128,
1345 GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_AESWRAP, 0);
1347 err = gcry_cipher_setkey (cipherhd, kek, keklen);
1354 while ((node = walk_kbnode (sec_keyblock, &ctx, 0)))
1356 if (node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY
1357 && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
1359 pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
1363 /* Make sure the keyids are available. */
1364 keyid_from_pk (pk, NULL);
1365 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
1367 pk->main_keyid[0] = pk->keyid[0];
1368 pk->main_keyid[1] = pk->keyid[1];
1372 pk->main_keyid[0] = main_pk->keyid[0];
1373 pk->main_keyid[1] = main_pk->keyid[1];
1377 ski = pk->seckey_info;
1382 stats->secret_read++;
1384 /* We ignore stub keys. The way we handle them in other parts
1385 of the code is by asking the agent whether any secret key is
1386 available for a given keyblock and then concluding that we
1387 have a secret key; all secret (sub)keys of the keyblock the
1388 agent does not know of are then stub keys. This works also
1389 for card stub keys. The learn command or the card-status
1390 command may be used to check with the agent whether a card
1391 has been inserted and a stub key is in turn generated by the
1393 if (ski->s2k.mode == 1001 || ski->s2k.mode == 1002)
1396 /* Convert our internal secret key object into an S-expression. */
1397 nskey = pubkey_get_nskey (pk->pubkey_algo);
1398 if (!nskey || nskey > PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY)
1400 err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
1401 log_error ("internal error: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
1405 init_membuf (&mbuf, 50);
1406 put_membuf_str (&mbuf, "(skey");
1407 if (pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA
1408 || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA
1409 || pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH)
1412 char *curvestr = openpgp_oid_to_str (pk->pkey[0]);
1414 err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
1417 err = gcry_sexp_build (&curve, NULL, "(curve %s)", curvestr);
1422 /* Append the public key element Q. */
1423 put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
1424 format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + 1;
1426 /* Append the secret key element D. For ECDH we
1427 skip PKEY[2] because this holds the KEK which is
1428 not needed by gpg-agent. */
1429 i = pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH? 3 : 2;
1430 if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1))
1431 put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %m");
1433 put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
1434 format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i;
1440 /* Standard case for the old (non-ECC) algorithms. */
1441 for (i=j=0; i < nskey; i++)
1444 continue; /* Protected keys only have NPKEY+1 elements. */
1446 if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (pk->pkey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1))
1447 put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %m");
1449 put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
1450 format_args[j++] = pk->pkey + i;
1453 put_membuf_str (&mbuf, ")");
1454 put_membuf (&mbuf, "", 1);
1456 xfree (get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL));
1459 char *format = get_membuf (&mbuf, NULL);
1461 err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
1463 err = gcry_sexp_build_array (&skey, NULL, format, format_args);
1468 log_error ("error building skey array: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
1472 if (ski->is_protected)
1476 /* Note that the IVLEN may be zero if we are working on a
