Revert "random: block in /dev/urandom"

[platform/kernel/linux-starfive.git] / drivers / char / random.c

// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
/*
 * Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
 * Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005
 * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All rights reserved.
 *
 * This driver produces cryptographically secure pseudorandom data. It is divided
 * into roughly six sections, each with a section header:
 *
 *   - Initialization and readiness waiting.
 *   - Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
 *   - Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
 *   - Entropy collection routines.
 *   - Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
 *   - Sysctl interface.
 *
 * The high level overview is that there is one input pool, into which
 * various pieces of data are hashed. Some of that data is then "credited" as
 * having a certain number of bits of entropy. When enough bits of entropy are
 * available, the hash is finalized and handed as a key to a stream cipher that
 * expands it indefinitely for various consumers. This key is periodically
 * refreshed as the various entropy collectors, described below, add data to the
 * input pool and credit it. There is currently no Fortuna-like scheduler
 * involved, which can lead to malicious entropy sources causing a premature
 * reseed, and the entropy estimates are, at best, conservative guesses.
 */

#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt

#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/major.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/fcntl.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/poll.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/blkdev.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/nodemask.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/irq.h>
#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/uuid.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <crypto/chacha.h>
#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/irq.h>
#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
#include <asm/io.h>

/*********************************************************************
 *
 * Initialization and readiness waiting.
 *
 * Much of the RNG infrastructure is devoted to various dependencies
 * being able to wait until the RNG has collected enough entropy and
 * is ready for safe consumption.
 *
 *********************************************************************/

/*
 * crng_init =  0 --> Uninitialized
 *              1 --> Initialized
 *              2 --> Initialized from input_pool
 *
 * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases
 * its value (from 0->1->2).
 */
static int crng_init = 0;
#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->2 transition. */
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_chain_lock);
static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(random_ready_chain);

/* Control how we warn userspace. */
static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
        RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
        RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly;
module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");

/*
 * Returns whether or not the input pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
 * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
 * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
 * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
 *
 * Returns: true if the input pool has been seeded.
 *          false if the input pool has not been seeded.
 */
bool rng_is_initialized(void)
{
        return crng_ready();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);

/* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */
static void try_to_generate_entropy(void);

/*
 * Wait for the input pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
 * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
 * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
 * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
 * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
 *
 * Returns: 0 if the input pool has been seeded.
 *          -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
 */
int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
{
        while (!crng_ready()) {
                int ret;

                try_to_generate_entropy();
                ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
                if (ret)
                        return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
        }
        return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);

/*
 * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the input
 * pool is initialised.
 *
 * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
 *          -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
 */
int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
        unsigned long flags;
        int ret = -EALREADY;

        if (crng_ready())
                return ret;

        spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
        if (!crng_ready())
                ret = raw_notifier_chain_register(&random_ready_chain, nb);
        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
        return ret;
}

/*
 * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
 */
int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
        unsigned long flags;
        int ret;

        spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
        ret = raw_notifier_chain_unregister(&random_ready_chain, nb);
        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
        return ret;
}

static void process_random_ready_list(void)
{
        unsigned long flags;

        spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
        raw_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_chain, 0, NULL);
        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
}

#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
        _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, (previous))

static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller, void **previous)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
        const bool print_once = false;
#else
        static bool print_once __read_mostly;
#endif

        if (print_once || crng_ready() ||
            (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
                return;
        WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
        print_once = true;
#endif
        if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
                printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n",
                                func_name, caller, crng_init);
}


/*********************************************************************
 *
 * Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
 *
 * These functions expand entropy from the entropy extractor into
 * long streams for external consumption using the "fast key erasure"
 * RNG described at <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>.
 *
 * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers:
 *
 *      void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 *      u32 get_random_u32()
 *      u64 get_random_u64()
 *      unsigned int get_random_int()
 *      unsigned long get_random_long()
 *
 * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes
 * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to
 * a read from /dev/urandom. The integer family of functions may be
 * higher performance for one-off random integers, because they do a
 * bit of buffering.
 *
 *********************************************************************/

enum {
        CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 300 * HZ,
        CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH = 2 * CHACHA_KEY_SIZE
};

static struct {
        u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
        unsigned long birth;
        unsigned long generation;
        spinlock_t lock;
} base_crng = {
        .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock)
};

struct crng {
        u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
        unsigned long generation;
        local_lock_t lock;
};

static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = {
        .generation = ULONG_MAX,
        .lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(crngs.lock),
};

