1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
3 * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
7 * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
9 #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
11 #include <linux/kvm_types.h>
12 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
13 #include <linux/kernel.h>
14 #include <linux/highmem.h>
15 #include <linux/psp.h>
16 #include <linux/psp-sev.h>
17 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
18 #include <linux/swap.h>
19 #include <linux/misc_cgroup.h>
20 #include <linux/processor.h>
21 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
24 #include <asm/trapnr.h>
25 #include <asm/fpu/xcr.h>
34 #ifndef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
36 * When this config is not defined, SEV feature is not supported and APIs in
37 * this file are not used but this file still gets compiled into the KVM AMD
40 * We will not have MISC_CG_RES_SEV and MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES entries in the enum
41 * misc_res_type {} defined in linux/misc_cgroup.h.
43 * Below macros allow compilation to succeed.
45 #define MISC_CG_RES_SEV MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
46 #define MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES MISC_CG_RES_TYPES
49 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
50 /* enable/disable SEV support */
51 static bool sev_enabled = true;
52 module_param_named(sev, sev_enabled, bool, 0444);
54 /* enable/disable SEV-ES support */
55 static bool sev_es_enabled = true;
56 module_param_named(sev_es, sev_es_enabled, bool, 0444);
58 #define sev_enabled false
59 #define sev_es_enabled false
60 #endif /* CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV */
62 static u8 sev_enc_bit;
63 static DECLARE_RWSEM(sev_deactivate_lock);
64 static DEFINE_MUTEX(sev_bitmap_lock);
65 unsigned int max_sev_asid;
66 static unsigned int min_sev_asid;
67 static unsigned long sev_me_mask;
68 static unsigned int nr_asids;
69 static unsigned long *sev_asid_bitmap;
70 static unsigned long *sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap;
73 struct list_head list;
80 /* Called with the sev_bitmap_lock held, or on shutdown */
81 static int sev_flush_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
83 int ret, asid, error = 0;
85 /* Check if there are any ASIDs to reclaim before performing a flush */
86 asid = find_next_bit(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, nr_asids, min_asid);
91 * DEACTIVATE will clear the WBINVD indicator causing DF_FLUSH to fail,
92 * so it must be guarded.
94 down_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
97 ret = sev_guest_df_flush(&error);
99 up_write(&sev_deactivate_lock);
102 pr_err("SEV: DF_FLUSH failed, ret=%d, error=%#x\n", ret, error);
107 static inline bool is_mirroring_enc_context(struct kvm *kvm)
109 return !!to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.enc_context_owner;
112 /* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
113 static bool __sev_recycle_asids(int min_asid, int max_asid)
115 if (sev_flush_asids(min_asid, max_asid))
118 /* The flush process will flush all reclaimable SEV and SEV-ES ASIDs */
119 bitmap_xor(sev_asid_bitmap, sev_asid_bitmap, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap,
121 bitmap_zero(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap, nr_asids);
126 static int sev_misc_cg_try_charge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
128 enum misc_res_type type = sev->es_active ? MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES : MISC_CG_RES_SEV;
129 return misc_cg_try_charge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
132 static void sev_misc_cg_uncharge(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
134 enum misc_res_type type = sev->es_active ? MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES : MISC_CG_RES_SEV;
135 misc_cg_uncharge(type, sev->misc_cg, 1);
138 static int sev_asid_new(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
140 int asid, min_asid, max_asid, ret;
143 WARN_ON(sev->misc_cg);
144 sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
145 ret = sev_misc_cg_try_charge(sev);
147 put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
152 mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
155 * SEV-enabled guests must use asid from min_sev_asid to max_sev_asid.
156 * SEV-ES-enabled guest can use from 1 to min_sev_asid - 1.
158 min_asid = sev->es_active ? 1 : min_sev_asid;
159 max_asid = sev->es_active ? min_sev_asid - 1 : max_sev_asid;
161 asid = find_next_zero_bit(sev_asid_bitmap, max_asid + 1, min_asid);
162 if (asid > max_asid) {
163 if (retry && __sev_recycle_asids(min_asid, max_asid)) {
167 mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
172 __set_bit(asid, sev_asid_bitmap);
174 mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
178 sev_misc_cg_uncharge(sev);
179 put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
184 static int sev_get_asid(struct kvm *kvm)
186 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
191 static void sev_asid_free(struct kvm_sev_info *sev)
193 struct svm_cpu_data *sd;
196 mutex_lock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
198 __set_bit(sev->asid, sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
200 for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
201 sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
202 sd->sev_vmcbs[sev->asid] = NULL;
205 mutex_unlock(&sev_bitmap_lock);
207 sev_misc_cg_uncharge(sev);
208 put_misc_cg(sev->misc_cg);
212 static void sev_decommission(unsigned int handle)
214 struct sev_data_decommission decommission;
219 decommission.handle = handle;
220 sev_guest_decommission(&decommission, NULL);
223 static void sev_unbind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle)
225 struct sev_data_deactivate deactivate;
230 deactivate.handle = handle;
232 /* Guard DEACTIVATE against WBINVD/DF_FLUSH used in ASID recycling */
233 down_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
234 sev_guest_deactivate(&deactivate, NULL);
235 up_read(&sev_deactivate_lock);
237 sev_decommission(handle);
240 static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
242 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
245 if (kvm->created_vcpus)
249 if (unlikely(sev->active))
253 sev->es_active = argp->id == KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
254 asid = sev_asid_new(sev);
259 ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
263 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->regions_list);
264 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sev->mirror_vms);
266 kvm_set_apicv_inhibit(kvm, APICV_INHIBIT_REASON_SEV);
274 sev->es_active = false;
279 static int sev_bind_asid(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int handle, int *error)
281 struct sev_data_activate activate;
282 int asid = sev_get_asid(kvm);
285 /* activate ASID on the given handle */
286 activate.handle = handle;
287 activate.asid = asid;
288 ret = sev_guest_activate(&activate, error);
293 static int __sev_issue_cmd(int fd, int id, void *data, int *error)
302 ret = sev_issue_cmd_external_user(f.file, id, data, error);
308 static int sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, int id, void *data, int *error)
310 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
312 return __sev_issue_cmd(sev->fd, id, data, error);
315 static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
317 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
318 struct sev_data_launch_start start;
319 struct kvm_sev_launch_start params;
320 void *dh_blob, *session_blob;
321 int *error = &argp->error;
327 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
330 memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
333 if (params.dh_uaddr) {
334 dh_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.dh_uaddr, params.dh_len);
336 return PTR_ERR(dh_blob);
338 start.dh_cert_address = __sme_set(__pa(dh_blob));
339 start.dh_cert_len = params.dh_len;
343 if (params.session_uaddr) {
344 session_blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr, params.session_len);
345 if (IS_ERR(session_blob)) {
346 ret = PTR_ERR(session_blob);
350 start.session_address = __sme_set(__pa(session_blob));
351 start.session_len = params.session_len;
354 start.handle = params.handle;
355 start.policy = params.policy;
357 /* create memory encryption context */
358 ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_START, &start, error);
362 /* Bind ASID to this guest */
363 ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
365 sev_decommission(start.handle);
369 /* return handle to userspace */
370 params.handle = start.handle;
371 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params))) {
372 sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
377 sev->handle = start.handle;
378 sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
387 static struct page **sev_pin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long uaddr,
388 unsigned long ulen, unsigned long *n,
391 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
392 unsigned long npages, size;
394 unsigned long locked, lock_limit;
396 unsigned long first, last;
399 lockdep_assert_held(&kvm->lock);
401 if (ulen == 0 || uaddr + ulen < uaddr)
402 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
404 /* Calculate number of pages. */
405 first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
406 last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
407 npages = (last - first + 1);
409 locked = sev->pages_locked + npages;
410 lock_limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_MEMLOCK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
411 if (locked > lock_limit && !capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
412 pr_err("SEV: %lu locked pages exceed the lock limit of %lu.\n", locked, lock_limit);
413 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
416 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(npages > INT_MAX))
417 return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
419 /* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffers. */
420 size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
421 if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
422 pages = __vmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
424 pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
427 return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
429 /* Pin the user virtual address. */
430 npinned = pin_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0, pages);
431 if (npinned != npages) {
432 pr_err("SEV: Failure locking %lu pages.\n", npages);
438 sev->pages_locked = locked;
444 unpin_user_pages(pages, npinned);
450 static void sev_unpin_memory(struct kvm *kvm, struct page **pages,
451 unsigned long npages)
453 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
455 unpin_user_pages(pages, npages);
457 sev->pages_locked -= npages;
460 static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
462 uint8_t *page_virtual;
465 if (this_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT) || npages == 0 ||
469 for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
470 page_virtual = kmap_local_page(pages[i]);
471 clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
472 kunmap_local(page_virtual);
477 static unsigned long get_num_contig_pages(unsigned long idx,
478 struct page **inpages, unsigned long npages)
480 unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
481 unsigned long i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
483 /* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
484 paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
486 next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
487 if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
498 static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
500 unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, pages, size, i;
501 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
502 struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
503 struct sev_data_launch_update_data data;
504 struct page **inpages;
510 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
513 vaddr = params.uaddr;
515 vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
517 /* Lock the user memory. */
518 inpages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
520 return PTR_ERR(inpages);
523 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_UPDATE encrypts pages in
524 * place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
526 sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
529 data.handle = sev->handle;
531 for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
535 * If the user buffer is not page-aligned, calculate the offset
538 offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
540 /* Calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go. */
541 pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
543 len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
546 data.address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
547 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
552 next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
556 /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
557 for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
558 set_page_dirty_lock(inpages[i]);
559 mark_page_accessed(inpages[i]);
561 /* unlock the user pages */
562 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, inpages, npages);
566 static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
568 struct sev_es_save_area *save = svm->sev_es.vmsa;
570 /* Check some debug related fields before encrypting the VMSA */
571 if (svm->vcpu.guest_debug || (svm->vmcb->save.dr7 & ~DR7_FIXED_1))
575 * SEV-ES will use a VMSA that is pointed to by the VMCB, not
576 * the traditional VMSA that is part of the VMCB. Copy the
577 * traditional VMSA as it has been built so far (in prep
578 * for LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA) to be the initial SEV-ES state.