1477 dummy key. We can't express that in an S-expression and
1478 thus we send dummy data for the IV. */
1479 snprintf (countbuf, sizeof countbuf, "%lu",
1480 (unsigned long)ski->s2k.count);
1481 err = gcry_sexp_build
1483 " (protection %s %s %b %d %s %b %s)\n",
1484 ski->sha1chk? "sha1":"sum",
1485 openpgp_cipher_algo_name (ski->algo),
1486 ski->ivlen? (int)ski->ivlen:1,
1487 ski->ivlen? ski->iv: (const unsigned char*)"X",
1489 openpgp_md_algo_name (ski->s2k.hash_algo),
1490 (int)sizeof (ski->s2k.salt), ski->s2k.salt,
1494 err = gcry_sexp_build (&prot, NULL, " (protection none)\n");
1497 xfree (transferkey);
1500 err = gcry_sexp_build (&tmpsexp, NULL,
1501 "(openpgp-private-key\n"
1508 openpgp_pk_algo_name (pk->pubkey_algo),
1510 (int)(unsigned long)ski->csum, prot);
1511 gcry_sexp_release (skey);
1512 gcry_sexp_release (prot);
1514 err = make_canon_sexp_pad (tmpsexp, 1, &transferkey, &transferkeylen);
1515 gcry_sexp_release (tmpsexp);
1518 log_error ("error building transfer key: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
1523 wrappedkeylen = transferkeylen + 8;
1525 wrappedkey = xtrymalloc (wrappedkeylen);
1527 err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
1529 err = gcry_cipher_encrypt (cipherhd, wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen,
1530 transferkey, transferkeylen);
1533 xfree (transferkey);
1536 /* Send the wrapped key to the agent. */
1538 char *desc = gpg_format_keydesc (pk, FORMAT_KEYDESC_IMPORT, 1);
1539 err = agent_import_key (ctrl, desc, &cache_nonce,
1540 wrappedkey, wrappedkeylen, batch);
1546 log_info (_("key %s: secret key imported\n"),
1547 keystr_from_pk_with_sub (main_pk, pk));
1548 stats->secret_imported++;
1550 else if ( gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_EEXIST )
1553 log_info (_("key %s: secret key already exists\n"),
1554 keystr_from_pk_with_sub (main_pk, pk));
1556 stats->secret_dups++;
1560 log_error (_("key %s: error sending to agent: %s\n"),
1561 keystr_from_pk_with_sub (main_pk, pk),
1562 gpg_strerror (err));
1563 if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_CANCELED
1564 || gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_FULLY_CANCELED)
1565 break; /* Don't try the other subkeys. */
1570 gcry_sexp_release (curve);
1571 xfree (cache_nonce);
1573 xfree (transferkey);
1574 gcry_cipher_close (cipherhd);
1580 /* Walk a secret keyblock and produce a public keyblock out of it.
1581 Returns a new node or NULL on error. */
1583 sec_to_pub_keyblock (kbnode_t sec_keyblock)
1585 kbnode_t pub_keyblock = NULL;
1586 kbnode_t ctx = NULL;
1587 kbnode_t secnode, pubnode;
1589 while ((secnode = walk_kbnode (sec_keyblock, &ctx, 0)))
1591 if (secnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
1592 || secnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
1594 /* Make a public key. */
1598 pkt = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *pkt);
1599 pk = pkt? copy_public_key (NULL, secnode->pkt->pkt.public_key): NULL;
1603 release_kbnode (pub_keyblock);
1606 if (secnode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY)
1607 pkt->pkttype = PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
1609 pkt->pkttype = PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
1610 pkt->pkt.public_key = pk;
1612 pubnode = new_kbnode (pkt);
1616 pubnode = clone_kbnode (secnode);
1620 pub_keyblock = pubnode;
1622 add_kbnode (pub_keyblock, pubnode);
1625 return pub_keyblock;
1629 * Ditto for secret keys. Handling is simpler than for public keys.
1630 * We allow secret key importing only when allow is true, this is so
1631 * that a secret key can not be imported accidently and thereby tampering
1632 * with the trust calculation.