/* Used by crng_reseed() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force);

/*
 * This extracts a new crng key from the input pool, but only if there is a
 * sufficient amount of entropy available or force is true, in order to
 * mitigate bruteforcing of newly added bits.
 */
static void crng_reseed(bool force)
{
        unsigned long flags;
        unsigned long next_gen;
        u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
        bool finalize_init = false;

        /* Only reseed if we can, to prevent brute forcing a small amount of new bits. */
        if (!drain_entropy(key, sizeof(key), force))
                return;

        /*
         * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one,
         * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX,
         * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this
         * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize.
         */
        spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
        memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
        next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1;
        if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
                ++next_gen;
        WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
        WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies);
        if (!crng_ready()) {
                crng_init = 2;
                finalize_init = true;
        }
        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
        memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
        if (finalize_init) {
                process_random_ready_list();
                wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
                kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
                pr_notice("crng init done\n");
                if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
                        pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
                                  unseeded_warning.missed);
                        unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
                }
                if (urandom_warning.missed) {
                        pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
                                  urandom_warning.missed);
                        urandom_warning.missed = 0;
                }
        }
}

/*
 * This generates a ChaCha block using the provided key, and then
 * immediately overwites that key with half the block. It returns
 * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second
 * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may
 * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
 */
static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
                                  u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
                                  u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
{
        u8 first_block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];

        BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);

        chacha_init_consts(chacha_state);
        memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
        memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4);
        chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block);

        memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
        memcpy(random_data, first_block + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len);
        memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block));
}

/*
 * Return whether the crng seed is considered to be sufficiently
 * old that a reseeding might be attempted. This happens if the last
 * reseeding was CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ago, or during early boot, at
 * an interval proportional to the uptime.
 */
static bool crng_has_old_seed(void)
{
        static bool early_boot = true;
        unsigned long interval = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL;

        if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(early_boot))) {
                time64_t uptime = ktime_get_seconds();
                if (uptime >= CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ * 2)
                        WRITE_ONCE(early_boot, false);
                else
                        interval = max_t(unsigned int, 5 * HZ,
                                         (unsigned int)uptime / 2 * HZ);
        }
        return time_after(jiffies, READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval);
}

/*
 * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating
 * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data
 * that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
 */
static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
                            u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
{
        unsigned long flags;
        struct crng *crng;

        BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);

        /*
         * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and
         * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not
         * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, because
         * this is what crng_pre_init_inject() mutates during early init.
         */
        if (!crng_ready()) {
                bool ready;

                spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
                ready = crng_ready();
                if (!ready)
                        crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
                                              random_data, random_data_len);
                spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
                if (!ready)
                        return;
        }

        /*
         * If the base_crng is old enough, we try to reseed, which in turn
         * bumps the generation counter that we check below.
         */
        if (unlikely(crng_has_old_seed()))
                crng_reseed(false);

        local_lock_irqsave(&crngs.lock, flags);
        crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs);

        /*
         * If our per-cpu crng is older than the base_crng, then it means
         * somebody reseeded the base_crng. In that case, we do fast key
         * erasure on the base_crng, and use its output as the new key
         * for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng.
         */
        if (unlikely(crng->generation != READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation))) {
                spin_lock(&base_crng.lock);
                crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
                                      crng->key, sizeof(crng->key));
                crng->generation = base_crng.generation;
                spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock);
        }

        /*
         * Finally, when we've made it this far, our per-cpu crng has an up
         * to date key, and we can do fast key erasure with it to produce
         * some random data and a ChaCha state for the caller. All other
         * branches of this function are "unlikely", so most of the time we
         * should wind up here immediately.
         */
        crng_fast_key_erasure(crng->key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len);
        local_unlock_irqrestore(&crngs.lock, flags);
}

/*
 * This function is for crng_init == 0 only. It loads entropy directly
 * into the crng's key, without going through the input pool. It is,
 * generally speaking, not very safe, but we use this only at early
 * boot time when it's better to have something there rather than
 * nothing.
 *
 * If account is set, then the crng_init_cnt counter is incremented.
 * This shouldn't be set by functions like add_device_randomness(),
 * where we can't trust the buffer passed to it is guaranteed to be
 * unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at all).
 *
 * Returns the number of bytes processed from input, which is bounded
 * by CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH if account is true.
 */
static size_t crng_pre_init_inject(const void *input, size_t len, bool account)
{
        static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
        struct blake2s_state hash;
        unsigned long flags;

        blake2s_init(&hash, sizeof(base_crng.key));

        spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
        if (crng_init != 0) {
                spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
                return 0;
        }

        if (account)
                len = min_t(size_t, len, CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH - crng_init_cnt);

        blake2s_update(&hash, base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
        blake2s_update(&hash, input, len);
        blake2s_final(&hash, base_crng.key);

        if (account) {
                crng_init_cnt += len;
                if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
                        ++base_crng.generation;
                        crng_init = 1;
                }
        }