580 memcpy(save, &svm->vmcb->save, sizeof(svm->vmcb->save));
582 /* Sync registgers */
583 save->rax = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
584 save->rbx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
585 save->rcx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
586 save->rdx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
587 save->rsp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
588 save->rbp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP];
589 save->rsi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI];
590 save->rdi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI];
592 save->r8 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8];
593 save->r9 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9];
594 save->r10 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10];
595 save->r11 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11];
596 save->r12 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12];
597 save->r13 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13];
598 save->r14 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14];
599 save->r15 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15];
601 save->rip = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
603 /* Sync some non-GPR registers before encrypting */
604 save->xcr0 = svm->vcpu.arch.xcr0;
605 save->pkru = svm->vcpu.arch.pkru;
606 save->xss = svm->vcpu.arch.ia32_xss;
607 save->dr6 = svm->vcpu.arch.dr6;
609 pr_debug("Virtual Machine Save Area (VMSA):\n");
610 print_hex_dump_debug("", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, save, sizeof(*save), false);
615 static int __sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
618 struct sev_data_launch_update_vmsa vmsa;
619 struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
622 /* Perform some pre-encryption checks against the VMSA */
623 ret = sev_es_sync_vmsa(svm);
628 * The LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command will perform in-place encryption of
629 * the VMSA memory content (i.e it will write the same memory region
630 * with the guest's key), so invalidate it first.
632 clflush_cache_range(svm->sev_es.vmsa, PAGE_SIZE);
635 vmsa.handle = to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info.handle;
636 vmsa.address = __sme_pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
637 vmsa.len = PAGE_SIZE;
638 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, &vmsa, error);
642 vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
646 static int sev_launch_update_vmsa(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
648 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
652 if (!sev_es_guest(kvm))
655 kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
656 ret = mutex_lock_killable(&vcpu->mutex);
660 ret = __sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, vcpu, &argp->error);
662 mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
670 static int sev_launch_measure(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
672 void __user *measure = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
673 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
674 struct sev_data_launch_measure data;
675 struct kvm_sev_launch_measure params;
676 void __user *p = NULL;
683 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, measure, sizeof(params)))
686 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
688 /* User wants to query the blob length */
692 p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
694 if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
697 blob = kzalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
701 data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
702 data.len = params.len;
706 data.handle = sev->handle;
707 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_MEASURE, &data, &argp->error);
710 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
719 if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
724 params.len = data.len;
725 if (copy_to_user(measure, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
732 static int sev_launch_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
734 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
735 struct sev_data_launch_finish data;
740 data.handle = sev->handle;
741 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
744 static int sev_guest_status(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
746 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
747 struct kvm_sev_guest_status params;
748 struct sev_data_guest_status data;
754 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
756 data.handle = sev->handle;
757 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_GUEST_STATUS, &data, &argp->error);
761 params.policy = data.policy;
762 params.state = data.state;
763 params.handle = data.handle;
765 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
771 static int __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src,
772 unsigned long dst, int size,
773 int *error, bool enc)
775 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
776 struct sev_data_dbg data;
779 data.handle = sev->handle;
784 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm,
785 enc ? SEV_CMD_DBG_ENCRYPT : SEV_CMD_DBG_DECRYPT,
789 static int __sev_dbg_decrypt(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long src_paddr,
790 unsigned long dst_paddr, int sz, int *err)
795 * Its safe to read more than we are asked, caller should ensure that
796 * destination has enough space.
798 offset = src_paddr & 15;
799 src_paddr = round_down(src_paddr, 16);
800 sz = round_up(sz + offset, 16);
802 return __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, src_paddr, dst_paddr, sz, err, false);
805 static int __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
806 void __user *dst_uaddr,
807 unsigned long dst_paddr,
810 struct page *tpage = NULL;
813 /* if inputs are not 16-byte then use intermediate buffer */
814 if (!IS_ALIGNED(dst_paddr, 16) ||
815 !IS_ALIGNED(paddr, 16) ||
816 !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
817 tpage = (void *)alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
821 dst_paddr = __sme_page_pa(tpage);
824 ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, size, err);
830 if (copy_to_user(dst_uaddr, page_address(tpage) + offset, size))
841 static int __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long paddr,
843 unsigned long dst_paddr,
844 void __user *dst_vaddr,
845 int size, int *error)
847 struct page *src_tpage = NULL;
848 struct page *dst_tpage = NULL;
851 /* If source buffer is not aligned then use an intermediate buffer */
852 if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)vaddr, 16)) {
853 src_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
857 if (copy_from_user(page_address(src_tpage), vaddr, size)) {
858 __free_page(src_tpage);
862 paddr = __sme_page_pa(src_tpage);
866 * If destination buffer or length is not aligned then do read-modify-write:
867 * - decrypt destination in an intermediate buffer
868 * - copy the source buffer in an intermediate buffer
869 * - use the intermediate buffer as source buffer
871 if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)dst_vaddr, 16) || !IS_ALIGNED(size, 16)) {
874 dst_tpage = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
880 ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt(kvm, dst_paddr,
881 __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage), size, error);
886 * If source is kernel buffer then use memcpy() otherwise
889 dst_offset = dst_paddr & 15;
892 memcpy(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
893 page_address(src_tpage), size);
895 if (copy_from_user(page_address(dst_tpage) + dst_offset,
902 paddr = __sme_page_pa(dst_tpage);
903 dst_paddr = round_down(dst_paddr, 16);
904 len = round_up(size, 16);
907 ret = __sev_issue_dbg_cmd(kvm, paddr, dst_paddr, len, error, true);
911 __free_page(src_tpage);
913 __free_page(dst_tpage);
917 static int sev_dbg_crypt(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp, bool dec)
919 unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr;
920 unsigned long dst_vaddr;
921 struct page **src_p, **dst_p;
922 struct kvm_sev_dbg debug;
930 if (copy_from_user(&debug, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(debug)))
933 if (!debug.len || debug.src_uaddr + debug.len < debug.src_uaddr)
935 if (!debug.dst_uaddr)
938 vaddr = debug.src_uaddr;
940 vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
941 dst_vaddr = debug.dst_uaddr;
943 for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr) {
944 int len, s_off, d_off;
946 /* lock userspace source and destination page */
947 src_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 0);
949 return PTR_ERR(src_p);
951 dst_p = sev_pin_memory(kvm, dst_vaddr & PAGE_MASK, PAGE_SIZE, &n, 1);
953 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
954 return PTR_ERR(dst_p);
958 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before DBG_{DE,EN}CRYPT read or modify
959 * the pages; flush the destination too so that future accesses do not
962 sev_clflush_pages(src_p, 1);
963 sev_clflush_pages(dst_p, 1);
966 * Since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
967 * offset within the page.