1635 import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
1636 struct stats_s *stats, int batch, unsigned int options,
1638 import_screener_t screener, void *screener_arg)
1641 struct seckey_info *ski;
1642 kbnode_t node, uidnode;
1646 kbnode_t pub_keyblock;
1647 char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE];
1649 /* Get the key and print some info about it */
1650 node = find_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY);
1654 pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
1656 keyid_from_pk (pk, keyid);
1657 uidnode = find_next_kbnode (keyblock, PKT_USER_ID);
1659 if (screener && screener (keyblock, screener_arg))
1661 log_error (_("secret key %s: %s\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk),
1662 _("rejected by import screener"));
1666 if (opt.verbose && !for_migration)
1668 log_info ("sec %s/%s %s ",
1669 pubkey_string (pk, pkstrbuf, sizeof pkstrbuf),
1670 keystr_from_pk (pk), datestr_from_pk (pk));
1672 print_utf8_buffer (log_get_stream (), uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
1673 uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->len);
1676 stats->secret_read++;
1678 if ((options & IMPORT_NO_SECKEY))
1681 log_error (_("importing secret keys not allowed\n"));
1688 log_error( _("key %s: no user ID\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk));
1692 ski = pk->seckey_info;
1695 /* Actually an internal error. */
1696 log_error ("key %s: secret key info missing\n", keystr_from_pk (pk));
1700 /* A quick check to not import keys with an invalid protection
1701 cipher algorithm (only checks the primary key, though). */
1702 if (ski->algo > 110)
1705 log_error (_("key %s: secret key with invalid cipher %d"
1706 " - skipped\n"), keystr_from_pk (pk), ski->algo);
1710 #ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
1713 /* We don't allow to import secret keys because that may be used
1714 to put a secret key into the keyring and the user might later
1715 be tricked into signing stuff with that key. */
1716 log_error (_("importing secret keys not allowed\n"));
1721 clear_kbnode_flags (keyblock);
1723 nr_prev = stats->skipped_new_keys;
1725 /* Make a public key out of the key. */
1726 pub_keyblock = sec_to_pub_keyblock (keyblock);
1728 log_error ("key %s: failed to create public key from secret key\n",
1729 keystr_from_pk (pk));
1732 /* Note that this outputs an IMPORT_OK status message for the
1733 public key block, and below we will output another one for
1734 the secret keys. FIXME? */
1735 import_one (ctrl, fname, pub_keyblock, stats,
1736 NULL, NULL, options, 1, for_migration,
1737 screener, screener_arg);
1739 /* Fixme: We should check for an invalid keyblock and
1740 cancel the secret key import in this case. */
1741 release_kbnode (pub_keyblock);
1743 /* At least we cancel the secret key import when the public key
1744 import was skipped due to MERGE_ONLY option and a new
1746 if (stats->skipped_new_keys <= nr_prev)
1748 /* Read the keyblock again to get the effects of a merge. */
1749 /* Fixme: we should do this based on the fingerprint or
1750 even better let import_one return the merged
1752 node = get_pubkeyblock (keyid);
1754 log_error ("key %s: failed to re-lookup public key\n",
1755 keystr_from_pk (pk));
1758 nr_prev = stats->secret_imported;
1759 if (!transfer_secret_keys (ctrl, stats, keyblock, batch))
1763 log_info (_("key %s: secret key imported\n"),
1764 keystr_from_pk (pk));
1765 if (stats->secret_imported > nr_prev)
1767 if (is_status_enabled ())
1768 print_import_ok (pk, status);
1769 check_prefs (ctrl, node);
1771 release_kbnode (node);
1781 * Import a revocation certificate; this is a single signature packet.