        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);

        if (crng_init == 1)
                pr_notice("fast init done\n");

        return len;
}

static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
        u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
        u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
        size_t len;

        if (!nbytes)
                return;

        len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes);
        crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, len);
        nbytes -= len;
        buf += len;

        while (nbytes) {
                if (nbytes < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
                        chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
                        memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
                        memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
                        break;
                }

                chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
                if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
                        ++chacha_state[13];
                nbytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
                buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
        }

        memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
}

/*
 * This function is the exported kernel interface.  It returns some
 * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
 * TCP sequence numbers, etc.  It does not rely on the hardware random
 * number generator.  For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
 * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
 * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
 * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
 * at any point prior.
 */
void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
        static void *previous;

        warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
        _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);

static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
        bool large_request = nbytes > 256;
        ssize_t ret = 0;
        size_t len;
        u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
        u8 output[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];

        if (!nbytes)
                return 0;

        len = min_t(size_t, 32, nbytes);
        crng_make_state(chacha_state, output, len);

        if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len))
                return -EFAULT;
        nbytes -= len;
        buf += len;
        ret += len;

        while (nbytes) {
                if (large_request && need_resched()) {
                        if (signal_pending(current))
                                break;
                        schedule();
                }

                chacha20_block(chacha_state, output);
                if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
                        ++chacha_state[13];

                len = min_t(size_t, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
                if (copy_to_user(buf, output, len)) {
                        ret = -EFAULT;
                        break;
                }

                nbytes -= len;
                buf += len;
                ret += len;
        }

        memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
        memzero_explicit(output, sizeof(output));
        return ret;
}

/*
 * Batched entropy returns random integers. The quality of the random
 * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness
 * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes()
 * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior.
 */
struct batched_entropy {
        union {
                /*
                 * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the
                 * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full
                 * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase
                 * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the
                 * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE.
                 */
                u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u64))];
                u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(u32))];
        };
        local_lock_t lock;
        unsigned long generation;
        unsigned int position;
};


static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
        .lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
        .position = UINT_MAX
};

u64 get_random_u64(void)
{
        u64 ret;
        unsigned long flags;
        struct batched_entropy *batch;
        static void *previous;
        unsigned long next_gen;

        warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);

        local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_u64.lock, flags);
        batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);

        next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);
        if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) ||
            next_gen != batch->generation) {
                _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u64, sizeof(batch->entropy_u64));
                batch->position = 0;
                batch->generation = next_gen;
        }

        ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position];
        batch->entropy_u64[batch->position] = 0;
        ++batch->position;
        local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_u64.lock, flags);
        return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);

static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
        .lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
        .position = UINT_MAX
};

u32 get_random_u32(void)
{
        u32 ret;
        unsigned long flags;
        struct batched_entropy *batch;
        static void *previous;
        unsigned long next_gen;

        warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);

        local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_u32.lock, flags);
        batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);

        next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation);
        if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) ||
            next_gen != batch->generation) {
                _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy_u32, sizeof(batch->entropy_u32));
                batch->position = 0;
                batch->generation = next_gen;
        }

        ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position];
        batch->entropy_u32[batch->position] = 0;
        ++batch->position;
        local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_u32.lock, flags);
        return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);

#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
 * This function is called when the CPU is coming up, with entry
 * CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, which comes before CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP.
 */
int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
{
        /*
         * When the cpu comes back online, immediately invalidate both
         * the per-cpu crng and all batches, so that we serve fresh
         * randomness.
         */
        per_cpu_ptr(&crngs, cpu)->generation = ULONG_MAX;
        per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
        per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
        return 0;
}
#endif