969 s_off = vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
970 d_off = dst_vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK;
971 len = min_t(size_t, (PAGE_SIZE - s_off), size);
974 ret = __sev_dbg_decrypt_user(kvm,
975 __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
976 (void __user *)dst_vaddr,
977 __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
980 ret = __sev_dbg_encrypt_user(kvm,
981 __sme_page_pa(src_p[0]) + s_off,
982 (void __user *)vaddr,
983 __sme_page_pa(dst_p[0]) + d_off,
984 (void __user *)dst_vaddr,
987 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, src_p, n);
988 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, dst_p, n);
993 next_vaddr = vaddr + len;
994 dst_vaddr = dst_vaddr + len;
1001 static int sev_launch_secret(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1003 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1004 struct sev_data_launch_secret data;
1005 struct kvm_sev_launch_secret params;
1006 struct page **pages;
1011 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1014 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
1017 pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr, params.guest_len, &n, 1);
1019 return PTR_ERR(pages);
1022 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before LAUNCH_SECRET encrypts pages in
1023 * place; the cache may contain the data that was written unencrypted.
1025 sev_clflush_pages(pages, n);
1028 * The secret must be copied into contiguous memory region, lets verify
1029 * that userspace memory pages are contiguous before we issue command.
1031 if (get_num_contig_pages(0, pages, n) != n) {
1033 goto e_unpin_memory;
1036 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1038 offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1039 data.guest_address = __sme_page_pa(pages[0]) + offset;
1040 data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
1042 blob = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
1044 ret = PTR_ERR(blob);
1045 goto e_unpin_memory;
1048 data.trans_address = __psp_pa(blob);
1049 data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
1051 hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
1056 data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
1057 data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
1059 data.handle = sev->handle;
1060 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_SECRET, &data, &argp->error);
1067 /* content of memory is updated, mark pages dirty */
1068 for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
1069 set_page_dirty_lock(pages[i]);
1070 mark_page_accessed(pages[i]);
1072 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, pages, n);
1076 static int sev_get_attestation_report(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1078 void __user *report = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data;
1079 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1080 struct sev_data_attestation_report data;
1081 struct kvm_sev_attestation_report params;
1086 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1089 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, sizeof(params)))
1092 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1094 /* User wants to query the blob length */
1098 p = (void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.uaddr;
1100 if (params.len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
1103 blob = kzalloc(params.len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1107 data.address = __psp_pa(blob);
1108 data.len = params.len;
1109 memcpy(data.mnonce, params.mnonce, sizeof(params.mnonce));
1112 data.handle = sev->handle;
1113 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_ATTESTATION_REPORT, &data, &argp->error);
1115 * If we query the session length, FW responded with expected data.
1124 if (copy_to_user(p, blob, params.len))
1129 params.len = data.len;
1130 if (copy_to_user(report, ¶ms, sizeof(params)))
1137 /* Userspace wants to query session length. */
1139 __sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
1140 struct kvm_sev_send_start *params)
1142 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1143 struct sev_data_send_start data;
1146 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1147 data.handle = sev->handle;
1148 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
1150 params->session_len = data.session_len;
1151 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
1152 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
1158 static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1160 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1161 struct sev_data_send_start data;
1162 struct kvm_sev_send_start params;
1163 void *amd_certs, *session_data;
1164 void *pdh_cert, *plat_certs;
1167 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1170 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1171 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
1174 /* if session_len is zero, userspace wants to query the session length */
1175 if (!params.session_len)
1176 return __sev_send_start_query_session_length(kvm, argp,
1179 /* some sanity checks */
1180 if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len ||
1181 !params.session_uaddr || params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
1184 /* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */
1185 session_data = kzalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1189 /* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */
1190 pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr,
1191 params.pdh_cert_len);
1192 if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) {
1193 ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert);
1194 goto e_free_session;
1197 plat_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_certs_uaddr,
1198 params.plat_certs_len);
1199 if (IS_ERR(plat_certs)) {
1200 ret = PTR_ERR(plat_certs);
1204 amd_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_certs_uaddr,
1205 params.amd_certs_len);
1206 if (IS_ERR(amd_certs)) {
1207 ret = PTR_ERR(amd_certs);
1208 goto e_free_plat_cert;
1211 /* populate the FW SEND_START field with system physical address */
1212 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1213 data.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
1214 data.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len;
1215 data.plat_certs_address = __psp_pa(plat_certs);
1216 data.plat_certs_len = params.plat_certs_len;
1217 data.amd_certs_address = __psp_pa(amd_certs);
1218 data.amd_certs_len = params.amd_certs_len;
1219 data.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
1220 data.session_len = params.session_len;
1221 data.handle = sev->handle;
1223 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, &data, &argp->error);
1225 if (!ret && copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.session_uaddr,
1226 session_data, params.session_len)) {
1228 goto e_free_amd_cert;
1231 params.policy = data.policy;
1232 params.session_len = data.session_len;
1233 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, ¶ms,
1234 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
1244 kfree(session_data);
1248 /* Userspace wants to query either header or trans length. */
1250 __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
1251 struct kvm_sev_send_update_data *params)
1253 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1254 struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
1257 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1258 data.handle = sev->handle;
1259 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
1261 params->hdr_len = data.hdr_len;
1262 params->trans_len = data.trans_len;
1264 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
1265 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
1271 static int sev_send_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1273 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1274 struct sev_data_send_update_data data;
1275 struct kvm_sev_send_update_data params;
1276 void *hdr, *trans_data;
1277 struct page **guest_page;
1281 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1284 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1285 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_update_data)))
1288 /* userspace wants to query either header or trans length */
1289 if (!params.trans_len || !params.hdr_len)
1290 return __sev_send_update_data_query_lengths(kvm, argp, ¶ms);
1292 if (!params.trans_uaddr || !params.guest_uaddr ||
1293 !params.guest_len || !params.hdr_uaddr)
1296 /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
1297 offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1298 if (params.guest_len > PAGE_SIZE || (params.guest_len + offset) > PAGE_SIZE)
1301 /* Pin guest memory */
1302 guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
1304 if (IS_ERR(guest_page))
1305 return PTR_ERR(guest_page);
1307 /* allocate memory for header and transport buffer */
1309 hdr = kzalloc(params.hdr_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1313 trans_data = kzalloc(params.trans_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1317 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1318 data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
1319 data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
1320 data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans_data);
1321 data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
1323 /* The SEND_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
1324 data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
1325 data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
1326 data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
1327 data.handle = sev->handle;
1329 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_UPDATE_DATA, &data, &argp->error);
1332 goto e_free_trans_data;
1334 /* copy transport buffer to user space */