1784 import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, kbnode_t node, struct stats_s *stats )
1786 PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
1788 kbnode_t keyblock = NULL;
1789 KEYDB_HANDLE hd = NULL;
1795 assert( !node->next );
1796 assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE );
1797 assert( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 );
1799 keyid[0] = node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0];
1800 keyid[1] = node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1];
1802 pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
1803 rc = get_pubkey( pk, keyid );
1804 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY )
1806 log_error(_("key %s: no public key -"
1807 " can't apply revocation certificate\n"), keystr(keyid));
1813 log_error(_("key %s: public key not found: %s\n"),
1814 keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
1818 /* Read the original keyblock. */
1821 byte afp[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
1824 fingerprint_from_pk (pk, afp, &an);
1825 while (an < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN)
1827 rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, afp);
1831 log_error (_("key %s: can't locate original keyblock: %s\n"),
1832 keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
1835 rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock );
1838 log_error (_("key %s: can't read original keyblock: %s\n"),
1839 keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
1843 /* it is okay, that node is not in keyblock because
1844 * check_key_signature works fine for sig_class 0x20 in this
1846 rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL);
1849 log_error( _("key %s: invalid revocation certificate"
1850 ": %s - rejected\n"), keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
1854 /* check whether we already have this */
1855 for(onode=keyblock->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) {
1856 if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
1858 else if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
1859 && !cmp_signatures(node->pkt->pkt.signature,
1860 onode->pkt->pkt.signature))
1863 goto leave; /* yes, we already know about it */
1868 insert_kbnode( keyblock, clone_kbnode(node), 0 );
1870 /* and write the keyblock back */
1871 rc = keydb_update_keyblock (hd, keyblock );
1873 log_error (_("error writing keyring '%s': %s\n"),
1874 keydb_get_resource_name (hd), gpg_strerror (rc) );
1881 char *p=get_user_id_native (keyid);
1882 log_info( _("key %s: \"%s\" revocation certificate imported\n"),
1888 /* If the key we just revoked was ultimately trusted, remove its
1889 ultimate trust. This doesn't stop the user from putting the
1890 ultimate trust back, but is a reasonable solution for now. */
1891 if(get_ownertrust(pk)==TRUST_ULTIMATE)
1892 clear_ownertrusts(pk);
1894 revalidation_mark ();
1898 release_kbnode( keyblock );
1899 free_public_key( pk );
1905 * Loop over the keyblock and check all self signatures.
1906 * Mark all user-ids with a self-signature by setting flag bit 0.
1907 * Mark all user-ids with an invalid self-signature by setting bit 1.
1908 * This works also for subkeys, here the subkey is marked. Invalid or
1909 * extra subkey sigs (binding or revocation) are marked for deletion.
1910 * non_self is set to true if there are any sigs other than self-sigs
1914 chk_self_sigs (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
1915 PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid, int *non_self )
1917 kbnode_t n, knode = NULL;
1920 u32 bsdate=0, rsdate=0;
1921 kbnode_t bsnode = NULL, rsnode = NULL;
1926 for (n=keyblock; (n = find_next_kbnode (n, 0)); )
1928 if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
1938 if ( n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
1941 sig = n->pkt->pkt.signature;
1942 if ( keyid[0] != sig->keyid[0] || keyid[1] != sig->keyid[1] )
1948 /* This just caches the sigs for later use. That way we
1949 import a fully-cached key which speeds things up. */
1950 if (!opt.no_sig_cache)
1951 check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
1953 if ( IS_UID_SIG(sig) || IS_UID_REV(sig) )
1955 kbnode_t unode = find_prev_kbnode( keyblock, n, PKT_USER_ID );
1958 log_error( _("key %s: no user ID for signature\n"),
1960 return -1; /* The complete keyblock is invalid. */
1963 /* If it hasn't been marked valid yet, keep trying. */
1964 if (!(unode->flag&1))
1966 rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
1971 char *p = utf8_to_native
1972 (unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
1973 strlen (unode->pkt->pkt.user_id->name),0);
1974 log_info (gpg_err_code(rc) == GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
1975 _("key %s: unsupported public key "
1976 "algorithm on user ID \"%s\"\n"):
1977 _("key %s: invalid self-signature "
1978 "on user ID \"%s\"\n"),
1984 unode->flag |= 1; /* Mark that signature checked. */
1987 else if (IS_KEY_SIG (sig))
1989 rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
1993 log_info (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
1994 _("key %s: unsupported public key algorithm\n"):
1995 _("key %s: invalid direct key signature\n"),
2000 else if ( IS_SUBKEY_SIG (sig) )
2002 /* Note that this works based solely on the timestamps like
2003 the rest of gpg. If the standard gets revocation
2004 targets, this may need to be revised. */
2009 log_info (_("key %s: no subkey for key binding\n"),
2011 n->flag |= 4; /* delete this */
2015 rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
2019 log_info (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
2020 _("key %s: unsupported public key"
2022 _("key %s: invalid subkey binding\n"),
2028 /* It's valid, so is it newer? */
2029 if (sig->timestamp >= bsdate)
2031 knode->flag |= 1; /* The subkey is valid. */
2034 /* Delete the last binding sig since this
2038 log_info (_("key %s: removed multiple subkey"
2039 " binding\n"),keystr(keyid));
2043 bsdate = sig->timestamp;
2046 n->flag |= 4; /* older */
2050 else if ( IS_SUBKEY_REV (sig) )
2052 /* We don't actually mark the subkey as revoked right now,
2053 so just check that the revocation sig is the most recent
2054 valid one. Note that we don't care if the binding sig is
2055 newer than the revocation sig. See the comment in
2056 getkey.c:merge_selfsigs_subkey for more. */
2060 log_info (_("key %s: no subkey for key revocation\n"),
2062 n->flag |= 4; /* delete this */
2066 rc = check_key_signature (keyblock, n, NULL);
2070 log_info (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO ?