/**
 * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
 * @start:      The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
 * @range:      The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
 *              random address must fall.
 *
 * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
 *
 * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
 * @start was already page aligned.  We now align it regardless.
 *
 * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range).  On error,
 * @start is returned.
 */
unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
{
        if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
                range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
                start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
        }

        if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
                range = ULONG_MAX - start;

        range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;

        if (range == 0)
                return start;

        return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
}

/*
 * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
 * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
 * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
 * bytes filled in.
 */
size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
        size_t left = nbytes;
        u8 *p = buf;

        while (left) {
                unsigned long v;
                size_t chunk = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));

                if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
                        break;

                memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
                p += chunk;
                left -= chunk;
        }

        return nbytes - left;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);


/**********************************************************************
 *
 * Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
 *
 * Callers may add entropy via:
 *
 *     static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
 *
 * After which, if added entropy should be credited:
 *
 *     static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
 *
 * Finally, extract entropy via these two, with the latter one
 * setting the entropy count to zero and extracting only if there
 * is POOL_MIN_BITS entropy credited prior or force is true:
 *
 *     static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
 *     static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force)
 *
 **********************************************************************/

enum {
        POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
        POOL_MIN_BITS = POOL_BITS /* No point in settling for less. */
};

/* For notifying userspace should write into /dev/random. */
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);

static struct {
        struct blake2s_state hash;
        spinlock_t lock;
        unsigned int entropy_count;
} input_pool = {
        .hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
                    BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
                    BLAKE2S_IV5, BLAKE2S_IV6, BLAKE2S_IV7 },
        .hash.outlen = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
        .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
};

static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
{
        blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, in, nbytes);
}

/*
 * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool".  It does not
 * update the entropy estimate.  The caller should call
 * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
 */
static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *in, size_t nbytes)
{
        unsigned long flags;

        spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
        _mix_pool_bytes(in, nbytes);
        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}

static void credit_entropy_bits(size_t nbits)
{
        unsigned int entropy_count, orig, add;

        if (!nbits)
                return;

        add = min_t(size_t, nbits, POOL_BITS);

        do {
                orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
                entropy_count = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
        } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig);

        if (!crng_ready() && entropy_count >= POOL_MIN_BITS)
                crng_reseed(false);
}

/*
 * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
 * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
 */
static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
        unsigned long flags;
        u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
        struct {
                unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)];
                size_t counter;
        } block;
        size_t i;

        for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) {
                if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) &&
                    !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i]))
                        block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy();
        }

        spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);

        /* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
        blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);

        /* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */
        block.counter = 0;
        blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
        blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));

        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
        memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));

        while (nbytes) {
                i = min_t(size_t, nbytes, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
                /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
                ++block.counter;
                blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
                nbytes -= i;
                buf += i;
        }

        memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
        memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
}

/*
 * First we make sure we have POOL_MIN_BITS of entropy in the pool unless force
 * is true, and then we set the entropy count to zero (but don't actually touch
 * any data). Only then can we extract a new key with extract_entropy().
 */
static bool drain_entropy(void *buf, size_t nbytes, bool force)
{
        unsigned int entropy_count;
        do {
                entropy_count = READ_ONCE(input_pool.entropy_count);
                if (!force && entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
                        return false;
        } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, entropy_count, 0) != entropy_count);
        extract_entropy(buf, nbytes);
        wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
        kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
        return true;
}


/**********************************************************************
 *
 * Entropy collection routines.
 *
 * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into
 * the above entropy accumulation routines:
 *
 *      void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
 *      void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
 *                                unsigned int value);
 *      void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
 *      void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
 *                                      size_t entropy);
 *      void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size);
 *      void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size);
 *      void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
 *
 * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
 * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
 * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
 * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* credit any actual entropy to
 * the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
 * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
 * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
 *
 * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
 * as the event type information from the hardware.
 *
 * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
 * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
 * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
 * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
 * times are usually fairly consistent.
 *
 * The above two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
 * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
 * order deltas of the event timings.
 *
 * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit
 * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will
 * block until more entropy is needed.
 *
 * add_bootloader_randomness() is the same as add_hwgenerator_randomness() or
 * add_device_randomness(), depending on whether or not the configuration
 * option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
 *
 * add_vmfork_randomness() adds a unique (but not necessarily secret) ID
 * representing the current instance of a VM to the pool, without crediting,
 * and then force-reseeds the crng so that it takes effect immediately.
 *
 * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
 * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
 * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64
 * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first.
 *
 **********************************************************************/

static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
{
        return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
}
early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);