1335 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.trans_uaddr,
1336 trans_data, params.trans_len)) {
1338 goto e_free_trans_data;
1341 /* Copy packet header to userspace. */
1342 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.hdr_uaddr, hdr,
1351 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
1356 static int sev_send_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1358 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1359 struct sev_data_send_finish data;
1361 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1364 data.handle = sev->handle;
1365 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
1368 static int sev_send_cancel(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1370 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1371 struct sev_data_send_cancel data;
1373 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1376 data.handle = sev->handle;
1377 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_CANCEL, &data, &argp->error);
1380 static int sev_receive_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1382 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1383 struct sev_data_receive_start start;
1384 struct kvm_sev_receive_start params;
1385 int *error = &argp->error;
1390 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1393 /* Get parameter from the userspace */
1394 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1395 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start)))
1398 /* some sanity checks */
1399 if (!params.pdh_uaddr || !params.pdh_len ||
1400 !params.session_uaddr || !params.session_len)
1403 pdh_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_uaddr, params.pdh_len);
1404 if (IS_ERR(pdh_data))
1405 return PTR_ERR(pdh_data);
1407 session_data = psp_copy_user_blob(params.session_uaddr,
1408 params.session_len);
1409 if (IS_ERR(session_data)) {
1410 ret = PTR_ERR(session_data);
1414 memset(&start, 0, sizeof(start));
1415 start.handle = params.handle;
1416 start.policy = params.policy;
1417 start.pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_data);
1418 start.pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_len;
1419 start.session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
1420 start.session_len = params.session_len;
1422 /* create memory encryption context */
1423 ret = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_START, &start,
1426 goto e_free_session;
1428 /* Bind ASID to this guest */
1429 ret = sev_bind_asid(kvm, start.handle, error);
1431 sev_decommission(start.handle);
1432 goto e_free_session;
1435 params.handle = start.handle;
1436 if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1437 ¶ms, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_start))) {
1439 sev_unbind_asid(kvm, start.handle);
1440 goto e_free_session;
1443 sev->handle = start.handle;
1444 sev->fd = argp->sev_fd;
1447 kfree(session_data);
1454 static int sev_receive_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1456 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1457 struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data params;
1458 struct sev_data_receive_update_data data;
1459 void *hdr = NULL, *trans = NULL;
1460 struct page **guest_page;
1464 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1467 if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
1468 sizeof(struct kvm_sev_receive_update_data)))
1471 if (!params.hdr_uaddr || !params.hdr_len ||
1472 !params.guest_uaddr || !params.guest_len ||
1473 !params.trans_uaddr || !params.trans_len)
1476 /* Check if we are crossing the page boundary */
1477 offset = params.guest_uaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
1478 if (params.guest_len > PAGE_SIZE || (params.guest_len + offset) > PAGE_SIZE)
1481 hdr = psp_copy_user_blob(params.hdr_uaddr, params.hdr_len);
1483 return PTR_ERR(hdr);
1485 trans = psp_copy_user_blob(params.trans_uaddr, params.trans_len);
1486 if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
1487 ret = PTR_ERR(trans);
1491 memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
1492 data.hdr_address = __psp_pa(hdr);
1493 data.hdr_len = params.hdr_len;
1494 data.trans_address = __psp_pa(trans);
1495 data.trans_len = params.trans_len;
1497 /* Pin guest memory */
1498 guest_page = sev_pin_memory(kvm, params.guest_uaddr & PAGE_MASK,
1500 if (IS_ERR(guest_page)) {
1501 ret = PTR_ERR(guest_page);
1506 * Flush (on non-coherent CPUs) before RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, the PSP
1507 * encrypts the written data with the guest's key, and the cache may
1508 * contain dirty, unencrypted data.
1510 sev_clflush_pages(guest_page, n);
1512 /* The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command requires C-bit to be always set. */
1513 data.guest_address = (page_to_pfn(guest_page[0]) << PAGE_SHIFT) + offset;
1514 data.guest_address |= sev_me_mask;
1515 data.guest_len = params.guest_len;
1516 data.handle = sev->handle;
1518 ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA, &data,
1521 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, guest_page, n);
1531 static int sev_receive_finish(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
1533 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1534 struct sev_data_receive_finish data;
1536 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1539 data.handle = sev->handle;
1540 return sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_RECEIVE_FINISH, &data, &argp->error);
1543 static bool is_cmd_allowed_from_mirror(u32 cmd_id)
1546 * Allow mirrors VM to call KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA to enable SEV-ES
1547 * active mirror VMs. Also allow the debugging and status commands.
1549 if (cmd_id == KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA ||
1550 cmd_id == KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS || cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT ||
1551 cmd_id == KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT)
1557 static int sev_lock_two_vms(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
1559 struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(dst_kvm)->sev_info;
1560 struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(src_kvm)->sev_info;
1563 if (dst_kvm == src_kvm)
1567 * Bail if these VMs are already involved in a migration to avoid
1568 * deadlock between two VMs trying to migrate to/from each other.
1570 if (atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(&dst_sev->migration_in_progress, 0, 1))
1573 if (atomic_cmpxchg_acquire(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0, 1))
1577 if (mutex_lock_killable(&dst_kvm->lock))
1579 if (mutex_lock_killable_nested(&src_kvm->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING))
1584 mutex_unlock(&dst_kvm->lock);
1586 atomic_set_release(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
1588 atomic_set_release(&dst_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
1592 static void sev_unlock_two_vms(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
1594 struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(dst_kvm)->sev_info;
1595 struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(src_kvm)->sev_info;
1597 mutex_unlock(&dst_kvm->lock);
1598 mutex_unlock(&src_kvm->lock);
1599 atomic_set_release(&dst_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
1600 atomic_set_release(&src_sev->migration_in_progress, 0);
1603 /* vCPU mutex subclasses. */
1604 enum sev_migration_role {
1605 SEV_MIGRATION_SOURCE = 0,
1606 SEV_MIGRATION_TARGET,
1607 SEV_NR_MIGRATION_ROLES,
1610 static int sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm,
1611 enum sev_migration_role role)
1613 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
1616 kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
1617 if (mutex_lock_killable_nested(&vcpu->mutex, role))
1620 #ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
1623 * Reset the role to one that avoids colliding with
1624 * the role used for the first vcpu mutex.
1626 role = SEV_NR_MIGRATION_ROLES;
1628 mutex_release(&vcpu->mutex.dep_map, _THIS_IP_);
1636 kvm_for_each_vcpu(j, vcpu, kvm) {
1640 #ifdef CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING
1642 mutex_acquire(&vcpu->mutex.dep_map, role, 0, _THIS_IP_);
1645 mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
1650 static void sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(struct kvm *kvm)
1652 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
1656 kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
1660 mutex_acquire(&vcpu->mutex.dep_map,
1661 SEV_NR_MIGRATION_ROLES, 0, _THIS_IP_);
1663 mutex_unlock(&vcpu->mutex);
1667 static void sev_migrate_from(struct kvm *dst_kvm, struct kvm *src_kvm)
1669 struct kvm_sev_info *dst = &to_kvm_svm(dst_kvm)->sev_info;
1670 struct kvm_sev_info *src = &to_kvm_svm(src_kvm)->sev_info;
1671 struct kvm_vcpu *dst_vcpu, *src_vcpu;
1672 struct vcpu_svm *dst_svm, *src_svm;
1673 struct kvm_sev_info *mirror;
1677 dst->asid = src->asid;
1678 dst->handle = src->handle;
1679 dst->pages_locked = src->pages_locked;
1680 dst->enc_context_owner = src->enc_context_owner;
1681 dst->es_active = src->es_active;
1684 src->active = false;
1686 src->pages_locked = 0;
1687 src->enc_context_owner = NULL;
1688 src->es_active = false;
1690 list_cut_before(&dst->regions_list, &src->regions_list, &src->regions_list);
1693 * If this VM has mirrors, "transfer" each mirror's refcount of the
1694 * source to the destination (this KVM). The caller holds a reference
1695 * to the source, so there's no danger of use-after-free.
1697 list_cut_before(&dst->mirror_vms, &src->mirror_vms, &src->mirror_vms);
1698 list_for_each_entry(mirror, &dst->mirror_vms, mirror_entry) {
1699 kvm_get_kvm(dst_kvm);
1700 kvm_put_kvm(src_kvm);
1701 mirror->enc_context_owner = dst_kvm;
1705 * If this VM is a mirror, remove the old mirror from the owners list
1706 * and add the new mirror to the list.