2071 _("key %s: unsupported public"
2072 " key algorithm\n"):
2073 _("key %s: invalid subkey revocation\n"),
2079 /* It's valid, so is it newer? */
2080 if (sig->timestamp >= rsdate)
2084 /* Delete the last revocation sig since
2085 this one is newer. */
2088 log_info (_("key %s: removed multiple subkey"
2089 " revocation\n"),keystr(keyid));
2093 rsdate = sig->timestamp;
2096 n->flag |= 4; /* older */
2107 * delete all parts which are invalid and those signatures whose
2108 * public key algorithm is not available in this implemenation;
2109 * but consider RSA as valid, because parse/build_packets knows
2111 * returns: true if at least one valid user-id is left over.
2114 delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock,
2115 u32 *keyid, unsigned int options)
2118 int nvalid=0, uid_seen=0, subkey_seen=0;
2122 for (node=keyblock->next; node; node = node->next )
2124 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
2127 if ((node->flag & 2) || !(node->flag & 1) )
2131 char *p=utf8_to_native(node->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
2132 node->pkt->pkt.user_id->len,0);
2133 log_info( _("key %s: skipped user ID \"%s\"\n"),
2137 delete_kbnode( node ); /* the user-id */
2138 /* and all following packets up to the next user-id */
2140 && node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID
2141 && node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2142 && node->next->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ){
2143 delete_kbnode( node->next );
2150 else if ( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2151 || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
2153 if ((node->flag & 2) || !(node->flag & 1) )
2156 log_info( _("key %s: skipped subkey\n"),keystr(keyid));
2158 delete_kbnode( node ); /* the subkey */
2159 /* and all following signature packets */
2161 && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
2162 delete_kbnode( node->next );
2169 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
2170 && openpgp_pk_test_algo (node->pkt->pkt.signature->pubkey_algo)
2171 && node->pkt->pkt.signature->pubkey_algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
2173 delete_kbnode( node ); /* build_packet() can't handle this */
2175 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
2176 && !node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable
2177 && !(options&IMPORT_LOCAL_SIGS)
2178 && !have_secret_key_with_kid (node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid))
2180 /* here we violate the rfc a bit by still allowing
2181 * to import non-exportable signature when we have the
2182 * the secret key used to create this signature - it
2183 * seems that this makes sense */
2185 log_info( _("key %s: non exportable signature"
2186 " (class 0x%02X) - skipped\n"),
2187 keystr(keyid), node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class );
2188 delete_kbnode( node );
2190 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
2191 && node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20)
2196 log_info( _("key %s: revocation certificate"
2197 " at wrong place - skipped\n"),keystr(keyid));
2198 delete_kbnode( node );
2202 /* If the revocation cert is from a different key than
2203 the one we're working on don't check it - it's
2204 probably from a revocation key and won't be
2205 verifiable with this key anyway. */
2207 if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0]
2208 && node->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1])
2210 int rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, NULL);
2214 log_info( _("key %s: invalid revocation"
2215 " certificate: %s - skipped\n"),
2216 keystr(keyid), gpg_strerror (rc));
2217 delete_kbnode( node );
2222 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
2223 && (node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x18
2224 || node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28)
2228 log_info( _("key %s: subkey signature"
2229 " in wrong place - skipped\n"), keystr(keyid));
2230 delete_kbnode( node );
2232 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
2233 && !IS_CERT(node->pkt->pkt.signature))
2236 log_info(_("key %s: unexpected signature class (0x%02X) -"
2237 " skipped\n"),keystr(keyid),
2238 node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class);
2239 delete_kbnode(node);
2241 else if ((node->flag & 4) ) /* marked for deletion */
2242 delete_kbnode( node );
2245 /* note: because keyblock is the public key, it is never marked
2246 * for deletion and so keyblock cannot change */
2247 commit_kbnode( &keyblock );
2253 * It may happen that the imported keyblock has duplicated user IDs.