/*
 * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
 * are still turned off. Here we push in RDSEED, a timestamp, and utsname().
 * Depending on the above configuration knob, RDSEED may be considered
 * sufficient for initialization. Note that much earlier setup may already
 * have pushed entropy into the input pool by the time we get here.
 */
int __init rand_initialize(void)
{
        size_t i;
        ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
        bool arch_init = true;
        unsigned long rv;

        for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(rv)) {
                if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
                    !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) {
                        rv = random_get_entropy();
                        arch_init = false;
                }
                _mix_pool_bytes(&rv, sizeof(rv));
        }
        _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
        _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));

        extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
        ++base_crng.generation;

        if (arch_init && trust_cpu && !crng_ready()) {
                crng_init = 2;
                pr_notice("crng init done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
        }

        if (ratelimit_disable) {
                urandom_warning.interval = 0;
                unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
        }
        return 0;
}

/*
 * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
 * initialize it.
 *
 * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
 * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
 * identical devices.
 */
void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
{
        cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
        unsigned long flags, now = jiffies;

        if (crng_init == 0 && size)
                crng_pre_init_inject(buf, size, false);

        spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
        _mix_pool_bytes(&cycles, sizeof(cycles));
        _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
        _mix_pool_bytes(buf, size);
        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);

/* There is one of these per entropy source */
struct timer_rand_state {
        unsigned long last_time;
        long last_delta, last_delta2;
};

/*
 * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
 * delays.  It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
 * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
 *
 * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
 * the type of event which just happened.  This is currently 0-255 for
 * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
 */
static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
{
        cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
        unsigned long flags, now = jiffies;
        long delta, delta2, delta3;

        spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
        _mix_pool_bytes(&cycles, sizeof(cycles));
        _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
        _mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
        spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);

        /*
         * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
         * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
         * in order to make our estimate.
         */
        delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
        WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);

        delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
        WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);

        delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
        WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);

        if (delta < 0)
                delta = -delta;
        if (delta2 < 0)
                delta2 = -delta2;
        if (delta3 < 0)
                delta3 = -delta3;
        if (delta > delta2)
                delta = delta2;
        if (delta > delta3)
                delta = delta3;

        /*
         * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
         * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
         * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
         */
        credit_entropy_bits(min_t(unsigned int, fls(delta >> 1), 11));
}

void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
                          unsigned int value)
{
        static unsigned char last_value;
        static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };

        /* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
        if (value == last_value)
                return;

        last_value = value;
        add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
                             (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);

#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
{
        if (!disk || !disk->random)
                return;
        /* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
        add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);

void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
{
        struct timer_rand_state *state;

        /*
         * If kzalloc returns null, we just won't use that entropy
         * source.
         */
        state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct timer_rand_state), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (state) {
                state->last_time = INITIAL_JIFFIES;
                disk->random = state;
        }
}
#endif

/*
 * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
 * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
 * when our pool is full.
 */
void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buffer, size_t count,
                                size_t entropy)
{
        if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
                size_t ret = crng_pre_init_inject(buffer, count, true);
                mix_pool_bytes(buffer, ret);
                count -= ret;
                buffer += ret;
                if (!count || crng_init == 0)
                        return;
        }

        /*
         * Throttle writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
         * We'll be woken up again once below POOL_MIN_BITS, when
         * the calling thread is about to terminate, or once
         * CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL has elapsed.
         */
        wait_event_interruptible_timeout(random_write_wait,
                        !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
                        input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS,
                        CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
        mix_pool_bytes(buffer, count);
        credit_entropy_bits(entropy);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);

/*
 * Handle random seed passed by bootloader.
 * If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise
 * it would be regarded as device data.
 * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
 */
void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t size)
{
        if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER))
                add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
        else
                add_device_randomness(buf, size);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);

#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMGENID)
static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(vmfork_chain);

/*
 * Handle a new unique VM ID, which is unique, not secret, so we
 * don't credit it, but we do immediately force a reseed after so
 * that it's used by the crng posthaste.
 */
void add_vmfork_randomness(const void *unique_vm_id, size_t size)
{
        add_device_randomness(unique_vm_id, size);
        if (crng_ready()) {
                crng_reseed(true);
                pr_notice("crng reseeded due to virtual machine fork\n");
        }
        blocking_notifier_call_chain(&vmfork_chain, 0, NULL);
}
#if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_VMGENID)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_vmfork_randomness);
#endif

int register_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
        return blocking_notifier_chain_register(&vmfork_chain, nb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_random_vmfork_notifier);

int unregister_random_vmfork_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
        return blocking_notifier_chain_unregister(&vmfork_chain, nb);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_random_vmfork_notifier);
#endif

struct fast_pool {
        struct work_struct mix;
        unsigned long pool[4];
        unsigned long last;
        unsigned int count;
        u16 reg_idx;
};

static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = {
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
        /* SipHash constants */
        .pool = { 0x736f6d6570736575UL, 0x646f72616e646f6dUL,
                  0x6c7967656e657261UL, 0x7465646279746573UL }
#else
        /* HalfSipHash constants */
        .pool = { 0, 0, 0x6c796765U, 0x74656462U }
#endif
};