1708 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(dst_kvm)) {
1709 struct kvm_sev_info *owner_sev_info =
1710 &to_kvm_svm(dst->enc_context_owner)->sev_info;
1712 list_del(&src->mirror_entry);
1713 list_add_tail(&dst->mirror_entry, &owner_sev_info->mirror_vms);
1716 kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, dst_vcpu, dst_kvm) {
1717 dst_svm = to_svm(dst_vcpu);
1719 sev_init_vmcb(dst_svm);
1721 if (!dst->es_active)
1725 * Note, the source is not required to have the same number of
1726 * vCPUs as the destination when migrating a vanilla SEV VM.
1728 src_vcpu = kvm_get_vcpu(dst_kvm, i);
1729 src_svm = to_svm(src_vcpu);
1732 * Transfer VMSA and GHCB state to the destination. Nullify and
1733 * clear source fields as appropriate, the state now belongs to
1736 memcpy(&dst_svm->sev_es, &src_svm->sev_es, sizeof(src_svm->sev_es));
1737 dst_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = src_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa;
1738 dst_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = src_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa;
1739 dst_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = true;
1741 memset(&src_svm->sev_es, 0, sizeof(src_svm->sev_es));
1742 src_svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = INVALID_PAGE;
1743 src_svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = INVALID_PAGE;
1744 src_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected = false;
1748 static int sev_check_source_vcpus(struct kvm *dst, struct kvm *src)
1750 struct kvm_vcpu *src_vcpu;
1753 if (!sev_es_guest(src))
1756 if (atomic_read(&src->online_vcpus) != atomic_read(&dst->online_vcpus))
1759 kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, src_vcpu, src) {
1760 if (!src_vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
1767 int sev_vm_move_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
1769 struct kvm_sev_info *dst_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1770 struct kvm_sev_info *src_sev, *cg_cleanup_sev;
1771 struct fd f = fdget(source_fd);
1772 struct kvm *source_kvm;
1773 bool charged = false;
1779 if (!file_is_kvm(f.file)) {
1784 source_kvm = f.file->private_data;
1785 ret = sev_lock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
1789 if (sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm)) {
1794 src_sev = &to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info;
1796 dst_sev->misc_cg = get_current_misc_cg();
1797 cg_cleanup_sev = dst_sev;
1798 if (dst_sev->misc_cg != src_sev->misc_cg) {
1799 ret = sev_misc_cg_try_charge(dst_sev);
1801 goto out_dst_cgroup;
1805 ret = sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(kvm, SEV_MIGRATION_SOURCE);
1807 goto out_dst_cgroup;
1808 ret = sev_lock_vcpus_for_migration(source_kvm, SEV_MIGRATION_TARGET);
1812 ret = sev_check_source_vcpus(kvm, source_kvm);
1814 goto out_source_vcpu;
1816 sev_migrate_from(kvm, source_kvm);
1817 kvm_vm_dead(source_kvm);
1818 cg_cleanup_sev = src_sev;
1822 sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(source_kvm);
1824 sev_unlock_vcpus_for_migration(kvm);
1826 /* Operates on the source on success, on the destination on failure. */
1828 sev_misc_cg_uncharge(cg_cleanup_sev);
1829 put_misc_cg(cg_cleanup_sev->misc_cg);
1830 cg_cleanup_sev->misc_cg = NULL;
1832 sev_unlock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
1838 int sev_mem_enc_ioctl(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
1840 struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
1849 if (copy_from_user(&sev_cmd, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
1852 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1854 /* Only the enc_context_owner handles some memory enc operations. */
1855 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm) &&
1856 !is_cmd_allowed_from_mirror(sev_cmd.id)) {
1861 switch (sev_cmd.id) {
1862 case KVM_SEV_ES_INIT:
1863 if (!sev_es_enabled) {
1869 r = sev_guest_init(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1871 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START:
1872 r = sev_launch_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1874 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA:
1875 r = sev_launch_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1877 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA:
1878 r = sev_launch_update_vmsa(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1880 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_MEASURE:
1881 r = sev_launch_measure(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1883 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH:
1884 r = sev_launch_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1886 case KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS:
1887 r = sev_guest_status(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1889 case KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT:
1890 r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, true);
1892 case KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT:
1893 r = sev_dbg_crypt(kvm, &sev_cmd, false);
1895 case KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_SECRET:
1896 r = sev_launch_secret(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1898 case KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
1899 r = sev_get_attestation_report(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1901 case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
1902 r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1904 case KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE_DATA:
1905 r = sev_send_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1907 case KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH:
1908 r = sev_send_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1910 case KVM_SEV_SEND_CANCEL:
1911 r = sev_send_cancel(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1913 case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START:
1914 r = sev_receive_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1916 case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA:
1917 r = sev_receive_update_data(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1919 case KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH:
1920 r = sev_receive_finish(kvm, &sev_cmd);
1927 if (copy_to_user(argp, &sev_cmd, sizeof(struct kvm_sev_cmd)))
1931 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1935 int sev_mem_enc_register_region(struct kvm *kvm,
1936 struct kvm_enc_region *range)
1938 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1939 struct enc_region *region;
1942 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
1945 /* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
1946 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
1949 if (range->addr > ULONG_MAX || range->size > ULONG_MAX)
1952 region = kzalloc(sizeof(*region), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
1956 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
1957 region->pages = sev_pin_memory(kvm, range->addr, range->size, ®ion->npages, 1);
1958 if (IS_ERR(region->pages)) {
1959 ret = PTR_ERR(region->pages);
1960 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1964 region->uaddr = range->addr;
1965 region->size = range->size;
1967 list_add_tail(®ion->list, &sev->regions_list);
1968 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
1971 * The guest may change the memory encryption attribute from C=0 -> C=1
1972 * or vice versa for this memory range. Lets make sure caches are
1973 * flushed to ensure that guest data gets written into memory with
1976 sev_clflush_pages(region->pages, region->npages);
1985 static struct enc_region *
1986 find_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_enc_region *range)
1988 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
1989 struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
1990 struct enc_region *i;
1992 list_for_each_entry(i, head, list) {
1993 if (i->uaddr == range->addr &&
1994 i->size == range->size)
2001 static void __unregister_enc_region_locked(struct kvm *kvm,
2002 struct enc_region *region)
2004 sev_unpin_memory(kvm, region->pages, region->npages);
2005 list_del(®ion->list);
2009 int sev_mem_enc_unregister_region(struct kvm *kvm,
2010 struct kvm_enc_region *range)
2012 struct enc_region *region;
2015 /* If kvm is mirroring encryption context it isn't responsible for it */
2016 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm))
2019 mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
2021 if (!sev_guest(kvm)) {
2026 region = find_enc_region(kvm, range);
2033 * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
2034 * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
2035 * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
2037 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
2039 __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm, region);
2041 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
2045 mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
2049 int sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd)
2051 struct fd f = fdget(source_fd);
2052 struct kvm *source_kvm;
2053 struct kvm_sev_info *source_sev, *mirror_sev;
2059 if (!file_is_kvm(f.file)) {
2064 source_kvm = f.file->private_data;
2065 ret = sev_lock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
2070 * Mirrors of mirrors should work, but let's not get silly. Also
2071 * disallow out-of-band SEV/SEV-ES init if the target is already an
2072 * SEV guest, or if vCPUs have been created. KVM relies on vCPUs being
2073 * created after SEV/SEV-ES initialization, e.g. to init intercepts.