2254 * We check this here and collapse those user IDs together with their
2256 * Returns: True if the keyblock has changed.
2259 collapse_uids( kbnode_t *keyblock )
2264 for(uid1=*keyblock;uid1;uid1=uid1->next)
2268 if(is_deleted_kbnode(uid1))
2271 if(uid1->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_USER_ID)
2274 for(uid2=uid1->next;uid2;uid2=uid2->next)
2276 if(is_deleted_kbnode(uid2))
2279 if(uid2->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_USER_ID)
2282 if(cmp_user_ids(uid1->pkt->pkt.user_id,
2283 uid2->pkt->pkt.user_id)==0)
2285 /* We have a duplicated uid */
2290 /* Now take uid2's signatures, and attach them to
2292 for(last=uid2;last->next;last=last->next)
2294 if(is_deleted_kbnode(last))
2297 if(last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
2298 || last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2299 || last->next->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
2304 (find_prev_kbnode(*keyblock,uid2,0))->next=last->next;
2306 /* Now put uid2 in place as part of uid1 */
2307 last->next=uid1->next;
2309 delete_kbnode(uid2);
2311 /* Now dedupe uid1 */
2312 for(sig1=uid1->next;sig1;sig1=sig1->next)
2316 if(is_deleted_kbnode(sig1))
2319 if(sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
2320 || sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2321 || sig1->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
2324 if(sig1->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_SIGNATURE)
2327 for(sig2=sig1->next,last=sig1;sig2;last=sig2,sig2=sig2->next)
2329 if(is_deleted_kbnode(sig2))
2332 if(sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
2333 || sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2334 || sig2->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
2337 if(sig2->pkt->pkttype!=PKT_SIGNATURE)
2340 if(cmp_signatures(sig1->pkt->pkt.signature,
2341 sig2->pkt->pkt.signature)==0)
2343 /* We have a match, so delete the second
2345 delete_kbnode(sig2);
2354 commit_kbnode(keyblock);
2356 if(any && !opt.quiet)
2358 const char *key="???";
2360 if ((uid1 = find_kbnode (*keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY)) )
2361 key = keystr_from_pk (uid1->pkt->pkt.public_key);
2362 else if ((uid1 = find_kbnode( *keyblock, PKT_SECRET_KEY)) )
2363 key = keystr_from_pk (uid1->pkt->pkt.public_key);
2365 log_info (_("key %s: duplicated user ID detected - merged\n"), key);
2372 /* Check for a 0x20 revocation from a revocation key that is not
2373 present. This may be called without the benefit of merge_xxxx so
2374 you can't rely on pk->revkey and friends. */
2376 revocation_present (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock)
2378 kbnode_t onode, inode;
2379 PKT_public_key *pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
2381 for(onode=keyblock->next;onode;onode=onode->next)
2383 /* If we reach user IDs, we're done. */
2384 if(onode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
2387 if(onode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
2388 onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x1F &&
2389 onode->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey)
2392 PKT_signature *sig=onode->pkt->pkt.signature;
2394 for(idx=0;idx<sig->numrevkeys;idx++)
2398 keyid_from_fingerprint(sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
2399 MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,keyid);
2401 for(inode=keyblock->next;inode;inode=inode->next)
2403 /* If we reach user IDs, we're done. */
2404 if(inode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID)
2407 if(inode->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE &&
2408 inode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class==0x20 &&
2409 inode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]==keyid[0] &&
2410 inode->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]==keyid[1])
2412 /* Okay, we have a revocation key, and a
2413 revocation issued by it. Do we have the key
2417 rc=get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (NULL,sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
2418 MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
2419 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
2420 || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY)
2422 char *tempkeystr=xstrdup(keystr_from_pk(pk));
2424 /* No, so try and get it */
2426 && (opt.keyserver_options.options
2427 & KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE))
2429 log_info(_("WARNING: key %s may be revoked:"
2430 " fetching revocation key %s\n"),
2431 tempkeystr,keystr(keyid));
2432 keyserver_import_fprint (ctrl,
2433 sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
2434 MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN,
2437 /* Do we have it now? */
2438 rc=get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (NULL,
2439 sig->revkey[idx]->fpr,
2440 MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN);