/*
 * This is [Half]SipHash-1-x, starting from an empty key. Because
 * the key is fixed, it assumes that its inputs are non-malicious,
 * and therefore this has no security on its own. s represents the
 * 128 or 256-bit SipHash state, while v represents a 128-bit input.
 */
static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], const unsigned long *v)
{
        size_t i;

        for (i = 0; i < 16 / sizeof(long); ++i) {
                s[3] ^= v[i];
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
                s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol64(s[0], 32);
                s[2] += s[3]; s[3] = rol64(s[3], 16); s[3] ^= s[2];
                s[0] += s[3]; s[3] = rol64(s[3], 21); s[3] ^= s[0];
                s[2] += s[1]; s[1] = rol64(s[1], 17); s[1] ^= s[2]; s[2] = rol64(s[2], 32);
#else
                s[0] += s[1]; s[1] = rol32(s[1],  5); s[1] ^= s[0]; s[0] = rol32(s[0], 16);
                s[2] += s[3]; s[3] = rol32(s[3],  8); s[3] ^= s[2];
                s[0] += s[3]; s[3] = rol32(s[3],  7); s[3] ^= s[0];
                s[2] += s[1]; s[1] = rol32(s[1], 13); s[1] ^= s[2]; s[2] = rol32(s[2], 16);
#endif
                s[0] ^= v[i];
        }
}

#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
 * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with
 * entry CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, just after CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE.
 */
int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
{
        /*
         * During CPU shutdown and before CPU onlining, add_interrupt_
         * randomness() may schedule mix_interrupt_randomness(), and
         * set the MIX_INFLIGHT flag. However, because the worker can
         * be scheduled on a different CPU during this period, that
         * flag will never be cleared. For that reason, we zero out
         * the flag here, which runs just after workqueues are onlined
         * for the CPU again. This also has the effect of setting the
         * irq randomness count to zero so that new accumulated irqs
         * are fresh.
         */
        per_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness, cpu)->count = 0;
        return 0;
}
#endif

static unsigned long get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
        unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)regs;
        unsigned int idx;

        if (regs == NULL)
                return 0;
        idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx);
        if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(unsigned long))
                idx = 0;
        ptr += idx++;
        WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx);
        return *ptr;
}

static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)
{
        struct fast_pool *fast_pool = container_of(work, struct fast_pool, mix);
        /*
         * The size of the copied stack pool is explicitly 16 bytes so that we
         * tax mix_pool_byte()'s compression function the same amount on all
         * platforms. This means on 64-bit we copy half the pool into this,
         * while on 32-bit we copy all of it. The entropy is supposed to be
         * sufficiently dispersed between bits that in the sponge-like
         * half case, on average we don't wind up "losing" some.
         */
        u8 pool[16];

        /* Check to see if we're running on the wrong CPU due to hotplug. */
        local_irq_disable();
        if (fast_pool != this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)) {
                local_irq_enable();
                return;
        }

        /*
         * Copy the pool to the stack so that the mixer always has a
         * consistent view, before we reenable irqs again.
         */
        memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool, sizeof(pool));
        fast_pool->count = 0;
        fast_pool->last = jiffies;
        local_irq_enable();

        if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
                crng_pre_init_inject(pool, sizeof(pool), true);
                mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
        } else {
                mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
                credit_entropy_bits(1);
        }

        memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool));
}

void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
{
        enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 };
        cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
        unsigned long now = jiffies;
        struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
        struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
        unsigned int new_count;
        union {
                u32 u32[4];
                u64 u64[2];
                unsigned long longs[16 / sizeof(long)];
        } irq_data;

        if (cycles == 0)
                cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);

        if (sizeof(cycles) == 8)
                irq_data.u64[0] = cycles ^ rol64(now, 32) ^ irq;
        else {
                irq_data.u32[0] = cycles ^ irq;
                irq_data.u32[1] = now;
        }