2075 if (sev_guest(kvm) || !sev_guest(source_kvm) ||
2076 is_mirroring_enc_context(source_kvm) || kvm->created_vcpus) {
2082 * The mirror kvm holds an enc_context_owner ref so its asid can't
2083 * disappear until we're done with it
2085 source_sev = &to_kvm_svm(source_kvm)->sev_info;
2086 kvm_get_kvm(source_kvm);
2087 mirror_sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
2088 list_add_tail(&mirror_sev->mirror_entry, &source_sev->mirror_vms);
2090 /* Set enc_context_owner and copy its encryption context over */
2091 mirror_sev->enc_context_owner = source_kvm;
2092 mirror_sev->active = true;
2093 mirror_sev->asid = source_sev->asid;
2094 mirror_sev->fd = source_sev->fd;
2095 mirror_sev->es_active = source_sev->es_active;
2096 mirror_sev->handle = source_sev->handle;
2097 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mirror_sev->regions_list);
2098 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mirror_sev->mirror_vms);
2102 * Do not copy ap_jump_table. Since the mirror does not share the same
2103 * KVM contexts as the original, and they may have different
2108 sev_unlock_two_vms(kvm, source_kvm);
2114 void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
2116 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
2117 struct list_head *head = &sev->regions_list;
2118 struct list_head *pos, *q;
2120 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
2123 WARN_ON(!list_empty(&sev->mirror_vms));
2125 /* If this is a mirror_kvm release the enc_context_owner and skip sev cleanup */
2126 if (is_mirroring_enc_context(kvm)) {
2127 struct kvm *owner_kvm = sev->enc_context_owner;
2129 mutex_lock(&owner_kvm->lock);
2130 list_del(&sev->mirror_entry);
2131 mutex_unlock(&owner_kvm->lock);
2132 kvm_put_kvm(owner_kvm);
2137 * Ensure that all guest tagged cache entries are flushed before
2138 * releasing the pages back to the system for use. CLFLUSH will
2139 * not do this, so issue a WBINVD.
2141 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
2144 * if userspace was terminated before unregistering the memory regions
2145 * then lets unpin all the registered memory.
2147 if (!list_empty(head)) {
2148 list_for_each_safe(pos, q, head) {
2149 __unregister_enc_region_locked(kvm,
2150 list_entry(pos, struct enc_region, list));
2155 sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
2159 void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
2162 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
2163 if (!sev_es_enabled)
2164 kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
2167 void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
2169 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
2170 unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
2171 bool sev_es_supported = false;
2172 bool sev_supported = false;
2174 if (!sev_enabled || !npt_enabled)
2178 * SEV must obviously be supported in hardware. Sanity check that the
2179 * CPU supports decode assists, which is mandatory for SEV guests to
2180 * support instruction emulation.
2182 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV) ||
2183 WARN_ON_ONCE(!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_DECODEASSISTS)))
2186 /* Retrieve SEV CPUID information */
2187 cpuid(0x8000001f, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
2189 /* Set encryption bit location for SEV-ES guests */
2190 sev_enc_bit = ebx & 0x3f;
2192 /* Maximum number of encrypted guests supported simultaneously */
2197 /* Minimum ASID value that should be used for SEV guest */
2199 sev_me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
2202 * Initialize SEV ASID bitmaps. Allocate space for ASID 0 in the bitmap,
2203 * even though it's never used, so that the bitmap is indexed by the
2206 nr_asids = max_sev_asid + 1;
2207 sev_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(nr_asids, GFP_KERNEL);
2208 if (!sev_asid_bitmap)
2211 sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap = bitmap_zalloc(nr_asids, GFP_KERNEL);
2212 if (!sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap) {
2213 bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
2214 sev_asid_bitmap = NULL;
2218 sev_asid_count = max_sev_asid - min_sev_asid + 1;
2219 WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, sev_asid_count));
2220 sev_supported = true;
2222 /* SEV-ES support requested? */
2223 if (!sev_es_enabled)
2227 * SEV-ES requires MMIO caching as KVM doesn't have access to the guest
2228 * instruction stream, i.e. can't emulate in response to a #NPF and
2229 * instead relies on #NPF(RSVD) being reflected into the guest as #VC
2230 * (the guest can then do a #VMGEXIT to request MMIO emulation).
2232 if (!enable_mmio_caching)
2235 /* Does the CPU support SEV-ES? */
2236 if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
2239 /* Has the system been allocated ASIDs for SEV-ES? */
2240 if (min_sev_asid == 1)
2243 sev_es_asid_count = min_sev_asid - 1;
2244 WARN_ON_ONCE(misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, sev_es_asid_count));
2245 sev_es_supported = true;
2248 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV))
2249 pr_info("SEV %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
2250 sev_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
2251 min_sev_asid, max_sev_asid);
2252 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES))
2253 pr_info("SEV-ES %s (ASIDs %u - %u)\n",
2254 sev_es_supported ? "enabled" : "disabled",
2255 min_sev_asid > 1 ? 1 : 0, min_sev_asid - 1);
2257 sev_enabled = sev_supported;
2258 sev_es_enabled = sev_es_supported;
2262 void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
2267 /* No need to take sev_bitmap_lock, all VMs have been destroyed. */
2268 sev_flush_asids(1, max_sev_asid);
2270 bitmap_free(sev_asid_bitmap);
2271 bitmap_free(sev_reclaim_asid_bitmap);
2273 misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV, 0);
2274 misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_SEV_ES, 0);
2277 int sev_cpu_init(struct svm_cpu_data *sd)
2282 sd->sev_vmcbs = kcalloc(nr_asids, sizeof(void *), GFP_KERNEL);
2290 * Pages used by hardware to hold guest encrypted state must be flushed before
2291 * returning them to the system.
2293 static void sev_flush_encrypted_page(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *va)
2295 int asid = to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info.asid;
2298 * Note! The address must be a kernel address, as regular page walk
2299 * checks are performed by VM_PAGE_FLUSH, i.e. operating on a user
2300 * address is non-deterministic and unsafe. This function deliberately
2301 * takes a pointer to deter passing in a user address.
2303 unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)va;
2306 * If CPU enforced cache coherency for encrypted mappings of the
2307 * same physical page is supported, use CLFLUSHOPT instead. NOTE: cache
2308 * flush is still needed in order to work properly with DMA devices.
2310 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT)) {
2311 clflush_cache_range(va, PAGE_SIZE);
2316 * VM Page Flush takes a host virtual address and a guest ASID. Fall
2317 * back to WBINVD if this faults so as not to make any problems worse
2318 * by leaving stale encrypted data in the cache.
2320 if (WARN_ON_ONCE(wrmsrl_safe(MSR_AMD64_VM_PAGE_FLUSH, addr | asid)))
2326 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
2329 void sev_guest_memory_reclaimed(struct kvm *kvm)
2331 if (!sev_guest(kvm))
2334 wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
2337 void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
2339 struct vcpu_svm *svm;
2341 if (!sev_es_guest(vcpu->kvm))
2346 if (vcpu->arch.guest_state_protected)
2347 sev_flush_encrypted_page(vcpu, svm->sev_es.vmsa);
2349 __free_page(virt_to_page(svm->sev_es.vmsa));
2351 if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free)
2352 kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
2355 static void dump_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2357 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
2360 /* Re-use the dump_invalid_vmcb module parameter */
2361 if (!dump_invalid_vmcb) {
2362 pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_amd.dump_invalid_vmcb=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
2366 nbits = sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap) * 8;
2368 pr_err("GHCB (GPA=%016llx):\n", svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa);
2369 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_code",
2370 ghcb->save.sw_exit_code, ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb));
2371 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_1",
2372 ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_1, ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb));
2373 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_exit_info_2",
2374 ghcb->save.sw_exit_info_2, ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb));
2375 pr_err("%-20s%016llx is_valid: %u\n", "sw_scratch",
2376 ghcb->save.sw_scratch, ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb));
2377 pr_err("%-20s%*pb\n", "valid_bitmap", nbits, ghcb->save.valid_bitmap);
2380 static void sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2382 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2383 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
2386 * The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
2388 * GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
2390 * Copy their values, even if they may not have been written during the
2391 * VM-Exit. It's the guest's responsibility to not consume random data.