2443 if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY
2444 || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY)
2445 log_info(_("WARNING: key %s may be revoked:"
2446 " revocation key %s not present.\n"),
2447 tempkeystr,keystr(keyid));
2460 * compare and merge the blocks
2462 * o compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
2463 * that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
2464 * o Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
2465 * the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it
2466 * into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey
2468 * Note: We indicate newly inserted packets with flag bit 0
2471 merge_blocks (const char *fname, kbnode_t keyblock_orig, kbnode_t keyblock,
2472 u32 *keyid, int *n_uids, int *n_sigs, int *n_subk )
2474 kbnode_t onode, node;
2477 /* 1st: handle revocation certificates */
2478 for (node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next )
2480 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
2482 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
2483 && node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20)
2485 /* check whether we already have this */
2487 for (onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next)
2489 if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
2491 else if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
2492 && onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20
2493 && !cmp_signatures(onode->pkt->pkt.signature,
2494 node->pkt->pkt.signature))
2502 kbnode_t n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
2503 insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
2508 char *p=get_user_id_native (keyid);
2509 log_info(_("key %s: \"%s\" revocation"
2510 " certificate added\n"), keystr(keyid),p);
2517 /* 2nd: merge in any direct key (0x1F) sigs */
2518 for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
2520 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
2522 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
2523 && node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x1F)
2525 /* check whether we already have this */
2527 for (onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next)
2529 if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
2531 else if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
2532 && onode->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x1F
2533 && !cmp_signatures(onode->pkt->pkt.signature,
2534 node->pkt->pkt.signature))
2542 kbnode_t n2 = clone_kbnode(node);
2543 insert_kbnode( keyblock_orig, n2, 0 );
2547 log_info( _("key %s: direct key signature added\n"),
2553 /* 3rd: try to merge new certificates in */
2554 for (onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next)
2556 if (!(onode->flag & 1) && onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
2558 /* find the user id in the imported keyblock */
2559 for (node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
2560 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
2561 && !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
2562 node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
2564 if (node ) /* found: merge */
2566 rc = merge_sigs( onode, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid );
2573 /* 4th: add new user-ids */
2574 for (node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
2576 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID)
2578 /* do we have this in the original keyblock */
2579 for (onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
2580 if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
2581 && !cmp_user_ids( onode->pkt->pkt.user_id,
2582 node->pkt->pkt.user_id ) )
2584 if (!onode ) /* this is a new user id: append */
2586 rc = append_uid( keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
2594 /* 5th: add new subkeys */
2595 for (node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
2598 if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY)
2600 /* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
2601 for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next)
2602 if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2603 && !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
2604 node->pkt->pkt.public_key))
2606 if (!onode ) /* This is a new subkey: append. */
2608 rc = append_key (keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
2614 else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
2616 /* do we have this in the original keyblock? */
2617 for (onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next )
2618 if (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY
2619 && !cmp_public_keys (onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
2620 node->pkt->pkt.public_key) )
2622 if (!onode ) /* This is a new subkey: append. */
2624 rc = append_key (keyblock_orig, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid);