        if (sizeof(unsigned long) == 8)
                irq_data.u64[1] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
        else {
                irq_data.u32[2] = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
                irq_data.u32[3] = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
        }

        fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, irq_data.longs);
        new_count = ++fast_pool->count;

        if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT)
                return;

        if (new_count < 64 && (!time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ) ||
                               unlikely(crng_init == 0)))
                return;

        if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func))
                INIT_WORK(&fast_pool->mix, mix_interrupt_randomness);
        fast_pool->count |= MIX_INFLIGHT;
        queue_work_on(raw_smp_processor_id(), system_highpri_wq, &fast_pool->mix);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);

/*
 * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
 * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
 * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
 * generating entropy..
 *
 * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
 * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
 * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
 * entropy loop is running.
 *
 * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
 */
static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
{
        credit_entropy_bits(1);
}

/*
 * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
 * generate enough entropy with timing noise
 */
static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
{
        struct {
                cycles_t cycles;
                struct timer_list timer;
        } stack;

        stack.cycles = random_get_entropy();

        /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
        if (stack.cycles == random_get_entropy())
                return;

        timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
        while (!crng_ready() && !signal_pending(current)) {
                if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
                        mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1);
                mix_pool_bytes(&stack.cycles, sizeof(stack.cycles));
                schedule();
                stack.cycles = random_get_entropy();
        }

        del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
        destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
        mix_pool_bytes(&stack.cycles, sizeof(stack.cycles));
}


/**********************************************************************
 *
 * Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
 *
 * getrandom(2) is the primary modern interface into the RNG and should
 * be used in preference to anything else.
 *
 * Reading from /dev/random has the same functionality as calling
 * getrandom(2) with flags=0. In earlier versions, however, it had
 * vastly different semantics and should therefore be avoided, to
 * prevent backwards compatibility issues.
 *
 * Reading from /dev/urandom has the same functionality as calling
 * getrandom(2) with flags=GRND_INSECURE. Because it does not block
 * waiting for the RNG to be ready, it should not be used.
 *
 * Writing to either /dev/random or /dev/urandom adds entropy to
 * the input pool but does not credit it.
 *
 * Polling on /dev/random indicates when the RNG is initialized, on
 * the read side, and when it wants new entropy, on the write side.
 *
 * Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom have the same set of ioctls for
 * adding entropy, getting the entropy count, zeroing the count, and
 * reseeding the crng.
 *
 **********************************************************************/

SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, unsigned int,
                flags)
{
        if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
                return -EINVAL;

        /*
         * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
         * no sense.
         */
        if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
                return -EINVAL;

        if (count > INT_MAX)
                count = INT_MAX;

        if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) {
                int ret;

                if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
                        return -EAGAIN;
                ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
                if (unlikely(ret))
                        return ret;
        }
        return get_random_bytes_user(buf, count);
}

static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
        __poll_t mask;

        poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
        poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
        mask = 0;
        if (crng_ready())
                mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
        if (input_pool.entropy_count < POOL_MIN_BITS)
                mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
        return mask;
}

static int write_pool(const char __user *ubuf, size_t count)
{
        size_t len;
        int ret = 0;
        u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];

        while (count) {
                len = min(count, sizeof(block));
                if (copy_from_user(block, ubuf, len)) {
                        ret = -EFAULT;
                        goto out;
                }
                count -= len;
                ubuf += len;
                mix_pool_bytes(block, len);
                cond_resched();
        }

out:
        memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
        return ret;
}

static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
                            size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
        int ret;

        ret = write_pool(buffer, count);
        if (ret)
                return ret;

        return (ssize_t)count;
}

static ssize_t urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
                            loff_t *ppos)
{
        static int maxwarn = 10;

        if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
                maxwarn--;
                if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning))
                        pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
                                  current->comm, nbytes);
        }

        return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes);
}

static ssize_t random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
                           loff_t *ppos)
{
        int ret;

        ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
        if (ret != 0)
                return ret;
        return get_random_bytes_user(buf, nbytes);
}

static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
        int size, ent_count;
        int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
        int retval;

        switch (cmd) {
        case RNDGETENTCNT:
                /* Inherently racy, no point locking. */
                if (put_user(input_pool.entropy_count, p))
                        return -EFAULT;
                return 0;
        case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
                if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                        return -EPERM;
                if (get_user(ent_count, p))
                        return -EFAULT;
                if (ent_count < 0)
                        return -EINVAL;
                credit_entropy_bits(ent_count);
                return 0;
        case RNDADDENTROPY:
                if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                        return -EPERM;
                if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
                        return -EFAULT;
                if (ent_count < 0)
                        return -EINVAL;
                if (get_user(size, p++))
                        return -EFAULT;
                retval = write_pool((const char __user *)p, size);
                if (retval < 0)
                        return retval;
                credit_entropy_bits(ent_count);
                return 0;
        case RNDZAPENTCNT:
        case RNDCLEARPOOL:
                /*
                 * Clear the entropy pool counters. We no longer clear
                 * the entropy pool, as that's silly.
                 */
                if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                        return -EPERM;
                if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0) >= POOL_MIN_BITS) {
                        wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
                        kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
                }
                return 0;
        case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
                if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
                        return -EPERM;
                if (!crng_ready())
                        return -ENODATA;
                crng_reseed(false);
                return 0;
        default:
                return -EINVAL;
        }
}

static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
{
        return fasync_helper(fd, filp, on, &fasync);
}

const struct file_operations random_fops = {
        .read = random_read,
        .write = random_write,
        .poll = random_poll,
        .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
        .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
        .fasync = random_fasync,
        .llseek = noop_llseek,
};

const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
        .read = urandom_read,
        .write = random_write,
        .unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
        .compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
        .fasync = random_fasync,
        .llseek = noop_llseek,
};


/********************************************************************
 *
 * Sysctl interface.
 *
 * These are partly unused legacy knobs with dummy values to not break
 * userspace and partly still useful things. They are usually accessible
 * in /proc/sys/kernel/random/ and are as follows:
 *
 * - boot_id - a UUID representing the current boot.
 *
 * - uuid - a random UUID, different each time the file is read.
 *
 * - poolsize - the number of bits of entropy that the input pool can
 *   hold, tied to the POOL_BITS constant.
 *
 * - entropy_avail - the number of bits of entropy currently in the
 *   input pool. Always <= poolsize.
 *
 * - write_wakeup_threshold - the amount of entropy in the input pool
 *   below which write polls to /dev/random will unblock, requesting
 *   more entropy, tied to the POOL_MIN_BITS constant. It is writable
 *   to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not
 *   change any behavior of the RNG.
 *
 * - urandom_min_reseed_secs - fixed to the value CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL.
 *   It is writable to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing
 *   to it does not change any behavior of the RNG.
 *
 ********************************************************************/

#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL

#include <linux/sysctl.h>

static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ;
static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_MIN_BITS;
static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE];

/*
 * This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
 * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
 * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
 */
static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
                        size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
        u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid;
        char uuid_string[UUID_STRING_LEN + 1];
        struct ctl_table fake_table = {
                .data = uuid_string,
                .maxlen = UUID_STRING_LEN
        };

        if (write)
                return -EPERM;

        uuid = table->data;
        if (!uuid) {
                uuid = tmp_uuid;
                generate_random_uuid(uuid);
        } else {
                static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootid_spinlock);

                spin_lock(&bootid_spinlock);
                if (!uuid[8])
                        generate_random_uuid(uuid);
                spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);
        }

        snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid);
        return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}

/* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */
static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
                            size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
        return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos);
}

static struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
        {
                .procname       = "poolsize",
                .data           = &sysctl_poolsize,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0444,
                .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec,
        },
        {
                .procname       = "entropy_avail",
                .data           = &input_pool.entropy_count,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0444,
                .proc_handler   = proc_dointvec,
        },
        {
                .procname       = "write_wakeup_threshold",
                .data           = &sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0644,
                .proc_handler   = proc_do_rointvec,
        },
        {
                .procname       = "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
                .data           = &sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed,
                .maxlen         = sizeof(int),
                .mode           = 0644,
                .proc_handler   = proc_do_rointvec,
        },
        {
                .procname       = "boot_id",
                .data           = &sysctl_bootid,
                .mode           = 0444,
                .proc_handler   = proc_do_uuid,
        },
        {
                .procname       = "uuid",
                .mode           = 0444,
                .proc_handler   = proc_do_uuid,
        },
        { }
};

/*
 * rand_initialize() is called before sysctl_init(),
 * so we cannot call register_sysctl_init() in rand_initialize()
 */
static int __init random_sysctls_init(void)
{
        register_sysctl_init("kernel/random", random_table);
        return 0;
}
device_initcall(random_sysctls_init);
#endif