arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h

   1 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
   2
   3 #ifndef _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
   4 #define _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_
   5
   6 #include <linux/static_key.h>
   7 #include <linux/objtool.h>
   8
   9 #include <asm/alternative.h>
  10 #include <asm/cpufeatures.h>
  11 #include <asm/msr-index.h>
  12 #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
  13
  14 /*
  15  * Fill the CPU return stack buffer.
  16  *
  17  * Each entry in the RSB, if used for a speculative 'ret', contains an
  18  * infinite 'pause; lfence; jmp' loop to capture speculative execution.
  19  *
  20  * This is required in various cases for retpoline and IBRS-based
  21  * mitigations for the Spectre variant 2 vulnerability. Sometimes to
  22  * eliminate potentially bogus entries from the RSB, and sometimes
  23  * purely to ensure that it doesn't get empty, which on some CPUs would
  24  * allow predictions from other (unwanted!) sources to be used.
  25  *
  26  * We define a CPP macro such that it can be used from both .S files and
  27  * inline assembly. It's possible to do a .macro and then include that
  28  * from C via asm(".include <asm/nospec-branch.h>") but let's not go there.
  29  */
  30
  31 #define RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS         32      /* To forcibly overwrite all entries */
  32
  33 /*
  34  * Google experimented with loop-unrolling and this turned out to be
  35  * the optimal version - two calls, each with their own speculation
  36  * trap should their return address end up getting used, in a loop.
  37  */
  38 #define __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(reg, nr, sp)       \
  39         mov     $(nr/2), reg;                   \
  40 771:                                            \
  41         ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL;           \
  42         call    772f;                           \
  43 773:    /* speculation trap */                  \
  44         UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY;                      \
  45         pause;                                  \
  46         lfence;                                 \
  47         jmp     773b;                           \
  48 772:                                            \
  49         ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL;           \
  50         call    774f;                           \
  51 775:    /* speculation trap */                  \
  52         UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY;                      \
  53         pause;                                  \
  54         lfence;                                 \
  55         jmp     775b;                           \
  56 774:                                            \
  57         add     $(BITS_PER_LONG/8) * 2, sp;     \
  58         dec     reg;                            \
  59         jnz     771b;
  60
  61 #ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
  62
  63 /*
  64  * This should be used immediately before an indirect jump/call. It tells
  65  * objtool the subsequent indirect jump/call is vouched safe for retpoline
  66  * builds.
  67  */
  68 .macro ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
  69         .Lannotate_\@:
  70         .pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe
  71         _ASM_PTR .Lannotate_\@
  72         .popsection
  73 .endm
  74
  75 /*
  76  * JMP_NOSPEC and CALL_NOSPEC macros can be used instead of a simple
  77  * indirect jmp/call which may be susceptible to the Spectre variant 2
  78  * attack.
  79  */
  80 .macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
  81 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
  82         ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), \
  83                       __stringify(jmp __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
  84                       __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; jmp *%\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
  85 #else
  86         jmp     *%\reg
  87 #endif
  88 .endm
  89
  90 .macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
  91 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
  92         ALTERNATIVE_2 __stringify(ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *%\reg), \
  93                       __stringify(call __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE, \
  94                       __stringify(lfence; ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE; call *%\reg), X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD
  95 #else
  96         call    *%\reg
  97 #endif
  98 .endm
  99
 100  /*
 101   * A simpler FILL_RETURN_BUFFER macro. Don't make people use the CPP
 102   * monstrosity above, manually.
 103   */
 104 .macro FILL_RETURN_BUFFER reg:req nr:req ftr:req
 105 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 106         ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lskip_rsb_\@", "", \ftr
 107         __FILL_RETURN_BUFFER(\reg,\nr,%_ASM_SP)
 108 .Lskip_rsb_\@:
 109 #endif
 110 .endm
 111
 112 #else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 113
 114 #define ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
 115         "999:\n\t"                                              \
 116         ".pushsection .discard.retpoline_safe\n\t"              \
 117         _ASM_PTR " 999b\n\t"                                    \
 118         ".popsection\n\t"
 119
 120 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 121 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 122
 123 /*
 124  * Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
 125  * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
 126  */
 127 # define CALL_NOSPEC                                            \
 128         ALTERNATIVE_2(                                          \
 129         ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
 130         "call *%[thunk_target]\n",                              \
 131         "call __x86_indirect_thunk_%V[thunk_target]\n",         \
 132         X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,                                  \
 133         "lfence;\n"                                             \
 134         ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
 135         "call *%[thunk_target]\n",                              \
 136         X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
 137
 138 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "r" (addr)
 139
 140 #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
 141 /*
 142  * For i386 we use the original ret-equivalent retpoline, because
 143  * otherwise we'll run out of registers. We don't care about CET
 144  * here, anyway.
 145  */
 146 # define CALL_NOSPEC                                            \
 147         ALTERNATIVE_2(                                          \
 148         ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
 149         "call *%[thunk_target]\n",                              \
 150         "       jmp    904f;\n"                                 \
 151         "       .align 16\n"                                    \
 152         "901:   call   903f;\n"                                 \
 153         "902:   pause;\n"                                       \
 154         "       lfence;\n"                                      \
 155         "       jmp    902b;\n"                                 \
 156         "       .align 16\n"                                    \
 157         "903:   lea    4(%%esp), %%esp;\n"                      \
 158         "       pushl  %[thunk_target];\n"                      \
 159         "       ret;\n"                                         \
 160         "       .align 16\n"                                    \
 161         "904:   call   901b;\n",                                \
 162         X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE,                                  \
 163         "lfence;\n"                                             \
 164         ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE                                 \
 165         "call *%[thunk_target]\n",                              \
 166         X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD)
 167
 168 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
 169 #endif
 170 #else /* No retpoline for C / inline asm */
 171 # define CALL_NOSPEC "call *%[thunk_target]\n"
 172 # define THUNK_TARGET(addr) [thunk_target] "rm" (addr)
 173 #endif
 174
 175 /* The Spectre V2 mitigation variants */
 176 enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 177         SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
 178         SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
 179         SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD,
 180         SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
 181 };
 182
 183 /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
 184 enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation {
 185         SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE,
 186         SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT,
 187         SPECTRE_V2_USER_STRICT_PREFERRED,
 188         SPECTRE_V2_USER_PRCTL,
 189         SPECTRE_V2_USER_SECCOMP,
 190 };
 191
 192 /* The Speculative Store Bypass disable variants */
 193 enum ssb_mitigation {
 194         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_NONE,
 195         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_DISABLE,
 196         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_PRCTL,
 197         SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_SECCOMP,
 198 };
 199
 200 extern char __indirect_thunk_start[];
 201 extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
 202
 203 static __always_inline
 204 void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
 205 {
 206         asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "wrmsr", %c[feature])
 207                 : : "c" (msr),
 208                     "a" ((u32)val),
 209                     "d" ((u32)(val >> 32)),
 210                     [feature] "i" (feature)
 211                 : "memory");
 212 }
 213
 214 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 215 {
 216         u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
 217
 218         alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
 219 }
 220
 221 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 222 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 223
 224 /*
 225  * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction
 226  * before calling into firmware.
 227  *
 228  * (Implemented as CPP macros due to header hell.)
 229  */
 230 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start()                    \
 231 do {                                                                    \
 232         u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base | SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;                  \
 233                                                                         \
 234         preempt_disable();                                              \
 235         alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,                  \
 236                               X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);                 \
 237 } while (0)
 238
 239 #define firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end()                      \
 240 do {                                                                    \
 241         u64 val = x86_spec_ctrl_base;                                   \
 242                                                                         \
 243         alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, val,                  \
 244                               X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);                 \
 245         preempt_enable();                                               \
 246 } while (0)
 247
 248 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
 249 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 250 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 251
 252 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
 253 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
 254
 255 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
 256
 257 #include <asm/segment.h>
 258
 259 /**
 260  * mds_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
 261  *
 262  * This uses the otherwise unused and obsolete VERW instruction in
 263  * combination with microcode which triggers a CPU buffer flush when the
 264  * instruction is executed.
 265  */
 266 static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 267 {
 268         static const u16 ds = __KERNEL_DS;
 269
 270         /*
 271          * Has to be the memory-operand variant because only that
 272          * guarantees the CPU buffer flush functionality according to
 273          * documentation. The register-operand variant does not.
 274          * Works with any segment selector, but a valid writable
 275          * data segment is the fastest variant.
 276          *
 277          * "cc" clobber is required because VERW modifies ZF.
 278          */
 279         asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
 280 }
 281
 282 /**
 283  * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
 284  *
 285  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
 286  */
 287 static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 288 {
 289         if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
 290                 mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
 291 }
 292
 293 /**
 294  * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
 295  *
 296  * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
 297  */
 298 static inline void mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 299 {
 300         if (static_branch_likely(&mds_idle_clear))
 301                 mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
 302 }
 303
 304 #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
 305
 306 /*
 307  * Below is used in the eBPF JIT compiler and emits the byte sequence
 308  * for the following assembly:
 309  *
 310  * With retpolines configured:
 311  *
 312  *    callq do_rop
 313  *  spec_trap:
 314  *    pause
 315  *    lfence
 316  *    jmp spec_trap
 317  *  do_rop:
 318  *    mov %rcx,(%rsp) for x86_64
 319  *    mov %edx,(%esp) for x86_32
 320  *    retq
 321  *
 322  * Without retpolines configured:
 323  *
 324  *    jmp *%rcx for x86_64
 325  *    jmp *%edx for x86_32
 326  */
 327 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 328 # ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 329 #  define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT_SIZE    17
 330 #  define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT()                               \
 331 do {                                                            \
 332         EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7);    /* callq do_rop */             \
 333         /* spec_trap: */                                        \
 334         EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90);       /* pause */                    \
 335         EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */                   \
 336         EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9);       /* jmp spec_trap */            \
 337         /* do_rop: */                                           \
 338         EMIT4(0x48, 0x89, 0x0C, 0x24); /* mov %rcx,(%rsp) */    \
 339         EMIT1(0xC3);             /* retq */                     \
 340 } while (0)
 341 # else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
 342 #  define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT()                               \
 343 do {                                                            \
 344         EMIT1_off32(0xE8, 7);    /* call do_rop */              \
 345         /* spec_trap: */                                        \
 346         EMIT2(0xF3, 0x90);       /* pause */                    \
 347         EMIT3(0x0F, 0xAE, 0xE8); /* lfence */                   \
 348         EMIT2(0xEB, 0xF9);       /* jmp spec_trap */            \
 349         /* do_rop: */                                           \
 350         EMIT3(0x89, 0x14, 0x24); /* mov %edx,(%esp) */          \
 351         EMIT1(0xC3);             /* ret */                      \
 352 } while (0)
 353 # endif
 354 #else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
 355 # ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 356 #  define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT_SIZE    2
 357 #  define RETPOLINE_RCX_BPF_JIT()                               \
 358         EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE1);       /* jmp *%rcx */
 359 # else /* !CONFIG_X86_64 */
 360 #  define RETPOLINE_EDX_BPF_JIT()                               \
 361         EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2)        /* jmp *%edx */
 362 # endif
 363 #endif
 364
 365 #endif /* _ASM_X86_NOSPEC_BRANCH_H_ */