2393 ghcb_set_rax(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]);
2394 ghcb_set_rbx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX]);
2395 ghcb_set_rcx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX]);
2396 ghcb_set_rdx(ghcb, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX]);
2399 static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2401 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2402 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2403 struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
2407 * The GHCB protocol so far allows for the following data
2409 * GPRs RAX, RBX, RCX, RDX
2413 * VMMCALL allows the guest to provide extra registers. KVM also
2414 * expects RSI for hypercalls, so include that, too.
2416 * Copy their values to the appropriate location if supplied.
2418 memset(vcpu->arch.regs, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.regs));
2420 BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(svm->sev_es.valid_bitmap) != sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
2421 memcpy(&svm->sev_es.valid_bitmap, &ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
2423 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rax_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
2424 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rbx_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
2425 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rcx_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
2426 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rdx_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
2427 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI] = kvm_ghcb_get_rsi_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
2429 svm->vmcb->save.cpl = kvm_ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
2431 if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(svm)) {
2432 vcpu->arch.xcr0 = ghcb_get_xcr0(ghcb);
2433 kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
2436 /* Copy the GHCB exit information into the VMCB fields */
2437 exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
2438 control->exit_code = lower_32_bits(exit_code);
2439 control->exit_code_hi = upper_32_bits(exit_code);
2440 control->exit_info_1 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb);
2441 control->exit_info_2 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb);
2442 svm->sev_es.sw_scratch = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_scratch_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
2444 /* Clear the valid entries fields */
2445 memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
2448 static u64 kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(struct vmcb_control_area *control)
2450 return (((u64)control->exit_code_hi) << 32) | control->exit_code;
2453 static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2455 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2456 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2461 * Retrieve the exit code now even though it may not be marked valid
2462 * as it could help with debugging.
2464 exit_code = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(control);
2466 /* Only GHCB Usage code 0 is supported */
2467 if (svm->sev_es.ghcb->ghcb_usage) {
2468 reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_USAGE;
2472 reason = GHCB_ERR_MISSING_INPUT;
2474 if (!kvm_ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(svm) ||
2475 !kvm_ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(svm) ||
2476 !kvm_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(svm))
2479 switch (exit_code) {
2480 case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7:
2482 case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7:
2483 if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm))
2486 case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
2488 case SVM_EXIT_RDPMC:
2489 if (!kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm))
2492 case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
2493 if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
2494 !kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm))
2496 if (vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] == 0xd)
2497 if (!kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(svm))
2503 if (control->exit_info_1 & SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK) {
2504 if (!kvm_ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(svm))
2507 if (!(control->exit_info_1 & SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK))
2508 if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm))
2513 if (!kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm))
2515 if (control->exit_info_1) {
2516 if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
2517 !kvm_ghcb_rdx_is_valid(svm))
2521 case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL:
2522 if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
2523 !kvm_ghcb_cpl_is_valid(svm))
2526 case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
2528 case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
2530 case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
2531 if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
2532 !kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm) ||
2533 !kvm_ghcb_rdx_is_valid(svm))
2536 case SVM_EXIT_MWAIT:
2537 if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
2538 !kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm))
2541 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
2542 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
2543 if (!kvm_ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(svm))
2546 case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
2547 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
2548 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE:
2549 case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
2552 reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT;
2559 if (reason == GHCB_ERR_INVALID_USAGE) {
2560 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: ghcb usage %#x is not valid\n",
2561 svm->sev_es.ghcb->ghcb_usage);
2562 } else if (reason == GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT) {
2563 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: exit code %#llx is not valid\n",
2566 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: exit code %#llx input is not valid\n",
2571 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 2);
2572 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, reason);
2574 /* Resume the guest to "return" the error code. */
2578 void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2580 if (!svm->sev_es.ghcb)
2583 if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free) {
2585 * The scratch area lives outside the GHCB, so there is a
2586 * buffer that, depending on the operation performed, may
2587 * need to be synced, then freed.
2589 if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync) {
2590 kvm_write_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm,
2591 svm->sev_es.sw_scratch,
2592 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa,
2593 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len);
2594 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = false;
2597 kvfree(svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
2598 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = NULL;
2599 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = false;
2602 trace_kvm_vmgexit_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id, svm->sev_es.ghcb);
2604 sev_es_sync_to_ghcb(svm);
2606 kvm_vcpu_unmap(&svm->vcpu, &svm->sev_es.ghcb_map, true);
2607 svm->sev_es.ghcb = NULL;
2610 void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
2612 struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu_ptr(&svm_data, cpu);
2613 int asid = sev_get_asid(svm->vcpu.kvm);
2615 /* Assign the asid allocated with this SEV guest */
2621 * 1) when different VMCB for the same ASID is to be run on the same host CPU.
2622 * 2) or this VMCB was executed on different host CPU in previous VMRUNs.
2624 if (sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] == svm->vmcb &&
2625 svm->vcpu.arch.last_vmentry_cpu == cpu)
2628 sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = svm->vmcb;
2629 svm->vmcb->control.tlb_ctl = TLB_CONTROL_FLUSH_ASID;
2630 vmcb_mark_dirty(svm->vmcb, VMCB_ASID);
2633 #define GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT (16ULL * PAGE_SIZE)
2634 static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
2636 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2637 u64 ghcb_scratch_beg, ghcb_scratch_end;
2638 u64 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end;
2641 scratch_gpa_beg = svm->sev_es.sw_scratch;
2642 if (!scratch_gpa_beg) {
2643 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch gpa not provided\n");
2647 scratch_gpa_end = scratch_gpa_beg + len;
2648 if (scratch_gpa_end < scratch_gpa_beg) {
2649 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch length (%#llx) not valid for scratch address (%#llx)\n",
2650 len, scratch_gpa_beg);
2654 if ((scratch_gpa_beg & PAGE_MASK) == control->ghcb_gpa) {
2655 /* Scratch area begins within GHCB */
2656 ghcb_scratch_beg = control->ghcb_gpa +
2657 offsetof(struct ghcb, shared_buffer);
2658 ghcb_scratch_end = control->ghcb_gpa +
2659 offsetof(struct ghcb, reserved_0xff0);
2662 * If the scratch area begins within the GHCB, it must be
2663 * completely contained in the GHCB shared buffer area.
2665 if (scratch_gpa_beg < ghcb_scratch_beg ||
2666 scratch_gpa_end > ghcb_scratch_end) {
2667 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area is outside of GHCB shared buffer area (%#llx - %#llx)\n",
2668 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end);
2672 scratch_va = (void *)svm->sev_es.ghcb;
2673 scratch_va += (scratch_gpa_beg - control->ghcb_gpa);
2676 * The guest memory must be read into a kernel buffer, so
2679 if (len > GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT) {
2680 pr_err("vmgexit: scratch area exceeds KVM limits (%#llx requested, %#llx limit)\n",
2681 len, GHCB_SCRATCH_AREA_LIMIT);
2684 scratch_va = kvzalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
2688 if (kvm_read_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm, scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_va, len)) {
2689 /* Unable to copy scratch area from guest */
2690 pr_err("vmgexit: kvm_read_guest for scratch area failed\n");
2697 * The scratch area is outside the GHCB. The operation will
2698 * dictate whether the buffer needs to be synced before running
2699 * the vCPU next time (i.e. a read was requested so the data
2700 * must be written back to the guest memory).
2702 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = sync;
2703 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_free = true;
2706 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa = scratch_va;
2707 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len = len;
2712 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 2);
2713 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_SCRATCH_AREA);
2718 static void set_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value, u64 mask,
2721 svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa &= ~(mask << pos);
2722 svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa |= (value & mask) << pos;
2725 static u64 get_ghcb_msr_bits(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 mask, unsigned int pos)
2727 return (svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa >> pos) & mask;
2730 static void set_ghcb_msr(struct vcpu_svm *svm, u64 value)
2732 svm->vmcb->control.ghcb_gpa = value;
2735 static int sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2737 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2738 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2742 ghcb_info = control->ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK;
2744 trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_enter(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
2747 switch (ghcb_info) {
2748 case GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO_REQ:
2749 set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
2753 case GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REQ: {
2754 u64 cpuid_fn, cpuid_reg, cpuid_value;
2756 cpuid_fn = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2757 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_MASK,
2758 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_FUNC_POS);
2760 /* Initialize the registers needed by the CPUID intercept */
2761 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = cpuid_fn;
2762 vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = 0;
2764 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_CPUID);
2766 /* Error, keep GHCB MSR value as-is */
2770 cpuid_reg = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2771 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_MASK,
2772 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_REG_POS);
2774 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
2775 else if (cpuid_reg == 1)
2776 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
2777 else if (cpuid_reg == 2)
2778 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
2780 cpuid_value = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
2782 set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, cpuid_value,
2783 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_MASK,
2784 GHCB_MSR_CPUID_VALUE_POS);
2786 set_ghcb_msr_bits(svm, GHCB_MSR_CPUID_RESP,
2791 case GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ: {
2792 u64 reason_set, reason_code;
2794 reason_set = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2795 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_MASK,
2796 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_POS);
2797 reason_code = get_ghcb_msr_bits(svm,
2798 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_MASK,
2799 GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_POS);
2800 pr_info("SEV-ES guest requested termination: %#llx:%#llx\n",
2801 reason_set, reason_code);
2803 vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SYSTEM_EVENT;
2804 vcpu->run->system_event.type = KVM_SYSTEM_EVENT_SEV_TERM;
2805 vcpu->run->system_event.ndata = 1;
2806 vcpu->run->system_event.data[0] = control->ghcb_gpa;
2811 /* Error, keep GHCB MSR value as-is */
2815 trace_kvm_vmgexit_msr_protocol_exit(svm->vcpu.vcpu_id,
2816 control->ghcb_gpa, ret);
2821 int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
2823 struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
2824 struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
2825 u64 ghcb_gpa, exit_code;
2828 /* Validate the GHCB */
2829 ghcb_gpa = control->ghcb_gpa;
2830 if (ghcb_gpa & GHCB_MSR_INFO_MASK)
2831 return sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(svm);
2834 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: GHCB gpa is not set\n");
2836 /* Without a GHCB, just return right back to the guest */
2840 if (kvm_vcpu_map(vcpu, ghcb_gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT, &svm->sev_es.ghcb_map)) {
2841 /* Unable to map GHCB from guest */
2842 vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: error mapping GHCB [%#llx] from guest\n",
2845 /* Without a GHCB, just return right back to the guest */
2849 svm->sev_es.ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb_map.hva;
2851 trace_kvm_vmgexit_enter(vcpu->vcpu_id, svm->sev_es.ghcb);
2853 sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(svm);
2854 ret = sev_es_validate_vmgexit(svm);
2858 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 0);
2859 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 0);
2861 exit_code = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(control);
2862 switch (exit_code) {
2863 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
2864 ret = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, true, control->exit_info_2);
2868 ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_read(vcpu,
2869 control->exit_info_1,
2870 control->exit_info_2,
2871 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
2873 case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
2874 ret = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, false, control->exit_info_2);
2878 ret = kvm_sev_es_mmio_write(vcpu,
2879 control->exit_info_1,
2880 control->exit_info_2,
2881 svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa);
2883 case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
2884 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, SVM_EXIT_IRET);
2886 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP:
2887 ret = kvm_emulate_ap_reset_hold(vcpu);
2889 case SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE: {
2890 struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(vcpu->kvm)->sev_info;
2892 switch (control->exit_info_1) {
2894 /* Set AP jump table address */
2895 sev->ap_jump_table = control->exit_info_2;
2898 /* Get AP jump table address */
2899 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, sev->ap_jump_table);
2902 pr_err("svm: vmgexit: unsupported AP jump table request - exit_info_1=%#llx\n",
2903 control->exit_info_1);
2904 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 2);
2905 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_INPUT);
2911 case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
2913 "vmgexit: unsupported event - exit_info_1=%#llx, exit_info_2=%#llx\n",
2914 control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2);
2918 ret = svm_invoke_exit_handler(vcpu, exit_code);
2924 int sev_es_string_io(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int size, unsigned int port, int in)
2930 if (svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2 > INT_MAX)
2933 count = svm->vmcb->control.exit_info_2;
2934 if (unlikely(check_mul_overflow(count, size, &bytes)))
2937 r = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, in, bytes);
2941 return kvm_sev_es_string_io(&svm->vcpu, size, port, svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa,
2945 static void sev_es_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
2947 struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
2949 svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ES_ENABLE;
2950 svm->vmcb->control.virt_ext |= LBR_CTL_ENABLE_MASK;
2953 * An SEV-ES guest requires a VMSA area that is a separate from the
2954 * VMCB page. Do not include the encryption mask on the VMSA physical
2955 * address since hardware will access it using the guest key.
2957 svm->vmcb->control.vmsa_pa = __pa(svm->sev_es.vmsa);
2959 /* Can't intercept CR register access, HV can't modify CR registers */
2960 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_READ);
2961 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_READ);
2962 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_READ);
2963 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR0_WRITE);
2964 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR4_WRITE);
2965 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_CR8_WRITE);
2967 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_SELECTIVE_CR0);
2969 /* Track EFER/CR register changes */
2970 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_EFER_WRITE);
2971 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR0_WRITE);
2972 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR4_WRITE);
2973 svm_set_intercept(svm, TRAP_CR8_WRITE);
2975 /* No support for enable_vmware_backdoor */
2976 clr_exception_intercept(svm, GP_VECTOR);
2978 /* Can't intercept XSETBV, HV can't modify XCR0 directly */
2979 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_XSETBV);
2981 /* Clear intercepts on selected MSRs */
2982 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_EFER, 1, 1);
2983 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, 1, 1);
2984 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, 1, 1);
2985 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, 1, 1);
2986 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, 1, 1);
2987 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_IA32_LASTINTTOIP, 1, 1);
2989 if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX) &&
2990 (guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) ||
2991 guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID))) {
2992 set_msr_interception(vcpu, svm->msrpm, MSR_TSC_AUX, 1, 1);
2993 if (guest_cpuid_has(&svm->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
2994 svm_clr_intercept(svm, INTERCEPT_RDTSCP);
2998 void sev_init_vmcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
3000 svm->vmcb->control.nested_ctl |= SVM_NESTED_CTL_SEV_ENABLE;
3001 clr_exception_intercept(svm, UD_VECTOR);
3003 if (sev_es_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm))
3004 sev_es_init_vmcb(svm);
3007 void sev_es_vcpu_reset(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
3010 * Set the GHCB MSR value as per the GHCB specification when emulating
3011 * vCPU RESET for an SEV-ES guest.
3013 set_ghcb_msr(svm, GHCB_MSR_SEV_INFO(GHCB_VERSION_MAX,
3018 void sev_es_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct sev_es_save_area *hostsa)
3021 * As an SEV-ES guest, hardware will restore the host state on VMEXIT,
3022 * of which one step is to perform a VMLOAD. KVM performs the
3023 * corresponding VMSAVE in svm_prepare_guest_switch for both
3024 * traditional and SEV-ES guests.
3027 /* XCR0 is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
3028 hostsa->xcr0 = xgetbv(XCR_XFEATURE_ENABLED_MASK);
3030 /* PKRU is restored on VMEXIT, save the current host value */
3031 hostsa->pkru = read_pkru();
3033 /* MSR_IA32_XSS is restored on VMEXIT, save the currnet host value */
3034 hostsa->xss = host_xss;
3037 void sev_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 vector)
3039 struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
3041 /* First SIPI: Use the values as initially set by the VMM */
3042 if (!svm->sev_es.received_first_sipi) {
3043 svm->sev_es.received_first_sipi = true;
3048 * Subsequent SIPI: Return from an AP Reset Hold VMGEXIT, where
3049 * the guest will set the CS and RIP. Set SW_EXIT_INFO_2 to a
3052 if (!svm->sev_es.ghcb)
3055 ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 1);