2632 /* 6th: merge subkey certificates */
2633 for (onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next)
2635 if (!(onode->flag & 1)
2636 && (onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2637 || onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY))
2639 /* find the subkey in the imported keyblock */
2640 for(node=keyblock->next; node; node=node->next)
2642 if ((node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2643 || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY)
2644 && !cmp_public_keys( onode->pkt->pkt.public_key,
2645 node->pkt->pkt.public_key ) )
2648 if (node) /* Found: merge. */
2650 rc = merge_keysigs( onode, node, n_sigs, fname, keyid );
2662 * Append the userid starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
2665 append_uid (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node, int *n_sigs,
2666 const char *fname, u32 *keyid )
2669 kbnode_t n_where = NULL;
2674 assert(node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
2676 /* find the position */
2677 for (n = keyblock; n; n_where = n, n = n->next)
2679 if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2680 || n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY )
2686 /* and append/insert */
2689 /* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
2690 * one is released first */
2691 n = clone_kbnode(node);
2694 insert_kbnode( n_where, n, 0 );
2698 add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
2701 if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
2705 if (node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
2714 * Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_USER_ID.
2715 * (how should we handle comment packets here?)
2718 merge_sigs (kbnode_t dst, kbnode_t src, int *n_sigs,
2719 const char *fname, u32 *keyid)
2727 assert(dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
2728 assert(src->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID );
2730 for (n=src->next; n && n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n = n->next)
2732 if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
2734 if (n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x18
2735 || n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x28 )
2736 continue; /* skip signatures which are only valid on subkeys */
2739 for (n2=dst->next; n2 && n2->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; n2 = n2->next)
2740 if (!cmp_signatures(n->pkt->pkt.signature,n2->pkt->pkt.signature))
2747 /* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
2748 * We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
2749 * one is released first */
2750 n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
2751 insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
2763 * Merge the sigs from SRC onto DST. SRC and DST are both a PKT_xxx_SUBKEY.
2766 merge_keysigs (kbnode_t dst, kbnode_t src, int *n_sigs,
2767 const char *fname, u32 *keyid)
2775 assert (dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2776 || dst->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY);
2778 for (n=src->next; n ; n = n->next)
2780 if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2781 || n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
2783 if (n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )
2787 for (n2=dst->next; n2; n2 = n2->next)
2789 if (n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2790 || n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
2792 if (n2->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
2793 && (n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0]
2794 == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[0])
2795 && (n->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1]
2796 == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->keyid[1])
2797 && (n->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp
2798 <= n2->pkt->pkt.signature->timestamp)
2799 && (n->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class
2800 == n2->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class))
2808 /* This signature is new or newer, append N to DST.
2809 * We add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
2810 * one is released first */
2811 n2 = clone_kbnode(n);
2812 insert_kbnode( dst, n2, PKT_SIGNATURE );
2824 * Append the subkey starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
2825 * Mark all new and copied packets by setting flag bit 0.
2828 append_key (kbnode_t keyblock, kbnode_t node, int *n_sigs,
2829 const char *fname, u32 *keyid)
2836 assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY
2837 || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
2841 /* we add a clone to the original keyblock, because this
2842 * one is released first */
2843 n = clone_kbnode(node);
2844 add_kbnode( keyblock, n );
2847 if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
2851 if (node && node->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE )